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Abstract 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
This thesis explores the forces driving a series of momentous transformations to 
Indonesia’s production and distribution systems since early colonial rule. The analysis of 
these forces is anchored in four conceptual themes: the basis of these systemic 
transformations, their politico-economic ordering as driven by a surplus-creation 
imperative, labour’s role in this imperative and its response to the ‘ordering’, and the 
mode of production as the historical setting within which the transformations occur.  This 
thesis illuminates an analytical gap in the literature by nominating labour as the key force 
in wealth-creation and recognising its active role in challenging ruling appropriation 
regimes and in the broader social struggles against exploitation and oppression.   
 
The thematic focus defines the boundaries for an exploration of successive colonial and 
post-colonial ruling regimes.  Early chapters examine how the Dutch penetrated the 
Indonesian politico-economy, entrenching their systems of production organisation and 
creating an exclusionary system of wealth appropriation. Appropriation systems are 
characterised by transitions in European political and economic systems, especially from 
mercantilism to industrial capitalism. The entrenchment of colonial power is considered 
in relation to the expansion of capitalist organisation in Indonesia.  The state’s 
stimulation of this expansion is associated with an undermining of the country’s 
reproductive base and a growing challenge to foreign rule.  The Japanese occupying 
force’ demolition of colonial productive and distributive linkages and encouragement of 
independence activism is connected with a post-war struggle for independence. Links are 
drawn between colonial rule and the tensions and organisational difficulties faced by 
Republican regimes leading up to the New Order’s re-establishment of a strict regulatory 
regime, and the development of an indigenous system of capitalist organisation. The 
surplus-generation and appropriation perspective informs the evolution of Indonesia’s 
productive and economic systems across colonial and post-colonial epochs and the 
challenges to the system of social and production regulation that heralded the 
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destabilisation of New Order rule and the rise of the contemporary era of political 
democracy. 
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Glossary  
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
abangan poor peasants or blue-collar workers   
ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia
(Indonesian Armed Forces) 
adat custom, used in the context of customary law 
aliran stream or current 
appanage division of land between villagers and rulers 
asli indigenous Indonesian people 
Atlantic Charter 1941 US/British declaration of common national 
principle as the basis for the Allies’ opposition to 
foreign intervention  
bakul merchant importers and suppliers of raw materials 
BANGUNAN series of 5 year development plans, from 
pembangunan (to build, develop)  
bapak father 
BAPPENAS National development Planning Board 
batik the drawing and dying of designs on textiles 
employing a waxing technique  
bekel or tengkulak in Javan tradition Chinese paddy brokers, working 
on a commission basis 
Benteng  'Fortress' program of indigenous business support 
introduced by the Republican government in 1950 
Berdikari Berdiri diatas kaki sendiri (to stand on your own 
feet) Sukarno credo promoting national self-
sufficiency 
Bimas Gotong-Royong agricultural credit or input-provision program to 
increase rural production (based on concepts of 
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community cooperation, self-help) 
Birorat Kapitalis (Kabir) derogatory popular reference to Indonesian 
bureaucrats’ entrepreneurial connections and graft 
boew, bahu measure of land, equals 1.75 acres 
bucho department head 
bupati local rulers 
bupati regent 
cukong Chinese word meaning ‘middleman’, applying to 
Chinese entrepreneurs 
Cultuurstelsel Dutch name for the Cultivation System  
daerah region 
desa village 
DEKON Sukarno’s Deklarasi Ekonomi, or Economic 
Declaration 
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Parliament) 
erfpacht land obtained on heritable lease from the 
government 
FBSI All Indonesia Workers’ Federation 
Gerindo Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia (Indonesian People’s 
Movement) 
Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Group); political 
party 
Gotong rojong mutual aid, collective assistance – especially 
during rice harvests, a key element of Sukarno’s 
‘konsepsi’. 
guilder basic unit of Nederlands Indies currency 
halus refined, cultured, sensitive 
HIP Hubungan Perburuhan Pancasila (Pancasila 
Industrial Relations) 
heerendienstein paid-labour for public works 
hongi raids to destroy competition in the growing of 
 v
export crops 
Industri Hilir  
 
‘downstream’  - manufactured goods:electronics, 
consumer goods, and footwear.   
Industri Hulu ‘upstream’ -  chemical steel, heavy industries, 
goods and some manufactured goods. 
IGGI Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia  
Jabotabek planning region covering Jakarta, Bogor, 
Tangerang, and Bekasi 
Kadin Kamar Dagang dan Industri (Chamber of Trade 
and Industry) 
kalang wealthy merchants 
kampong population centre of desa 
Konsepsi Sukarno’s credo (conception) for a new, post 
parliamentary democracy era, parliament  
Kopassus Special Forces Command 
Kostrad Army Strategic Reserve Command 
kretek clove cigarette 
ladang agricultural system whereby uncultivated land is 
cleared, burnt off, and crops planted 
LBH Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Office) 
NGO offering legal support 
liburan religious holiday 
lurah village chiefs, headmen 
Malari Malapetaka Januari (January disaster) the Jakarta 
riots of Juary 1974 
Masyumi The Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims 
Masyumi Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Muslim 
Consultative Council, Muslim Political party 
merdeka; kemerdekaan free, liberated; freedom, liberation 
MPR Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s 
Consultative Assembly) 
 vi
mufakat consensus and agreement 
Muhammadiyah  Muslim Organisation  
musjawarah  mutual consultation, discussion, deliberation 
Nasakom acronym from Nationalism, Religion, Communism
Nekolim  Neo-colonialism, Colonalism and Imperialism 
nogyo kumiai agricultural cooperation 
NU Nahdatul Ulama. Moslem Theologians’ party 
padi rice in the husk 
Pancasila Indonesian state ideology 
pangreh praja in the colonial era, ‘rulers of the realm’; in 
contemporary parlance, civil servants 
pasar market 
pemborong labour contractors 
pemuda youth, especially politically active youth  
pengusaha business person 
peranakan locally born Chinese or European who is 
acculturated to local society 
perintah halus persuasion used by officials to implement policy 
Pertamina Indonesian state-owned oil company 
Peta Japanese established Indonesia armed units in Java
Peta  Pembel Tanah Air (Defender of the Motherland) 
pikul, picul Dutch unit of weight, one pikul equals 61.9kg 
PKI Partai Kommunis Indonesia (Indonesian 
Communist Party) 
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist 
Party) 
pribumi indigenous Indonesian 
priyayi Aristocrats, member of the Javanese gentry, or 
higher officialdom  
PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist 
Party) 
 vii
Putera  nationalist organisation set up by the Japanese  
Repelita Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five Year 
Development Plan) 
romusha forced labour during Japanese occupation 
  
RTC November 1949 Roundtable Conference 
Agreement on Indonesian independence 
santri pious Moslems. 
Sarekat Islam Islamic Association 
sawah irrigated land cultivated with padi  
SOBSI Serikat Organisi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (All-
Indonesia Workers Organisation) the national 
association of trade unions   
tebasan system of forward-selling of cash crop prior to 
harvesting 
tegalan dry (not irrigated) field near the rice fields but used 
for vegetables and other secondary crops 
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National 
Army) 
Totok-Chinese Chinese-Indonesian people born in China and 
settled in Indonesia for a relatively short time 
transmigrasi transmigration 
VOC Vereenigde Oosindische Compagnie (Dutch East 
India Company) 
wayang puppet shadow-play  
zaibatsu large Japanese business conglomerate 
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Introduction 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
From the earliest days of western colonial occupation the production and distribution 
systems of the thirteen thousand islands of the archipelago now known as Indonesia 
have been comprehensively transformed by powerful international forces. The winds 
of economic change have forced shifts in national priorities from subsistence and 
tribute-good production to export commodity production.  In the modern era this has 
taken the form of pressures for Indonesia to massively restructure its economic system 
as a condition of receiving financial assistance. This thesis will investigate the sources 
of these momentous changes and refocus critical attention on the history of 
Indonesia’s political and economic evolution.   
 
The research was inspired by an ambition to determine the origin, character, and 
objectives residing in the imperatives impelling fundamental changes to what 
Indonesians produced and the systemic basis for the organisation of production.  The 
concern has also been with identifying the interests served by the changes, the source 
of their authority, and the political and economic impacts of these changes on 
Indonesia and Indonesians.  The thesis investigates these issues for the various epochs 
of economic organisation since colonial times, considering the factors that cohered 
them and tore them apart.  It is contended that an understanding of the sources and 
impacts of these changes on Indonesia’s productive and distributive systems can be 
used to illuminate contemporary political and economic developments in Indonesia.  
 
A core ambition for this thesis has been to fundamentally redress a major lacunae in 
established texts’ conceptualisation of the processes of economic order and capital 
accumulation within Indonesia. Thus, for example, Richard Robison's book, The Rise 
of Capital in Indonesia, although a seminal exposition of the character and origin of 
Indonesia’s ruling class neglects to systematically analyse the role of the Indonesian 
working class in this “rise”. It is intended that this thesis will address this gap by 
illuminating the mechanisms of accumulation from the perspective of the ruling class’ 
systemic application of succeeding forms of labour regulation. 
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International political economy  
The research task is addressed within an international political economy conceptual 
framework. This analytical approach is introduced in the context of the early colonial-
era relations between Holland - as the metropolitan ‘centre’ of colonial authority – 
and Indonesia as the ‘peripheral’ site of the colonial enterprise. Whilst the established 
literature tends to focus on this relationship as the prime determinant of colonial 
development, an international political economy approach broadens the analytical 
focus to encompass the wider European arena of imperial struggle and economic 
change.  The penetration of western productive and economic relations in the 
periphery is thus investigated within the gradually unfolding context of European 
productive and commercial development. This development is perceived as the 
‘powerhouse’ that drove western resource-seeking enterprise to the archipelago.  The 
successive transformations sparked by the western colonial project are thus seen as 
inextricably tied into European and, later, US and Japanese centres as part of an 
evolving world economic system based on capital accumulation.  
 
This perception of the processes of Indonesian political and economic change as 
residing within the context of an unfolding international capitalist system aligns my 
research with ‘world system’ analysis.  The origins of this analytical framework are to 
be found in the work of Immanuel Wallerstein.  Wallerstein defines a ‘world system’ 
‘quite simply as a unit with a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems’ 
(Wallerstein, 1980:5).  Its chief characteristic is that ‘production is constantly 
expanded as long as further production is profitable, and men constantly innovate new 
ways of producing things that will expand the profit margin’ (Wallerstein, 1980:15).  
The international political economy focus of this research thus locates Indonesia’s 
development within, and interacting with, an evolving capitalist world system.   
 
Analytical themes 
The research project is organised around an historical appreciation of Indonesian 
development and a critical re-interpretation of an established, though contested, 
historiography.  In undertaking this re-interpretation task I have focused on the 
historical analysis and sought to reconcile the diversity of understandings by 
restricting the analytical focus to four major themes. The first theme recounts the 
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systemic transformation of Indonesia’s production and distribution systems by 
successive ruling regimes.  The second focuses on the mode of production as the 
historical setting within which these transformations occur. The emphasis here is on 
the struggle between capital and labour1 and the relationship between this struggle 
and political and economic change. The third theme concentrates on the creation of a 
productive surplus as the basis of capital accumulation as well as the political 
economic focal point for change and struggle. The fourth theme represents labour as 
the principal agent in the production of a surplus, as a politically active element in the 
struggle for a share of that surplus, and as a key actor in the shaping of Indonesia’s 
political history. In sum, this thematic framework forms the analytical basis and 
anchoring point from which to investigate successive Indonesian systems of 
production organisation and wealth generation.  
 
Structural change 
Indonesia’s colonial and post-colonial economic history has incorporated a series of 
transformations of Indonesia’s production and distribution systems marked by 
‘watersheds’ of profound political and economic change.  The distinctive character of 
this history is brought out in this research by examining the way successive ruling 
regimes controlled the production system to determine what is produced and how it is 
produced.   
 
A contemporary example of the sorts of productive and economic transformations 
undergone by Indonesia is the enforced shift of employment from rural to Indonesian 
industrial manufacturing production. A prominent Indonesian economic analyst, 
Sjahir, favours the expansion of the continuing transformation that has seen 
Indonesia’s productive base consolidated through the bringing a much higher 
proportion of the labour force into the ‘modern sector’ to ‘reduce the proportion of 
workers dependent upon agriculture for their livelihood’ (Sjahir, 1993:13).  This 
underscores the state’s policy focus on the expansion of manufactured export-
commodity production. He argued that whilst ‘only 18 per cent of GDP is contributed 
                                                 
1 In the following discourse, ‘labour’ can, depending on the era and context, refer to the peasantry or the combined 
class of labour and the peasantry. ‘Labour’, however,  generally refers to paid workers. Labour/peasantry in 
combination or separately is conceptually associated with their role as producers of an extractable surplus over and 
above what is used for subsistence and reproduction.  
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by the agricultural sector, it still accounts for roughly half of the labour force. To 
reduce the proportion of workers dependent upon agriculture for their livelihood will 
require perseverance with the struggle to cut back the privileges and protection now 
enjoyed by particular firms and industries, so that others which are more able to 
expand into world markets – thus rapidly creating more job opportunities for 
Indonesia’s millions of low-skill workers – will be given a better chance to make their 
contribution to Indonesia’s development’ (Sjahir, 1993:13). 
 
Indonesia’s peasantry, thus, must move to that employment site offering the greatest 
world-export market opportunity.  The liberal economic logic that posits this 
imperative is that the restructuring, by advancing Indonesia’s productive efficiency, 
enables the economy to more effectively respond to international market pressures.  
Sjahir’s ‘ordering’ of the supply and regulation of labour would thus improve 
Indonesia’s world-market opportunities and thereby expand national employment and 
income. Sjahir’s policy prescription is a powerful example of the sorts of restructuring 
imperatives imposed on Indonesia by successive colonial and post-colonial ruling 
regimes. It thus illuminates the key theme of successive transformations to 
Indonesia’s productive and distributive base.   
 
Mode of production 
The ‘world systems’ analytical framework reflects a conceptual understanding of the 
‘mode’ of production to describe the modus operandi of the dominant system of 
economic organisation. I draw upon Wolf’s understanding of this conception to define 
and distinguish various phases of economic organisation in Indonesia (Wolf, 1982).  
Wolf argues that ‘[s]ocial life is shaped by the ways human beings engage nature 
through production. The idea of society centres upon the social alignment of groups; 
the idea of mode of production aims at identifying the forces that guide those 
alignments. To speak of a mode of production, therefore, draws attention to the ways 
in which human beings confront their world in order to modify it in their favour, and 
focuses on the dynamic consequences of that confrontation’ (Wolf, 1982:386). 
 
An example of the way this theme is used to focus the analysis of successive systems 
of production organisation can be observed in 18th and 19th Century imperial 
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confrontations between England and Holland. The Dutch empire represented the 
declining age of mercantile power, overtaken on the world-stage by the immense 
industrial and commercial power of the British Empire. This struggle is seen as 
reflected in the forms of economic organisation applied in the periphery, specifically 
– as shown in the following research, in the forms of labour regulation underpinning 
surplus production and appropriation.  The specific mode of production defining the 
political economy character of the centre is thus seen as a key element of centre-led 
transformations to Indonesia’s production system.  The research builds on the mode 
of production, world-system analysis to critically assess Indonesia’s colonial and 
post-colonial transformations.   
 
The creation of a productive surplus  
The ‘social alignments’ shaped by a ‘confrontation of the world in the modification of 
nature through production’ referred to by Wolf introduces the question of the basis for 
those alignments. From the perspective of this research Indonesia’s economic 
direction can be usefully regarded as being framed by an imperative of generating 
wealth from the country. This determined the character of the particular social 
alignments instituted to generate wealth. The concept of a ‘surplus’ is key to this 
analysis. Following Howard and King, an economic surplus is defined as the 
difference between ‘the net product of society and the consumption requirements of 
the producers, or in short, as the difference between social output and socially 
necessary input’ (Howard and King, 1985:64).  The thesis investigates how a 
productive surplus was generated through the exploitation of Indonesian resources, 
the political interaction between the actors involved in its creation, and the way this 
interaction impacted on, and defined the character of, succeeding production regimes.    
 
It is argued that the way in which the surplus product is appropriated and distributed 
largely determines the structure of social relations in every epoch. This location of 
surplus-creation within the production process parallels that of world systems theory 
where ‘(c)apital is accumulated by appropriating surplus produced by labor’ 
(Wallerstein, 1980:273).  The creation of a surplus is regarded as the essence of 
accumulation and growth.   
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This theme is evident in the Indonesian wealth-generating transformations instituted 
in the late Dutch colonial era.  The research demonstates how traditional social 
relations based on surplus generation and distribution through the tribute system were 
overtaken by a capitalist wage-based system of surplus production.  This approach, 
emphasising the production of surplus and the patterns of surplus extraction, mirrors 
that of Hoogvelt who locates the surplus-extraction process in a world systems 
context. Hoogvelt emphasises the ‘core-periphery hierarchy and the exploitation of 
the periphery by the core’ as involving ‘not only appropriation of the surplus value by 
an owner from a labourer, but also the appropriation of the whole economy by the 
'core' areas’ (Hoogvelt, 1997:60).   
 
This surplus-generation and appropriation perspective, it is contended, informs not 
only the evolution of Indonesia’s productive and economic systems across colonial 
and post-colonial epochs, but also the basis of the contemporary flux over control of 
Indonesia’s production apparatus between local and international interests, and the 
political struggle over surplus distribution.  
 
Role of labour  
Labour is the core element of each analytical theme.  Labour is seen as playing a key 
role in Indonesia’s economic and political transformation.  Labour is regarded as the 
pivotal element in surplus creation and, as well, a politically active element in the 
struggle for distribution of the shares of surplus.  The centrality of labour in this 
analytical framework is further manifest in the way in which the surplus product is 
appropriated and distributed and thereby largely determining the structure of social 
relations in every epoch (Howard and King, 1985:64).  All modes of production 
incorporate a division of labour or specialisation of activities, and can be 
characterised by the way which 'surplus  ...  is pumped out of the direct producers (i.e. 
labour)' (Howard and King, 1985:6).  This is based on the perception that the 
‘defining characteristic of a social system [is] the existence within it of a division of 
labor, such that the various sectors or areas within are dependent upon economic 
exchange with others for the smooth and continuous provisioning of the needs of the 
area’ (Wallerstein, 1980:5). 
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This priority to ‘order’ labour as the basis of national wealth-creation introduces the 
concept of the political economy of class and the process of class regulation of surplus 
production.   Shifts in the mode of production are seen as crucial in the understanding 
of processes of change in production systems, but the relation between the ‘actors’ in 
the wealth generating process in their response to the ‘top down’ imposition of 
production agendas is also key to this understanding.  This elaboration of Wolf’s 
analysis is informed by the argument that the ‘ordering’ of society for economic ends 
incorporates a political and social, as well as a technical engagement between the 
economic actors.  In this scenario, the production process – and thus the process of 
capital accumulation – is ordered by a ruling class, with the prime consideration in 
this ‘ordering’ or ‘regulation’ the organisation of labour as a collective entity. This is 
seen as determining the conditions for a collective struggle for shares from, and 
control over, the surplus-generating process (Wolf, 1982:386).  My research considers 
the implications of this struggle for political challenges or ‘confrontations’ with the 
ruling regime, and the ‘dynamic consequences’ of that struggle in terms of 
transformations in the production system and the process of wealth distribution.  
 
By bringing labour and the peasantry to the forefront of Indonesian economic 
development, this research is premised on the need to redress a crucial analytical 
deficiency in the literature. Whilst processes of capital accumulation in Indonesia 
have been well researched, labour’s role in this accumulation generally receives scant 
attention. Whilst labour’s role has received reasonable attention in the accounts of the 
way wealth was extracted from the peasantry under colonial rule, this has not 
translated into an appreciation of the economic impact of this extraction on the 
peasantry as a class, nor has it generated contemporary comparisons with the way in 
which labour as a class is regulated to create a surplus.  A prime example of these 
lacunae is seen in Robison’s research on the rise of capital in Indonesia.  Robison 
describes the Dutch as superimposing ‘themselves upon an existing system of peasant 
production in which the surplus was extracted by means of political coercion’ 
(Robison, 1986:5). Robison’s focus on the rise of capital-interests provides a 
tantalising glimpse of the importance of class relations but neglects an appreciation of 
the process of collective labour regulation for surplus production as a core element 
and function of these relations.   
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This gap in the analysis of labour’s pivotal role in Indonesian political economic 
history is reflected in other important ways.  It excludes an appreciation of the 
political dimension, both in terms of labour’s political struggle and of the political 
ordering of labour to comply with ruling regimes’ production objectives.  Sjahir 
promotes the transformation of the peasantry into an industrial labour force. As with 
all the ‘grand plans’ to restructure Indonesia’s productive base, the prime 
consideration is the enforced supply of a strictly regulated labour force.  However, 
Sjahir makes no reference to the social and political implications of this 
transformation, either in terms of the political force required to carry out the shift or in 
terms of possible political responses to this massive reorientation of Indonesian 
working-lives.   A further core concern of this research was thus to determine the 
political impact of transformations to Indonesia’s productive and distributive systems 
by successive ruling regimes.    
 
Phases of political and economic development 
The above themes provide the conceptual backdrop for an overview of the unfolding 
phases of Indonesian political and economic organisation undertaken in this research.  
Early chapters outline the relationship between the dominant mode of production 
within which Dutch colonial authorities defined their system of surplus-production 
organisation and the consequent fundamental transformations in Indonesian 
production and distribution systems. This established the basis for the long-term 
organisation of the colony as a productive enterprise, and of labour and the peasantry 
as pivotal elements in this process. These chapters outline the forces determining the 
Dutch presence in Indonesia, the metropolitan political and economic agenda for 
Indonesia, and the colonial consolidation of political rule and economic dominance.   
 
Chapter 1 establishes the European historical context for this research. It describes the 
Dutch industrial and commercial environment that led to the institution of a long-
distant trading concern, the Dutch East India Company, which became the ‘surrogate 
state’ carrying out Dutch state-corporate objectives in Indonesia.  The essence of this 
era is captured in my answer to the question of how a small group of Dutch merchant-
traders and military could overthrow local and international competition to dominate 
the trade and supply of Indonesian export commodities.  The answer is seen as 
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residing in the singular character of Dutch mercantilist wealth-extraction as applied in 
Indonesia, the nature of indigenous surplus-generation and distribution systems – 
described as the existing ‘social, political and economic infrastructure’, and the 
contradictions between centre-ambitions and the logistics of territorial control. The 
analysis of the Dutch construction of a substantial colonial outpost from these small 
beginnings constitutes a crucial element in the understanding of later, differing forms 
of state-corporate intervention in Indonesia.  
 
Chapter 2 builds on these defining features of Dutch corporate and state intervention 
to describe how a remote colonial outpost could develop into a powerful colonial state 
apparatus able to control much of the archipelago.  The focus is on the transition from 
private corporate intervention to state territorial sovereignty and the role of centre 
economic and strategic forces in defining this intervention. An appreciation of the 
crucial role of the state in creating the conditions for wealth creation heralds the 
introduction of capitalist production relations and private corporate accumulation.   
The analysis considers the impact of the European forces seen as fundamental 
determinants in this transitional process, in particular the Napoleonic Wars.  The 
recurring Indonesian struggles for independence culminating in the 1825 to 1830 
Javan war, it is contended, triggered the institution of the Cultivation System of 
social, political and economic regulation.  The transformation in production 
organisation instituted by the Cultivation System of production regulation is seen as a 
crucial determinant in the transition to a political economy dominated by private 
capital accumulation. 
 
Chapter 3 elaborates these defining moments of state regimentation of Indonesia’s 
production apparatus within the late 19th Century context of a vast penetration of 
private corporate enterprise into Indonesia’s primary-produce export sector.  
Connections are drawn between this introduction of a laissez-faire system of market 
regulation and the state facilitation and institution of controlling mechanisms such as 
employment contract and land-use laws.  This is represented as a powerful new 
dynamic in the process of producer regulation. The Chapter considers the implication 
of this dynamic for the introduction of a vastly consolidated expanded financial and 
commercial sector. 
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The processes of factor commodification described in Chapter 3 are associated with 
an erosion of Indonesian social systems’ ability to assure resource and workforce 
reproduction. The analysis of the Corporate Plantation era thus requires an 
investigation of some of the political implications of threats to the security of surplus 
creation and the threats to the survival of the colonial economic and social order 
posed by unregulated private corporate appropriation from Indonesia.   
 
This leads into the review in Chapter 4 of the subsequent phase of colonial 
organisation encapsulated in the ‘Ethical Era’. The political and economic 
complexities of this era are examined in relation to major shifts in the metropolitan 
state’s agenda for the colony and Indonesians’ political responses to the expanded 
state intervention.  A growing political and industrial challenge to Dutch political 
sovereignty and foreign economic control brings to the fore the role of labour in a 
struggle for shares of the surplus. The analytical focus concentrates on the connection 
between the mass political and industrial struggle and the fight for political 
independence.  A distinction is drawn between the mainstream literature perceiving 
the political struggle as essentially driven by popular opposition to foreign political 
control, and this thesis’ alternative perspective of the independence struggle as 
primarily a class struggle driven by economic considerations.  
 
This political struggle is associated with a growing Japanese political and corporate 
influence within Indonesia.  As Indonesia faced the prospect of being drawn into a 
world war, the research emphasis on the nature of the nationalist struggle draws the 
analytical focus back to the ‘world-system’ arena. Indonesia’s internal political and 
economic conditions are considered in the context of international movements for 
liberation from colonial control and the international political and economic struggles 
for international corporate control over Indonesia’s resources and for a political and 
economic strategic presence in the region.   
 
These internal and external political and economic struggles culminate with a rupture 
in the western regime of colonial appropriation riven by the Japanese wartime 
occupation of Indonesia. Chapter 5 outlines the role of the Japanese occupation in 
redirecting Indonesia’s productive resources to produce war-needs, and how this 
impacted on national production and distribution linkages and influenced the 
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character of post-war economic systems. The significance of the Japanese occupation 
is also considered in terms of the role the Japanese presence played in defining post-
war political struggles for national independence and challenging western economic 
influence.   
 
The post-World War Two struggle between Republican and Allied re-colonisation 
forces over political and economic control of Indonesia is examined in the light of a 
mass political and military mobilisation for which the Japanese occupation acted as a 
catalyst, late-colonial shifts in the apparatus of state-rule, and the struggle between 
western interests for control of Indonesia’s export production system. Pressures for 
political independence are associated with a struggle for economic independence and 
for the dismantling of colonial systems of industrial regulation and wealth 
appropriation.  Chapter 6 develops an analysis of the linkages between colonial 
politico-economic relations and republican economic ambitions. These pressures on 
the Indonesian production and distribution system are considered within a broad 
context of international pressure to institute a new corporate agenda for Indonesia in a 
post-war ‘jockeying’ for economic and strategic power.  
 
The emphasis in this Chapter concerns the character of those early post-colonial 
ruling political forces and uncovers why they were in a position to dominate the 
Republican agenda. The major consideration is the sources of, and interests served by, 
the implementation of a policy-agenda designed to shift the economy from the 
colonial primary-commodity based production system to an urban-based industrial 
developmentalist trajectory. This introduces the element of political and class-interest 
in the formation of Republican state policy.  Republican reformism is posed against a 
developing mass political pressure for economic sovereignty and control over the 
production and distribution of the national surplus, and the rising power of the 
military as a political and corporate, as well as military, force.   
 
The inability of succeeding parliamentary regimes to address these economic and 
political challenges led to the overthrow of parliamentary democracy and the 
institution of a system of autocratic presidential rule.  This research considers why 
this brief trial of western democratic institutional systems was doomed to failure, 
drawing on the themes of the political organisation of labour, surplus-extraction and 
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structural transformation to illuminate the forces at work. From this understanding the 
experiment of ‘democratisation’ can be seen to illuminate much of the contemporary 
political struggle and economic conflict within Indonesia. This forms the background 
to an understanding of the subsequent violent repression at the hands of the military 
and also to the political and economic conflicts that plagued the immediate post-war 
ruling regimes. The seizure of control of Indonesia’s production apparatus and 
workforce by a military-corporate clique will be considered in this context.   
Chapter 7 describes Sukarno’s ascendency as all-powerful ‘Supreme Ruler’. This 
ascendency is informed by successive parliamentary democratic Republican regimes’ 
inability to address political conflict and the divisive issues facing the young nation. It 
is also informed by an analysis of the undercurrent of international corporate and 
strategic opposition to the rise of the extremely nationalist and independent Sukarno 
regime. His regime’s intention to resolve these political and economic tensions and 
struggles is seen in its institution of a ruling coalition that incorporated the chief 
protagonists in the struggle for economic and political control. Strong emphasis is 
given to Sukarno’s role in the development of a national political and economic 
ideology that established the basis for national unity and common goals. The 
institution of mechanisms and systems for the promotion and entrenchment of these 
credos as a fundamental element of nationalist rule heralds their enforcement as an 
institutional component of the developmentalist credo imposed by the New Order 
regime.   
 
The collapse of Indonesia’s economic base in the Sukarno era is described in terms of 
the regime’s inability to institute structures and systems to replace the colonial 
regimes of extraction. The key challenges facing the Sukarno regime are seen as 
international corporate and strategic objectives, military ambition, the popular 
pressure for economic independence and self-sufficiency, and indigenous corporate 
demands for expanded economic opportunity. In my analysis, this resolves to the 
question of the class-orientation of the protagonists and the competing ambitions for 
the control over surplus production and distribution. This class undercurrent forms the 
basis for an understanding of the consequent rupture of the Sukarno system and the 
brutal ascendency to power of the New Order regime.    
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Chapter 8 locates the New Order regime’s ascendency in this context of class 
struggle. The regime’s systematic destruction of all institutional structures and the 
massacre of all political and industrial opposition is described in these terms. The 
establishment of a military-authoritarian regime is considered in terms of its role in 
creating an autocratic state based on a developmentalist ethos, and defining the 
regulatory processes underpinning surplus production and appropriation under the 
New Order. This encompasses developing an understanding of the way the regime 
addressed tensions between local and international capital and the formation of a 
rentier-capitalist state system. This system is associated with a dependency-relation 
between Indonesia, world-markets and western strategic interests.  
 
This analysis of the final phase of the chronological reconsideration of Indonesia’s 
engagement with the international political economy thus covers the entrenchment of 
a patrimonialist regime and the incorporation of this regime within the international 
system of production and distribution relations. This relates the economic and 
political links between the Indonesian ruling elite and international capital in terms of 
systems of wealth generation, especially in the context of rentier income, and 
corporate patronage systems and relations.  The primary focus is on the class interests 
served by the state institutional and structural systems imposed to enforce social 
discipline and production control.  
 
This historical perspective on Indonesia’s political economic development seeks to 
illuminate the current dilemmas facing the nation. It shows that the changes and 
challenges to the system of social and production regulation arising from international 
corporate demands were the primary determinant of the destabilisation of New Order 
rule.  In a postscript to the New Order, the thesis assesses the systemic basis for its 
collapse. It draws upon the conceptual concerns of this study to understand the 
processes of accumulation under the Soeharto patrimonial regime, and the way this 
ordering precipitated the undermining and political collapse of that regime heralding 
an era of political democracy.  
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A note on sources 
I have drawn principally upon the established body of literature, taking issue with it, 
and building on this material to recast the analysis of Indonesian history within the 
dominant themes and conceptual approach upon which this study is formed.  Dutch 
and other western accounts and records provide the major sources for the 
investigation of the colonial period. Indonesian critical perspectives of the historical 
processes at work are scarce having been effectively prohibited by the exclusionary 
system of colonial control. Some of these gaps have been redressed by critics, such as 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer for example with his epic trilogy describing Indonesians’ 
struggles for political independence (Toer, 1984).  As with other critical perspectives 
of ruling regimes, Toer’s manuscripts were destroyed by the New Order regime as 
well as the Dutch.  Toer and those other Indonesian authors and playwrights who have 
critically analysed the way in which ruling regimes have exploited the Indonesian 
people have been forced to obscure the critical perspectives of their work within 
fictional accounts. This literature makes profoundly important historical and 
analytical points but, unfortunately, does not provide an appropriately scholarly 
foundation for substantiating historical evidence in the context of doctoral research.  
 
The extensive use of European histories of Indonesia has led to the occasional need to 
‘force’ a resolution over differing understandings of the impacts of regimes of 
regulation on the economy and the people. Whilst I have, wherever possible, cross-
checked the evidence to affirm particular developments, the emphasis on secondary 
sources begs further research to affirm its validity, especially for those early eras 
where the available research is severely contested. I have sought, however, to balance 
the inadequacies of primary evidence against the analytical contribution of this thesis, 
relating the evidence to the conceptual perspective underpinning this work. 
 
Contemporary secessionist struggles in Indonesia have forced a widespread 
appreciation that any understanding of Indonesia as a unified nation with uncontested 
state boundaries is highly contested. This serves to introduce a major proviso relating 
to the use of the term “Indonesia” in this thesis. Clearly any perspective representing 
‘Indonesia’ as an undifferentiated monolith misconceives the cultural and political 
diversity within the archipelago. There were also obvious  significant regional 
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variations created in the process of the formation and expansion of the Netherlands 
Indies State.  Whilst it is inevitable that any broad analysis of the rich tapestry of 
Indonesian history can lay itself open to the charge that the exposition does not give 
adequate attention to these variations and diversities, the reader needs to bear in mind 
that the analytical emphasis on wealth-generation predicates the focus on those 
regions that constituted the fundamental sources of resources and factors of 
production for any particular epoch.  
 
Thus much of this history focuses on Java as the centre of national development, as 
the territorial basis of early colonial penetration, and as the Indonesian heartland of 
the transformations that flowed throughout the archipelago.  However, this ‘Java 
centric’ emphasis has inevitably led to gaps in the vast mosaic of historical 
consideration necessary to provide a complete picture of Indonesia’s political 
economic development.  These gaps are acknowledged, but it is argued that as this 
thesis’ primary concern is to investigate production and labour regulation for surplus 
production, and as Java reflects the core elements of these processes, the research 
must inevitably focus on Java as the primary centre of productive and distributive 
transformations within Indonesia.  
 
It is the objective of this thesis to glean essential ideas and information from the 
available sources in order to construct an alternative perspective on Indonesia’s 
economic development and inform the analysis of processes of change.  Thus whilst 
this research relies on the literature describing each period under review, the main 
criteria for inclusion of particular studies is the extent to which they provide an 
insightful contribution to the contested understanding of those forces and processes 
vital for the organisation of capital accumulation and class struggle in each era. The 
reflection of the available evidence through the prism of my conceptual and 
methodological framework in refining the source-material thus produces a significant 
reinterpretation of Indonesia’s political economy.   
 
 
 16
Chapter 1  
The formation of the Dutch East Indies 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
‘Monopoly of one kind or another, indeed, seems to be the sole engine of the 
mercantile system’ Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, (volume 2, 1933:126) 
 
At the dawn of the 17th Century Holland’s dominant business grouping of traders, 
manufacturers, merchants and bankers created a state-supported trading company 
establishing Holland as a world economic power.  This company achieved its 
ambition to monopolise the supply of East Indies spices for the hugely profitable, but 
high-risk, European trade.  The company’s rapid defeat of all competition in the 
Indies heralded the early 17th Century establishment of an international productive, 
commercial, and trading empire. In the periphery, the Dutch East Indies Company 
control of the supply of Indonesian export-commodities prefaced a three and a half 
Century system of colonial extraction.  The following analysis illuminates the 
mechanisms and political economic forces driving the development of this joint stock 
trading company, and the way in which it imposed monopoly control over the trade in 
Indonesian commodities.  
 
The appreciation of the rise of the Dutch as an international economic and political 
force foreshadows the consequent incorporation of the Indonesian productive 
apparatus within the Dutch system of economic organisation. In introducing the 
nature of Indonesia’s incorporation into the European orbit, I primarily want to focus 
on the way in which the company imposed its trading, production and appropriation 
ambitions on the Indonesian people. The chapter sets out to examine this interaction 
as a developing process, one organized initially in terms of the company expanding 
from a trading concern monopolising trade in Indonesia’s international market 
commodities, to a surrogate colonial state that controlled the production of supply for 
that trade. In doing so, the chapter will also reflect back upon the entrenchment of a 
Dutch system of appropriation from Indonesia in terms of its role in creating the 
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wealth underpinning the 17th Century Dutch metropolitan ‘Golden Age’ (Gouden 
Eeuw). 
 
This investigation and analysis of the processes of Dutch colonial intervention for 
wealth-appropriation is organized in three sections.  These cover the forces driving 
the corporate expansion from the European arena, indigenous political and economic 
organisation, and the processes of Dutch East India company entrenchment in 
Indonesia.  
 
The three sections encompass the processes of financial, industrial and state power 
that enabled the metropolis to institute long-distance trading company, the existing 
political and economic infrastructure that provided the elements of surplus generation 
and internal political rupture facilitating a corporate and military ‘beachhead’ in the 
country, and the transformation of the productive and trading base to a company-
controlled monopoly enterprise. A primary consideration in examining the institution 
of these corporate extractive arrangements will be unravelling the relationship 
between the corporation and the productive apparatus. In considering how the Dutch 
corporate imperative ensured the appropriation of wealth from the country, it is also 
essential that the dynamic for this extraction as the maintenance of the existing social 
and economic ‘order’ of tributory relations be taken into account.  In considering the 
significance of the foreign business presence, the analysis will reflect on its status as 
an agency of facilitation, rather than exploitation, of the existing system of economic 
organisation. This reflection introduces what I contend was a common structural 
feature that underpinned control over wealth production and surplus appropriation 
throughout the colonial and post-colonial eras.  This is the pivotal place of monopoly 
– generally foreign – agencies institutionalised in a variety of ways in order to 
exercise control over wealth production and surplus appropriation being instituted by 
insinuating social regulation and production control via existing institutional systems.  
It is this emphasis that locates the research within a vastly different conceptual 
framework to most established perspectives on Indonesian history. The key point of 
difference is with the perspective that the Dutch achieved their goals by political 
conquest and subjugation.  
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A further essential element of the general theme of processes of wealth extraction 
during the early colonial period that this chapter will explore focuses on the 
transformation of Indonesia’s productive base into what is conceptualised as a 
‘factory’ manufacturing commodities for the Dutch metropolitan state and its agent, 
the Dutch East Indies Company.  This introduces a further distinctive conception of 
Indonesian history contrasting with the established readings that represent Holland as 
a ‘free and fair’ trading nation. The following exposition draws out the ways in which 
the Indonesian people were excluded from any participation in the ‘free and fair’ 
exchange of their commodities. The argument that Indonesia was a ‘factory’ for the 
Dutch company illuminates this contradiction in established conceptions of 
Indonesian history. 
 
The drive from the centre  
The Dutch East India Company represented the culmination of years of commercial 
and industrial development. This base supported the development of powerful 
international shipping companies that were combined to form the conglomerate of the 
Dutch East India Company. An investigation of the metropolitan system of economic 
organisation development and the development of this company is crucial for an 
understanding of the sources of Dutch commercial strength. This section focuses on 
how this state and military-supported international trading company was created and 
how it established a system of long-distance trade and production organisation to 
extract wealth from Indonesia.   
 
The following evidence suggests that Holland’s economic power was built on a highly 
efficient agricultural-industrial base, supported by an extensive financial banking and 
investment system, and a decentralised system of political and economic support. 
These factors determined that Holland would become the greatest hegemonic power 
of the capitalist world-economy between 1625 and 1675 (Wallerstein, 1982: 95).  The 
fundamental determinant of this hegemony was perceived to be Holland’s ability to 
produce goods more efficiently than other core-states, making it ‘the primary 
beneficiary of a maximally free world-market’ (Wallerstein, 1982:95).  
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The origins of Dutch economic strength 
It has been argued that 17th Century Dutch economic success resulted from the 
psychological strength, motivations and abilities of  ‘stubborn hard work, 
comparatively rational business organisation, and Calvinist work ethic’ (Peacock, 
1973: 39).  This research suggests, however, that Dutch economic power was more a 
function of its strategic trading position in Europe, and the material and political 
conditions defining the survival of a small country holding limited land-resources and 
under threat from territorial takeover.  
 
Seafaring and related trades such as merchants, skippers, masters, pilots, sailors, and 
shipwrights supported Holland’s 16th Century economy.  The Dutch had developed 
sailing and navigational skills in ‘farming’ fish from the North Sea and the Atlantic 
Ocean, and the fishing industry was supported by value-adding trades (curing, 
industrial and consumer products), and capital-goods production (nets, ropes, sails, 
and woodworking).  Holland made advances in agricultural production to produce the 
industrial crops needed for the fishing industries (flax, hemp, dyes) as well as food 
(Wallerstein, 1982: 98). Holland’s overall commercial advantage then grew with the 
development of textile, dyestuffs, sugar refining and shipbuilding industries.  
Wallerstein contends that ‘no other country showed such a coherent, cohesive, and 
integrated agro-industrial production (industrial capitalist) complex’ (Wallerstein, 
1982: 100). This enabled the ‘United Provinces (as Holland was then known) to 
flower in about 1600 into the principal … production centre of the European world 
economy’ (Wallerstein, 1982:101). 
 
This industrial efficiency and maritime skill underpinned Holland’s 17th Century 
domination of trade in the North Sea and the Baltic, North America, and much of 
Asia. Daniel Defoe said that this supported Holland’s rise as an international trading 
power. For Defoe, the Dutch were ‘the Carryers of the World the middle person in 
trade, the factors and brokers of Europe: they buy to sell again, take in to send out: 
and the greatest part of their vast commerce consists in being supplyd from all parts of 
the world that they may supply all the world again’ (Wilson, 1966:4).  Holland’s 
merchant shipping took the trade from all their European competitors and succeeded 
Portugal as the major carrier.   
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Military strength and brute power is often taken as the single most important reason 
for the Dutch ability to defeat its trade-opposition.  Thus in the long-distance trading 
context– to be described – Van Leur sees the Dutch’ successful defeat of trade 
opposition to have resulted from ‘the sturdier rigging and greater speed of the ships, 
the more powerful cannon-royal, the greater mobility of armed troops’ (May, 1968: 
5). Dutch companies’ trade dominance was certainly a function of the companies’ 
strategic employment of large numbers of lighter, better built, more manoeuvrable 
ships that were equipped with superior long-range cannon and backed by a substantial 
navy. By 1670 Dutch companies owned three times the tonnage of English ships, and 
greater than that of England, France, Portugal, Spain and the Germanies combined 
(Wallerstein, 1982: 102). Haley contends that Dutch companies held about 568,000 
tons of shipping and employed 80,000 sailors (Haley, 1972: 29). 
 
Whilst the strength of the trading-power determined Dutch success, this strength 
could only have occurred as the result of the capital formation that resulted from the 
industrial organisation and technical innovations that underpinned lower production 
costs.  The material conditions defining Holland’s survival lay in an ability to ‘farm’ 
the sea, providing fish supplies to feed the population and generate export earnings.  
The technical and industrial innovations supporting production efficiencies and 
shipping requirements were themselves the result of the years of maritime experience 
in this seafaring industry, with ship builders working closely with seafarers to 
improve ship-capabilities.  The financial and commercial backgrounds of the 
merchants, and their seafaring experience, determined ship-owners’ ability to reduce 
costs of production and of running their vessels in the carrying-trade.  In about 1590 a 
Dutch company developed the fluyts (‘fluteships’) incorporating major design 
advances, and innovative, labour-saving construction techniques effecting significant 
reductions in production costs. These fluyts became the dominant design for the long-
distance trade, and cost less than two-thirds of an equivalent English vessel to 
construct (Haley, 1972: 19).  
 
The Dutch had developed large scale and standardised production techniques, 
incorporating labour-saving equipment such as cranes for handling heavy timber, and 
wind-driven sawmills (Haley, 1972: 20). The ship design represented great advances, 
chiefly that of the ability to contain substantially greater cargoes than other ships of 
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the time, and required about a third of the crew required on English vessels (Haley, 
1972: 22). With lower wage bills, and reduced supplies of provisions compared to 
their competitors in other countries, fluyts owners could offer freight rates a third to a 
half lower than their major competitors (Haley, 1972: 22). By 1644 the Dutch had in 
operation over 1000 vessels ‘fit for use as warships’, and a further 1,000 topsail 
merchant ships, as well as 6,000 herring busses (keeled barges) used on the inland 
waterways (Boxer, 1965: 59). 
 
The development of a Dutch manufacturing industry with Holland as the major 
production centre of Europe originated in the material conditions under which the 
Dutch economy survived. Holding few natural resources, the Dutch depended on fish-
farming to generate export income. With Holland being located at a strategic point for 
European trade, the Dutch sea-faring experience led to the growth of the carrying 
trade, and used this experience for shipbuilding, and associated trades and industries. 
Thus Holland’s rapidly expanded manufacturing capacity developed from a state-
supported, corporate concentration on surplus-creation through fishing and associated 
industries.  Dutch economic hegemony was thus a product of its productive and 
commercial strength, and its institutional and technical expertise as a carrying agency.  
This established the conditions for Dutch traders’ ability to dominate international 
trade.  
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Institutional support for trade hegemony 
The development of production efficiencies created surpluses for Dutch trading and 
industrial companies. The possibilities for re-investing this wealth for further 
accumulation depended on a further economic fundamental: strong financial 
organisation. Dutch mercantile strength was underpinned by a substantial system of 
financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies and trading entrepôt.   
 
Financial institutions had been employed in the European trade-arena from the early 
Italian mercantile era when goldsmiths and merchants created banks and used their 
profits to make loans of money at interest to princes or merchants. The facility of the 
clearing house developed, whereby bills of indebtedness, instead of being paid 
directly, could be 'cleared' by other bills from other sources, so ‘saving the risks of 
transporting gold, and greatly facilitating business between different countries’ 
(Flenley and Weech, 1936:448).  
 
A further fundamental factor defining the strength of Dutch commercial relations was 
the federalist character of national political organisation. The character of this 
decentralised federal system was influential in determining the form of national 
corporate ownership and decision-making, and underpinning strong corporate 
expansion.  Towards the end of the 16th Century the Dutch republic consisted of a 
federation of provinces (the ‘United Provinces of Holland’) with political control 
resting in the hands of a group of merchant traders, finance capitalists and 
industrialists.  Although each of the seven provinces was politically autonomous, each 
provided regional elite’ representatives to the States-General as the Federation’s 
parliamentary body, (Haley, 1972:67). The States-General was a ‘meeting of allies 
rather than a parliamentary assembly’ (Haley, 1972: 67). This flexible and 
cooperative organisation enabled the United Provinces to more effectively mobilise 
resources and gain investor confidence for overseas expansion investment than a 
centralised state. ‘(I)n early modern Europe, republics inspired more confidence 
among businessmen and investors than absolute monarchies, while centralised 
republics, such as those of Italy, were less well equipped to mobilise resources than a 
federal republic.’  (Israel, 1989:188). 
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The federalist character of political and economic organisation played a crucial role in 
subsequent economic developments that supported mercantilist accumulation, 
especially through the sharing of the risks and opportunities of investment and the 
development of monopoly economic control. These two factors apply to all contexts 
of economic development of the Dutch corporate-state in the 17th and 18th Century. 
However, the key factor underpinning the joint stock company’s commercial success 
was the company-financing system, especially through the sharing of corporate costs, 
profits and losses.  The practice of broad, collective ownership of productive 
enterprise appears to have commenced with a mid 16th Century Holland, Zeeland, 
and Friesland ship ownership divided into numerous shares. This spread the risk of 
the investment across a variety of United Provinces’ companies (Israel, 1989: 22). 
 
The strength of the commercial institutions backing the 17th Century Dutch entrepôt 
was a further major factor supporting long-distance trade. Thus the entrepôt added to 
its role as a central store of commodities for world trade, by providing the financial 
and insurance services that were the basis of sound international finance and 
investment. In summary the entrepôt was ‘the hub of its system of commercial finance 
and exchange ...  a comprehensive set of mechanisms of exchange, remittance, 
commodity classification, insurance and credit’ (Israel, 1989:73). In particular the 
Amsterdam stock exchange developed from a conventional European type of 
commodity exchange into ‘a world exchange which itself became an instrument of 
trade control’ (Israel, 1989: 75). Brokers determined commodity quality and classified 
goods, dealt in present and future stocks, handled shares, organised shipping and 
storage space, arranged insurance and help arrange financial backing for trade. The 
borrowing for trade was at lower rates than all competitors, and was consolidated by 
the ‘unrivalled array of mechanisms for settling bills and balances, financing trade, 
and investing in commodities expected or already stockpiled’ (Israel, 1989: 
78).‘Buying ahead and on advantageous terms was ‘to be one of the most 
characteristic features of the Dutch trading system’ (Israel, 1989:79). These 
commercial arrangements and institutions supported the easier movement of wealth, 
specie and credit necessary to gain international commercial support for the Dutch 
trading system. This enabled Amsterdam’s financial development to become the 
centre of the international payments system and money market.  
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Wallerstein summarises the key factors determining the superiority of Dutch 
accumulation processes: Holland’s advantage was productive, distributional, and 
financial; its financial strength was the result of its productive and commercial 
strength. Holland’s worldwide commercial network and control over the international 
money market permitted the export of Dutch capital providing income far greater than 
that generated by national productive activity (Wallerstein, 1982:111).  
 
The spice trade  
The wealth and economic power that resulted from the Dutch establishment’s 
effective melding and strategic use of its strong productive, financial and distribution 
systems determined Holland’s international economic hegemony.  The interesting 
question for this thesis in particular is what drove Dutch traders from the European 
trading arena to directly trade with Asian suppliers. The analysis addresses this 
question in the context of political constraints on the supply of profitable trade-goods 
from Asia, the metropolitan pressure to reinvest accumulating bullion, and the Dutch-
state’s strategic ambitions.    
 
In the late 16th Century, demand for Asian commodities was a major contributor to 
European traders’ profits. The wealth from the Malay region was in spices, especially 
cloves, nutmegs and mace (Bagchi, 1982:69).  For most of the 16th Century the 
Portuguese monopolised the major spice route using the trade winds to travel around 
the Cape of Good Hope to Malacca. Lisbon was the spice centre of the West, and 
Antwerp was the northern distribution centre. Malacca received its supplies from 
Javanese traders, who collected them directly from the Malaccan Islanders. Supplies 
of the spices were abundant and cheap, and it was clear to the Europeans that if the 
European prices were to be kept high, they had to monopolise supply. 
 
Whilst Dutch traders obtained spices for the European trade from Lisbon and Cadiz, 
Spain had annexed Portugal in 1680. The States of Holland were also under the 
political control of Spain, but with Philip’s repression of Calvinists, the Dutch 
determined to free themselves from Spanish control. As a consequence the Spanish 
king closed Lisbon and Cadiz to Dutch shipping. The expansion of Dutch 
accumulation enabled the States of Holland to directly challenge the Portuguese 
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domination of the spice trade by despatching Dutch traders’ to obtain spices from 
Indonesian suppliers. 
 
The Spanish closure of Portuguese ports to Dutch traders precipitated the States of 
Holland’ decision to bypass Portuguese suppliers (Israel, 1989: 68). This engendered 
a transformation in both the role of the state and the character of capital accumulation. 
It foreshadowed the extension of the Dutch state as a military-trading power able to 
defend its trade against major competitors, and the overseas organisation of trade 
commodity production and supply. 
 
The formation of the joint stock company 
The United Provinces’ financial ruling group of merchant traders, finance capital and 
industrial capitalists were capital rich and thus able to finance risky long distance 
trade expeditions. Their Mediterranean, Levant, and South Atlantic early 1590s trade 
was extended to the Indian Ocean region. In March 1594 nine northern Netherlands' 
merchants organised a Company of Far Lands (van Verre) and sent two fleets to 
Indonesia for spices (Boxer, 1965: 22). In 1597 the first fleet of four ships returned 
with the loss of a ship and 160 men. The second fleet, however, returned to Holland 
with a huge cargo of 600,000 pounds of pepper, and 250,000 pounds of cloves 
together with nutmeg and mace (Haley, 1972: 24). In 1598 twenty-two ships from 
five rival trading companies left Dutch ports for the East Indies. Of the thirteen ships 
that sailed via the Cape of Good Hope, one vessel was lost. Nine ships sailed via 
South America but only one ship arrived safely (Zainu’ddin, 1968: 77). Simple 
mathematics determined a company imperative to employ the former route in later 
expeditions.  
 
Despite such losses, the Far Lands Company’ ships returned greater than 400 per cent 
on investment (Boxer, 1965: 22).   The Chairman, Van Neck, contended that these 
huge profits were not obtained by ‘force or fraud… but by free and honest trading 
with the Indonesian merchants, in accordance with the Directors’ orders “not to rob 
anyone of their property, but to trade uprightly with all foreign nations”’ (Boxer, 
1965: 23). 
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This ‘upright’ trade generated huge corporate returns, but involved substantial costs of 
human lives and privation. Boxer shows that Company cost saving led to fierce 
workloads and privations on sailors, who lived ‘on the edge of bare subsistence’ 
(Boxer, 1965: 69). The high level of unemployment in the United Provinces, and the 
pressure for seafaring jobs from Scandinavia and Germany Companies meant 
employers paid barely subsistence wages and provided minimal food supplies (Boxer, 
1965: 69). The dangerous and oppressive working conditions led to ‘frequent mutiny, 
insubordination, and riots’ (Boxer, 1965:72).  
 
The institution of the Dutch East India Company 
Dutch trading ships entered a market dominated by the Chinese, Gujeratis, 
Portuguese, Arabs, British, Spanish and Danish. Portuguese attempts to occupy 
Indonesia and seize control of spice production were repulsed by the solidly 
entrenched and powerful kingdoms on the major islands of Java, Sumatra, and 
Madura but the Portuguese retained the greatest share of the European trade in spices. 
However, by 1600 the state-supported and heavily armed Dutch competition 
overthrew the Portuguese trade (Israel, 1989:68). 
 
By the end of 1601 fourteen fleets of sixty-five ships had sailed from the United 
Provinces to the East Indies. Intense Competition between rival Dutch companies 
forced the price of pepper to rise by 100 per cent in the first six years of trade (Israel, 
1989: 68). However, the subsequent accumulation of pepper and fine spices in the 
United Provinces caused a fall in prices to consumers, and whilst supplies of the 
spices were abundant and cheap, it was clear that if the European prices were to be 
kept high, exports from Indonesia had to be under monopoly control. The merchants 
convinced the States General that profits would evaporate or the Portuguese would 
regain the market ‘unless the state intervened to curb this ruinous rivalry and rescue 
the investors from their predicament’ (Israel, 1989: 69). 
 
In 1602 the States-General moved to counter this threat by chartering the United 
Dutch East India joint-stock company (the Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie - 
VOC).  The VOC was initially capitalised by nine businessmen with a share capital of 
290,000 guilders. This triggered the flow of capital from all states, with the state-
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source of capital shown in Table 1.  Whilst there is a paucity of scholarly information 
as a guide to estimate the comparative values of the sums invested, some idea of the 
value of the investment can be gleaned from Boxer’s evidence of the mid 17th century 
wages paid to VOC employees. The basic rate of pay for VOC seamen was 7 to 10 
guilders per month, with merchants’ salary 4 to 60, masters 60 to 80, and boatswain 
22 to 26 (Boxer, 1972:300,301).  The VOC wage for sailors represented a basic 
subsistence level of income (Boxer, 1972:68). 
 
Table 1.1: VOC starting capital (guilders) 
Amsterdam 3,674,915 
South Holland  
   Delft 469,400 
   Rotterdam 173,000 
West Friesland  
   Hoorn 266,868 
   Enkhuizen 540,000 
Zeeland 1,300,405 
  
Total 6,424,588 
 
Source: Israel, 1989: 71  
 
The final subscription amounted to in excess of ten times the initial capitalisation of 
the English East India Company (Glamann, 1981: 6).  Whilst the private investor 
capitalisation suggests that the company was determined by business objectives, the 
state held clear political ambitions for the VOC’s operation: ‘The States General had 
use for a financially strong central organism which might divert the war of Spain 
against the Netherlands and wage the war in India without any expenses on the part of 
the Government’ (Glamann, 1981: 6). 
 
The state thus supported the trade-expeditions with subsidies, armaments, military 
forces and tax (especially customs) exemptions. The Company was granted the power 
to make, protect, and enforce trade agreements (Israel, 1989: 67,70). The VOC had its 
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own ‘treasury, currency, executive, laws, army and navy’ (Fischer, 1959:18). The 
VOC was a ‘“staat-buten-de-staat” with its own administration, own jurisdiction, and 
finally also a right to make agreements with the foreign, Asiatic powers’ (Glamann, 
1981: 7). The political as well as economic objective was to appropriate a surplus, as 
well as attacking the competitive ‘power, prestige, and revenues of Spain and Portugal 
in Asia’ (Israel, 1989: 71). This determined that within three years, the trade-only 
policy of earlier companies had been ‘transformed into a full-scale strategic offensive, 
involving dozens of warships and many hundreds of troops’ (Israel, 1989:73). 
 
Overall, the VOC was established ‘in part to contain ruinous competition among the 
Dutch, in part to provide a stable outlet for the smaller investor, in part to create an 
economic and political weapon against Spain, and in part simply to get more spices 
than were then available in Europe’ (Wallerstein, 1982: 102). The subsequent VOC 
profitability was accomplished by the transformation of company policy from the 
trade organisation to the military enforcement of production control.  
 
This outline of the formation of the VOC has shown how the Company came to be in 
a militarily and diplomatically stronger position than their European and Asian 
competitors to seize control of the Spice Islands trade.   
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The infrastructure of Malay trade and production 
The existing Indonesian social, political and economic environment 
 
The indigenous system of political and economic organisation operating in the late 
17th Century incorporated a hierarchical system under the overall control of a 
monarch, with the kingdom divided into various provinces largely autonomously 
controlled by princes.  Java had been ruled by the Mataram monarchical dynasty 
monarchical rule for more than a thousand years (Day, 1966:10). It appears that rulers 
and their subordinate governors extracted severe taxes, tolls, and labour-obligation to 
support their rule.  The Mataram king and the ruling elite obliged landholding 
peasants to provide paid-labour for public works (kerig aji, heerendienstein)  (Suroyo, 
1990: 154). The rulers controlled local markets, taxing exchange and prohibiting any 
exchange outside this trade monopoly (Day, 1966:25). The production surplus was 
used to support the state administration, a military force, and the trappings of power.  
 
Dynastic wars and wars of succession weakened the Mataram state’s ability to defend 
itself from foreign attack, and its chief characteristic was a lack of trust between 
feuding princes.  Whilst Day considers that the political conflict was based on feuding 
princes’ power ambitions, Zainu’ddin’s research shows that the 16th and 17th Century 
princely wars were driven by the substantive economic considerations of territorial 
control and trade-dominance, especially through the control of local market 
monopolies (Zainu’ddin, 1969:80-87). From this latter viewpoint, the disputes 
represented a competition for control of systems of production, distribution and 
exchange.  
 
Traditional surplus creation and distribution  
The evidence of monarchical and princely rule suggests a feudal, land-ownership 
based, power relationship between the peasantry and the rulers. It is argued, however, 
that as land was not in short supply, the power-relationship consisted of ties of social 
obligation and patronage rather than the European social relations of feudalism. Reid 
refers to this as the holding of society together through ‘the vertical bonds of 
obligation between men’, whereby ‘the wealth of the rich, and the power of the 
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strong, lay in the dependent man-power they could gather around them’ (Reid, 
1983:8).  
 
Warren argues that there was a material basis underpinning these bonds. She contends 
that ‘inequalities in power, wealth and status existed in all of the pre-capitalist states 
of South East Asia which we must certainly define as class societies’ (Warren, 1985: 
131). In this understanding the relations of production conformed to the Marxist 
model of the Asiatic Mode ‘where the centralised state is superimposed on relatively 
self-contained agricultural village communities which provide tribute in labour and 
kind’ (Warren, 1985: 131). 
 
Marx’s conception of the Asian pre-colonial production systems was that they 
generally did not create their surplus production through feudalist or slave labour 
production relations. Marx argued that Asian social formations were part of a 
distinctively different, ‘Asiatic mode of production’ (Howard and King, 1985: 227).  
In Marx’s conception the typical Asian production environment consisted of a 
multitude of small isolated villages under the political control of an authoritarian 
state. He contended that there was minimal commodity production, but – at least in 
the context of the ruler’s organisation of labour – major production schemes relating 
to large scale public works, especially for irrigation. The despotic state taxed the 
peasantry to pay for these works from the villages’ surplus production (Howard and 
King, 1985: 227). This conceptual understanding suggests the existence of a dominant 
system of production control, hierarchically based, including an administrative 
structure supported by the ‘tax farmer’ appropriation of surplus. 
 
Zainu’ddin affirms that in the context of the village social organisation, Asian 
production relations were vastly different from the feudal system in that village elders 
did not hold the power of land ownership over farmers and the rural producer was not 
tied to a feudal lord. ‘The peasant in Java, unlike the serf under the European feudal 
system, was not bound to the soil’ (Zainu’ddin, 1969:109). Warren argues that whilst 
there is difficulty in precisely determining class relations prior to colonial occupation, 
control over labour was the crucial factor defining pre-capitalist production relations 
(Warren, 1985:131).  In her view, access to land did not become a significant factor of 
labour-control until the nineteenth Century (Warren, 1985: 131).  
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Warren argues that a surplus was created and distributed through a complex system of 
tributory relations and social obligation. These ranged from collective services and 
tribute paid by corporate villages to personal patron-client arrangements between 
landowner and dependents or landholder and state. She contends that these 
arrangements meant that duties were individual responsibilities, and ‘that much 
greater flexibility existed and that the degree of surplus extraction was considerably 
less severe in pre-colonial times’ (Warren, 1985: 131). 
 
A more sanguine appreciation of the severity of this system of surplus production is 
advanced by Reid, who argues that South East Asia was a ‘peculiarly fruitful place to 
examine the interaction of different concepts of servitude – Islamic, Indic, Chinese 
and modern European, as well as a range of indigenous forms’ (Reid, 1983:2).  For 
three centuries prior to the European imposition of control on labour in Sumatra and 
Java people were forced into slavery. In his view, the various forms of bondage in the 
last eight centuries of recorded history were ‘indigenous developments having their 
origin in a characteristically South East Asian acceptance of mutual obligation 
between high and low, or creditor and debtor’ (Reid, 1983:8). 
 
Social and cultural rather than pure property relations generally formed the substantial 
cultural infrastructure of bondage. This could be seen in the strong connection 
between the obligation to sell one's own labour when in debt. Wilken provides an 
example of the Toba-Bataks who, when going to market expecting to gamble, were 
‘equipped with a special form of rope (tali pasa) as an indication of good faith that 
their bodies, as labour power, constituted the surety for their gambling debts’ (Reid, 
1983:10).  
 
A common means of obtaining capital was to ‘pawn’ an individual or dependents, or 
to enter a very unequal partnership where the creditor became the patron, if not the 
master. In these relationships the labour service of the debtor became a continuing 
process of bondage whereby payments were for the cost of the debt (the interest on 
the debt), and not towards reducing the debt itself (the principal). In this way bondage 
was passed to succeeding generations. Slavery was also an accepted part of society.  
Slave ownership was a measure of social status, generally recognised as a symbol and 
trapping of power. Slaves were primarily employed as servants rather than as 
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producers of commodities for exchange. The scarcity of workers determined the 
ownership of domestic slaves as a particularly important status symbol in Javanese 
society. 
 
Whatever the severity of the system of surplus production and appropriation, there is 
clear evidence that an institutional system of unfree and coerced labour operated in 
the Indonesian archipelago for centuries prior to the European occupation. This 
institutionalised basis of production organisation represented a ‘social legitimacy’ for 
unfree labour. The enforced compliance with this system determined the ‘social 
infrastructural’ basis for the superimposition of Dutch appropriation, and the 
cultural/social basis for the subsequent direct colonial system of labour coercion.   
 
Labour organisation for commercial production  
These systems of labour organisation for production and surplus appropriation 
appeared to have been applied in the dominant system of rural production 
organisation rather than in the trading context of urban production organisation and 
the carrying trade. In Indonesia’s pre-colonial mercantile cities such as Aceh, 
Makassar and Bantem, trading work generated a substantial demand for labour. There 
was a limited supply of labour with the then small populations and priorities for rural 
production work, especially in the production of subsistence produce. The large 
demand for trade labour was thus generally supplied by slave traders, as captives of 
war, or from the traders’ retinue.  No entrepôt trade could function effectively without 
the ready availability of a passive bonded workforce, and harsh laws were enacted to 
ensure the compliability of the slaves and the protection of slavers against murder and 
theft, or from their slaves absconding (Reid, 1983:16). 
 
Trading infrastructure 
The Malay islands had a long tradition and culture of accommodating and 
assimilating new systems of trading and commercial organisation introduced by 
foreign traders. Whilst the Arab traders who engendered the spread of Muslim culture 
and thought to Indonesian seaboard dwellers arrived three centuries prior to the 
European traders, they were merely the latest in a series of long-distance foreign trade 
forays to the region. It appears Chinese traders had travelled to Java for textiles in the 
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1st Century BC. The Arab traders had, however, established a much stronger and more 
pervasive commercial presence than earlier traders. It is argued that the Arab system 
provided a solid foundation for Dutch commercial expansion.   
 
The exact influence and role of Islam is open to conjecture, but Wertheim contends 
that there is strong evidence to suggest that the Islamic religious and cultural system 
was profoundly influential in establishing the values of ‘typical’ and 'mature 
bourgeois individualism' prior to the development of capitalist social relations 
(Wertheim, 1959:212).  Further, Islamic scholars go to the extent of giving Islam the 
credit for ‘providing a blue-print for the organization of trading diasporas’ and 
‘providing a symbol around which ethnic boundaries could consolidate’ (Dobbin, 
1983:260). Whilst Dobbin did not elaborate on this latter proposition, the role of 
Islam in engendering certain of the values underpinning capitalist development 
appears to be undisputed.   
 
Peacock contends that the main components of this influence relevant to the 
facilitation of trade were the introduction of market values, fair dealing and social 
equality in exchange (Peacock, 1973:31,32).  Islam teachings supported the belief that 
trade ‘was meaningful and legitimate … all believers should deal honestly and 
impartially with one another (on the basis of) frugality, diligence, honesty and 
dependability.  In this way Islam stimulated the growth of trade’ (Peacock, 1973:31). 
In the political context, the Islamic tradition of fair trading, impartiality over 
competing interests and dependability in agreement made Muslim traders more 
readily accepted by local rulers. 
 
Caldwell and Utrecht postulate a more invasive, and material imperative in the spread 
of Muslim ideology. They argue that Islam had profound consequences for South East 
Asia, ‘paving the way for modernisation before the arrival of European power’ 
(Caldwell and Utrecht, 1979:10). Islam is seen as ‘a catalyst in the European revival’ 
This is seen to have resided in the widespread use of Malay as an Islamic ‘lingua 
franca’ facilitating trade and commerce; a Muslim perspective that all believers are 
equal facilitating a ‘free give and take of bargaining and the free operation of the law 
of supply and demand; and helping ‘to undermine the traditional oligarchic, rigid and 
hierarchical structure with a god-king at the apex’ (Caldwell and Utrecht, 1979:10).  
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In summary, for the regions where Islam spread, the ruler became ‘the chief 
merchant; he controlled all external trade and traders, for he directed and controlled 
all supplies of the basic commodities required by them, rice on Java and in Macassar 
to exchange for spices in the Spice Islands, pepper at Bantam and the ports of SE and 
SW Sumatra, pepper also and especially gold at Aceh’ (Hall, 1966:202).  It was 
evident that the facilitation of good trade relations was paramount for the Indonesian 
rulers. In this context Hall remarks that the ruler’s most important official in dealing 
with foreign merchants ‘was the Shahbander (‘Ruler of the port’) who, by reason of 
his duties, was in most cases a foreigner’ (Hall, 1966:202). 
 
Thus, distinctive elements of the existing social, political and economic organisation 
provided a basis on which the VOC could construct a regime of appropriation. The 
pre-existence of a traditional infrastructure of unfree labour and collective coercion 
for surplus production and distribution constituted the fundamental institutional base 
for foreign extraction. Further, divisions within the ruling establishment ensured that 
the Dutch were in a strong position to advance their commercial interests through the 
cultivation of divisions between these rulers, and the negotiation of peace agreements 
that would advantage the Company’s interests. Arab traders had established the 
general legitimacy of trade over three preceding centuries. The corporate imperative 
of profits over territorial expansion provided the mechanism for the insertion of the 
VOC within the existing regime of surplus production. This foreshadows the capacity 
of the VOC to exert political and economic domination of the traditional ruling class 
in order to enforce control over the peasantry for production objectives.  
 35
The entrenchment of VOC political and economic power 
The Secretary to the Makasarese Sultan in 1641 addressing local leaders after their 
defeat by the Dutch: ‘Listen sirs, to my advice: never make friends with the Dutch. 
Possessed of a sort of devilish cunning, no country can call itself safe when they are 
around’ (Zainu’ddin, 1969:86). 
 
The Dutch introduced a strikingly different system of surplus extraction to Indonesia 
than had been attempted by their European mercantilist competitors. The singular 
nature of the VOC’s intervention into the Javanese economy determined an ability to 
control supply where its competitors had failed. The nature of this successful 
intervention is considered in the context of Dutch corporate imperatives and the 
interaction between these imperatives and needs of the indigenous ruling 
establishment. The way in which the Dutch reconciled these ambitions and attached a 
system of wealth extraction onto the indigenous political, social, and economic 
‘infrastructure’ informs the process of the incorporation of the Indonesia system of 
export commodity production into the Dutch system of capital accumulation.  The key 
consideration concerns the transition from indigenous to Dutch domination of export 
commodity production.    
 
The entrenchment of the VOC within the Indonesian politico-economy established 
structures and systems that underpinned the subsequent colonial state system of 
appropriation, in particular the entrenchment of an administration and infrastructure to 
control labour for the extraction of wealth from the colony. The chapter concludes 
with an overview of the forces determining the collapse of the VOC. It is argued that 
the forces determining this collapse influenced the institution of major changes in the 
way in which wealth was appropriated from Indonesia, and in the structure of 
production organisation that supported this appropriation.   
 
VOC entrenchment for trade control 
The initial VOC forays to establish trade links did not appear to represent a significant 
threat to Indonesian political and economic sovereignty.  Dutch corporate imperatives  
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determined the application of a gradual expansion of ‘commercial’ relations with the 
indigenous leadership. This constituted a vast and crucial distinction between earlier 
European, especially Portuguese, mercantilist approaches to dominate trade through 
territorial occupation.   
 
The VOC was unsuccessful with their first attempts to negotiate monopoly trade-
agreements with the major spice-suppliers of Ternate, Ambon, Banda and Ceram. The 
Company then moved to control the ‘transit’ ports of Makasar and the northern Javan 
ports (Robertson, 1972:80). The Dutch negotiated a trade advantage by exploiting 
political conflicts between the ruling Sultans warring for control over vassal 
kingdoms (Robertson, 1972: 80). The Dutch employed their military strength to back 
trade-treaty bargaining. An example of a typical treaty was the 1667 treaty for control 
of Ujung Pandang. The Dutch conditions included the requirement of a strong fortress 
with a supply of good drinking water, and a safe harbour in order to make it ‘a bastion 
of the valuable eastern districts’ (Zainu’ddin, 1969:87).  The Dutch’ method of 
consolidating the opportunities for long-term territorial control was evidenced by the 
fact that whilst the provision of the fort was negotiated on a temporary lease, the 
Secretary of the defeated Makarese Sultan believed the Dutch thought it to be a ‘fairly 
permanent’ arrangement (Zainu’ddin, 1969:87). 
 
It seems the Dutch went to great lengths to avoid committing their troops and 
armaments to imposing trade control by force. Nevertheless, in the instances where 
negotiation failed, they brutally repressed all opposition to their establishment of a 
trade-monopoly and imposed severe penalties for non-compliance.  Reporting an 
Batavian judge’s sentencing of a crew of black marketeers who seized a Company 
vessel in the Sunda Straits in 1680, a VOC surgeon noted that: ‘[o]f the whole (crew), 
one part was broke upon the wheel, some were quartered, some were whipt, some had 
their ears and noses cut off, and some were burnt in the forehead. The three 
Hollanders were hang’d; the two Danes beheaded’ and the others sent into slavery’ 
(Zainu’ddin, 1974: 79). 
 
In 1621 the VOC entered into formal contracts for exclusive deliveries of spices with 
local headmen in Amboyna and Banda. It allowed only a few farmers to grow specific 
quantities of high value spices in order to keep the market price high (Zainu'ddin, 
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1975:79). When the Bandanese continued to trade outside the Dutch embargo, they 
were murdered by Company forces and replaced by Dutch settlers (perkenier). The 
perkenier were granted land tracts and Company slaves were imported to cultivate 
nutmeg plantations.  
 
The Dutch directed high-ranking chiefs (‘regents’) to impose nominated penalties for 
growing produce in excess of the Dutch quota, including the destruction of the 
plantation, burning of the produce and often the execution of farmers. ‘Company 
policy was to punish enterprise wherever that was not in accordance with its own (or 
its servants') profits’ (Caldwell and Utrecht, 1979:15). Thus the hongi-tochten 
(traditional tribute-gathering war parties) destroyed unlicensed Moluccan spice trees 
that were surreptitiously planted to evade the Dutch monopoly to gain profit from the 
strong world demand. The subjugation of Macassar in 1669 determined that the VOC 
had a complete monopoly over the Indonesian spice-trade (Wertheim, 1956:238). 
 
Competing priorities for economic and political organisation  
Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, the Advocate of the States of Holland, had directed the 
VOC to build militarily strong outposts from which territorial control for trade-good 
supply could be assured. VOC merchants employed Dutch naval and military power 
to establish fortified bases in several Asian trading centres. These entrepôt were 
backed by Dutch warships based permanently in the region.  In the first and second 
decade of the 17th Century, the VOC constructed a chain of fortified trading posts 
along Java’s Northern seaboard, with their Indonesian headquarters at Jacatra 
(renamed Batavia, now Jakarta). William Dampier described his visit to the fort at 
Pulau Dinding, which had been established to secure the monopoly control of the tin 
trade from Bangka Island. The fortifications were said to be necessary because the 
Dutch ‘dare not trust them (the Malays) so far, as to be ranging about the island in any 
work of husbandry’ (Zainu’ddin, 1974: 78). Clearly, the Dutch gradual establishment 
of a trade-control beachhead generated substantial political opposition.  
 
The establishment of fortified centres and ruthless defence of trading points to enforce 
a trade monopoly was not, however, indicative of the Company’s ambition to assert 
colonial sovereignty, VOC officials were ‘anxious to avoid the responsibilities and 
costs of territorial government’ (Spruyt and Robertson, 1972:78). Nevertheless, 
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Company officials ‘on the ground’, believed that trade control could only be assured 
by production control, and control over production could only be enforced through 
territorial occupation. This conflict over corporate ambitions and the necessity for 
state intervention to protect long-run corporate accumulation foreshadowed a 
continuing tension between investors and the state.  
 
Jan Coen, the Dutch East Indian commander of the provincial capital of Batavia, was 
a ‘partisan of a strong manner in Asia’ and strongly independent of the VOC 
directors. His views – shared by succeeding proconsuls – were evidenced in a 1614 
memorandum to De Heeren Zeventien: ‘Your Honours should know by experience 
that trade in Asia must be driven and maintained under the protection and favour of 
Your Honours’ own weapons, and the weapons must be paid for by the profits from 
the trade, so that we cannot carry on trade without war, nor war without trade’  
( Bagchi, 1982:70).  
 
Coen argued for the peripheralisation of the spice producing regions through the 
construction of fortified bulwarks from which political control and thus production 
control could be exerted over spice supply. This was considered necessary in order to 
enforce trade control over local potentates, to repress local opposition and to 
reorganise production. This production reorganisation would result from the exporting 
of a ‘white settler class, both to help with supervising cash-crop production and to 
provide a secure initial market for European exports other than bullion’ (Wallerstein, 
1982: 103). Coen said that the peripheralisation could not occur whilst the Republic 
was intent on ‘administering trade, and required the operation of a market principle’ 
(Wallerstein, 1982:103). The issue concerned the capitalist priorities of ‘the profits of 
exploitation or the profits of speculation’ (Wallerstein, 1982: 103). Wallerstein argues 
that the pro-consuls had two choices: to ‘transform the nature of the trade by 
incorporating the Indies as a peripheral zone of the capitalist world-economy’ or to 
administer the trade as long-distance commerce between world empires (Wallerstein, 
1982: 103). 
 
It was evident that the Company could not seize trade control over its competitors 
without the support provided by the military-backed strong corporate presence. 
Nevertheless some shareholders were unhappy about the use of force, and others 
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opposed the costs of enforcing a territorial presence. The war-like conduct of business 
alienated some investors who were opposed to the use of force in business. These 
withdrew their financial support upon learning of the State’s supply of armaments for 
early expeditions.  Other investors were more concerned about the loss of profits with 
the costs of armaments. They bemoaned the ‘money spent on arms, munitions, troops 
and fortifications’ employed to establish entrepôt in Asia (Israel, 1989:72). They 
believed the Company priority should not be concerned with territorial expansion but 
with trade profits. It appears that Dutch merchants held the view that business 
transcended international political relations. Thus it was ‘widespread practice’ for the 
Dutch to trade with the enemy at wartime. During the Dutch attempt to break from the 
Spanish yoke the ‘Dutch continued to trade with Spain without official disapproval’ 
(Haley, 1972: 46). The VOC shareholders were apparently unconvinced that their 
Indonesian investment faced a political threat and considered that the state’s objective 
of seizing territorial control was a threat to the profits on their investment. Those 
supporting the profits of speculation prevailed over those supporting the profits of 
productive exploitation, and the Company continued the traditional system of 
‘administering’ long-distance trade between Indonesian suppliers and Company 
agents. The matter was far from being resolved, however, and subsequent chapters 
investigate the implications for Indonesia’s production system of the contestation over 
the degree of state intervention required to assure company profits.  
 
Expanding the trade monopoly by controlling supply 
We have seen that where there was an adequate workforce to generate surplus 
production the Dutch preferred to ‘seek out countries which could be exploited rather 
than settled and developed’ (Braudel, 1982:235). Thus whilst the priority of trade over 
territorial control persisted, the Dutch were obliged to exploit the existing system of 
surplus-production and appropriation. Their steady extension of political control to 
establish trade-commodity supply commenced with the negotiation of trade 
agreements. The Dutch employed the threat of Portuguese occupation to negotiate a 
closed-trade agreement with the ruler of the North West Javanese province Bantam.  
The Bantamese took advantage of the agreement to build support against the 
aggressive Portuguese attempts to occupy their territory.   
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The fortified entrepôt that have been described above were represented by the 
Company as purely part of the capital apparatus to secure trade with Indonesia, and as 
such ‘external’ to the continuing system of traditional political rulership. The VOC 
officials maintained this façade of political non-involvement in indigenous affairs by 
leaving the control of internal political organisation ‘as much as possible in the hands 
of the traditional indigenous authorities’ (Penders, 1977: 3). The trading centres 
facilitated the export of trade goods for the Sultans, and Company officials readily 
accepted a role as ‘impartial’ conciliators resolving disputes between feuding local 
rulers. Thus various pretenders to the throne of Mataram in wars of succession gained 
Dutch support by ceding areas of land to the Company so that by the end of the 18th 
Century the Company had extended its influence over much of Java (Legge, 1977:81).  
 
The Company extended its political control over the economic supply of trade-
commodities. The traditional leadership were now obliged to sign agreements 
committing them to supply fixed amounts of specified crops at fixed prices 
(Zainu’ddin, 1974: 109). The ‘bupati’ (chief of the class of traditional rulers) 
extracted the agricultural surplus as tribute from peasants for the sultan or king, who, 
in turn, supplied this to the Dutch. The Dutch paid pensions to the traditional rulers, 
and provided them with military backing to defend their realms. The largesse 
provided to the Sultans led to them forcing the peasantry to replace staple subsistence 
crops with trade crops (Peacock, 1973: 41).  
 
This gradual extension of political control meant that whilst the class of traditional 
rulers (the bupati) retained their traditional place within hierarchy of production 
organisation and labour-control until the end of 18th Century, power relations 
between the Dutch and local rulers were reversed. In the early days of the Dutch trade 
intervention the Dutch officials had to prostrate themselves before the regents and 
suffer other humiliations to curry favour in trade negotiations. As the VOC 
entrenched and expanded its economic influence, its growing political strength 
determined that the regents now had to pay tribute to the Governor General as they 
had done towards Sultans in earlier times.  The VOC was said to have domesticated 
the indigenous elite leadership employing that elite’s ‘customary authority over the 
peasantry’ (Elson, 1986:140). The bupati ‘extracted agricultural tribute from the 
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peasants and turned it over to the VOC instead of the sultan or king’ (Wolfe, 
1982:14). 
 
By the mid-18th Century, the VOC was increasingly intervening directly in the 
supervision of the Regents to enforce their stipulated cultivations of produce for the 
export market (Zainu’ddin, 1974:109).  It was in a position to demand the fixed-price 
production of annual quotas of trade commodities such as indigo, cotton and some 
sugar. The regents received as payment the right to collect from the peasants the 
traditional taxes of labour and rice (Caldwell, 1977:14). 
 
The severity of extraction 
A later (English) ruler of Java, Stamford Raffles, provides us with a liberal 
perspective of the brutal nature of the VOC extraction system.  He considered that 
Indonesian labour was more harshly treated under this system than under slavery: 
‘The Dutch Company, actuated solely by the spirit of gain, and viewing their Javan 
subjects with less regard or consideration than a West India planter formerly viewed 
the gang upon his estate, because the latter had paid the purchase money of human 
property, which the other had not, employed all the pre-existing machinery of 
despotism to squeeze from the people their utmost mite of contribution the last dregs 
of their labour’ (Raffles, 1830: 330).  In a further indictment of the Dutch system of 
unfree labour, as distinct from wage-labour, Raffles contended that ‘Dutch officials 
universally employed the services of the people without regular hire’ so that ‘[t]he 
system of contingents and of forced services reduced the people to the lowest state of 
vassalage and subjection (Fischer, 1959: 23). 
 
VOC decline 
From 1613 to 1693 the Dutch Company’s net annual profit averaged 600,000 
guilders, with a total income over the eighty years of 48 million guilders (Fischer, 
1959:23).  However, the long-distance system of trade could not sustain VOC 
shareholders’ profits. A complex set of factors determined the change in the 
Company’s fortunes, but it appears that the essential consideration related to the 
Company’s inability to compete with the rapidly expanding English mercantile-
industrial capitalist system. This meant that there was a decline in Company revenues 
 42
from the beginning of the 18th Century (Day, 1966: 61,62). This appears to have 
consolidated costs and sources of declining revenues in the periphery.  
 
The Company relied on the Netherlands worldwide commercial network, its 
international money market and international payments system from the export of 
Dutch capital to keep trading until the end of the 18th Century. Over this period VOC 
shareholder’ dividends were subsidised from VOC reserves (Wertheim, 1956:111).  
Between 1613 and 1779 the VOC’s cumulative losses were nearly 85 million 
guilders. In 1798 the directors in Amsterdam ceased trading and transferred the debts 
and possessions to the Dutch state. The Company left a total debt of 134 million 
guilders (Hall, 1966:320).  
 
The decline and fall of the VOC and the transference of its interests to the Dutch state 
triggered major changes to the way the Netherlands extracted wealth from Indonesia 
and the system of political rule.  An analysis of the forces determining the collapse of 
the Company is seen to illuminate these changes and the motives driving the state’s 
subsequent transformation of the system of foreign wealth-appropriation from 
Indonesia.   
 
Local forces leading to the collapse of the Company 
The VOC’s collapse is usually explained as due to an international inability to 
compete with the English competition. Nevertheless, the peripheral cost-factors – 
associated with VOC shareholders’ demands for greater returns, and the English 
regional threat to the VOC’s trading monopoly – were crucial elements in the 
Company’s demise. 
 
A major peripheral source of declining corporate returns related to the direct pressures 
on producers as a result of VOC losses. Company officials reduced emoluments paid 
to the indigenous leadership. To maintain their traditional prestige and relative wealth 
the regents increased compulsory villager servitude and tribute. Villagers had no 
redress against the regents, or the regents against the Company. There was increasing 
poverty and starvation amongst an increasingly resentful population (Schrieke, 
1957:73). 
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In regions where VOC or traditional leadership could not exert absolute control and 
where the level of extraction was harshest, producers migrated from Company-
controlled regions, or neglected cash crops to cultivate their subsistence crops. The 
Dutch related the decline in productivity to Indonesians’ alleged ‘natural indolence’. 
Where military resources enabled, they increased the severity of extraction ‘for their 
(the natives’) own welfare as well as for commercial profits’ (Tarling, 1962: 514) 
 
There were other peripheral sources of Company losses associated with a declining 
corporate ability to enforce its regime of appropriation. Local officials became heavily 
involved with the black-market trade.  Smuggling, corruption and nepotism 
constituted the most visible component of the rising costs of the Company’s 
peripheral operations (Zainu’ddin, 1974:118). Clearly, the VOC had lost an ability to 
control its remote regional operations. This inability to enforce centre objectives 
foreshadowed the state’s entrenchment of a peripheral infrastructure and 
administrative system of production organisation and control.  
 
Finally, as each new treaty was negotiated with indigenous leaders the local 
administrators required additional resources to enforce the terms of the treaty. The 
major cost was that of maintaining VOC authority in the face of growing popular 
discontent arising from the extension of Company control and the severity of the 
extractive regime.  
 
Overall, the declining corporate ability to maintain acceptable rates of return and to 
enforce Dutch East Indies Company control foreshadowed the introduction of a 
regime that would reduce the role of the local rulers in appropriating a surplus from 
the country, and one that would replace collectivist enforcement systems with new 
forms of production regulation.  
 
Metropolitan pressures undermining the VOC 
Whatever the extent of the declining output and increasing production costs involved 
in running a peripheral regime of extraction, these did not constitute the fundamental 
source of the VOC’s collapse. The fundamental threat to the VOC’s corporate 
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viability resided in England’s emerging industrial capitalist strength. The crisis of 
accumulation in Indonesia – and thus the increasing severity of the extraction regime 
– was a symptom of the Dutch attempt to retain mercantilist power against this 
competition. As a large proportion of the profits from Indonesia went into supporting 
English industrial capitalist development rather than recapitalising in Dutch 
manufactures, the mercantilist endeavour contributed to its own demise (Dobb, 1976: 
195,6). To explain this complex of factors and conditions determining the shift in 
Company fortunes, it is necessary to consider the competitive impact of the increasing 
commercial and productive strength of industrial capitalism.  
 
Conditions in 17th Century England encouraged industrial investment, with increased 
capital investment in agricultural production, cheap wages and the growth of financial 
institutions (Wilson, 1966: 200). The greater intensity in the utilisation of agricultural 
resources resulting from increased capitalisation liberated resources for industrial 
investment. By contrast, however, the Dutch ability to effectively and efficiently 
combine their systems of production, distribution, and finance into a coordinated basis 
for imperial expansion had been eroded by the early successes of the VOC.  It 
appeared firstly that the leaders at the helm of the Company’s early 17th Century 
‘engine of growth’ had been replaced by a self-styled superior merchant class of 
overseas traders who rejected the need for a corporate association with industrial 
capitalists.  The joint stock company had excluded competition, with its profits from 
previous trade self-financing new investment rather than expanding the manufacturing 
base and employing investment funds from alternative sources. Dobb notes the 
traders’ ‘stress on privilege and the exclusion of interlopers (with their) limitation on 
the number of those engaging in the trade and their emphasis on favourable terms of 
trade at the expense of its volume, increasingly acted as fetters on the further progress 
of industrial investment and brought them into opposition with those whose fortunes 
were linked with the expansion of industry’ (Dobb, 1976:193) 
 
The VOC and Dutch state’s dependency on the monopolist system of trade-control 
was now under severe attack from English industrial capitalist pressure to ‘open up’ 
world trade to English merchant access. A fundamental ideological pillar supporting 
English industrial expansion was the anti-monopolist, free trade ethos of liberalism. 
Free trade was seen as ‘the best way to perpetuate Britain's industrial monopoly’ 
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(Nabudere, 1978:106). It provided ‘the clearest vision of a free trade Britain as 
Workshop of the World’ (Barrett Brown, 1974:107). This signalled a developing 
political and economic pressure for Holland to dismantle the system of monopolistic 
trade control that underpinned its peripheral appropriation. More particularly, it 
represented an economic pressure to bypass the monopolistic systems with expanding 
‘black markets’, smuggling and the search for alternative suppliers. 
 
The trigger for the Company’s demise was the fourth Dutch (1780-1784) war against 
the English. In 1780 the English fleet blockaded Dutch homeports as retaliation for 
Holland's support of Russia in that country’s conflict with Britain over sea-lane rights. 
English forces cut the Indies' connections with the centre thus breaking the monopoly 
trade constraint through the Malacca Straits.  The Dutch government pressed the VOC 
to bypass the blockade by selling its accumulating goods to foreign traders.  However 
the Amsterdam directors insisted on keeping to the old monopoly. The directors' 
policy was disastrous for the Company, the fortunes of which declined further when 
the 1784 Treaty of Paris allowing free trade in the East gave the British freedom to 
sail in the Indies’ seas. This allowed English traders to smuggle spices from the 
Moluccas. The British largely operated from the Outer Islands and could undercut 
Dutch markets by arranging competitive deals with local princes and corrupt 
Company officials. The Treaty was the final blow for the Dutch trade monopoly in the 
Indies (Zainu’ddin, 1974:118). The Dutch refusal to break their monopoly and 
compete on the open market with British traders encouraged Company servants to tap 
the rich returns in the black market. The Dutch Company was could not compete with 
the English commercial power and was bankrupted.  
 
Marx suggests that the decline of mercantilism was particularly evident ‘in the history 
of the carrying trade, as among the Venetians, Genoese, Dutch, etc., where the 
principal gains were not ... made by exporting domestic products, but by promoting 
the exchange of products of commercially and otherwise economically undeveloped 
societies, and by exploiting both producing countries’ (Marx, 1974:329). In his view, 
merchants’ profits were dependent on the exploitation and lack of development of 
these undeveloped societies. This lack of development then became a source of 
disintegration for the carrying trade. The decline in ‘merchant's capital wherever it 
rules over production is strikingly illustrated not only by the colonial economy (the so 
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called colonial system) in general, but quite specifically by the methods of the old 
Dutch East India Company’ (Marx, 1974:329) 
 
VOC Finale 
In January 1795 France’s European territorial expansion reached the Netherlands, and 
William V, the official Republic representative (Stadholder), took refuge in England.  
The Stadholder gave the English crown trusteeship responsibility over the East Indies 
for the duration of the war with France (van Klaveren, 1953:74-78).   However, the 
Patriot government proceeded to declare the VOC charter of monopoly and tributation 
at odds with the spirit of reform and revolution, and on December 31st 1799 assumed 
control of the VOC for the price of its debts (van Klaveren, 1953:76). This purchase 
signalled a brief respite from the Dutch oppression, and an era of liberal reform for 
Indonesians.  
 
Conclusion 
Holland’s well-established financial and industrial system of textiles, fishing, 
shipping and ancillary industries Dutch economy can be characterised as the ‘engine’ 
that enabled the expansionist mercantilist regime to blossom into an international joint 
stock company, part-state and part-private corporate enterprise. This was the core 
mechanism underpinning the successful ‘transplantation’ of the processes of 
accumulation into Indonesia via a monopolist long-distance trading company. 
Contrary to the established view, the VOC’s success was not solely or even 
substantially, a function of its military capacity and strength or of Calvinist 
dynamism. The Dutch Company’s long-term entrenchment within the Indonesian 
political economy and its successful insinuation within the Indonesian political 
economy was primarily a factor of its mercantilist preoccupation with trade control 
rather than territorial domination. 
 
Whilst this argument explains the substance of the Dutch successful trading 
intervention into Indonesia, the analysis points to the necessity for a more critical 
appreciation of the role of existing local political tensions within Indonesia that acted 
to facilitate Dutch corporate intervention. However, the following discussion shows 
that the Dutch’ motivation in the exploitation and ‘taking sides’ with these internal 
 47
political conflicts was intended to promote corporate ambitions rather than achieve 
territorial conquest per se. Thus whilst their tactical support for particular political 
interests lead to the eventual control of the major trading ports, the corporate objective 
was to gain control over trade. This trade control led to an expanding production-
control via the enforcement of the supply of particular commodities within the 
hinterlands of North Java. Dutch officials’ political and economic insinuation into the 
ruling echelons of the traditional hierarchical system facilitated this production 
control and the creation of a surplus without the costs of reproduction of other unfree 
labour systems such as slavery.  Day forcefully affirms the point that the Dutch 
exerted their rule through the indigenous elite by exploiting traditional Javanese 
customs of government and ‘attaching itself like a parasite to Javanese society’ (Day, 
1966:3). 
 
The direct trading between the Company and its European buyers in the centre was an 
exclusionary process in so far as Indonesian producers were concerned. The Dutch 
monopoly control over supply meant that the trading company effectively owned all 
the commodities that it produced for the export market whilst Indonesians were totally 
excluded from process of exchange and thus from any share of the value of 
Indonesian commodities. By excluding Indonesians from the exchange process, 
restricting them to the realm of cultivators and harvesters of their produce, the 
Company enforced direct control over the production process. This exclusionary 
resource extraction system enabled the VOC to grow from being ‘small fish in the 
Eastern oceans at the start of the 17th Century, where in 1625 a Chinese junk could 
earn in a single shipment a tenth of the VOC's annual capital’, to become by 1700 the 
only traders of Javanese commodities to world markets (Peacock, 1973: 38). 
 
As the Dutch enforced their monopoly over trade and supply, the Indonesian elite and 
producers were incorporated into the production process, with the rulers effectively 
taking the role of production managers. This meant that Indonesian rulers were 
increasingly politically and financially dependent on the Dutch. A core element of this 
thesis’ analysis of production and distribution-control systems is thus encapsulated in 
the Dutch’ monopoly production-control. This is seen as the foundation for the 
consequent colonial-state system of production control and wealth appropriation.  
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The nature of this relationship is explicit in the colonial distinction between trade and 
production. This has been explained as in the analogy of the Dutch peripheral 
enterprise as the productive apparatus or ‘factory’, with the extraction ‘overseers’ the 
indigenous hierarchical system of surplus generation, and Dutch officials as 
‘management’.  That is, the periphery can been characterised as an industrial system, 
with all traditional forms of open access to Indonesian product superseded by the 
trading monopoly, and all traditional forms of exchange in local entrepôts superseded 
by the Dutch imposition of monopoly production controls.  
 
This relationship is explicit in the contradiction between the forms of exchange as 
applied in the periphery and that carried out in the European metropolitan trading 
centres. The essence of this transformation from the traditional indigenous trading 
system is evidenced through the eighteenth century European view that the Dutch 
company were paragons of ethical business practice, carrying out their exchange 
through ‘free and unrestricted trade’. Thus ‘the thing which most impressed observers 
in those states which still groaned under mercantile restrictions, was the comparative 
freedom of Dutch trade. It was a free trade conditioned by the requirements of an 
entrepôt system, and enabled by the fact that trading interests controlled government, 
preferring a sound economic policy to the fiscal considerations which were too often 
the deciding factor elsewhere’ (Wilson, 1966:4). 
 
Whilst this ‘prudent conduct’ by Dutch merchants and traders prevailed in the context 
of distribution and exchange, it clearly did not apply in the context of the production 
and extraction of Indonesian trade-commodities. Here, as with employment on sailing 
vessels or in manufacture, Indonesian producers were part of the system of production 
and excluded from the fruits of trade. The traditional leaders, by allowing the Dutch to 
usurp their process of tribute distribution, became part of the production process. 
They effectively supported the institution of the colonial process establishing the basis 
of a collective extraction. The peripheral state excluded indigenous interests in the 
application of political and economic control over the generation and appropriation of 
the country’s surplus. 
 
The silver specie given as largesse to the regents by the Dutch was a means of 
ensuring the maintenance of the indigenous rulers’ prestige and relative wealth in the 
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process of preserving the system of surplus production and appropriation. The rulers’ 
sinecures, pensions or emoluments were effectively payments to maintain their role as 
production agents for the Dutch. The fact that these payments were not regarded by 
the Dutch as payment for the supply of trade-commodities is affirmed by Bagchi’s 
evidence that, whilst Hague records show there were extraction and transporting 
costs, there are no records of internal payments for exchange (Bagchi, 1982:xxi). In 
terms of the organisation of supply, treaties with regents determined the tribute 
required and the terms on which further trade was to be carried out.  Trade-
commodity supply ‘(forced deliveries) was fixed by the buyer, not the seller; and the 
amount to be delivered was also specified, whether it bore any relationship to the size 
of the annual crop or not’.  Thus the forced deliveries were really ‘tribute disguised as 
trade’ (Zainu’ddin, 1974:108). 
 
The forces driving the peripheral development and system of production control 
enabled the Dutch to defeat their trading rivals, but also created the internal 
contradictions and divisions that led to the Company’s demise. Competitive 
dominance of the English industrial capitalist-based empire led the VOC to attempt to 
expand revenues by increasing the severity of extraction, but this led to a decline in 
productivity and political confrontation. Schrieke contends that with their ‘short 
sighted’ monopoly control the Dutch ‘were blind to the fact that by undermining the 
purchasing power and prosperity of the people, they were killing the goose with the 
golden eggs’ (Schrieke, 1957:72). ‘The people ... became more and more averse to the 
Company - in whose monopoly they rightly saw a threat to their prosperity and 
traditional emoluments - because of the heavy service it demanded’ (Schrieke, 
1957:73).  The collapse of the VOC heralded the formal introduction of colonial rule 
with Indonesia becoming Netherlands sovereign territory. The fundamental 
importance of the interaction between the forces of the centre and the forces of the 
periphery is seen in the way in which they defined a particular regime of foreign 
appropriation. The crucial importance of these defining factors is in the role that they 
played in engendering the subsequent system of colonial appropriation.   
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Chapter 2  
The first phase of colonial intervention: 
The Liberal eras and the Cultivation System 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
‘Upon the back of Java, therefore, the Kingdom was kept afloat; Java's wealth, Dutch 
commerce and industry were revived and Dutch railways were built’ (Tarling, 
1966:120). 
 
The transfer of VOC assets and liabilities to the Netherlands government marked the 
direct intervention of the Dutch state into Indonesia’s politico-economy. The Dutch 
acquisition of the VOC ‘property’ has been often represented as solely a commercial 
transaction (Legge, 1977:82; May, 1978:18). This representation belies the immense 
economic political and social significance of the transfer. The significance of the 
transfer was the explicit and vastly expanded state-control over the apparatus of 
wealth production and appropriation. This is an extension of the continuing argument 
as established in Chapter 1 that, at least in terms of Indonesian participation, the 
colony was best regarded as being constituted as an enclosed and exclusionary system 
designed to ‘order’ the process of surplus-generation in the production of international 
market commodities. This characterisation pinpoints an essential difference with the 
established view, locating the Dutch East Indies as form of ‘property’ for 
metropolitan interests. The prime mechanism for the ‘ordering’ is seen in the way the 
colonial state imposed a system of social relations for surplus production and 
appropriation and enforced a widespread expansion of Dutch political as well as 
economic dominance in the archipelago.  
 
This chapter develops an appreciation of this by examining the transformation from 
state-supported private corporate intervention under De Heeren Zeventien’s trade 
administration policy to the direct state control of the indigenous system of social 
organisation for wealth production and distribution.  How the state transformed the 
social relations of production to generate a surplus is considered in the context of the 
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interrelationship between the centre’s ambitions and colonial politico-economic 
conditions.  
 
The direct intervention of the Dutch state into the Indonesian political economy is 
represented as proceeding in two discrete phases: a part-liberal system of production 
organisation, followed by a consolidated and more intensive form of coerced cash-
crop production. Orthodox economic scholars have argued that the latter form of 
surplus-production constituted a vital mechanism for locating Indonesian on a 
developmentalist trajectory by facilitating both the development of its productive base 
and engagement in world markets. I want to take issue with this view by developing 
an alternative interpretation that emphasises the Dutch efforts to assert control and 
management of Indonesia as a productive enterprise, and by examining this control as 
being specifically designed to exclude Indonesians from commodity markets and 
thereby foreclosing the opportunities for Indonesians realise and hold on to economic 
surplus.  
 
In contrast with the dominant established appreciation of Indonesian politico-
economic development, the chapter will also examine the character of established 
structures and institutions with a view to considering how these influenced the 
character of subsequent regimes’ wealth production and distribution structures and 
institutions. This approach aims to avoid what is essentially an ahistorical analysis 
that poses the development of each regime or epoch almost wholly in terms of the 
nature of the regime being primarily a function of the form of rule and the associated 
policies specific to the respective periods as if these are completely historically self-
contained.  The interpretation advanced will emphasise the distinctive characteristics 
of the liberal vis-à-vis coercive production systems, with each system contributing 
vital components to define the unique character of subsequent regimes. 
 
The liberal phase 
French economic and strategic intervention 
The immediate objective driving Dutch entrenchment of a secure state-regime within 
Indonesia was the strategic imperative to secure the major islands against attack from 
European imperialist competitors. This political and military consideration operated in 
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tandem with centre wealth-appropriation objectives, and is seen as a key factor in 
establishing the conditions for wealth appropriation. The first era of the liberal phase 
thus concerns the construction of the security infrastructure, the imposition of a new 
regime of wealth appropriation, and the challenges to indigenous rule implicit in this 
entrenchment of state power.  The character of the resulting system was shaped and 
influenced by existing forces and conditions in the periphery.  Thus the interaction 
between central and peripheral forces was a key determinant of the direction and 
character of peripheral colonial organisation, defining the form of production 
organisation imposed on the colony.  
 
Centre ambitions and objectives  
The Straits of Malacca were a crucial part of the major trade route joining Europe, 
India, China and Indonesia.  Securing the Straits constituted a key strategic objective 
for European mercantilist empires. The European state able to secure territorial 
control over the major Indonesian islands of Java and Sumatra was in a powerful 
position to monopolise the European trade in Asian produce. As Holland’s economic 
power declined, English and French governments fought for territorial control in the 
region.  
 
With the Dutch Republicans supporting the French in Napoleon’s march across 
Europe, their overthrow of Holland’s monarchy meant that Indonesia became an 
outpost of the French empire. Napoleon appointed Marshall Daendels, of the Patriot 
(Napoleon supporters’). Party, to govern Indonesia and construct a defence of Java 
against English territorial expansion. Daendels was commissioned to construct a 
defensive bulwark against attack and built a series of forts along the Northern Javan 
seaboard to defend the Malaccan Straits, and to construct a road from West to East 
Java (Zainu’ddin, 1968:119).  
 
Operating conjointly with these defensive territorial operations, colonial 
administrators moved to buttress political and strategic control by expanding income 
from the export trade. This rekindled debates over the optimum means of generating 
an income from the Dutch East Indies (Tarling, 1966:158). Liberalism was now the 
dominant political and economic discourse in Holland, and French Revolutionary 
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values of humanity and ‘freedom in all forms of intercourse’ influenced the direction 
of colonial policy. From this perspective VOC monopoly systems and appropriation 
of the Indonesian hierarchical system of production-coercion and tribute were a 
straitjacket on producers’ self-motivation. They had to be demolished in favour of 
open labour and produce markets.  Thus Van Hogendorp, a former governor of the 
NE coast province of Java, contended that trade must be separated from government 
and forced deliveries and that heerendiensten (compulsory tribute) must be abolished 
as an incentive to private investment in the cultivation of export crops. The aim was to 
replace ‘exploitation (as wage labour) for tributation, laissez faire for feudalism’ (van 
Klaveren, 1953:77).  
 
Peripheral forces countering liberal reforms 
State and corporate policy-objectives devised in far-off Amsterdam often conflicted 
with the aspirations and ambitions of indigenous leaders, colonial officials and the 
expatriate community in Indonesia. The colonial expatriate ruling class had prospered 
from VOC appropriation and were threatened by reforms that destabilised or 
demolished systems of authority, prestige, and patronage.  
 
Further, Governor Daendels saw that for export crop prices to rise to levels that would 
encourage producers to grow them, prices would be uncompetitive against the prices 
of other colonial suppliers employing coerced labour. Thus forced cultivations were 
retained for fear that to loosen the controls over the indigenous population would 
threaten surplus generation, and pose a threat to the value of the colony for the home 
country (Zainu’ddin, 1968: 119).  
 
Liberal redefinition of social relations as exchange relations 
Daendels retained state cultivations and labour coercion, but moved to undermine the 
regents’ traditional power and prestige by employing them as paid officials directly 
subordinate to the colonial state. Daendels built on this key change to traditional 
institutional relations by replacing the tributory system with a direct colonial tax. This 
consolidated the transition from the hierarchy of indigenous relations to the state’s 
direct extraction of a share of the surplus via taxes on the general population.  
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Pressures on the colonial state to generate finances to protect the colony from English 
takeover led Daendels to sell large areas of Javanese land (Zainu'ddin, 1968: 120). 
This alienation of Javanese land on the presumption that it was sovereign territory of 
the Dutch state instituted the distinction of the colonial use of Dutch law as related to 
property ownership, market and commercial relations, retaining traditional Muslim 
law (adat) for all other aspects of Indonesian life. This affirmed the separatist nature 
and role of colonial rule. 
 
The demolition of the regents’ status and authority was an affirmation of the Dutch’ 
political, as well as economic, authority in Indonesia.  The transformation of the 
regent into an official agent of Dutch signified that they had – by indirect means – 
achieved the territorial dominance sought, but not achieved, by the Portuguese.  Land 
commodification and the replacement of indigenous cultural and social relations with 
direct Dutch state rule constituted a fundamental undermining of the mercantilist 
monopoly system of production organisation and control. As such it heralded a later 
penetration of market-driven production and distribution systems.   
 
English imperial expansion in Indonesia 
The continuity of the regime of appropriation was, however, constantly threatened as 
European powers continued to battle for political and economic supremacy. This 
struggle for world economic hegemony was reflected in the periphery, with the major 
protagonists, England and France, determined to expand their imperial boundaries, 
and exploit Indonesia’s resources. By the late 18th Century, the English controlled the 
greater part of the Outer Islands’ trade, and were in a strong position to control the 
Malacca Straits.  
 
The exiled Dutch king had granted the English government trusteeship responsibility 
for the Dutch East Indies, and the English used this to justify an invasion of Java. As 
the Patriot colonial government moved to shore up defences on Java, an English naval 
fleet sailed from British Imperial Headquarters in Calcutta and attacked Patriot forces 
at Batavia.  Daendels’ removal of princely authority determined that the Patriots 
received no military support from the Javanese rulers, and the Dutch forces were 
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easily overthrown. The English installed former English East India Company official 
Thomas Stamford Raffles as Lieutenant Governor of Java and Madura.     
 
The wars between European empires had precipitated yet another transfer of 
‘ownership’ of Indonesia and its resources. The ambitions and dominant values of the 
English colonial regime are seen as key determinants of the processes of production 
organisation established to appropriate wealth from the country.    
 
English liberal reformism  
Raffles’ idealism on behalf of the English empire was shown in a contemporary 
biographer’s remark that the English occupied Indonesia to further the cause of 
‘liberty’ in the region by ‘wresting from her rival the islands that Napoleon's genius 
would have made the base of his designs on our Eastern possessions’ (Boulger, 1897: 
84). The reference to ‘liberty’ implies, however, that a more substantive objective of 
territorial occupation was the regional enforcement of free trade to further England’s 
corporate objectives. Thus whilst it was politically expedient for England to represent 
the takeover of Java as a principled defence of free trade against French monopoly, a 
more fundamental economic objective was to extend world markets for English 
manufactures.  Wertheim affirms this with his view that the raising of the British flag 
at Batavia signified: ‘[t]he British colonial expansion, largely directed by the rising 
need for a market felt by a developing young textile industry, had won a victory’ 
(Wertheim, 1956:58).   
 
Raffles was determined to institute greater changes than those introduced by 
Daendels, and to establish Java as another jewel in the British Crown.  Lord Minto 
wrote that Raffles ‘set himself with dogged determination to the task of showing that 
Java could be made as valuable a possession as any under the British crown; and that 
it might become the seat of an eastern empire extending throughout the Archipelago, 
and onwards to the ports of China and Japan’ (Boulger, 1897:158).   
 
Raffles believed this could be accomplished by replacing the remnants of mercantilist 
monopoly and labour-coercion with free enterprise. He considered that ‘feudalism and 
fixed delivery is no security against oppression nor any excitement to industry.  It 
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leads to degradation and migration’ (Wurtzburg, 1954:284). He aimed to disengage 
the production system from its enforced supply of commodities to European markets 
as a colony, ‘dependant on the state of a foreign market for the irregular and uncertain 
sale of its colonial produce’ would be a drain on the Empire’s resources and thus 
could not adequately develop its own productive potential’ (Wertheim, 1969: 60). The 
peasantry should be freed from forced labour, as a peasant ‘found insufficient 
incentive in the low and dwindling payment given for growing crops unfamiliar to 
him, not for his own needs but to satisfy the capricious requirements of foreign 
overseers’ (Raffles, 1835:116) 
 
To achieve colonial self-sufficiency Raffles established a land rental system with the 
native princes based on the British India ryotwari system. This derived fixed money 
revenue to the state based on land productivity (Tarling, 1966: 159). Raffles believed 
that revenue would expand from the extension of free peasant cultivation of export 
products like cotton or rice. He encouraged rural producers to grow what they wished 
and to sell in an open market at prevailing prices. All land was vested in the colonial 
government and leased to peasants for a rent paid in produce.  This freed the peasant 
from forced deliveries and the granting of a net yield of the crop was intended to spur 
the producer to higher production that would enable the peasant to pay the tax, cover 
needs, and still reap a profit. Raffles imposed a severe tax: he asked half, a third or a 
fifth part of sawah crops and 2/5, 1/3 and 1/4 part of tegalan-crops, depending on the 
fertility of the soil (Wertheim, 1956: 92). This was effectively a tax on product but, as 
an occupying power, the English state determined sovereignty over the land and its 
ownership, how the wealth generated by the land was valued, and how the produce 
was distributed or sold (van Klaveren, 1953:90).  The tax arrangements were made 
with the village headmen, and not the regents as under the VOC (Tarling, 1966: 159) 
 
Whilst wages had been a means of payment for services since well before the 
Mataram empire, Fischer contends that Raffles was responsible for promoting the 
more widespread and regular use of wages, as opposed to payment-in-kind, as the 
usual form of exchange for land cultivation (Fischer, 1959: 23). Raffles’ considered 
that ‘(the natives of Java) are neither so indolent as to refuse to labour when they feel 
that the fruits of it are their own’ (Boulger, 1897:164). Suroyo affirms that, under 
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Raffles’ regime, heerendiensten was vastly extended with the payment of wages to 
the landless as well as the land-owning peasantry (Suroyo, 1990: 154).  
 
Valuing the produce of the land for tax purposes determined that land was 
increasingly valued as a commodity generating monetary value.  The colonial 
government instituted this shift firstly by setting the quantum of tax as a proportion of 
the market value. This replaced the traditional system of obligatory peasant-
contributions to the local ruler. This ‘market mechanism’ was later corrupted by the 
state when straitened circumstances led it to set land values above market prices. 
Secondly, the English government now owned land that was previously used by 
peasants and generating surplus for traditional rulers and owned by them per adat 
land law.  Thirdly the monarchy/peasant tributary relation was now a market relation, 
with rent required to be paid by the peasants for the use of the land now owned by the 
state.  
 
There was a negative impact here on the objective of land commodification to expand 
land available for cultivations.  As taxes increasingly made land possession more of a 
burden, landowners converted their land to communal ownership to impose an equal 
division of the burden of tributes and services amongst villagers.  The institutional 
change thus engendered two land ownership forms: communally owned land with 
fixed shares, and communal ownership with periodical redistribution of shares (van 
Klaveren, 1953:91). 
 
Wertheim perceived Raffles’ changes as precipitating a transformation of ‘the feudal 
system of government into a modern Western bureaucratic hierarchy’ (Wertheim, 
1956:60).  If we disregard the European connotations of the concept of ‘feudalism’, 
this is a useful conception of the changed power relations superseding the VOC’s 
maintenance of traditional political control with an entrenched Western-state system 
of surplus extraction.  
 
Raffles faced difficulties in abolishing forced labour and payments-in-kind within the 
limited time frame given to transform the Indonesian political economy. Allen and 
Donnithorne argue that there was an inadequate circulation of money to support 
Raffles’ major reforms (Allen and Donnithorne, 1962:22).  However, it was more 
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likely that the imperatives of generating expanded export income determined that, like 
Daendels, Raffles was obliged to maintain the VOC system of forced cultivations.  
 
The end of the Raffles regime 
England’s defeat of Napoleon was followed by Indonesia’s return to Dutch rule. 
Raffles’ idealistic objectives for the colony evaporated in the face of England’s 
strategic decision to establish good relations with Holland as a means of extending 
colonial sovereignty in other regions, and ending their trade-debilitating territorial 
disputes. Raffles was well aware that, rather than establishing the conditions for an 
improvement of Indonesians’ economic opportunity as part of the British Empire’s 
international idealism of free trade and free labour, he, and Indonesia, were pawns in 
the European imperial battles for political and economic supremacy.  
 
English capital had extended its international division of labour to India, but the 
VOC’s preoccupation with rural commodity appropriation had determined that 
Indonesia was not in the position to develop as a wage-based, capitalist enterprise and 
consumer based society.  This determined a continuing colonial preoccupation with 
cash-crop coercion as a means of generating income for colonial self-sufficiency.  The 
liberal era’s immediate legacy of a deficit of ten million guilders became a colonial 
justification for the reintroduction of forced labour (Penders, 1977:10).  
 
The return of the Dutch – the final Dutch liberal era 
European war, civil war with Belgian separatists, the decline of its manufacturing 
industry, and the erosion of its entrepôtal position in Europe had debilitated the 
Netherland’s economy.  With England’s defeat of the French and the consequent 
restoration of the East Indies to Dutch control, the Dutch determined to make the 
colony the major source of income for metropolitan development, and sought to 
maintain liberal forms of labour organisation for that end (Tarling, 1962:159).  
 
The instability of political rule in Indonesia resulting from European-based imperialist 
battles was ended with the 1824 English-Dutch Treaty of London demarking Dutch 
and English territorial ownership with the Straits of Malacca as the dividing line. To 
the South was the Dutch Empire, to the North the British. Thus the Dutch exchanged 
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Malacca for Bencoolen and the Malayan entrepôt for Indonesia (Allen and 
Donnithorne, 1962:22).  
 
In 1824 the King of Holland registered a new private joint-stock company, the 
Netherlands Trading Company (Der Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij NHM) 
giving it monopoly rights over private investment in the colony. This company was 
the commercial agent for more than two-thirds of Indonesian exports and all imports 
from the Netherlands. This enabled the Netherlands’ reassertion of merchant power 
and reduced English shares in Indonesian trade (Utrecht, 1987:174).   
 
The collapse in coffee prices resulting from an expanded Brazilian supply triggered 
the Dutch state’s decision to protect Javan trade from British competition by reviving 
VOC treaties with Indonesian princes (Tarling, 1962:159; Day, 1966: 241).  The 
NHM was given a monopoly of the buying, transporting and selling of Dutch East 
Indies government estate produce on the European market. This heralded the 
introduction of an expanded white settler class, both to help with supervising cash-
crop production and to provide a secure initial market for European exports. 
 
Whilst the post-Raffles regime maintained the role of the regency as paid agents of 
commodity production, they gradually dismantled liberal producer organisation 
systems on the presumption that liberalism had been tried and failed. It was 
considered necessary to reassert strong centralised control over producers and the 
production system (Tarling, 1962:159). 
 
However, further changes to the mechanism of extraction were postponed when Javan 
princes rebelled against the liberal-era dismantling of their traditional powers, status 
and authority (Wertheim, 1956:51). In 1825 Governor General van der Capellen 
discovered that many private Dutch and Chinese estate-owners were leasing land 
from village leaders and employing peasants to work the export commodity crops 
(Spruyt and Robertson, 1972: 110). This violated colonial law enacted to protect 
government enterprise. Van der Capellan’s cancellation of the leasing and 
employment arrangements in those princely territories that had given seigniorial rights 
to European planters was seen as a violation of local autonomy and sparked a major 
war against the Dutch (Tarling, 1962:159). With the replacement of salaries in lieu of 
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the customary tributes of labour and produce, regents passed on their increased costs 
to the peasants by increasing peasant services and forced tribute. This ‘paradoxically, 
produced widespread support for a princely revolt against the Dutch’ (Tarling, 
1962:159). In 1825 members of the Javanese princely courts led by Jogjanese Prince 
Diponegoro took up arms against Dutch rule, launching a rebellion that took Dutch 
forces five years to repress.  
 
The liberal era: summary 
The liberal interregnum was characterised by the establishment and entrenchment of a 
permanent system of rule on behalf of colonial interests.  This replaced the VOC 
transient policy of immediate profit (Day, 1966:130).  The state rule incorporated 
some dismantling of collective labour control, the widespread implementation of 
wage-relations, and the breaking down of traditional hierarchical social relations. The 
state facilitated private extraction by maintaining the VOC institutional structure of 
appropriation, by codifying structures of labour regulation and enforcement, and 
establishing a legal and commercial infrastructure to enforce control over surplus 
production.  This marked the transition from the corporation as state, to an entrenched 
state apparatus for the institutionalisation of cultivation control.  
The key mechanism of change was the replacement of traditional social relationship 
of surplus-as-tribute with the direct extraction of a surplus by the state and private 
companies. The liberal preoccupations determined that the concept of land ownership 
by right of ruler sovereignty was transformed firstly to a foreign sovereign, then into a 
commodity of financial value.  The principle force driving the establishment and 
extension of this state control were the European battles for imperial political and 
economic dominance, and in particular, England’s struggle to attain world political 
and economic hegemony. Indonesia was drawn into this struggle as a pawn in the 
regional strategy for territorial dominance. England’s decision to resolve the struggle 
with Holland in order to pursue its other territorial ambitions meant that Indonesia 
was formally returned to Dutch control in return for free trade and open access 
through the Malacca Straits.  
 
The battles for territorial dominance in the region determined that the priorities for 
Indonesian development were for colonial financial self-sufficiency and the 
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construction of defensive infrastructure. These war imperatives formed the basis for a 
strong state entrenchment within the Indonesian political economy, establishing the 
infrastructure and enforcement apparatus to repress internal dissent and regulate 
production.   
 
The conservative phase – the Cultivation System 
 ‘With the Cultivation System den Bosch struck gold in Java like Moses struck water 
from the rock in the arid desert’  (Fasseur, 1992:24). 
 
Declining colonial returns and Indonesians’ animosity towards Dutch rule that 
culminated in the five-year Javan war were the deciding factors driving a Dutch 
reassessment of their system of colonial appropriation. They considered control over 
the production apparatus could be best achieved, and surplus-extraction maximised, 
by re-establishing the indigenous social structures on which the VOC imposed its 
appropriation regime. The Dutch believed by dismantling the traditional systems of 
law and custom the liberal regimes had removed the key agency of indigenous 
hierarchical rule as the principal source of the VOC’s profits. This precipitated the 
reintroduction of a system of dual political administration with the Dutch-state as ‘big 
brother’ guiding the Indonesian rulers as ‘younger brother’ in the production of a 
surplus for the centre. 
 
This distinction between indigenous political authority and foreign economic control 
is examined in terms of the way in which the state entrenched its political and 
economic authority. The primary focus is on how the state built an expanded 
apparatus of production organisation and labour regulation employing the indigenous 
hierarchical system of tributory relations. The key issue is the impact of this 
intervention on the organisation of labour and the development of wage-relations in 
Indonesia.  
 
The impact of the centre on the periphery 
The Netherland’s economy was devastated by European wars and the costs of the 
Java War (Suroyo, 1993: 151). The metropolitan state envisaged that by readdressing 
the processes of appropriation from the colony, its profitability could be restored and 
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the Netherland’s financial problems overcome. King William 1st charged Johannes 
van den Bosch with the task of restoring colonial profitability.  The King gave den 
Bosch the imprimatur to carry out the financial role of banker to the Dutch 
Government. He was given the authority to grant loans on the security of future crops. 
To support the redevelopment of the colonial property, den Bosch took to Indonesia 
two million guilders in cash with the authority to obtain another two million on credit.  
 
The Dutch King’s confidence in den Bosch’ ability to return a profit from the East 
Indies was based on den Bosch’ experience in enforcing labour-discipline as 
Commissioner-General of the Dutch slave-colony of Suriname in the West Indies. 
Den Bosch had generated substantial profits for the Netherland’s state from the 
colony.  He considered liberal regimes to be less productive than slave regimes and 
that the VOC’s coercion system showed the potential for even greater profit. He 
calculated that if the costs of reproducing labour were not to be borne by their owners 
– as they were under slavery – but by the village community, a forced labour system 
was potentially more profitable than slavery.   
 
The major shift in labour control within the Dutch East Indies was engendered by the 
state’s concerns with political disorder. The lengthy battle with Prince Diponegoro 
and the eruption of other princely rebellions across the archipelago had created a 
concern amongst metropolitan decision-makers that liberalism, by allowing ‘native’ 
economic autonomy, represented a political threat to colonial control. The Dutch 
committed substantial resources to repressing the opposition, and sought a mechanism 
for the restoration of long-term economic as well as political control. They 
determined to employ the peasantry to work state plantations on the lines of the VOC 
Priangan-region system of compulsory coffee production. The regime was determined 
to preclude indigenous producers from a share of the export market earnings, and 
prevented peasants from cultivating export crops for private sale.   
 
Institutions of colonial control  
A key component of den Bosch’ program was the rejection of market forces in favour 
of the re-establishment of traditional systems of production organisation.  He focused 
on what he perceived to be the two key social institutions underpinning indigenous 
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production organisation: indigenous hierarchical rule and village organisation. He 
determined to reinstate much of the regents’ authority, position and prestige, and re-
engage them in the task of political rule through the re-establishment of tributory and 
hierarchical relations. Den Bosch’ role for the regents was clear. He argued  ‘[s]urely 
it should be easy to prove that we can govern the Javanese only through the medium 
of their own chiefs...’ (Penders, 1977:10).   
 
The Dutch believed that production could be maximised by reinstituting the regent’s 
right to impose tributory demands on the peasantry. Village life with its social 
institutions and customs was thought to provide a political haven from external 
pressures and as such to be cultivated as part of the Dutch imperative to restore 
traditional social relations.  Den Bosch’ objective was to employ this social 
infrastructure to maximise appropriation and minimise social conflict. Accordingly 
the Dutch determined to remove all aspects of western ‘interference’ in village life.2 
Den Bosch’ rejection of wage-relations in favour of traditional village systems of 
production organisation through social custom (adat), and compulsory unpaid service 
for the regent (corvee) constituted, however, the core element of social regulation for 
production organisation under the Cultivation System.  
 
Den Bosch’ policy of providing regents and the native rulers or village headmen with 
a stake in the production monopoly by granting a share of the produce  (‘a culture-
percentage’) ensured that the regents enforced the intermediary labour and crop 
supply agreements between government and the people.  These land-rent agreements 
involved labour contracts in which local authorities leased village land along with its 
inhabitants to non-Indonesians, generally European, planters. The planter could then 
demand compulsory labour and the production of specified amounts of particular 
crops. However, during this period the government was practically the sole planter 
and the Netherlands Trading Dutch Company (NHM) the sole agent (Lyon, 1970:6).  
 
                                                 
2 Later chapters consider the veracity of den Bosch’ conception of the village as a ‘natural’ component of 
indigenous social organisation. 
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Colonial controls enforcing surplus production   
Land control 
Den Bosch’ political and strategic approach was to maintain the mystique of 
traditional rule in a traditional environment, whilst ensuring that all productive land 
was effectively controlled by the state. This effectively wiped out individual or 
common ownership of desahs that began to flourish in the liberal era.  Communal 
ownership was replaced with redistributive ownership of desahs as government 
obligations eroded land’s traditional value as a privilege. Where Dutch officials 
forced the production of world-market cultivations past the point where producers 
could generate adequate supplies of subsistence crops, or in situations where 
oppressive conditions and penalties for non-compliance determined it, the villagers 
migrated to ever more remote regions away from intensive Dutch control.  
 
The Dutch state had granted den Bosch comprehensive powers to implement his 
schemes to force villagers to cultivate tropical export crops. He ordered the 
assessment of Javan cultivation areas and according to conditions, altitude, and 
climate introduced, maintained and extended cultures. The resident allocated his 
assessment among districts and villages.  Bosch ordered the planting of fixed areas of 
villagers’ own holdings with an export product and to deliver this product to the 
government at a low rate. The state employed police officials to enforce this 
production.  
 
For coffee cultivation the government supplied the land and the villages provided 
workers. Sugar workers were paid in proportion to the amount of sugar manufactured 
from the cane they grew, and received extra payments for harvesting, transport and 
factory labour - usually as forced labour.    For sugar and indigo the villages had to 
give up part of their sawahs (rice-cultivation land).  
 
The state demanded that new crops be cultivated, most notably, indigo, tea, cochineal, 
tobacco, and silk, with the largest continuing to be coffee. Sugar was the second 
largest crop as it required more machinery and thus more of the limited capital 
(Tarling, 1966:161). Sugar and indigo were grown on irrigated fields and rotated 
around the available rice fields so that before each was planted, peasants had to tear 
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down the intricate arrangement of dykes and channels which previously serviced rice 
crops, and prepare large garden tracts for planting cane or indigo cuttings. Sugar 
fields were often organised in large complexes worked by a number of villages 
together.  The authority of the state and European influence had now reached out into 
individual desahs, enabling the expanded domination of the regents.  
 
Whilst sugar was well suited for cultivation on rice sawahs, coffee was grown on 
`waste' or uncultivated lands, and the government assumed full control over these.  
The shift in land use from sawah to sugar and indigo led to a vast expansion of 
cultivations into the hinterlands.  The restriction of sugar cultivation to existing sawah 
and the total control of sugar cultivation on state-owned uncultivated regions inhibited 
individual commercial opportunities for the Javanese peasants (Tarling, 1966:161).  
Villagers were forced to allocate 20 per cent of village lands on sawhas and on 
uncultivated lands for the production of specified commercial crops for delivery to the 
state. They were forced to provide 66 days of labour per year to work on these state 
plantations.   
 
Compulsory labour duties were extended as an obligation for each village household, 
manual labourer and merchant, independent of land ownership (Suroyo, 1990:154). 
As the result of these expanded state cultivations, much of lowland Java thus became 
a ‘virtual state sugar plantation’, with the value of sugar exports from the Indies in 
1840 making up 77.4 per cent of the total value of exports (Robison, 1986:12).  
 
The state enforced the reclamation and distribution of land to provide a means of 
supporting an expanded workforce. These people contributed compulsory labour and 
could use the land for subsistence production, thus reducing the state’s payment of 
wages (Suroyo, 1990: 155).  Suroyo argues that whilst this created an expanded 
‘peasantisation’ in the early years of the Cultivation System, by the latter half of the 
century as available land for distribution declined, a landless class of peasantry was 
forced into the labour market (Suroyo, 1990: 156). 
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State legal apparatus 
To enforce state orders on cultivation production the Dutch meted out corporal 
punishment to those village chiefs who did not comply with cultivation orders, and in 
turn, the chiefs punished the villagers. General punishment for non-compliance 
included banishment, rotan and chain lashings, forced labour, and being chained by 
the feet - on Javanese chiefs for ‘laziness’ and ‘sluggishness’ in the task of forcing 
people to expand surplus production of prescribed crops (Alatas, 1977:66). Van Soest 
described examples of punishment as ‘prison, 25 lashes with the cane, hanging of the 
victim by the thumbs from a tree, fastening on a wooden cross for one night, eating 
horse faeces’ (van Klaveren, 1953:121).  Between 1862 and 1863, the courts ordered 
3 474,375 beatings be carried out (van Klaveren, 1953:121). Flight was frequent, but 
often women and children remained who then were subject to punishment until the 
men returned.  
 
In the era of the Cultivation System western plantations employed forced labour and 
reduced the wages to less than subsistence. Female tea-leave pickers were paid one-
and-one half cent per day, whilst a Dutch plantation administrator’s salary amounted 
to 500 guilders a month (Utrecht, 1976:176). Dissenting villagers were imprisoned, 
and under the principle of ‘mutual obligation’ were obliged to contribute towards the 
costs of imprisonment by building roads, bridges and irrigation works.  
 
The controlling ethos 
A consistent theme of Dutch rule was the dominant ruling ethos that colonial 
extraction was justifiable because it brought western values of productive dynamism 
to native peoples not self-motivated to create the conditions for their own economic 
development.   It was alleged they lacked self-motivation, and were insufficiently 
intellectually developed to be productive workers (Hussein, 1977:61). In 1830 Den 
Bosch remarked ‘never forget that the Javan has progressed no further in intellectual 
terms than our children of twelve or thirteen years old, and possesses even much less 
knowledge than they do’ (Elson, 1986:139).  Den Bosch considered that this was an 
admirable characteristic for the colonial project as the Javanese’ ‘habit of submission 
and obedience’, made ‘many things possible here (in Indonesia) which elsewhere 
would be fraught with great difficulties’ (Elson, 1986:140).   However, as the 
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Javanese were considered to be childlike and lazy ‘with neither the initiative nor the 
inclination to voluntarily cultivate export crops like coffee and sugar’ thus ‘they must 
be led and governed as children’ (Elson, 1986:140).  Given Indonesians’ `childlike 
respect’ for traditional authority, it was appropriate for them to be `led and governed’ 
by their own leaders (Elson, 1986:140).   
 
These attitudes constituted the basis of an ethical environment justifying the 
imposition of strict regulatory and disciplinary controls over Indonesian labour. Thus, 
force was necessary as it brought ‘the habits of steady industry and the art of scientific 
cultivation’ (Wallace, 1874:74). 
 
The Cultivation System was justified in terms of redefined notions of the nature of 
work. It was said to have brought the morally uplifting and character-building virtue 
of labour to a backward and indolent race.  The belief in the racial superiority of 
Europeans was a key rationale supporting the reinstatement of regent authority and 
the hierarchical divisions of this social structure.  Colonial officials constituted a 
further, upper, stratum of rule imposed on the traditional hierarchy of caste 
distinction.   
 
Den Bosch argued that tribute had been a usual component of the peasantry’s 
traditional responsibility. The presumption was that the peasantry delivered a portion 
of their production to a higher authority and worked part of each year at tasks 
designated by their superiors ‘as an expression of social solidarity and supportive of 
the hierarchical social order’ (Van Niel, 1990: 73).  
 
The European colonialists made a strong distinction between the work-inclinations of 
the Chinese and of the Javanese.  The distinction justified the coercion of the Javanese 
and positioning of the Chinese in the colonial segmented and hierarchical system as 
financial intermediaries, where ‘[t]hey were as indispensable to the Dutch as Dutch 
rule was to them (Zain’uddin, 1968:116)’. Zain’uddin points to the powerful influence 
of the Chinese in trade and commerce, and notes their industriousness as they sought 
to build a niche in a remote social environment. This supported the Europeans’ view 
of the comparative laziness of the indigenous peasant ‘secure in his traditional role 
within the village community’ (Zain’uddin, 1968:116). She contends that this 
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supported the myth of the industrious ‘Chinese and the lazy Javanese or Malay, on 
which was built the whole edifice of forced delivery’ (Zain’uddin, 1968:116). This 
echoes Raffles belief that Indonesians lack of enthusiasm for producing export crops 
for the Dutch was a function of   the income received rather than ‘natural indolence’. 
Day believed that the natives only worked because they were forced to, ‘not because 
they wanted to, in fear of punishment and not for hope of reward … The peasants had 
been watching the merchant boats take their produce to Holland and return empty-
handed: why shouldn’t they let them go away in the same condition?’ (Day, 
1966:353). 
 
Income for Holland 
The Cultivation System’s large-scale exploitation of the peasantry created enormous 
profits for the Dutch metropolis.  More than half of the agrarian-sector population was 
directly involved in government plantation production in 1840, but the total land 
cultivated was only 6 per cent of Java (Suroyo, 1993:150). Most of the surplus was 
exported from the 1830s thus the export and fiscal surpluses and the drain from 
Indonesia in terms of remitted profits and other outward capital flows ‘had few 
parallels elsewhere in the colonial world’ (Booth, 1990:294). 
 
Between 1831 and 1877, 832.4 million guilders in budget surpluses were remitted 
from the Indies to Holland (Penders, 1977:7).  Total exports increased from 12.9 
million florins in 1830 to 74.2 million florins in 1840, with 80 per cent consisting of 
coffee (Allen and Donnithorne, 1962:23). The export of sugar and coffee earned 
approximately 97 per cent of the Cultivation System’s estimated profits (Caldwell, 
1968:47). 
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Table 2.1: ‘Batig slot’ (profit) from the Cultivation System in Java 
 
Years Total profit to 
Netherlands 
(Million guilders) 
 
% of Dutch national 
income 
1833 – 40 75.9 35.3 
1840 – 45 75.7 19.3 
1845 – 50 70.6 27.0 
1850 – 55 80.6 29.4 
1855 – 60 139.8 50.7 
1860 – 65 126.8 56.8 
1865 – 70 91.3 27.5 
1870 – 75 65.0 17.2 
 
Source: Utrecht, 1987: 175  
 
Metropolitan pressures for change 
The price of the Cultivation System of wealth-extraction was Indonesian economic 
stagnation. Between 1830 and 1900 growth within Indonesia was less than 2 per cent 
per annum (Booth, 1990:294).  Den Bosch’ condition that only a fifth of the rice 
fields of a village should be used for cultivating cash crops was generally disregarded, 
and the demand for compulsory labour was extended from 66 to 240 days per year for 
particular cultures (Alatas, 1977: 63).  The regents were pressured to maximise profits 
regardless of the deleterious impacts on the peasantry, and this overrode the checks 
and balances of the pre-colonial adat law limiting surplus appropriation to bearable, 
and reproducible, levels.  For the first two decades of its operation the system ensured 
that the peasantry provided as much as four or five times the amount of labour 
customarily demanded before 1830 (Alatas, 1977:28). 
 
Fixed-tribute forced-cultivation of world market crops was carried out at the expense 
of subsistence cropping. The surplus drained from the country led to a decline in local 
income and subsistence production causing widespread starvation amongst an 
increasingly resentful population. Large numbers of peasants were driven to emigrate 
to areas where the culture system was not in force (Penders, 1977:8).  Thus the 
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control that the Dutch could exert was limited by the marginal point of extraction 
where ‘they preferred flight’ (Zainu’ddin, 1968: 109).  Thus the overall effect of the 
first regime of coercion was to reduce surplus production of world-market 
commodities, both by forcing producers to migrate from Dutch controlled areas, and 
destroying producers’ motivation to cultivate world market crops in those areas, even 
in the face of dire penalty. 
 
News of the chronic famine and poverty engendered by the Cultivation System 
reached Holland and was publicised in the press and parliament. The immiserisation 
of the population was seen by many critics and especially by the increasingly vocal 
liberals in Holland as the inevitable consequence of the labour coercion and monopoly 
trade of the Cultivation System. The idea that the ‘native’ was a victim of the system 
of forced labour gathered momentum with the wide distribution of a 1860 book 
exposing the Cultivation System’s harsh regime to an apparently previously largely 
unaware metropolitan public.  Former Dutch East Indies state-official Douwes Dekker 
published Max Havelaar as an attack on the Netherland’s citizens complacency over 
their colonial government’s system of labour coercion claiming that ‘it is a fact that 
very few Europeans think it worth their trouble to stoop and observe the emotions of 
those coffee and sugar-producing machines we call “natives”’ (Dekker, 1967:73).  
 
However, Dutch liberals were in a dilemma. The removal of the Cultivation System 
was a threat to Holland's income, and liberals argued for a gradual change on the basis 
of maintaining profits from the colony. In 1851 a prominent liberal, Van Hoevell, 
foreshadowed a fundamental condition for the dismantling of state-interventionist 
controls over wealth appropriation and labour coercion. He argued that the Cultivation 
System was indispensable, ‘not only for the Netherlands but also to bring Java to a 
state of development and prosperity by ushering in a social environment in which 
private entrepreneurs and investors would be able to assume the role of government 
and its officials’ (Fasseur, 1992:123).  
 
Thus the key issue underpinning liberal ambitions for the Dutch East Indies was not 
the moral propriety of the Netherlands living on wealth generated from the 
immiserisation of the Indies population. The issue revolved around ‘which system 
would bring, directly or indirectly, the most benefits: the system in which the 
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government acted as producer and entrepreneur or a state of affairs in which it was 
not agriculture “on high authority” but “free labour” that made Java productive for the 
benefit of the mother country’ (Fasseur, 1992:161).  
 
The advocates for expanded opportunities for private-enterprise in the colony believed 
that ‘free labour’ employment would motivate Indonesians to be more productive and 
thus create more profits for investors and revenue for the state from charges and taxes.  
They argued the state’s monopoly and restrictions on private activity reflected 
colonial officials’ ‘lack of intelligence, and narrowness’, and that the state was 
‘jealously’ hoarding the opportunities that should have been made available for 
private accumulation (Fasseur, 1992:105). In 1851 a prominent liberal member of the 
Dutch parliament affirmed the principle of private corporate prerogative. He advised 
the government ‘to relinquish as quickly as possible the improper role of ‘planter and 
merchant’ and to limit itself to the role of ‘sovereign’.  ‘Freed from the burden of the 
government cultivations, the Javanese people would seek their own advantage in “free 
labour”, as a result of which production and various taxation yields would increase 
considerably’ (Fasseur, 1992:105). Declining profits were a decisive factor triggering 
the rise of an expanded private corporate intervention, and declining role of the 
forced-cultivations system (Zainu’ddin, 1968: 161). 
 
Conclusion 
A major conceptual theme of this research is that colonial rule was primarily 
dedicated towards extracting a surplus from Indonesia, and the colonial state was the 
prime agency for turning the productive base to this end. The way in which producers 
were organised and regulated was determined by central political and economic 
ambitions in an interaction with existing political and economic conditions in the 
periphery.  With Holland’s economic decline, especially in the face of England’s 
supremacy in terms of trade competitiveness and industrial productivity, the colony 
was seen as the primary means of restoring metropolitan fortunes.  This was solely 
through a continuing role as ‘milch cow’ for commodity extraction as the Netherlands 
was in no position to implement the sorts of imperial economic ties that provided 
England’s manufacturers with colonial consumer markets. Thus the metropolitan 
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agenda for Indonesia remained as a resource-supplier rather than a market for 
European goods.  
 
In the periphery the Javan war was a salutary experience to the colonial state that they 
held a precarious grip on Indonesia.  The eventual costly military repression of 
dissidents convinced the state to impose a vastly extended and enforced colonial 
administrative system for the extraction of Indonesia’s resources.  
 
These factors influenced the Netherlands’ government to pursue its profit ambitions 
by rejecting laissez-faire market relations and reinstituting the system of labour 
coercion as applied under the VOC mercantilist system. The substantive difference 
with the VOC’s cash-crop-coercion system was that the state had largely subdued 
political opposition and imposed territorial sovereignty. The VOC shareholder-driven 
imperatives of corporate extraction were now replaced by the state institutionalisation 
of production control. Coercion was to be underpinned with a vastly expanded and 
strengthened administrative and enforcement apparatus.  The pro-consuls’ early 
imperative for the state to seize territorial control was finally accomplished. 
 
This analysis rejects the benevolent paternalist perspective that the coercive system 
provided Indonesians with the opportunity to participate in world markets. From this 
perspective the economic policies of the colonial state established the conditions for 
the development of an indigenous economic autonomy. Booth’s analysis is perhaps 
the best example of this perspective.  For Booth, the Cultivation System drew ‘many 
millions of Indonesians into increasing dependence on the world economy for their 
livelihood’ thus enabling a ‘closer engagement in the world economy’ and (implicitly) 
national economic development (Booth, 1990:274).  
 
There was no doubt that Indonesians were increasingly affected by variations in world 
market demand resulting from an increasing economic dependency on forced 
cultivations.  This, however, was an enforced dependency whereby their opportunities 
for survival in the face of a decline in market demand were vastly reduced given a 
decline in subsistence production.  Further, Indonesians’ engagement with the world 
economy was solely via the Dutch, as they had no ownership of their produce, nor 
gained market-returns. The conceptual understanding of an exclusionary process at 
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work serves to illuminate the distinction between a colonial engagement, as Dutch 
realisation of Indonesians surplus production, and an indigenous engagement, as 
producers of surplus for the centre.  
 
A further major theme of this research is that each phase of colonial organisation 
established particular conditions for, and defined the character of, subsequent political 
and economic regimes.  In this understanding the Cultivation System’s importance for 
Indonesia’s economic development did not – as perceived by Booth – reside in the 
fact of the regime’s productivity. Whilst increased productivity was certainly a major 
characteristic of the System, in this research its importance was in the way in which it 
established the conditions for the subsequent system of private capital accumulation. 
The state is seen as playing a fundamental role in exerting control over the productive 
apparatus and enforcing the production of a surplus. Both the apparatus and the 
surplus are seen as crucial determinants of the subsequent capital accumulation. The 
prime means of establishing the basis of control was the reinstitution of indigenous 
rule as a key means of enforcing labour control. Den Bosch’ major accomplishment in 
the history of the development of processes of capital accumulation in Indonesia was 
thus his transformation of the village social organisation into a production system, 
with the central-state as owner, the regent as agent for the state, and the village 
community as the workforce or labour power.  
 
This system of production organisation based on forced deliveries at fixed prices, and 
the re-establishment of the indigenous elite as production controllers, consolidated the 
colonial exclusionary system. Indonesians carried out the production and the Dutch 
owned the product and realised it through their market systems. The colonial state had 
thereby established the conditions for the enforcement of private capital and 
metropolitan-state appropriation ambitions for Indonesia.  
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Chapter 3 
The Corporate Plantation system 1870-1912 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
“Colonial industry dispensed with forced labour in the later 19th Century and 
replaced it with a new, more subtle and more purely wage-labour economic form of 
coercion, grounded in the deepening poverty and dependence of the Javanese 
peasantry” (Elson, 1986:142). 
 
The Cultivation System entrenched colonial wealth extraction by reimposing forced-
labour as the core element of the surplus production apparatus.  This post Javan-war 
rejection of the ‘liberal reformist’ private appropriation agenda brought into sharp 
focus the state’s imperative to not only enforce the production of wealth for the 
metropolis, but to underpin that enforcement by instituting an inflexible system of 
social as well as economic control.  The continuing theme of the crucial role played 
by the state in facilitating wealth production and appropriation is illuminated in this 
chapter’s exposition of the return of private (plantation) production enabled by the 
Cultivation System’s regaining of political and economic control over Indonesia’s 
production system. It describes the process by which the state facilitated private 
accumulation by establishing the necessary infrastructure and securing a supply of 
production factors necessary for the private cultivation of export crops.  Again, the 
analysis focuses on labour as the linchpin for private capital accumulation. 
 
The Cultivation System’s consequent re-establishment of the productive conditions 
enabling Indonesia to be once again a highly profitable resource for Holland 
reawakened European interest in investing in all sectors related to primary commodity 
production and distribution. The resulting capitalisation of the Indonesian agricultural 
sector is examined in terms of its role in defining Indonesia’s late 19th Century 
transition to capitalist production relations. This analysis thus considers the Corporate 
Plantation era as part of a developing process based on the colonial foundations of 
territorial expansion and labour coercion.   
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Prefaced by a nearly two century private corporate intervention with the VOC as 
surrogate state, these foundations were set in place by the state as a primary condition 
for private accumulation. In the first instance primary industry accumulation required 
a secure and expanded supply of arable land for cultivations. Again the state is seen to 
play a vital role in facilitating the transformation of village subsistence lands to 
private ownership, and dismantling the traditional cultural ties on land use.  
 
 This process is considered in the context of metropolitan political and class 
determinants of Indonesian economic development, and the way these interrelated 
with the forces operating in the periphery. The resulting growth of commercial 
institutions and part-processing industry supporting corporate plantation expansion 
foreshadows a developing competitive tension between segments of capital. This is 
investigated in the context of a takeover of small planter concerns by limited 
companies, and the competition between established planter interests and 
manufacturing companies for low cost, strongly controlled, labour.  
 
Whilst the processes of labour regulation are seen in the following exposition as a 
crucial element of private accumulation, the enforcement of a ready supply of labour 
and land is also seen as a function of the state commodification of land. This 
argument will be developed within the context of the introduction of the Agrarian 
Law and associated restrictions on indigenous economic autonomy. 
 
In a further counter to the established literature and building on the ‘continuity across 
epochs’ theme, the chapter will examine the role of the state in facilitating private 
accumulation. The major proposition to be considered is the extent to which this 
provided the basis for a continuing security of wealth production and appropriation. 
The threats to this security are investigated in the contexts of a growing political 
opposition to foreign ownership and economic control, and the shift in colonial 
priorities away from direct engagement in wealth appropriation to the facilitation of 
private accumulation.  This foreshadows an analysis of the state’s role both in 
addressing the counter pressures of private corporate ambition and popular discontent. 
At all stages, however, and in contradistinction to the established perspectives, the 
discourse encapsulates an appreciation of the core role of the state in the direct ‘hands 
on’ facilitation of private capital accumulation.    
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The transitional role of the Cultivation System  
Whilst much of the literature suggests the shift to market-driven liberalism from a 
paternalistic system of collective coercion was a remarkable about-face in colonial 
administration, an alternative critique suggests that the expanded private capital 
accumulation of this era was a logical development in processes of capital 
accumulation. In the former understanding, the new wave of liberal thought 
engendered a changed political discourse triggering the state’s demolition of what was 
perceived to have been an anachronistic system of labour repression.  Robison 
perceives the Cultivation System as having denied Indonesia the mid-19th Century 
acceleration of world-market production causing it to stagnate in a ‘frozen, pre-
capitalist mode’, where ‘existing Javanese agrarian relations of production’ were 
consolidated (Knight, 1982:148). In this scenario the liberal changes to the 
Cultivation System reflected the state’s sudden appreciation ‘that the “character” or 
“nature” of Javanese villagers (i.e. as ‘lazy’, ‘intransigent’ etc. A.M.) was not 
necessarily an immutable given, but a result of the way in which their lives were 
organised’ (Elson, 1986:155).   
 
It is argued that the concept of a change from a ‘frozen mode’ via an ‘awakening’ 
does not illuminate the fundamental political economy processes resulting from the 
Cultivation System, nor contribute towards an understanding of the forces driving the 
change to the Cultivation System of colonial appropriation. A conceptual focus on the 
sphere of political relations gives no inkling as to why and how private capital could 
build a massive private corporate system from a ‘frozen’ mode.  Instead, a focus on 
the political and economic organisation of the Cultivation System shows the 
importance of the regime as a mechanism of dynamic development that created the 
necessary foundations for an expanded western private capitalist intervention in the 
Indonesian political economy. The major considerations are the character of the 
particular economic interests seen to determine the policy changes, the advantages 
accruing to those interests as a result of the conditions of production organisation set 
in place by the Cultivation System, and thus the importance of that system for an 
expanded private capital intervention in Indonesia.  
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The political pressure to allow an expanded private corporate intervention in 
Indonesia came from existing western interests in the colony and European-based 
investors. Parliamentary debates indicated that the Netherlands government’s priority 
was to retain the colony as a major source of income whilst attempting to ameliorate 
the harsh living and working conditions that jeopardised labour reproduction under 
the Cultivation System. The second objective was to be accomplished by giving land-
ownership security to Indonesians and replacing coercion with wage-market 
regulation.  Indigenous and state needs were to be ‘balanced’ against the imperative of 
giving ‘equal’ consideration to western agricultural companies’ corporate ambitions 
(Booth, 1997:29).   
 
Zainu’ddin suggests there were other corporate interests driving corporate expansion 
in the colony. She points to the fact that the Netherlands’ loss of the more highly 
industrialised areas of southern Holland to Belgium caused the Dutch state to employ 
wealth generated by the Cultivation System to support industrial development in the 
north of Holland (Zainu’ddin, 1968:139).  The financial accumulation from these 
industries generated the investment capital driving greater private economic 
penetration in the periphery.  This process was limited to the late 19th Century 
opening up of new Outer Island areas to extract the raw materials needed for 
European industrialisation, especially rubber, oil, and tin (Zainu’ddin, 1974:139). In 
this view, the political decline of mercantilist dominance in the face of the growing 
power of private corporate interests in Holland led to the state encouragement of 
private investment in the colony.  
 
Whilst there is no doubt that this capital investment was a vital factor in the expansion 
of the system of private corporate accumulation in Indonesia, the political pressure for 
the state to provide greater opportunities for private investment began in the mid 
century whilst surpluses from Dutch manufacturing arose at the end of the century.  A 
more critical analysis of events suggests that, whilst many forces determined the rise 
of the corporate sector and the gradual demise of the Cultivation System, the prime 
instigators of change were the European plantation and processing-mill owners in 
Indonesia. Government sugar contractors led the political campaign to expand their 
operations and these were followed by the ‘agency houses, which had never ceased to 
exist in Java and thrived under the Cultivation System’ (Van Niel, 1990:86).  The 
 78
agency houses believed that they could gain greater profits from their enterprise than 
with the ‘patronage-ridden government system’ (Van Niel, 1990:86). 
 
It should be emphasised that the existing European plantation and processing 
proprietors’ pressure to liberalise the system had the primary objective of, and was 
limited to, the expansion of corporate opportunity.  Thus liberalisation was not 
intended to apply to the system of labour regulation. We recall that the labour-
coercion aspect of the Cultivation System was a response to the private companies’ 
inability to enforce discipline over the workforce. When Van Hoevell proposed the 
dismantling of the system of labour coercion in the mid-19th Century, this was only on 
the condition that the colony had reached a stage of development where private 
entrepreneurs and investors could ‘assume the role of government and its officials’ 
(Fasseur, 1992:123).  In other words the state had to establish the apparatus of labour 
and social control as a precursor for private accumulation.  
 
The continuing role of the state in maintaining the conditions for appropriation clearly 
indicated that there was no sudden about-face from labour-coercion to market 
liberalism. More particularly it shows that senior figures of the metropolitan 
establishment had in mind that labour-coercion was a finite employment-regulating 
device that would cease once the state had established full control over society and the 
production system. In fact, from the earliest stages of the den Bosch regime, 
government considered that private processing companies were sufficiently 
financially independent to operate without the need of forced labour. Thus as early as 
1834 the government had indicated to private processing factory employers they 
should attempt to obtain and regulate their own supply of labour (Elson, 1986:143).  
The objective was to ‘wean’ the private employers away from the ‘nurturing’ state-
subsidy of cheap or no-cost labour. Employers’ succeeded in pressuring the 
government to stall this reform, and coerced labour remained the mainstay of private 
plantation surplus extraction until the mid-1850s. 
 
This evidence of continuity in the development of a private corporate regime of 
appropriation supports a key conceptual theme of this research – that the developing 
processes of production-system control are primarily determined by the conditions 
required for capital accumulation. Once these conditions were established, the 
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Cultivation System of production organisation and labour regulation could then be 
dismantled in favour of an expanded private corporate intervention. The necessary 
conditions for this intervention included a state-imposed apparatus of social and 
labour control, the extended commodification of land and the effective application of 
the labour market as a system of labour regulation.  
 
Expanded private corporate investment 
The process of extended private corporate intervention was to focus on corporate 
plantations, with expanded output fuelling a growth of private value-adding 
manufacturing companies primarily in sugar production. The state instituted a variety 
of incentives, protectionist measures, and concessions to encourage European 
investment in this industry. These included interest-free loans, cheap materials and 
forced labour. As a result, by the late 1840s nearly a hundred sugar factories had 
commenced operation in east and central Java (Knight, 1982:132). 
 
The colonial state subsidised private sector development by supplying forced labour 
for cultivation, harvesting, transportation of crops to the processor; for the 
construction of the infrastructure to facilitate transport, such as ports and roads; for 
the construction and supply of capital goods for factories, such as building, 
woodcutting for the mill steam-engines, for factory work; and the transportation and 
loading of processed commodities to the ports and onto the ships (Ingleson, 1986:19). 
Labour mobility was advanced through an expanded transport system.  The trunk 
roads built in the 1830s were extended through a railway network feeding into 
Surabaya, Semarang, Cirebon, Batavia and Yogyakarta. These created labour 
catchment areas, with many of the unskilled workers coming from the hinterland to 
find work in the towns (Ingleson, 1986:19).  
 
Introduction of market-forces 
By the late 1860s it was clear to the metropolitan state that the growth and 
competitive capacity of privately-run milling and manufacturing companies was 
sufficiently strong to warrant the removal of the coerced labour ‘friction’ on the 
movement of labour both in the market and to employers. The colonial government 
ordered private companies to employ ‘voluntary’ (non state-coerced) wage labour, or 
 80
pay higher wages for the employment of coerced labour. By 1872 no government 
sugar factory employed labour ‘conscripted and delivered by the government’ (Elson, 
1986:159). 
 
Other direct forms of subsidy were removed in 1854, with the Government’s colonial 
Regulation (Indisch Regeringsreglement) reducing the government’s role as export 
agency (Booth, 1998:30). Whilst the government maintained its monopoly control 
over the most profitable crops, such as coffee, by the late 1850s rising world market 
rural commodity prices drew private investment into other cultivations. In the early 
1860s the government began selling state-run estates to private companies. In 1862 it 
sold its pepper plantations; in 1863 its clove and nutmeg farms; in 1865 its indigo, tea, 
cinnamon and cochineal farms; and, in 1866 its tobacco plantations (Spruyt and 
Robertson, 1972:87). The capital costs of the ‘privatisation’ buyouts meant that the 
major players were banking or trading companies, or conglomerate planters pooling 
their resources to extend plantation production.  
 
Liberating land as a productive commodity 
The social and political regimen disciplining and enforcing a supply of labour for 
private plantations, whilst a fundamental condition of appropriation, was insufficient 
in itself to support the vast plantation expansion envisaged by the state and primary 
industry capital.  The second vital condition of appropriation was an unrestrained 
supply of arable land. In 1870 the private-cultivator lobby achieved this with the 
Netherlands’ Parliament passing of the Agrarian Law. This legislation imposed state 
title on all Indonesian land not controlled by village communities, allowed the leasing 
of village land for export crops in rotation with sustenance crops, and the provision of 
heritable leases. The legislation facilitated capital accumulation, directly through 
changes in land-supply for Corporate Plantations, and indirectly through the impact of 
changed land-ownership patterns on the labour supply for agricultural commodity 
production. The objective of the Act was to transform ownership relations that were 
perceived by the colonial state as an impediment to the transfer of ownership of land 
in the market place. The legislation is thus considered in terms of its impact on 
traditional land-ownership relationships and social ties. 
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The Act determined that all unoccupied land not privately owned nor subject to native 
rights was declared ‘free’ land (Allen and Donnithorne, 1962:68). The implication 
was that as Indonesia was sovereign territory of the Netherlands government, land not 
controlled by the village was owned by the Dutch state. The colonial government 
gave Dutch Netherlands subjects and companies registered in the Indies the authority 
to lease ‘free’ land for a term of not more than 75 years. These heritable leases were 
attractive for European planters as they allowed a sufficient period to allow the 
planting of slow-maturing perennials and the erection of processing factories and 
other buildings. Moreover, as the land was available in large tracts, it was suitable for 
extensive forms of agriculture (Furnivall, 1944:312)   
 
Another, more socially destabilising, component of the legislation opened-up 
traditional irrigated rice growing lands (sawahs) for heritable lease by plantation 
companies for up to 21 years (Robison, 1986:6,7). This was intended to balance 
indigenous land-security against foreign extraction by allowing peasants to cultivate 
their subsistence crops whilst still allowing the private cultivation of export crops – 
largely sugar – on a rotational basis (Wertheim, 1956:80). Thus the Law was designed 
to protect peasants from dispossession by foreign planters by prohibiting the sale of 
the peasantry’s land whilst giving expanded leasing opportunities for plantation 
owners. This paved the way for a great expansion in private capital plantation sector 
investment. By 1930 the total rented private estate area was 3.8 million hectares 
(Robison, 1986:6,7). 
 
Whilst this land was leased, not directly owned by foreign capital, the private access 
to land and the income/rental/commodity-price transaction transformed traditional 
village relations with the land. Village leaders were responsible to their local 
community in the negotiations with corporate plantations over leasing arrangements. 
The village land had been cooperatively, communally, or individually owned. These 
income-as-rent, land-use negotiations transformed both the concept of land as a public 
resource for village use, the valuation of land as a market-commodity, and the 
cooperative use of that land. Village land was now increasingly alienated from its 
traditional social and cultural setting of communal ownership and transformed into a 
productive commodity owned and controlled by individuals. Thus whilst earlier 
colonial authorities had not resolved the difficulty of land commodification because it 
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was not clear just who owned the land, the Agrarian Law overcame this difficulty by 
allocating the responsibility for ownership to the local community – through the 
village head – and imposing a mechanism of commodification through long-term 
lease.   
 
The Act as a means of consolidating labour commodification 
The Act also played an indirect role in establishing the conditions for an expanded 
labour supply for plantation and processing mills production through the altered land-
ownership relations. The village leaders’ appointment as agents for the supply and 
rental of land gave them further political power within the village. This engendered a 
patronage system of political, social and economic relationships that reflected the 
graduations of wealth and rank within the village.  Village leaders assumed the right 
to impose a ‘tribute’ exaction of a proportion of villagers’ surplus produce and labour 
in return for protection and social advantage (Elson, 1986: 155). The change to village 
power relations was not smooth as evidenced by the emergence of popular opposition 
to village leaders’ decisions.  The leaders’ state-instituted ability to control rental-
income arrangements through individual land-ownership negotiations created 
marginalised groups of peasants without access to land. Further, the low rentals paid 
to the peasantry by the plantation companies were less than subsistence income, 
forcing the peasantry to work as ‘wage slaves’ for these companies (May, 1978:22).  
 
These patronage-based social relations forced marginalised villagers to become wage 
labourers on planters' estates or in processing mills. This employment also formed 
part of the patronage relation with manufacturers using indigenous leaders to mobilise 
peasants bound to them by allegiance or dependence.  Whilst not condoned by the 
colonial state, this village-leader/ employer labour-supply arrangement led employers 
to co-opt networks of district heads and village chiefs to ‘mobilise, deliver and 
discipline’ a regular supply of workers to the factories (Elson, 1986:173).  
 
At least in the early stages of the Corporate Plantation system the pressure for labour 
commodification did not lead to an immediate surge of labour for the mills or 
corporate plantations. The payment of wages, and even the existence of large numbers 
of landless peasants due to land alienation were insufficient to enforce labour 
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discipline (Day, 1966:344). Disinterest in paid employment has been variously 
described as a result of post-Cultivation System intransigence towards working for the 
Dutch and a rising political consciousness rejecting colonial exploitation. This was a 
reflection of subsistence-cropping priorities, a lack of consumer-good demand and of 
low-wages.   
 
Clearly these are all important understandings of the motives behind opposition to 
employment with foreign employers. It is suggested that the most important of these 
reasons was the peasantry’s ambition to achieve self-sufficiency through village 
production rather than seeking employment in a severely underpaid labour market. It 
will be argued that until the tentacles of land commodification strangled this ambition 
the peasantry remained implacably opposed to working for the Dutch.  
 
The gradual dismantling of the coercion system and the declining political authority 
of indigenous leaders awakened an appreciation of the peasantry’s political strength. 
This is evidenced by the numbers of complaints to the Residency concerning the 
policies of indigenous rulers. In 1863 the Resident of Probolinggo contended that 
‘already the little man often makes evident the feeling of independence that is stirring 
in him.  Just as the little man is already at present slowly withdrawing himself from 
the power and influence of his village chief, so shall he quickly become unwilling to 
assist him in the working of his fields, and furthermore to carry out those small 
services and provide those little benefits’ (Elson, 1986:165).  
 
State measures to enforce work discipline 
Employers pressured the state to enforce work discipline by introducing stiff penalties 
for employees’ non-compliance with work agreements. Thus when companies 
determined to gain a labour supply by paying an upfront wage in advance, the state 
enforced the employment-agreement by severely penalising employees who did not 
comply with the terms of employment.  To gain the necessary labour at a pay of about 
six guilder a month, employers provided a payment in advance of the order of 50-100 
guilder, and in 1872 the government introduced legislation punishing a breach of a 
labour contract with ‘a fine of 16-25 florins, or forced labour on public works for 
seven to twelve days’ (Day, 1966:358). Although the regulations produced nine 
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thousand convictions of breach of contract within three years (Day, 1966:358), 
employers still claimed they had difficulty in obtaining a consistent supply of 
productive labour. Legal injunctions were considered to be too slow and an 
inadequate means of enforcement, and strong-arm men were often employed to 
enforce a labour supply.  The Resident of Surabaya noted in 1858 that voluntary 
labourers could not be procured from villages on any large scale ‘without chiefs and 
government officials involving themselves in the matter, making arrangements and 
giving orders so that what is free labour in name is in fact the opposite’ (Elson, 
1986:151).  
 
Money, credit, the consumer-market and labour regulation  
Another, perhaps peripheral, agency of labour control resided in an expanded supply 
of mass consumer goods. In the late 19th Century there was a marked increase in the 
import of cheap and readily available consumer goods, such as cooking utensils and 
other household goods, and a growing supply of mass-produced manufactures, such 
as cotton goods from the Netherlands. These replaced indigenous home-industry 
goods (Wertheim, 1956:80). 
The increased consumption-good demand was a function of the growth in the use and 
supply of money resulting from factor commodification. As labour and land were 
increasingly exchanged for money as rent or wages, liberals were in no doubt that the 
wage market could be more effective than coercion as a means of asserting control 
over labour. This was tempered with a concern that Indonesians had not reached the 
stage of social development where they required a supply of consumer goods and thus 
they were not tied to the money economy and labour market. Day considers the 
Cultivation System was responsible for this delayed development because it ‘gave 
(Indonesians) the capacity for labour (but did not supply) the motive for applying it, 
for it created in them no wants that they had not had before.’ From this perspective 
the problem of labour control resided in ‘the difficulty of finding a basis of exchange 
with uncivilised peoples’ (Day, 1966:53).    
 
The lack of participation reflected the degree to which people could express their 
needs were limited by their available income rather than by social development.  This 
income was a function of the opportunities available for rental-income and the degree 
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to which labour commodification had penetrated into Indonesia.  Day’s perspective 
nevertheless foreshadows the increasingly important role of a growing consumer 
market and the widening use of money and credit in enforcing labour control.  
 
The most influential agency supporting the growth of a mass consumer-goods market 
and credit system in Indonesia were Chinese financial intermediaries. This group 
played a significant role in facilitating commercial transactions between the Dutch 
and Indonesians. The colonial state benefited from Chinese expertise in economic 
organisation and commercial efficiency.  The Chinese were tax gatherers, 
moneylenders and traders, establishing relations and forming commercial 
organisations throughout the country. Their business activities ranged from tax 
collecting to pawnshops, gambling dens and the opium monopoly. They dealt in 
wholesale and retail imports, the collection of produce and money lending, retailing 
credit and distribution (Phoa Liong Gie, 1992:5). The Chinese diaspora of commercial 
facilitation was an indispensable component of the system of Dutch colonial rule 
(Day, 1966:362).  
 
A Dutch reforming liberal bureaucrat condemned the Chinese as ‘the blood suckers of 
the Javanese’ (Fernando, 1992:23). He claimed that they ‘provoke the peasant to 
speculate and buy things… they sell or barter their textiles for rice at a price two or 
three times higher than the value of the goods. The natives borrow money to be repaid 
after the rice harvest ... at high rates that double Chinese capital in half a year per 
peasant’ (Fernando, 1992:23). Whilst the Chinese may have ‘provoked’ consumption 
and there is no doubt they tied Indonesians into ‘credit bondage’ with high interest 
rates, it is argued that the effective demand was not sourced in the consumer goods 
supply, but in the greater private corporate intervention in the economy.  The changes 
here have to be considered in the context of the commodification of land and labour. 
With village land now widely converted into a market-commodity dedicated to export 
cultivations as well as subsistence crop production, village leaders allocated an 
increasing proportion of village land to rental income. The relative decline in 
subsistence production led to an expanded villager dependency on consumer goods 
and thus on a wage-income to pay for them. Similarly, labour was forced from the 
traditional ‘fold’ of village community subsistence provided through cooperative or 
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shared returns in the village surplus. These marginalised peasants increasingly relied 
on the supply of cheap imported consumer goods.  
 
The market’s growing effectiveness as a labour disciplining 
mechanism  
The employers’ difficulties in regulating labour during the early stages of the 
Corporate Plantation system came to an end with the early-1880s collapse in world 
markets for Indonesian commodities. The major sources of the early 1880s declining 
demand for Indonesia’s commodities was a severe international economic depression 
and the collapse of the world sugar market. International sugar prices were further hit 
due to competition from European beet sugar producers’ product selling at well below 
the cost of the Indonesian product (Elson, 1986:169). Business proprietors sought to 
cut costs, especially that of labour, and introduced new labour-saving machinery. 
They increased the proportion of cheaper female and child labour and reduced wages 
by up to a third (Elson, 1986:169).  Plantation and processing-mill managers 
introduced European cultivation tools and equipment and technical advances such as 
milling mechanisation.  
 
With a growing proportion of Indonesia’s peasantry relying on wages as their chief 
means of existence, the rising level of unemployment determined that the labour 
market became a strongly effective means of disciplining labour. This served to put 
increasing pressure on the available jobs so that – to employers’ satisfaction – 
workers were being ‘turned away from the factory gates’ (Knight, 1982:141).  Further 
evidence of employers advantaging from the labour market as an institutional medium 
to regulate labour was the decline in employers’ complaints to the government about 
the extent of ‘undisciplined’, ‘untrustworthy’, ‘unreliable’, and ‘lazy’ labour (Elson, 
1986:170).  
 
A further pressure on the labour market resulted from the increasing private 
ownership or lease of subsistence land available to support a rapidly expanding 
population.  Whilst in earlier colonial eras, the peasantry could often escape economic 
hardship by moving to other, less developed, regions (Elson, 1986:171), between 
1870 and 1940 Java’s population increased from 17 to 48 million, with a 
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commensurate reduction in holdings so that the ‘average farmer cultivated a plot of 
only a couple of acres’ (Peacock, 1973:56). This foreshadows the introduction of state 
policy assisting the ‘transmigration’ of people from densely to sparsely populated 
regions of the archipelago.  
 
Expanded corporate intervention and labour-market control  
The land shortage and population growth consolidated a major shift to labour 
commodification as the primary determinant of labour discipline and enforced labour-
market participation. Further, the Land Act removed ‘free land’ from public use, and 
allocated it for leasehold use, thus leaving little financial opportunity for Indonesians 
to lease this land to cultivate subsistence crops let alone capitalise plantation 
cultivations.  The expanded capital intervention drove the land shortage, 
unemployment, and labour market dependency. 
 
With the increasing capital intensity required to glean profits from cultivations, 
finance was difficult enough to obtain for small private European proprietors, but 
almost impossible for Indonesians. In sugar production, this stepped-up requirement 
involved large new outlays for land, processing equipment, and transportation 
infrastructure.  The necessary financial and technical resources for transportation, 
labour, and processing were taken over by banks and the large commercial trading 
houses.  Financial control shifted from ‘merchant houses to joint stock or limited-
liability companies, and still later to corporate capital’ (Wolf, 1982:335).  By the end 
of the 19th Century the oligopolisation of the agricultural sector determined that 
industry control was in the hands of about eight large trading, banking and plantation 
conglomerates (Robison, 1986:7).  
 
This marked the final stage in the transition to a capitalist rural-production economy 
organised around the capital-intensive sugar mill.  In general terms the transition 
represented the accomplishment of a state-engendered transformation of the processes 
of labour organisation where labour was directly employed, regulated, and largely 
dependent on, private capital and the wage-market. The nature of this employment, 
however, was predicated on a growing competition between sectors of Dutch colonial 
capital where planters demanded a consistent supply of cheap and compliant labour in 
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competition with the growing urban industrial capitalist employers. This 
foreshadowed an emerging struggle between private, largely European cultivation 
owners and industrial capital. Estate companies became opposed to manufacturing 
investment as a threat to the maintenance of low rural wages.  
 
The entrenchment of capitalist production 
The expanded private corporate intervention generated substantial increases in export-
commodity production that were accompanied by a vastly increased demand for 
imported capital and consumption goods.  From 1870 to 1890 Indonesian exports 
doubled and imports quadrupled (Zainu’ddin, 1968:133).  Whilst work-intensity 
substantially increased as the result of technological advances, the growth in supply of 
arable land for cultivations required increases in the supply of labour. The state-
engendered private plantation and part-processing mill expansion was accomplished 
through a commensurate decline in the availability of subsistence land. The decline in 
subsistence production, and low wages put the Indonesian peasantry increasingly in 
debt to Chinese moneylenders. The declining standards of living threatened the 
viability of reproduction of the rural labour force. The recognition by colonial 
officials that labour exploitation – and thus the viability of the system of accumulation 
– could not be sustained without substantive state intervention. This heralded the 
introduction of the ‘Ethical Era’.  
 
Conclusion 
The Corporate Plantation era was a distinct phase of capital accumulation that built on 
the foundations of social and labour control established by the Cultivation System. 
This chapter has provided evidence of the politico-economic forces that underpinned 
the transformation of the system of production control and labour organisation.  I have 
drawn on this material to show that the chief characteristic of this era was not the 
expanded intervention in itself, but the role of the state in driving the intervention, and 
as a consequence the returns to private capital were as much a function of the state 
intervention as of private corporate initiative.  Whilst the state played a key role in 
facilitating private accumulation, it is argued that the prime consideration for 
accumulation was the extent to which labour was ‘ordered’ by the state, in 
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conjunction with the state facilitation of labour market forces, to enforce the supply of 
a strongly regulated workforce. The market was only an effective system in the 
enforcement of work-discipline once core productive factors of labour-power and 
land-use were commodified through their ‘liberation’ from the system of coercion and 
other traditional social, political, and cultural constraints. This established the 
fundamental conditions for the development of a market-based system of production 
control and labour regulation. This logic determined that economic downturn, land 
shortage and population growth consolidated rather than defined the power of the 
market to regulate and discipline labour. The formation of colonial state-engendered 
conditions for factor commodification foreshadowed the transformation of an itinerant 
and independent peasantry into estate-production and, later, factory workers. 
 
The state’s project for private accumulation was primarily implemented through state 
legislation, such as the 1870 Agrarian Act. Whilst the Land Act sought to protect the 
peasantry from the takeover of their land by Corporate Plantation owners, it was 
primarily designed to expand the supply of arable land. The legislation determined the 
state’s final assumption of sovereignty over most arable Indonesian land and its 
transformation into a component of its productive enterprise. It ensured the final 
transformation from village and communal dealings with the state, to contractual 
arrangements between individual peasants and workers, and individual firms or 
plantation owners.  
 
The Agrarian Law was the turning point in the history of Western agriculture in the 
Indies. In terms of the political economy of power-relations, the legislation created the 
conditions for capital accumulation by undermining indigenous control over 
subsistence production. In these terms the legislation was arguably of equal 
significance in Indonesia’s political and economic history as the transfer of ownership 
of the country from the VOC to the Dutch Government. The importance of the 
legislation is seen, firstly, in the way it achieved the private corporate ambition to 
transform Indonesia’s production organisation from a state-controlled system using 
the indigenous hierarchy for surplus extraction, to a system of direct private corporate 
appropriation. Secondly, this resulted in a shift from a planter-dominated, to an 
oligopolistic capitalist system of economic control. Finally, the transition represented 
a powerful reassertion of private corporate political and economic control as 
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symbolised by VOC appropriation. This conception of continuity across epochs 
affirms the key role of the metropolitan state in facilitating surplus extraction from 
Indonesia and realising this surplus through international markets.  
 
Private European planters, the financial commercial institutions backing those 
planters, and Chinese financial intermediaries prospered under the colonial systems of 
labour discipline and enforcement established by the Cultivation System. The state 
continued to play a powerful protectionist, ‘nurturing’, role providing the necessary 
conditions for private accumulation. With the colonial government enforcing control 
over labour and the supply of cheap and compliant workers to a burgeoning private 
sector, the labour market was not a ‘free’ means of facilitating optional participation 
in employment by Indonesians, but a mechanism by which employers enforced labour 
coercion. The collective controls and village-support systems of the Cultivation 
System were replaced by individual contractual employment and other controls such 
as credit bondage. 
 
The increasing oligopolisation of economic control and the consequent expansion of 
capital led to increasing intensity of extraction from an increasingly commodified 
workforce. Thus whilst the Corporate Plantation system was highly profitable for 
private investors it contained the seeds of its own downfall in a contradiction between 
the supply of a cheap, controlled labour force and the reproduction of that force.  
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Chapter 4 
The last colonial, Ethical regime 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
“The colonial entrepreneurs slowly came to realise that labour, even that of the 
Asians, was a production factor with its own value, and that its destruction was 
irrational from the economic point of view” (Breman, 1989:274). 
 
“The Netherlands East Indies were… in essence an extension of metropolitan 
Netherlands in Europe and of its economy, its energies, enterprise, indeed of all its 
intrinsics. It was we who made this archipelago what it is. It was we who fashioned its 
great and modern agricultural structure, we ordered its communications, we gave it a 
clean bill of health, our technicians worked wonders in every field. We made the 
Indies.” Netherlands WW2 Prime Minister (Gerbrandy, 1950:28). 
 
European economic penetration throughout the Indonesian archipelago undermined 
the indigenous reproductive systems that had sustained Indonesian economic 
organisation.  The basis of this erosion was the transformation of productive resources 
into commodified components of the colonial appropriation system. The following 
analysis of the final phase of Dutch rule focuses on how the metropolitan state 
responded to this erosion of the colony’s reproductive base.  
 
In November 1900 the Netherlands’ Prime Minister foreshadowed the introduction of 
a bold new humanitarian agenda referred to as the ‘Ethical System’. He proposed that 
‘a greater share of the riches deriving from the soil of the Indies no longer fall to the 
foreign entrepreneur working with foreign capital, but in which also, and above all, 
the person native to the country can demand his share in those riches’ (van Deventer, 
1966:258). The Colonial Minister asserted that neither ‘an increase in our possessions, 
an increase in our power, an increase in our honour, an increase in our capital is the 
aim of colonial possession, but the advancement of the Native population’ (van 
Deventer, 1966:258).  
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The critical analysis of the metropolitan state’s reformist policies in this chapter 
suggests that the commitment to indigenous welfare represented the ‘benevolent face’ 
of a new colonial policy-making regime instituted to restore the basis of colonial 
appropriation.  The investigation investigates the underlying intent of these policies, 
linking them with a major conceptual theme of this research whereby the state’s 
paramount concern is to assure the appropriate supply and regulation of labour 
consistent with world market commodity production as the touchstone of colonial 
development. The state’s response to the challenge to the colony’s reproductive base 
is considered in relation to a growing political antagonism to colonial authority. The 
core focus concerns the way in which the state attempted to ameliorate these 
contrasting impacts of colonial intervention.  
 
This foreshadows the role of a state-credo (the ‘Ethical’ era) in underpinning the 
apparatus of wealth appropriation for this final phase of colonial rule. The Chapter 
locates the role of the state in instituting ethical policies within the international 
context of demand for Indonesia’s commodities, especially the imperative to engender 
a substantive ‘gearing up’ of the colonial export commodity productive base 
following the early 20th Century growth in international demand for Indonesia’s 
mineral and other resources.   This heralds the introduction of a more inclusionary 
political process and system of colonial administration as a major plank of colonial 
organisation.  
 
This Chapter’s representation of the fundamental elements defining the Ethical Era 
constitutes a decisive break with the standard literature.  Whilst this literature 
generally portrays Ethical policies as a ‘reversal’ of the state’s commitment to an 
unrestrained private appropriation agenda, this research suggests a contrary 
appreciation in terms of the overall theme of the role of the state in directly 
underpinning the foundations of private accumulation.  The breadth of this 
appreciation incorporates an understanding of the political role of the colonial state in 
encapsulating elements of the indigenous elite within the apparatus of rule, and its 
economic role in shoring up the infrastructural basis of economic organisation.  
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The new political and economic institutional arrangements initiated by the state are 
considered in relation to their impact on Indonesia’s class structure and the socio-
economic order and, more particularly, the passage of class struggle. In this latter 
regard, the research outlines the state’s response to popular antagonism towards 
political exclusion. A core element of this unfolding appreciation concerns the way in 
which the state rationalised continued colonial occupation and wealth appropriation. 
The contradictions and dissonances between established readings analysing the forces 
at work are starkly obvious in the following elaboration of the state’s implementation 
of political ‘reform’. This is shown in the contrast between colonial assumptions of 
acquiescence to their reformist program on the one hand, and evidence of a continuing 
denial of economic opportunity on the other.  
 
This introduces a further key difference with those established texts that contend the 
colonial state was, in a very real sense, acting as an independent agency on behalf of 
its colonial constituency.  The following evidence and analysis suggests that this 
constitutes a fundamental misunderstanding of the processes at work in colonial rule.  
More specifically, the core argument of this Chapter turns on its head the established 
conceptual understanding that the basis of dissent resided in considerations of racial 
dissent rather than the exploitation of the Indonesian people as a class. The analysis 
postulates a substantive link between race and class as a core element in the 
nationalist movement.  This reaffirms the continuing theme of this work of the 
accumulation role of colonial authorities and links Dutch colonial extraction to the 
processes of extraction as instituted by the next, Japanese, occupation regime.  
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Estate capital aggregation and labour regulation  
The Corporate Plantation system advanced accumulation by consolidating the 
ownership of key sectors of agricultural production and incorporating estates into 
limited liability companies that held close links with the plantation banks. The 1880s 
depression had been a catalyst in this process, with bankrupted smaller and medium-
sized estates taken over by large commercial enterprises, with the result that financial 
control of the estates shifted from ‘merchant houses to joint-stock or limited-liability 
companies, and still later to corporate capital’ (Wolf, 1982:335).  
 
Smaller European planters had difficulty surviving the depression, but Indonesian 
planters were forced to leave their plantations through an inability to obtain credit or 
derive alternative income. Some measure of the diminished indigenous ownership of 
plantation acreage can be noted by reference to Table 4.1.  Day describes the 
plantation-sector as characterised by ‘vast estates of 75,000 or even 175,000 people ... 
owned in large part by stock companies, by absentee landlords, or by Chinese’ (Day, 
1966:368).  
 
Table 4.1: Plantation Land Ownership (1903) 
 
 Number Bouws (1.75 acres) Inhabitants 
Stock Companies 62 622,971 592,631 
Europeans 101 557,636 513,092 
Chinese 197 368,810 469,937 
Other Orientals and natives 74 18,907 43,870 
    
Totals 434 1,568,324 1,619,530 
 
Source: Day, 1966:368 
 
The depression-driven aggregation of estate-enterprise meant that by the end of the 
19th Century the agricultural-exports sector was largely controlled by eight large 
trading, banking and plantation conglomerates (Robison, 1986:7).  These firms were 
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in turn controlled by metropolitan-based syndicates and cartels operating in 
association with import and export firms (Wertheim, 1956:99).   
 
The process of capital consolidation is evidenced by the structural and corporate 
changes carried out by the colonial joint-stock company, the Der Nederlandsche 
Handel-Maatschappij (NHM).  Until the mid-1870s the NHM was largely concerned 
with organising trade for primary export-commodities. An 1853 Netherlands state 
consignment contract shows that the NHM’s main role was to trade in those 
commodities that created a colonial surplus (van Klaveren, 1953:165).  In the late 
1880s, however, as the NHM’s financial future was threatened by the reduced demand 
for Indonesian commodities, the Company shifted its focus to banking and finance. 
The Company survived by drawing on its substantial capital reserves and enforcing 
sugar-manufacturers’ dependency by providing them with the necessary credit to 
continue trading. 
 
Company directors retaining a mercantilist-era preoccupation with restricting 
Company operations to trade in estate-sector commodities were replaced by directors 
committed to broadening commercial operations. The Company subsequently 
extended its role from trade and brokerage to banking. The NHM and several major 
Dutch banks amalgamated and sought public funds to finance a new corporation, the 
NHM Bank.  The merger was finalised by 1882 enabling the corporation to survive 
the sugar industry depression that began in 1884. The NHM Bank’s productive, 
financial, and commercial foundations made it a dominant regional and commercial 
power for major Asian ports. European-based international companies utilised this 
commercial strength to capitalise their extraction of industrial raw materials such as 
tin, copra, cinchona, petroleum, and rubber (Robison, 1986:8).  This set in train the 
vast extraction of the 1930s, by which time seven oil refineries operated in the Dutch 
East Indies, three in Sumatra, one in East Borneo, and three in Java (Allen and 
Donnithorne, 1962: 163). 
 
The Major European companies’ ability to extract Indonesia’s resources was backed 
by advanced technological and commercial innovations supported their worldwide 
commercial networks. This enabled them to exert what Allen and Donnithorne refer 
to as ‘sovereignty’ over Indonesia’s mineral resources by paying rent to the Dutch 
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colonial government ‘but not the real owners, the Indonesian people ‘ (Allen and 
Donnithorne, 1962:163). The Dutch form of colonial control meant that the drain of 
surplus from Indonesia was far greater than from other colonial Asian countries.  In 
the 1930s the ‘unrequited’ export surplus from India was 1.5 per cent of National 
Income whilst the surplus from Indonesia represented 13.4 per cent of the National 
Income (Booth, 1990:294). 
 
The late 19th Century western economic penetration and surplus extraction from 
Indonesia was backed by the state’s ‘pacification’ (the Pax Neerlandica) of anti-
colonial rebellion and of tribal and dynastic war (Zainu’ddin, 1968:166). The most 
costly drain on colonial tax-revenues was the 1873 Aceh (North Sumatra) war to 
repress Acehnese’ military and political attempts to achieve Acehnese political and 
economic sovereignty (Penders, 1984:26).  It was ironic that land taxes imposed on 
Indonesians were a source of the funds to repress Indonesians’ attempts to regain 
control over their resources.   
 
The threat to labour reproduction 
The 1880s international market slump in demand for Indonesian commodities and the 
heavy taxes imposed on Indonesians caused a major decline in Indonesian standards 
of living (Schmutzer, 1977:32).  Much of the rural population – by some accounts, a 
third (Knight, 1994:52) – were alienated from the security and support of their 
kampongs as they were forced to work in factories some distance from their villages. 
This undermined the capacity of Indonesian village communities to reproduce wage 
labour and posed a clear threat to the system of colonial appropriation. 
 
The Ethical era 
By the latter part of the 19th Century, growing metropolitan concerns about the threat 
to the colony’s economic base triggered political campaigns for the state to alleviate 
the hardships and ‘curb’ what they saw as the ‘corporate excesses’ and ‘ravages of 
unbridled capitalism in the colony’ (Penders, 1984:27).  ‘[C]onservative industrialists 
and trading interests joined the anti laissez-faire choir demanding effective measures 
to increase buying power’ (Penders, 1984:27). Moral suasion also came to bear, as 
encapsulated by Queen Willehemina’s 1901 declaration that the Netherlands has ‘an 
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ethical obligation and moral responsibility to the peoples of the East Indies’ (Van 
Niel, 1960:32).  There was a real concern that the laissez-faire system of extraction 
had created massive wealth for private entrepreneurs but undermined the basis of 
colonial production and appropriation.   
 
In the face of the considerable political opposition, and responding to the evidence of 
an imminent economic as well as political crisis in Indonesia, the metropolitan state 
realised that it was imperative to reorder the basis of production organisation in order 
to restore colonial self-sufficiency and avoid political and economic collapse. The 
dominant influence of elements in the Netherlands’ parliament who believed in the 
necessity for the state to strongly intervene to protect the interests of its colonial 
peoples prevailed. Accordingly, the state moved to alleviate the effects of unbridled 
capitalism and restore the basis of labour reproduction. 
 
Most prominent among the progressive forces in the metropolitan parliament were the 
‘Ethici’ who proposed that the Netherlands’ government repay the ‘debt of honour’ 
owed to Indonesians for the centuries of Dutch wealth-extraction from the colony 
(Bastin, 1967:119). They identified the failure of unrestrained private corporate 
enterprise to either create colonial self-sufficiency or protect Indonesian’s standards 
of living as the main contradictions engendered by colonial rule. They won 
widespread metropolitan political support for the contention that, as previous Indies’ 
extractions flowed to the Dutch Treasury in Holland’s ‘time of need’, the 
Netherlanders should repay some of this surplus to help Indonesians in their time of 
need. Repayment was never made, but the state’s welfare of its colonial citizens’ 
marked the introduction of what was to become known as the era of ‘Ethical rule’. 
 
The reordering of labour and capital 
Following Deventer’s pronouncements for the colony, the colonial government 
concentrated on expanding agricultural and mining production, and promoting 
industrial and commercial development.  It was thought that the consequent economic 
activity would generate sufficient income-flows and taxation revenues to improve 
welfare infrastructure such as education, irrigation and sanitation systems (Schmutzer, 
1977:33).  
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Expanding the public sector 
To develop the colony it was imperative to expand the educational facilities needed to 
train indigenous technical and administrative functionaries and generate a more 
skilled and self-sufficient workforce. The Netherlands’ Prime Minister backed the 
program of expanded education for Indonesians as: ‘the level of his knowledge and 
abilities must be raised considerably … and for this a vigorous expansion of primary 
education will prove to be the most essential expedient’ (van Deventer, 1966:260). 
 
There was a further political objective implicit in the state’s decision to expand 
Indonesians’ educational opportunities. An influx of indigenous personnel into the 
state administration would inhibit political discontent by underscoring the state’s 
newfound reformist ethos that allowed political sovereignty for all colonial citizens. 
The dominant Ethical view considered that some degree of colonial devolution from 
metropolitan political domination and the incorporation of Indonesians into 
government administration would eventually enable colonial self-rule. It was also 
believed that the developmentalist project would contribute to this by engendering a 
more humane, participatory and non-discriminatory system of social organisation and 
economic development. Promoting Dutch education would be integral to this, and was 
regarded as a necessary precursor to the growth of modern European civilisation in 
Indonesia.  
 
These multiple objectives informed the establishment of a comprehensive schooling 
system covering primary to tertiary education and focussing on administrative and 
commercial efficiency. The success of the project was evidenced in the extension of 
indigenous employment in the state sector. By the 1920s Indonesians staffed colonial-
state institutions such as the Volkscredietwezen (peoples’ credit service), Government 
Pawnshops, Agricultural information and advice, Post, Telegraph and Telephone 
services, State Railways; Government Schools, and the Forestry Service (Zainu’ddin, 
1968:143, 144). 
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State policies supporting labour reproduction 
The success of the state’s developmentalist project depended on regenerating the 
subsistence basis of labour-reproduction. To this end the state legislated to enforce the 
peasantry’s right to control their land as a prime means of securing their economic 
integrity. We recall that the 1870 Land Act affirmed the state’s commitment to 
supporting indigenous ownership of rural subsistence-lands. This objective was 
frustrated as financial pressures on landholders forced them to allocate greater 
proportions of their lands for export production. Government officials sought to 
redress this by legislating for estates to lease from the principality, rather than from 
the traditional holders of princely and dignitary’ lands (appanage), and to remove 
corvee (unpaid) labour in favour of wage-labour.  It was considered that this leasing 
and wage-payment arrangement would remove the political conflict of appanage 
holders’ tie over the peasantry. Communal lands were divided into plots of half a bau, 
with a particular (male) villager gaining temporary use (usufruct) of that land and a 
housing plot (‘kuli kencing’) (Shiraishi, 1990:20). In plantation areas, this half bau 
was divided into two fields that were rotated between rice and plantation cropping.  
 
Health care 
The Corporate Plantation era was associated with the spread of epidemics and disease 
such as cholera, flu, malaria and the plague (Abeyasekere, 1986:2).  Health care thus 
became a vital part of the Government’s reformist agenda. Most illnesses resulted 
from, or were exacerbated by, malnutrition, polluted water and soil, poor sanitation 
and lack of general hygiene. Following the state’s initial priority for the provision of 
health services solely for the military and Europeans, in 1910 western treatment of 
disease and general health was extended to cover Indonesians (Abeyasekere, 1986: 2). 
 
The extended basis of capital accumulation  
The state’s shoring-up of the productive and reproductive base consolidated the 
foundations for expanded industrial development established by private corporate 
penetration and conglomeration.  The Indonesian manufacturing sector and as a 
corollary, an industrial working class, grew out of estate-plantation production. 
Estates required infrastructure, repair, and component-manufacture workshops to 
maintain their capital goods. The largest of these concerns were organised on the basis 
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of mechanised, western Fordist and capital-intensive production-line systems; but 
most production was carried by small-scale and largely non-mechanised concerns 
(Robison, 1986:23). A key component of this development was the heavily 
regimented organisation of a commodified estate-sector labour-force.   
 
A mass-consumption goods industry for the internal market developed in conjunction 
with urban development. These firms were often Indonesian-managed but mostly 
Chinese-owned. The larger firms covered cigarette-production, furniture-
manufacturing, printing and wholesaling and other consumer-goods industries 
(Pinches and Lakha, 1987:18).  The indigenous-owned enterprises generally consisted 
of small, cottage industry weaving, spinning, batik work, furniture making and kretek 
cigarette manufacture concerns. Batik-makers obtained raw materials from merchants 
and received commission for the supply of finished or partly finished products.  The 
import of cotton goods for batik printing increased from 9.837 million guilders in 
1850 to 20.943 in 1860, and for Java and Madura alone to 29.105 in 1875 (Shiraishi, 
1990:24).  The merchants who dominated the importing and supplying of raw 
materials controlled the industry. These merchants (bakul) received between 50-70 
per cent of the total income, maintaining their control over peasant/worker producers 
through credit networks and paternal social and political relationships (Robison, 
1986:23).  
 
The financial and commercial intermediary role of Chinese merchants enabled them 
to accumulate the necessary capital to dominate small and medium industrial 
production in Indonesia. Their organisational skills and diaspora social-infrastructure 
enabled them to out-compete Indonesian firms in most aspects of manufacturing 
production (Robison, 1986:27). Chinese entrepreneurs also exhibited much keener 
and broader business acumen as they established a major presence in the agrarian 
trade, the trade and manufacture of textiles, foodstuffs, beverages, and furniture and in 
the transport sector.3 This severely constrained the possibility of indigenous 
entrepreneurs building a capital base. 
  
                                                 
3 The relevance of this Chinese commercial dominance over Indonesians will be seen in the context of a rising 
Indonesian political mass consciousness directed against foreign political and economic domination. The superior 
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The regulation of industrial labour 
Urban manufacturing development required a ready supply of strongly regulated 
workers. The indigenous hierarchical system of social relations again became the core 
mechanism for supplying and disciplining labour. In this early ‘modern’ phase of 
manufacturing development European companies appointed Indonesians as company-
foremen with the responsibility to organise, supply and discipline labour. These 
foremen were generally former artisans with long-standing high social-status or 
traditional authority in the local village. The foremen were ‘powerful men with 
considerable patronage at their disposal’ as they held the power to provide 
employment (Robison, 1986:22). The state’s devolution of administrative 
responsibility to indigenous regional authorities supported this process of hierarchical 
labour organisation.  
 
The foremen achieved the equivalent urban prestige to lurahs in terms of power and 
patronage (Robison, 1986:22). Their contacts with village-leaders enabled the 
organisation of villagers for factory work. They received commissions from workers 
for arranging jobs, housing, and promotions. Management underscored this important 
social and management role and position by granting hereditary rights to succession, 
thus preserving the hierarchical control-system and the status of the indigenous elite.  
 
These processes assured the continuation of a clear hierarchical link between 
European managers and Indonesian workers with little communication between the 
two. Local managers rarely made any effort to learn the indigenous language, and 
most Dutch managers were paternalistic and condescending towards Indonesians. 
Dutch attitudes were reinforced by their belief in the superiority of European culture 
and by their perception that Javanese society was essentially feudal, with its people 
bound by traditional ties of bondage and dependence.   
 
The dramatic increase in the number of young Dutch immigrants employed to manage 
the ‘modern’ manufacturing sector served both to affirm the existence of unequal 
opportunity for Indonesians and to support anti-colonial activism amongst Indonesian 
workers.  The established colonial managers and authorities were concerned that the 
                                                                                                                                            
economic position of the Chinese merchants and industrialists formed the basis for the late 19th century nationalist 
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‘younger Europeans were less well prepared for work in the colony, more brash and 
less inclined to be bothered about understanding their native workforce’ (Ingleson, 
1986:23). 
 
The political responses to expanded state and corporate expansion 
The Government had sought to lay the foundations for an economic and political 
order that was more inclusive of Indonesians. It resulted in an expansion of the role of 
the state, an expansion that increased public service employment opportunities for 
Indonesians. However, these institutional and economic transformations had the effect 
of consolidating anti-colonial resentment. This precipitated a widespread mobilisation 
against foreign rule.  
 
In analysing this period of political transformation, the critical importance of struggles 
over the organisation of production and distribution of the proceeds of production 
cannot be overlooked, and I seek to review the political unrest in terms of a range of 
challenges to the economic and institutional order of the system of colonial 
production and distribution and not simply in terms of an indigenous challenge to 
metropolitan rule. The focus thereby shifts from an interpretation of that period as 
shaped by anti-colonialism, or racial conflict, to an interpretation emphasising class 
struggle. 
 
History of political and industrial struggle 
History shows that the last decades of the 19th Century were one of the more turbulent 
periods in Indonesia’s colonial past. There were numerous and widely supported 
political and industrial campaigns based in a complex mix of urban and rural forces. 
The practical expression of this politico-economic-industrial struggle was the birth of 
institutions of industrial representation. In 1908 the first Indonesian and South East 
Asian trade union, the Union of Rail and Tramway Personnel (VSTP) was born. In the 
same year, the first major militant industrial campaigns had been sparked by 
oppressive conditions in sugar plantation production (Ingleson, 1986:104).  The 
history of this period of industrial struggle has been well documented. However, it is 
appropriate to reconsider the conventional wisdom and review the nation-wide 
                                                                                                                                            
campaigns against foreign ownership. 
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political and industrial actions in the context of the impact of changed urban/rural 
work-relations and production systems, as well as in the light of external pressures 
such as Indonesia’s increasing engagement with international markets. 
 
The most extensive and authoritative research of the political discord during this 
period has been carried out by John Ingleson, who chronicled the ‘considerable 
militancy and political activity’ evidenced in Indonesia over the course of the first 
three decades of the 20th Century (Ingleson, 1986:1). Ingleson’s research provides the 
basis on which a critical analysis of the fundamental determinants of the industrial 
and political dissent can be developed.   
 
Ingleson uses his extensive empirical evidence to conclude that early 20th Century 
industrial and political activism was driven by race, not class, antagonism (Ingleson, 
1986:6). However, the conclusion, I would suggest, does not accord sufficient critical 
weight to the structural transformations initiated under the Ethical regime. In view of 
the emphasis here on these structural transformations, it is sensible to reconsider the 
character of late-colonial political and industrial unrest, especially in terms of colonial 
development and the political responses that this engendered.  
 
Ingleson introduces his theoretical exposition of the sources of early 20th Century 
Indonesian mass unrest by cautioning against the ‘misuse’ of class analysis in the 
Indonesian context.  Thus whilst ‘there are strong and important similarities in the 
processes of industrialization and commercialisation in Indonesia and Europe’, we 
should be careful not to impose on the Indonesian context ‘theoretical insights’ gained 
by labour historians from their examination of labour and industrialisation in Europe 
and the US. This is because ‘the social and cultural bases (between the developed 
countries and Indonesia) are very different’ (Ingleson, 1986:5).  
 
Further, Ingleson criticises the Marxist, and what he refers to as ‘vaguely socialist’, 
Indonesian leaders of the period for using western conceptual approaches to build 
working-class and peasantry solidarity. He contends that their analysis of colonial 
oppression and of ‘urban workers in class terms’ in the promotion of this cause was 
inappropriate because ‘there was little observable consciousness of class among the 
tens of thousands of ordinary union members (Ingleson, 1986:6). For these 
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Indonesians, the struggle was more basic and directed towards immediate 
improvement in their lot in life  (Ingleson, 1986:6).  Ingleson believes that Indonesian 
leaders had difficulty in inculcating class-consciousness because their society was 
characterised by ‘vertical cleavages of ethnicity, kinship, patronage and religion’ 
(Ingleson, 1986:6).  
 
These cleavages are seen as continuing at this stage of colonial history because 
capitalism had not yet penetrated to the extent that class relations could overshadow 
the ‘cleavages’. Thus ‘economic differentiation in colonial Java was less advanced 
than in contemporaneous Western societies and the relationship between capital and 
labour less decisive in determining a person’s social status’ (Ingleson, 1986:6). 
Ingleson’s proof of the overriding power of the ‘cleavages’ to define political and 
industrial activism relies on the claim that unionism was only successful where union 
leaders could employ kinship and other cultural relations to gain the support of 
patrons in the workplaces or of kampung leaders (Ingleson, 1986:6). Thus, for 
Ingleson the continuing dominance of traditional hierarchical differentiation and 
status denied the possibility of class-solidarity amongst workers and peasants. 
 
Ingleson’s view implicitly assumes that without class-consciousness there are not 
class relations.  However, whilst the absence of class consciousness in general 
impedes the development of class struggle, this need not deny the existence of class 
relations as defined in terms of people’s relationships to the means of production.   
 
The history of industrial and political mobilisation 
The success of industrial and political campaigns sponsored by workers, the 
indigenous petty bourgeoisie and an emergent middle class created a growing mass-
awareness that real improvements could be achieved by industrial and political action. 
The formation of political parties and trade unions, and the support for these 
institutions evidenced in the growing membership, tended to be framed by a dual 
industrial/political objective. Most labour unions arose out of the two largest 
nationalist parties, the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association – SI) and Perserikatan 
Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party – PKI) (Ingleson, 1986:4). Nationalist parties 
drew their core membership from skilled workers, teachers and government 
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employees. Unions became training grounds for the nationalist party leadership as 
they provided the opportunity to develop organisational, recruiting and public 
speaking skills. Many workers radicalised by workplace injustice were drawn into 
nationalist activities. Thus ‘worker mobilisation and unionisation were important parts 
of the making and development of nationalism (Ingleson, 1986:4). Ingleson provides 
evidence of the strong structural links and interlocking leaderships between the labour 
unions and nationalist parties, but cautions against any presumption that union 
activities were directed by nationalist groups, arguing that each had an independent 
role in the promotion of their membership’s social and economic interests. In his 
understanding local union leaders and ordinary members’ industrial ambitions related 
to the specific social and economic grievances within each workplace.  
 
Major political and industrial action 
The first major instance of widespread political action in the 20th Century was the 
mass-mobilisation against estate and mill-owner’ exploitation. The campaign was 
triggered by the rice-harvest failure in 1918 and led by the SI.  Whilst the history of 
this organisation will be developed in the context of Republican political organisation, 
it is pertinent to outline its modus operandi. The SI was a moderate, urban, 
organisation set up in 1912 to mobilise small and medium indigenous business against 
Chinese commercial domination. It was essentially a reformist association that would 
become the major non-communist mass-based political power in Indonesia. ‘[The 
Sarekat Islam] was geared to launch boycotts against the Chinese in defence of the 
interests of the large number of Javanese merchants’ which followed a ‘suddenly 
increased impingement of aggressively competitive Chinese entrepreneurs upon the 
interests of the vestigial Javanese merchant class that attended the gradual lifting of 
travel restriction on the Chinese in the interior of Java between 1904 and 1911’ 
(Kahin, 1952: 67).  
 
Sources of rural anti-colonial antagonism 
The SI saw that the unrest prompted by the rice-famine had the potential to build on 
the urban anti-colonial unrest to become a nation-wide movement. It thus extended its 
urban small-business base to cover the reformist ambitions of the peasantry.  Focusing 
on the onerous village compulsory labour obligations and land taxes the SI began a 
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mobilisation campaign that spread across Java’s Northern coastal plain (Ingleson, 
1986:14). The SI realised that the colonial tax system was a particular source of 
public antagonism as ‘[n]othing about the colonial order seemed to infuriate the 
peasantry more than its taxes’ (Scott, 1976:91). The land tax system generated a 
considerable increase in indebtedness. The 19th Century plethora of state taxes 
included the market tax and the ‘head tax’ that replaced compulsory labour service.  
The land-revenue tax was the most hated because it was set as a fixed charge which 
was based on the estimated average yield of graded rice fields and thus bore ‘no 
relation to yield, ability to pay or subsistence needs’ (Lucas, 1991:5). SI officials 
proved that the colonial authorities had over-estimated the average yield of graded 
rice fields imposing taxes vastly exceeding the peasantry’s ability to pay. As villagers 
were unable to pay these taxes ‘in kind’, they were forced to rely on moneylenders to 
tide them over to the next harvest (Kartodirdjo, 1988:33). 
 
Ethical planners’ well-intentioned policy of removing the oppressive obligation to 
work for the appanage-holder did not, however, serve to ameliorate rural discontent as 
the peasantry’s prime need was to expand their income.  Further, the removal of 
corvee served to reduce living standards as workers in corporate plantations were paid 
less than what villagers would have received from solely cultivating rice (Shiraishi, 
1990:22). The reformist policies were also frustrated by the government’s early 20th 
Century accommodation of pressure from landlords to allow the right to evict tenants 
at will if they were in arrears with the rent. The consequent evictions put increasing 
financial pressure on tenants, increasing their opposition to colonial rule (Kartodirdjo, 
1988:33) 
 
SI leaders followed up their support for small rural producers by providing support for 
the peasantry in their industrial claims against processing mill employers. They 
pressured mill proprietors to raise wages for casual labour and pay higher rents to 
villagers. However, the mill-owners were in a stronger position and whilst the 
Resident supported the peasants, management rejected their demands (Ingleson, 
1986:10). The continuing ability of private mill-owners to override Ethical-state 
welfare imperatives and dictate employment and resource-supply conditions was 
evidenced in their control of the water supply.  The processing mills’ demands for 
water to irrigate sugar cultivation affected all cultivators as sugar required three times 
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the quantity of water necessary for wet rice cultivation.   Plantation-owners assumed 
priority over the use of water supply for sugar cultivations, and restricted peasants’ 
access to water for rice irrigation to nights and during the cane-growing season. 
European managers argued that this was appropriate as mill workers could only tend 
their fields at night. The policy led to the theft of water, and a growing hostility 
between villages in their competition for the dwindling supply of water (Ingleson, 
1986:10). 
 
The bargaining strength of the parties shifted following World War One. Employers’ 
industrial dominance was eroded by a sudden post-war demand for Indonesian 
produce that led to a shortage of skilled labour. The shortage coincided with a growth 
in industrial and political activism and a shift in the balance of power towards workers 
(Ingleson, 1986:11). Industrial agitation spread to the Sumatran rubber plantations and 
other regions throughout the archipelago.  By 1920 there were 100,000 members 
covered by 100 unions, and the first national trade union conference was held in the 
major Javanese trading and manufacturing centre of Semarang.  Whilst the nationalist 
objective to gain independence from colonial rule gained general support at the 
conference, an inability to gain consensus between the PKI and SI over industrial 
policy foreshadowed what would become a major philosophical schism in Indonesian 
politics.  
 
Employers took the opportunity to exploit labour’s internal divisions, setting up 
industry associations and working cooperatively with the state to re-establish ‘law and 
order’ to repress all industrial disputation. When the inflation accompanying the 
economic upturn led to increased costs of living, employers refused to adjust wages to 
compensate. In March 1920 sugar industry workers took major strike action 
demanding wage increases and improvements in working conditions.  Rejecting the 
demands, and employing the tactic of claiming the strike was intended to threaten 
colonial rule, the state employed the military to repress the union action and forced 
workers back to work. 
 
Industrial disputes escalated and, following the union conference, harbour-workers 
halted the loading of shipping in the port of Surabaya.  The state again employed the 
military to overthrow the strike but this time applied the extensive forces of the state 
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enforcement apparatus to repress any further union action across Indonesia.  With the 
unions unable to ‘protect (workers) from the wrath of government and employers’, 
union membership declined to low levels for the remainder of the colonial period 
(Ingleson, 1986:11).  
 
Leading up to the Great Depression the government instituted covert police operations 
to uncover industrial and independence activism. From 1935 the Colonial 
Government imposed restrictions on PKI association, and imposed legal and military 
constraints on all trade union activity (Zainu’ddin, 1968:193). The resulting campaign 
of military repression led to the state executing one thousand independence activists 
and transporting the remaining activists to the Upper Dibul concentration camp in 
New Guinea.   
 
The state further enforced its industrial policies by covertly fostering anti-nationalist 
and pro-employer worker-associations especially amongst groups such as the pangreh 
praja (‘rulers of the realm’ within the Dutch-trained state-administrative strata. In the 
late 1930s the state set up a broad-based organisation the Mardi Oetomo (Excellent 
Community) to build anti-nationalist power and influence in South Pemalang. The 
organisation consisted of low-ranking state administrative officials such as clerks and 
assistant clerks.  They participated in campaigns supporting the Ethical state’s 
welfarist ethos, such as medicine distribution, the eradication of rats, campaigns for 
the prevention of soil erosion, provision of lavatories, and of brown rice to the 
malnourished. The Dutch also extended the priyayis’ tax-gathering functionary role to 
political surveillance of SI activists through the Piroekoenen (Harmony) organisation 
(Lucas, 1991:12).  As the titles of these organisations suggest, their role was to 
support the state’s developmentalist objectives and the ethos of indigenous political 
opportunity in order to undermine class and race conceptions of colonial rule and 
foreign economic control.  
 
Sources of activism 
Whilst the colonial state’s anti-nationalist and anti-union campaigns effectively 
destroyed all defensive indigenous representative institutions and structures, the 
political and economic sources of the early 20th Century political unrest remained. 
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This meant that the widespread belief in the possibilities of challenging colonial rule 
remained as a subterranean force awaiting the conditions for its revival. It is 
appropriate to reconsider the sources of unrest and the character of this ‘force’, in the 
context of the state-led efforts to expand corporate accumulation, to draw out the 
influence of issues of class and race as the background to the 1940s ‘revived’ political 
and industrial mobilisation.  
 
Early 20th Century union and nationalist campaign successes inspired a widespread 
belief in the possibilities for rapid political and industrial change. Thus the Sarekat 
Islam (Union of Islam) blossomed ‘with a suddenness and force which quite 
astonished not only the Dutch but also Indonesians as well’ (Kahin, 1952:65). The SI 
grew to a membership of two and a half million within eleven years of its birth 
(Furnivall, 1969:119).  
 
Ingleson argues that this activism was in response to Indonesia’s accelerated 
urbanisation that precipitated substantial social changes engendering union solidarity 
and political activism (Ingleson, 1986:6). Educational advances for Indonesians were 
a major factor in fuelling opposition to colonial state-rule.  Skilled and relatively 
secure workers became the most politically active in the 1910s and 1920s and formed 
the backbone of labour union branches.  This was reflected in the union leadership, 
which largely consisted of skilled workers, foremen, and western educated 
government employees such as clerks, teachers and pawnshop workers. Unions’ 
collective organisation and subsequent industrial action advanced the awareness of the 
potential for political and strike action, building working class’ organisation and 
communication skills (Ingleson, 1986:9).  
 
Employer maltreatment, once accepted as ‘normal’ because no one could see a way of 
successfully opposing it, then came under challenge (Ingleson, 1986:9). Ingleson 
considers that it was not the degree of exploitation that underscored the greatly 
increased militancy of the early 20th Century, but the social and economic changes 
that gave voice to the ongoing exploitation (Ingleson, 1987:141). These changes 
defined the character of union representation driving nationalist and labour campaigns 
(Ingleson, 1986:8). Thus whilst the nationalism developing in rural communities 
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lacked a coordinated organisation and direction, the educated urban campaigners led 
the charge against colonial rule. 
 
Educational opportunity also indirectly furthered anti-colonialist activism with 
educated Indonesians being refused the same job-opportunities available to 
Europeans. The greater transparency in socio-economic disparities stimulated the 
acceptance and dissemination of western revolutionary concepts of anti-imperialism, 
anti-colonialism, and socialism. Coupled with a growing appreciation of Asian anti-
colonialist struggles in China and India and the success of Japan over Russia in 1905, 
Indonesians developed a confidence in the possibilities for national self-determination 
(Caldwell, 1970:382).    
Sources of unrest: class or race? 
Ingleson uses his extensive empirical evidence to conclude that early 20th Century 
industrial and political activism was driven by race, not class, antagonism (Ingleson, 
1986:6). However, the conclusion, I would suggest, does not accord sufficient critical 
weight to the structural transformations that had been initiated under the Ethical 
regime. In view of the emphasis here on these structural transformations, it is sensible 
to reconsider the character of late-colonial political and industrial unrest, especially in 
terms of colonial development and the political responses that this engendered.  
 
The form of colonial state regulation of Indonesian production was determined by the 
metropolitan and European capital’s accumulation ambitions for Indonesia.  The 
centre-defined identification of Indonesia and its people as a productive resource 
drove the institution of an exclusionary process whereby Indonesians – as workers – 
were collectively and largely involved with creating a surplus for foreign interests, 
with those interests –as employers – appropriating that surplus. In this scenario all 
Indonesians – the elite, the peasantry, urban and rural workers alike – were excluded 
from the ownership and distribution of the colonial surplus.  The colonial state’s 
prime function was to support the supply and regulation of labour necessary for 
capital accumulation.  This conceptual perspective defines Indonesian industrial and 
political responses to colonial rule primarily in terms of the class relations between 
Indonesians and the European, largely Dutch, owners and controllers of the 
productive apparatus.  
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Ingleson’s belief that social and cultural determinants defined industrial and political 
action enables him to conclude that the major source of early 20th Century unrest in 
Indonesia was race, rather than class, antagonism. Thus, apart from the ‘vertical 
divisions ... the predominant consciousness of indigenous peoples in all colonies was 
that of race’ (Ingleson, 1986:6). This race-antagonism was reinforced by the fact that 
the modern sector of the economy was largely owned and managed by Europeans and 
that there was a minimal level of indigenous capital ownership.   
 
However, Ingleson’s denial of an influential class-role in the struggles falters when he 
provides evidence as to how some Indonesians were drawn into a class-awareness by 
their participation in industrial action (Ingleson, 1986:7). This implication that class is 
a function of struggle rather than production relations is premised on E.P. 
Thompson’s notion that ‘class and class consciousness are the last stages of an 
historical process, a process which begins with struggle’ (Ingleson, 1986:7). This 
opens the possibility that whilst there was ‘little observable consciousness of class’ 
and Indonesians exhibited ‘race (-based)’ antagonism to the Chinese and the Dutch, 
the racist rhetoric may have disguised a class perspective.  Furthermore, Ingleson’s 
view that the Indonesian struggle was ‘more basic and directed towards immediate 
improvement in their lot in life’ neither proves nor disproves the existence of class-
consciousness or class-relations. Whilst it is unclear what Ingleson regards as ‘basic’ 
struggle, there is no doubt that the objective to improve ‘their lot’ was shared by most 
workers.  
 
It was impossible for most Indonesians to have distinguished between foreign 
political rule and the process of surplus-extraction by a capitalist class. In this 
situation there is no distinction between class and race. Thus, the struggle for self-
determination emerges from a complexity of class-race-caste factors into a more 
identifiable ‘class struggle’. This was especially the case given the extent of foreign 
ownership and control and the connection between political rule and social 
organisation for surplus appropriation. The urban and rural workers’ united 
campaigns to overthrow the exclusionary system of foreign rule necessarily had a 
racial dimension because the owners of the productive apparatus were largely Dutch, 
Europeans, whilst employees were predominantly Indonesian. Furnivall argues that 
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‘such feelings are an amalgam of envy and warranted resentment toward 
institutionalised blocks to upward mobility…(with these animosities) greatly 
intensified as exaggerated income distinctions are brought into sharp relief by ethnic 
or racial differences’ (Furnivall, 1969:118).  
 
The antagonism towards foreign exploitation was heightened by European 
managements’ refusal to allow Indonesians equal political, economic, or social status. 
The oppressive management style of the newer European managers, especially the 
Dutch, led to workers’ overt rejection of the condescending paternalism of Dutch 
employers. The state supported employers by enforcing labour agreements and 
inhibiting free industrial association.  
With the widespread commodification of labour and the decline in village subsistence 
opportunities and land-ownership, most Indonesians had no option but to depend on 
the labour market for their material existence.  As Indonesia’s economy was 
increasingly dependent on international markets, labour-commodification determined 
that Indonesians were under constant threat from a collapse of international markets 
for their commodities. This dependency was perceived as an effect of colonial rule 
rather than mere market volatility, and thus consolidated the antagonism towards 
foreign economic control and colonial appropriation. Nevertheless, market 
fluctuations had markedly affected the Indonesian population under previous epochs. 
It is important, therefore, to investigate just what components of the Ethical state’s 
expanded intervention served to consolidate the dissention and mobilise political and 
industrial action.   
 
Exclusion and nationalism 
In the urban as well as the rural context, colonial authorities utilised indigenous 
hierarchical and patronage relations to facilitate export commodity production. 
Colonial exclusion of indigenous participation in the ownership and share of wealth 
extracted from Indonesia was underpinned by the Dutch exploitation of the traditional 
hierarchy to act as ‘agents’ in the regulation of production and labour. From this 
perspective, the organisation of Indonesia as a productive entity was incorporated into 
the international political economy through the agency of state-systems of internal 
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regulation, and external relations mediated by the international markets and 
accumulation objectives.  
 
Ingleson’s argument that Indonesian social and cultural conditions of ethnicity, 
kinship, patronage and religion defined the social relations of the period and 
precluded the formation of class/economic differentiation discounts the vital role of 
those relations in supporting capitalist appropriation. The use of these relations to 
support production control was an affirmation of the existence of hierarchy and 
economic differentiation as the basis of colonial appropriation and anti-colonial 
conflict.  
 
Contrary to Ingleson’s understanding, the economic relations underpinning colonial 
appropriation points to the development of capitalist systems of production and 
distribution developing in the rural as well as the urban context. This argument for the 
existence of rural capitalist accumulation provides the final measure of doubt as to the 
race-basis of Indonesian unrest and supports the assumption of an exclusionary basis 
of capitalist development in the colony.     
 
We have seen that the Corporate Plantation regime’s economic penetration led to the 
transformation from state indigenous hierarchical production control to direct Dutch 
management. Capital accumulation was underpinned by labour commodification and 
estate-sector systems of work-intensification. Shiraishi points to the capitalist nature 
of Indonesian development by positing that there were two ‘ages of capital’ 
commencing with the Corporate Plantation era: the liberal colonial policy and private 
capitalist expansion phase, and, associated with this, the rise of ancillary industry and 
urban manufacturing production (Shiraishi, 1990:8-27). The most powerful element in 
the transformation to capitalist endeavour was seen as the corporate aggregation of 
individual estates within capitalist conglomerates that were controlled by metropolitan 
boards (Shiraishi, 1990:9). In the rural sector, generally Chinese, merchants linked 
land-owning peasants and tool-owning cottagers to the market through an ‘intricate 
credit and distribution system’ making Indonesian peasants closer in terms of relative 
economic power ‘to the factory worker than to the entrepreneur’ (Furnivall, 
1969:115).   
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The estate system of production organisation was characterised by a strict separation 
of the estate from the local community and village production. The intensive 
supervision and labour control enabled the institution of factory forms of organisation 
to increase labour intensity enabling higher productivity than village-cultivation. 
Thus, estate-production enabled capitalist accumulation through the incorporation of 
all aspects of manufacturing production relations to expand surplus. These mid 19th 
Century capitalist work-relations in the plantation estates threw up conditions that 
spawned conflict that was decidedly class conflictual in character. 
 
Fasseur affirms the late 19th Century existence of a capitalist system of agricultural 
production. He contends that the influx of Dutch capital private entrepreneurs was 
associated with the sweeping away of the Cultuurstelsel compulsory cultivation 
system enabling Indonesian cultivated land to be leased from the peasant by the 
European planter. He argues that this was ‘capitalist agriculture (consisting of) private 
land-leasing, clearing, planting and the construction of mills with hired wage labour’ 
(Fasseur, 1992:165).  
 
In summary, the weight of evidence and argument suggests that industrial 
organisation and action was driven by a complex of interrelated factors. The role of 
education seems to be of particular importance. The Ethical regime’s ‘modernist’ 
agenda to provide the Indonesian middle-class and elite with the skills and academic 
background necessary to support the welfare state also created a broader political 
awareness and was a trigger for activism. Thus education played a major role in 
contributing to an awareness of political and economic alternatives and an ability to 
lead change. Ingleson’s analysis suggested this was a key determinant of change, but 
a more critical analysis suggests that the leadership abilities and awareness of 
alternative possibilities provided the technical facility and confidence to lead, but the 
political sources for change lay in the production process. In these terms the educated 
elite were the political agents of the masses, and not the source of change.  This 
suggests that there was an iterative relationship at work, with the elite fuelling the 
mass mobilisation and vice versa.  
 
The underlying source of stress, generating political and industrial unrest, was the 
process of societal and labour regulation for capital accumulation.  Rural development 
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established the conditions for capitalist accumulation, and thus production relations 
largely determined the antagonism towards foreign extraction. In these terms, the 
material conditions rather than race-antagonism were the prime determinants of strike 
and nationalist action.  
 
Much of the emphasis in this chapter has been on the transformations triggered by 
metropolitan fears of the threat to the reproductive base posed by unrestrained private 
corporate extraction. Whilst these transformations are generally perceived as initiated 
by the Ethical Regime the reformist agenda constituted merely the first, and one 
aspect, of systemic forces operating in this last phase of colonial rule.  
 
There appear to be various understanding as to when the impetus of Ethical reform 
declined.  Some argue that the colonial state ceased to emphasis ‘Ethical’ reformism 
in state policy just prior to the First World War, whilst others consider the welfarist 
agenda continued up until the Second World War (Zainu’ddin, 1968:157). Certainly 
there was a decline in the government’s commitment to these policies, evident in 
nationalists’ growing cynicism about the Dutch commitment to indigenous welfare 
(Zainu’ddin, 1968:157).  More to the point of this thesis, however, the importance of 
the Ethical system is seen in its precipitation of a broader state intervention and the 
decentralisation of power as a basis for an expanded colonial appropriation.  
 
Conclusion 
It appears that the Corporate Plantation regime may have presumed that their laissez-
faire corporate activity would assure an adequate level of labour reproduction by 
generating sufficient income to sustain living standards. It was more likely, however, 
that their focus on accumulation allowed little concern for the devastating impact of 
unrestricted, and state facilitated, labour regulation and wealth appropriation. It has 
been argued that the resulting threat to the standards of living of the masses, and thus 
to labour reproduction triggered the widespread pressure, both in the metropolitan 
polity and by colonial interests, for the state to institute mechanisms and agencies to 
protect the colony’s reproductive base. The resulting engendering of some forms of 
welfare ‘protection’ for the masses heralded the dawn of the ‘modern’ era of 
‘welfarist reformism’. There is no doubt that this state interventionism was designed 
 116
specifically to consolidate Indonesia’s productive base and thus support an expanded 
capitalist appropriation from Indonesia.  
 
The rationalisation of this pragmatic policy translated the reality of assuring labour 
reproduction into the modernist nomenclature of ‘welfare reformism’, hence this 
period was officially titled the Ethical era. This welfarist imagery served to justify 
colonial occupation and ameliorate colonial oppression in the face of worldwide 
movements to overthrow colonial rule.   
 
The fundamental role, nature and impact of the ‘Ethical Era’ did not in any way 
threaten the private corporate system of extraction. To the contrary the ‘welfarist’ 
state apparatus was designed to underpin and protect the basis of colonial 
accumulation. This is consistent with the overall conceptual understanding of this 
thesis that the role of the state was to strengthen the institutional underpinnings of 
capitalist accumulation through the regulation of labour and the ordering of capital.  
 
The state intended to re-secure political and economic control by acknowledging its 
past political exclusion and granting Indonesians responsibility for sharing the 
burdens of colonial administration.  By the late 19th Century, the state had enforced 
colonial rule to the extent that it could decentralise political control, representing rule 
as an impartial process of political representation on behalf of all colonial citizens, 
and not solely metropolitan capital interests.  This imagery of impartiality and 
inclusion in decision-making lay at the core of the regime of social-control and the 
ordering of capital accumulation. The Ethical state thus represented the final transition 
of colonial administration from the territory and its people as a resource to that of 
sovereign self-sustaining territory as a component of the metropolitan state, but under 
decentralised rule. 
 
This shift in perspective locating the nation-state as distinct from, and independent of, 
the process of class-rule for capital accumulation creates an effective mystique of the 
impartiality of the state that survives in contemporary versions of political power-
relations of the era (Gordon, 1993:444-464).  As Gordon notes, this ‘imagining’ of 
what the state was like is clear in Anderson’s version of the character of the late 
Dutch East Indies’ colonial state. Anderson contended that the state apparatus 
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‘became the business of a rapidly expanding officialdom, which unfolded more 
according to its inner impulses than in response to any organised extrastate demands’ 
(Anderson, 1983:479). Similarly, Benda argued that in late colonial times, colonial 
government represented ‘a-political, administrative polities par excellence…as an 
instrument for the implementation not of competing social demands’ (Benda, 1966: 
591,591).   
 
My analysis confirms Gordon’s view that these interpretations of the state as 
essentially carrying out an administrative function independently of the process of 
capital accumulation represented the Dutch East Indies government as ‘a kind of 
“extra-terrestrial state”’ (Gordon, 1993: 445). The important point of the Anderson-
Benda characterisation within the context of this research is, however, the role of 
indigenous participation within the administration in creating a dominant imagery of 
state impartiality. This ‘hands free’ state impartiality is in stark contrast to the role 
actually played in facilitating the extraction of Indonesia’s resources for metropolitan 
interests. It thereby served the vital purpose of creating a mystique to subsume 
indigenous administrators within this ethos.  
 
The Ethical regime presided over a vast re-ordering of the colonial appropriation 
regime that contributed towards improved standards of living. The regime was, 
however, dogged by a major contradiction that undermined colonial authority.  This 
was the state’s imperative to restore and secure the colony’s productive base that 
translated into government regulatory and interventionist policy.  To re-secure the 
productive apparatus as a viable basis of appropriation the colonial government 
expanded the state apparatus by employing large numbers of Indonesians as 
technicians, administrators, clerks and general staff.  This expanded state intervention 
established a new social class within Indonesia that contributed towards the 
development of conditions that resulted in a political mobilisation against continuing 
foreign rule and appropriation and thereby challenging the exclusionary system as 
well as colonial appropriation.  
 
Thus, whilst the state ethos of decentralised and inclusive political responsibility was 
intended to undermine the belief in exclusionary foreign domination and 
appropriation, the false promise of equal opportunity for Indonesians with Europeans 
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was made more transparent. The level of the ‘unrequited export surplus’ affirmed the 
role of the Ethical regime in consolidating the exclusionary process of wealth 
extraction.  There can be little doubt that Indonesians were well aware that the wealth 
they created continued to be extracted from the country for minimal recompense and 
recapitalisation. Exclusion impelled the growing political and industrial action 
supporting independence and wage justice. The state’s response in resorting to brutal 
repression to retain political power in its frustration to reconcile appropriation 
objectives and political pacification, served to cement Indonesian opposition to 
colonialism and the colonial-capitalist system of production and distribution. 
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Chapter 5 
The Japanese occupation of Indonesia 
  ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
We will have the people endure the pressure, and we can’t avoid affecting the 
people’s livelihood because of the need to gain resources for national defence and 
self-support of local armies of occupation.” Japanese Government ‘Draft for 
Administration of Occupied Areas in the South’, 29th November 1941(Lebra, 
1975:168). 
 
“Since enemy nations took the possessions they wanted, there is no reason for our 
hesitation in taking them away. Military administration must be carried out for a long 
time. We should not indulge them (former European colonial countries) by promising 
independence too early’. Japanese Imperial General Headquarters’ Planning Agency 
Directors Suzuki Teiichi and Kaya Okinori, 14th March 1942 (Lebra, 1975:168). 
 
The Japanese imperial expansion that engulfed Indonesia in 1942 constituted a total 
reconstruction of the system of wealth-extraction that had underpinned Dutch colonial 
occupation for three and a half centuries. This Chapter focuses on the confrontation 
between the Dutch and the Japanese systemic means of accommodating their imperial 
goals, and the implications of this confrontation for the future of Indonesia’s 
production system.  The way in which the Japanese marshalled Indonesian resources 
for war-production is considered in the context of the ongoing analysis of systems and 
processes of labour organisation and control as the core element of wealth generation. 
A primary focus is on the way labour was marshalled for this end, especially through 
the intensive mobilisation of the romusha labour-force. The fundamental redirection 
of social, political and economic priorities is seen in the mechanisms and ordering of 
mass mobilisation.   
 
The dramatic wartime changes in distributional linkages and organisational relations 
wrought by the Japanese occupation are located in the broader historical context of 
the penetration of Japanese commercial and industrial interests in Indonesia from the 
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early 20th Century, the rise of the Japanese economic power and the expansive 
character of Japanese industrial capitalism. The interrelation between these external 
politico-economic pressures and the growing political and social dissension within the 
country forms the basis for an analysis of the wartime severing of major institutional 
and distributional ties locking systems of production into the Dutch world economic 
system. This severing is seen as giving vent to the political forces that were to erupt in 
the struggle for independence. 
 
The chapter examines the way in which the Japanese occupation sowed the seeds for 
more broadly-based transformations. The investigation of these transformations 
presents a significantly different understanding from the established view that the 
Japanese occupation led to the complete devastation of Dutch structures and 
institutions of economic order and wealth appropriation. The continuing theme of the 
wealth generation and extraction imperatives implicit in successive ruling regimes’ 
political, social and economic systems is applied to illuminate the prime 
characteristics of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia.  The core consideration is the 
way in which the occupation impacted on existing institutional and political relations 
to determine not only whether there were elements of continuity between Dutch and 
Japanese systems of economic organisation, but to establish the impact of these 
systems on Indonesia’s economic foundations.  
 
The analytical focus is on the conception of the pre-war systems of economic 
organisation apprehended within the earlier analogy of Indonesia as a ‘factory’, 
owned and managed by foreign agencies, but with wealth generation carried out by 
Indonesians. Exclusion from participation in the realisation of wealth in exchange was 
the ‘linchpin’ of accumulation. With the transition from Dutch to Japanese and 
subsequently to political independence, the research has shown the existence of a 
continuing political pressure to demolish these exclusionary arrangements.  This 
chapter emphasises the character of this demolition, and establishes the basis for 
succeeding systems of appropriation. 
 
A crucial context for this demolition was the pre-war trade and investment forays by 
Japanese business with their direct dealings with Indonesian producers and 
independence activists. This analysis also turns on the colonial role of the Chinese as 
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financial and commercial intermediaries for the Dutch. The rapid demolition of the 
Chinese institutional linkages and power-relations by the Japanese authorities in 
Indonesia raises questions for the established texts as to what replaced these 
mechanisms in the post-colonial environment.  These questions are considered in the 
light of previous evidence of the extent and depth of indigenous economic relations 
that had operated outside the Dutch exclusionary ‘zone’. This Chapter contrasts the 
colonial impression of Indonesians as incapable of self-rule and autonomous 
economic management with an appreciation of the establishment of the foundations of 
Republican post-colonial political and economic organisation under the Japanese 
occupation. 
 
Japanese pre-war economic and political intervention 
The Japanese military intervention into Indonesia was preceded by two corporate-
interventionist phases having critical impact on indigenous political economic 
opportunity. In the late 19th Century a group of small-scale merchants began trading in 
the main Dutch East Indies’ colonial entrepôt and in the nineteen-twenties large 
Japanese resource-firms moved into the country to extract mineral resources. The 
latter wave of Japanese business activity was an aggressive corporate campaign 
employing state subsidies, tenders, licences and contracts to access and extract 
Indonesian resources. The impact of Japanese intervention was of considerable 
significance in terms of its impact on commercial and industrial development. 
However, the expansion of commercial interests also had quite important political 
impacts. The resulting symbiosis of commercial and political developments between 
Japanese business and the Indonesia independence movement warrants closer 
scrutiny.  
 
Initially the Japanese merchant penetration appeared as another competitor with the 
Chinese in the supply of consumer goods to Indonesians. Given the strength of 
Japanese industrial development and the expansionary character of the Japanese 
regime, however, this penetration in fact constituted a threat to the Chinese control of 
the internal commercial and consumer goods markets. Further, the Chinese role as 
commercial intermediaries between the Dutch and Indonesians meant that this threat 
contained critical implications for the exclusionary system of appropriation. These 
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implications became explicit as the dominant military-industrial interests in the 
Japanese metropolis expressed their wider agenda for Japanese business in the 
European colonies of East Asia.   
 
Japanese metropolitan interests perceived that the growing Indonesian-Japanese 
business links provided the opportunity for directly undermining the Chinese 
stranglehold over internal commerce. There was an identifiable corollary to this in 
that the Japanese soon realised that their commercial expansion could also become the 
basis for challenging the Dutch exclusion of non-Europeans from engagement in 
production and commerce, and this soon formed part of a more ambitious objective.  
 
The explicitly economic aspect of this campaign became evident when Japanese 
merchants moved to undercut the Chinese stores’ monopoly supply of Japanese 
textiles by establishing their own retail outlets in Indonesia. The more competitive 
prices offered by Japanese merchants, associated with the fairer and more equitable 
dealings between Japanese business proprietors and Indonesians, presented a stark 
contrast with the exploitative character of Chinese business, especially in the context 
of credit dealings and money-lending. The consequent burgeoning Indonesian demand 
for Japanese goods in Japanese stores led Japanese investors to expand into other 
sectors. Investment in retail outlets was followed by the establishment of a Japanese 
banking sector to finance the growing sugar trade with Japan and Japanese investment 
in Sumatran and Outer Islands’ sugar plantations. By 1921 Java sugar producers 
exported 265,460 tons of sugar to Japan (Murayama, 1993: 107). In the 1920s the 
relatively small-scale merchant penetration erupted into a full-scale intervention when 
large Japanese zaibatsu (conglomerate)-associated trading companies established 
textile distribution outlets throughout Java. Japan’s total cotton export to Indonesia 
grew from about 3 per cent in the first decade of the 20th Century to 12 per cent in 
1920.  By 1935, thirty per cent of Indonesian imports were from Japan (Murayama, 
1993: 108).  
 
China’s imposition of a world-wide boycott on Japanese goods following Japan’s 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931 provided a further opportunity for Japanese merchants 
to contest the Chinese commercial dominance. The boycott on Chinese trading with 
Japanese inspired Japanese business to extend their retail-outlets and initiate joint 
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textile production ventures with Indonesians (Post, 1997:92). Textile firms supplied 
looms to Indonesian textile companies to consolidate indigenous production and 
undercut Chinese trade (Sato, 1994:91).   
 
That this commercial and then industrial expansion formed part of a larger political 
economic agenda was soon apparent. In 1909 the Dutch East Indies government 
endorsed the establishment of a Japanese consulate in Batavia (Post and Touwen-
Bouwsma, 1997:89). With a view to removing further obstacles to its commercial 
ambitions, the Japanese Government approached the Dutch colonial administration 
and insisted that colonial law must provide equal treatment to Japanese expatriates as 
that given to Europeans. The Dutch East Indies’ government reluctantly introduced 
the Japannerwet (Japanese law) that granted European social status to Japanese 
citizens (Fasseur, 1994:36). This freed Japanese business from the commercial 
restraints that applied to other non-western or Chinese investors.     This Dutch 
appreciation of the potential benefits to be gained from strong Dutch East Indies-
Japanese trading relations belied the ‘Trojan horse’ implications of the Japanese 
business intervention.  
 
The major political connection between Indonesians and the Japanese that should 
have caused concern for the colonial government related to the commercial and 
political interests of the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trader’s Union) movement. 
We have seen that the Sarekat Islam roots were in the small-business opposition to 
Chinese commercial dominance. The Sarekat Islam grew to become a strong 
independence movement that represented the interests of Indonesian nationalists in all 
walks of life.  The Japanese merchants took advantage of the Sarekat Islam’s Islamic 
business community connections to promote their wider political and economic 
objectives.  
 
In 1932 the Japanese ruling nationalist military and industrial clique pressed industry 
to gear up for rapid expansion into South Asia.  Japanese companies won concessions 
from the Dutch to mine bauxite and the Japanese moved to develop bauxite mining 
and aluminium refining industries in Bintang, Johor, and the Palau Islands. Dams 
were constructed in Sumatra to generate hydroelectric power for aluminium smelters. 
By the late thirties, sixty-three Japanese companies were supplying Indonesian 
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commodities for the home industry (Allen and Donnithorne, 1962:142). This second 
phase of Japanese penetration set the agenda for wartime and post-war mineral 
resource-extraction from Indonesia. 
 
Expansionary movements in the Japanese metropolis 
Within Japan the military-industrial capitalist regime’s resource-acquisition ambitions 
foreshadowed a Southern territorial expansion that would culminate in the occupation 
of Indonesia. Encapsulated in the articulated ambition of the ‘Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere’, the institutional foundations of Japanese military-industrial 
development engendered a particular global projection of Japanese state and capital. 
This expansionary process defined a particular focus and form of production control 
and resource appropriation that became a pivotal element defining Japan’s expansion 
into Indonesia.  
 
Nationalists demanded that parliamentary government be abolished and authoritarian 
systems instituted to enforce corporate dynamism in a challenge to western imperial 
dominance. The government introduced a comprehensive system of industry-support 
and industrial regulation that resulted in an expansion of total heavy-industry output 
from 38 per cent in 1930, to 58 per cent in 1937.  By 1929-30 the interventionist-state 
control and coordination of industry ensured that output exceeded the US (Aziz, 
1955:48). 
 
The Japanese imperialist-extractive ambitions posed a major threat to countries, such 
as Indonesia, who owned those resources sought by Japanese industrialists.  The first 
major expression of Japanese resource-extraction territorial-expansionist ambition 
was the Japanese military invasion of the North-East of China on September 18th, 
1931. This ‘Manchurian Incident’ was intended to bolster industrialisation by 
ensuring a greater supply of mineral resources for the Japanese heavy manufacturing 
industry. The Japanese imperialist agenda was politically justified with the rubric of 
the ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ (Lebra, 1975:53). The concept of an 
Asian equal identity with Japan as ‘guide and mentor’ where ‘ the whole sphere must 
be reorganised into a single body as an organic unit’ became the focus for indigenous 
colonial peoples’ aspirations for independence (Lebra, 1975:38,9).   Asians under the 
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‘yolk’ of European colonial control could gain their independence defended by the 
‘aegis’ of Japan’s economic and security ‘umbrella’. This would give a ‘complete, 
centralised unity of purpose’ for ‘international trade, production, distribution of 
industries, money and banking and diplomatic affairs’ (Lebra, 1975:54).  
 
The ‘Sphere’ sounds alarm bells in Indonesia  
Some socialist and communist Indonesian independence activists believed the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ was merely a justification for imperialist expansion. 
The left nationalist group Gerindo (Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia – Indonesian People’s 
Movement) argued in 1941 that ‘the Greater East Asia idea (was) exclusively 
designed to deprive other peoples of their freedom by Japanese domination as 
happened in Manchukuo, China and Indo-China’ (Aziz, 1955:146).  These groups 
supported western colonial states on the presumption that European liberalism 
represented the democratic ideal over fascism and militarism (Anderson, 1972:37). 
Some independence movements offered the colonial state co-operation to defend 
Indonesia against Japanese expansionism. This offer was rebuffed by the Dutch. 
 
The Japanese military defeat of the Dutch  
On December 1st 1941 the Japanese Imperial conference declared war against 
Holland, Britain, and America.  The Prime Minister declared that the war was 
necessary ‘to preserve the achievement of the Manchurian Incident’ (Lebra, 
1975:165) The Japanese annihilated US battleships in Pearl Harbour. This was the 
first phase of an overall strategic plan to conquer the colonial territories of East Asia 
and which culminated in the overthrow of the Dutch East Indies to seize the colony’s 
oil, tin, bauxite, rubber, and rice. In January 1942 the Japanese captured the Dutch oil 
installations in Sumatra.  On March 1st, the 16th division defeated a combined Dutch, 
US, Australian, and British navy force in the Java Sea. This led to the Netherlands 
unconditional surrender on the 8th March. The ease with which the Dutch were 
defeated indicated a marked lack of Indonesian commitment to the Dutch cause 
affirming the national commitment to independence and foreshadowing the post-war 
Republican revolution.  It also indicated the Dutch colonial state’s military 
preoccupation with containing anti-colonial struggle than ensuring external security. 
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Occupation: 8th March, 1942 – 10th August, 1945 
The seizure of the Dutch East Indies presented the Japanese occupying administration 
with the mammoth challenge of managing the production and distribution systems to 
accommodate wartime industrial objectives. The organisational and economic 
transformations that resulted, as the Japanese military administration moved to re-
order the colonial systems of production and distribution, warrants of closer 
consideration for the economic, as well as the political, implications. In its efforts to 
restructure Indonesia’s productive base, a primary concern of the occupying 
administration was the re-institution of coercive forms of labour-regulation, especially 
through the romusha system of intensive labour-control. The changes to European 
institutional and distributional ties and political relations introduced by the 
occupational regime effected changes in political relations that engendered the 
mobilisation of an indigenous challenge to foreign control.  
 
Production reorganisation: the labour regulation priority 
Japan’s militarist regime signalled its wartime production and extractive program for 
Indonesia in a 5th November, 1941 ‘Draft for the Administration of Occupied Areas 
in the South.’  The Japanese Imperial Conference endorsed the Draft’s two-stage 
agenda for the Southern colonies ‘to foster metropolitan industry’ expand local 
markets for Japanese consumer goods, then to expand Japanese-controlled 
manufacturing industry in the region (Nishijima  and Kishi, 1965:262).  A program of 
productive autonomy – especially of food crops – was to be driven by the ‘aggressive 
utilisation of the native inhabitants’ where ‘ wages should be maintained at as low a 
rate as possible’ to generate self-sufficiency at minimal cost (Lebra, 1975:168). Other 
objectives were to construct military goods such as transport – especially shipping, to 
prevent resource flow to enemy nations, and to induce Indies enterprises to cooperate 
with the war effort (Nishijima and Kishi, 1965:260). 
 
The Military administration abolished all forms of democratic representation 
including trade unions in order to control the political environment and enforce 
labour-discipline. The administration imposed a military system of hierarchical 
regimentation as the basis of labour-control. The fulcrum of this labour-regime was 
the romusha (dutiful labour) form of compulsory labour-mobilisation. Romusha 
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carried out building and rural- production work including the construction and repair 
of airfields, fortifications, factories and oil wells, harbours, bridges, and railway lines. 
Village and subdistrict officials were directed to organise the supply of adult male 
workers not directly employed in economic production to work on war-projects. 
Romusha recruitment agencies were set up throughout Java. Most romusha were 
drafted from those unemployed created by the closure of Dutch estates, but many 
active village workers were taken thus reducing the subsistence production, especially 
rice, workforce (Sato, 1994:95). Romusha organisation replicated the Japanese system 
of rice distribution where the pangreh praja were obliged to fulfil central 
administrative-office planners nominated quotas of the resource.  Most Indonesian 
men of working age were employed as romusha at some stage during the war (Sato, 
1994:95). This coercive, centrally and hierarchically organised mechanism of labour 
control underpinned the war-effort in all sectors of production and distribution. 
Transmigration to other islands - in particular Sumatra – introduced by the Dutch 
during the Ethical era to reduce Javanese over-population and unemployment, was 
now more extensively applied supplying Javanese labour for Sumatran and the Outer 
Islands war-projects and industry.  Many romusha were forced to work in other 
Pacific war-arena countries such as Burma or Siam. Overseas workers suffered 
extremely bad working conditions, and low pay. Japanese food supply regulations 
stipulated that romusha must receive 400 grams of rice per day for hard work, and 
250 grams per day for light work, whereas the provision for the Japanese soldiers was 
640 grams per day (Sato, 1994:114).   
 
Peasants were forced to carry out military objectives by whatever ‘fair’ or ‘foul’ 
means deemed necessary in each situation. In instances of a labour-shortfall, they 
were ‘mustered’ with fraudulent contracts, forced to register for work or face the 
withdrawal of rations, and there was random kidnapping of peasants. In some 
instances the degeneration of labour conditions was beyond description.  Human 
attrition was connected with the deterioration of the military operations, the failure in 
labour control, and the complete ignorance of human life on the part of the Japanese 
forces’ (Nishijima and Kishi, 1965:317).  
 
The scant documentation of the numbers of romusha and death-rates have led to much 
speculation about the importance of their role in the Japanese war-effort, and post-war 
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politico-economic implications.  Whilst Sato calculates there were more than 2.6 
million romusha mobilised by the army, navy, and military administration, the 
Indonesian government’s post war reparations claimed compensation against the 
Japanese state for the loss of four million people. The military administration 
employed over 85 per cent of the romusha, mostly on programs to increase 
agricultural production (Sato, 1994:157). Of the 200,000 recruited for overseas work 
only about 70,000 survived (Sato, 1994:155).   
 
Industry 
The zaibatsu seized control of foreign as well as regional trade, and occupied those 
economic sectors indispensable to the Japanese war effort, like oil, coal, copra, tin, 
bauxite and rubber.  The remaining sectors like processed foods and manufacturing 
were left to pribumi, Chinese Arab and Indian merchants and businesses (Post, 
1997:103). 
 
Within the extractive-sector the central regulation of labour constituted the major 
institutional change from the pre-war ordering of productive resources and factors. 
Apart from the regulation and disciplining of labour, wartime mineral-extraction and 
some industrial manufacturing production was largely accomplished without 
fundamental transformations being made to colonial systems of production and 
distribution. Clearly the Japanese pre-war intervention established the foundations for 
the wartime mineral resource extraction, but the appropriated systems of colonial 
extraction nevertheless constituted the backbone for Japanese wartime extraction.   
 
In November 1942 Japan set up a ‘Greater East Asia Ministry’ to foster investment 
and co-ordinate activities of the Japanese corporations licensed to cover the occupied 
territories of the Co-Prosperity Sphere (Aziz, 1955:185). The mineral sector 
represented the primary focus for resource extraction, with pre-war geological 
investigations showing the archipelago as a major source of essential raw materials 
for military goods, energy and special steel manufacturing such as oil, iron, 
manganese, bauxite, and chromite, nickel and copper.  European and US oil and tin 
companies were appropriated with western managers interned and replaced by 
Japanese military personnel. All mineral production was controlled by zaibatsu under 
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contract to the military and rigorously supervised by the Military forces. The Military 
administration abolished the pre-war Dutch and western cartel price-maintenance 
output constraints, and, assisted by Japanese petroleum companies, moved to expand 
petroleum production (Aziz, 1955:183).   
 
The Military Government’s facilitation of private corporate activity as part of the 
overall plan for the use of Indonesia’s resources created substantive investment 
activity in Indonesia. The bulk of wartime investment in Indonesia was in 
manufacturing, accounting for 27.7 per cent of the total foreign investment. This was 
followed by mining with 16.2 per cent, agriculture, 12.2 per cent, trading 10.2 per 
cent, and shipping 9.3 per cent (Yasuyuki, 1997:136).  Japan invested more heavily in 
Indonesia than any other South East Asian country, and more than a hundred Japanese 
firms operated in Java during the war (Sato, 1997:64).   
 
Banking and finance arrangements 
The Japanese colonial economy required a sound currency-system and financial 
infrastructure to support investment, commerce and exchange. Having occupied and 
secured the territory, the Military Government reorganised the monetary and 
commercial systems required for resource exploitation (Yasuyuki, 1997:136). The 
administration required a centrally controlled financial system backed by general 
community acceptance of the Japanese currency. The transition to Japanese  
‘occupation money’ was forced on the community by the closure of non-Japanese 
banks, with the circulation of money initially controlled by the three established 
Japanese banks (Yokohama, Taiwan and Mitsui) The European banks were later 
liquidated and their activities taken over by the latter two banks. Foreign exchange 
and capital was allocated through the state -controlled banks, the generation of foreign 
exchange reserves through the heavy dependence on overseas trade, and the priority 
to expand sea transportation through industrialisation. 
 
In the early stages of the occupation, the Japanese currency was threatened by the 
inflationary pressure on consumer good prices resulting from the cessation of 
imported goods from the west.  The government imposed currency stability by 
controlling price movements. The Indonesian Peoples Credit Bank was reopened in 
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October 1943 in seventy locations under a Japanese name. Overseeing all these banks 
was the Southern Development Bank (Nanpo Kaihatu Kinko). This bank began in 
1943 to provide credit to those industries necessary for the war effort. It became the 
umbrella financial institution through which the Japanese state controlled the 
Indonesian economy and organised the sale to Japanese business of all western 
property ‘nationalised’ by the occupation force.  
 
Subsistence production  
The Military administration was able to impose its war-objectives on the mineral-
extraction and manufacturing sector without fundamentally altering pre-war 
production and distribution linkages and systems. It was quite another matter for the 
administration to transform the cumbersome colonial system of agricultural 
production and distribution to accommodate central military objectives. The 
administration confronted a dual, exclusionary economic system that was based on 
decentralised Chinese financial and indigenous systems of reproduction and village-
support that operated independently from, but was the mainstay of, the colonial 
regimes’ wealth appropriation. As has been discussed, the Dutch superimposition of 
their regimes of colonial appropriation on the traditional Indonesian system of social 
relations was intended to leave the latter as self-functioning and self-sustaining as 
possible. Whilst commercialisation and the commodification of labour and land 
undermined the supportive character of the indigenous system, the exclusionary 
apparatus remained largely intact. Thus the administration, control of labour for the 
appropriation of export commodities, and the ownership of those appropriated 
commodities was in the hands of the colonial regime, and Regency organisation was 
at least nominally in the hands of indigenous people (Sato, 1994:25). 
 
The Military administration determined that European institutions and structures had 
to make way for a centrally planned hierarchical system to regulate production and 
labour and enforce subsistence production and surplus distribution. It abolished the 
provincial governments and representative councils making Regencies directly 
responsible to the Military administration. This set in train the total dismantling of the 
dual colonial system of representation. To the Japanese rulers, any form of local 
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representation was rejected as reactionary western democratic parliamentary 
liberalism (Aziz, 1955:157).   
 
 The organisation of the production and distribution of all commodities was placed 
under the central administrative command of the Military administration. The 
abolition of the dual system reflected the objective of single central control, and a 
rejection of western racial dominance.  The objective of the new administrative 
system was to replace most lower-status officials with Indonesians and replace senior 
officials with Japanese (Sato, 1994:22). However, as there were only 200 Japanese 
civilian administrators to oversee the 15,000 Dutch, Dutch officials were retained and 
junior largely indigenous appointments promoted to senior administrative positions 
(Aziz, 1955:159).  By the end of the war there were 23,242 Japanese officials in Java 
alone (Aziz, 1955:159).  The irony that the ‘superior’ western administrative expertise 
could be so easily replaced by that of the Japanese officials did not go unnoticed 
amongst Indonesian nationalists.  
 
The transition to new productive/distributive relations 
By June 1942 Allied countries had found alternative suppliers for the Indonesian 
export commodities such as rubber, coffee, tea and quinine that had been previously 
available through the Dutch international commercial systems and supplied on Dutch 
vessels.  Established markets for Indonesian exports were immediately severed and 
the prices of commodities collapsed. The export-estates sector was thrown into 
disarray, and with further disruption following the loss of estate-labour wages, the 
Japanese administration was forced to assert direct control over cultivation 
enterprises. It established the Cultivation Enterprise Control Corporation and the 
agency set commodity prices, determined the crops to be planted and in what 
quantities, and prohibited the sale or mortgage of estates. It also provided loans for 
Indonesians to cultivate crops demanded within the Co-prosperity Sphere and began 
to promote the indigenous ownership of estates (Nishijima and Kishi, 1965:266,7). 
The creation of alternative production organisation and distribution arrangements 
presented the first substantive opportunity for indigenous small-planters to operate 
outside the constraints imposed by European commercial and distribution systems.  
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The difficulties in restructuring the complex colonial system of distributional links 
became apparent when the Military administration moved to institute a monopoly rice 
distribution system. Their intention was to avoid war profiteering and price inflation, 
and to ensure adequate food supplies for the military and the labour force (Sato, 
1994:113).  This was also clearly designed to demolish the decentralised system that 
in effect handed Chinese businesses a monopoly over the production and distribution 
of rice. The Japanese system was devised on the presumption that Indonesian rice 
production and distribution was ordered in essentially the same way as in Japan. 
Japanese rice farms and mills were largely owned by village communities as small 
business operations. Villagers processed rice with small motorised rice mills, as 
distinct from the Indonesian situation of largely Chinese owned mills.  Further, 
Japanese farmers extracted sufficient for local needs and sold the surplus directly to 
wholesalers. Japanese farmers could give priority to rice production, creating a 
surplus without – as in Indonesia – being dependent on the colonial-imposed 
imperative to produce income-generating export crops. The Military administration 
believed that the central organisation of surplus rice production and distribution 
would ensure that Java generated adequate food supplies for the community and war 
needs. By instituting a centrally controlled monopoly distribution system the Japanese 
had clearly failed to appreciate the complexity and antagonism of relations between 
Indonesian villagers, luruhs and Chinese millers, brokers and money-lenders (Sato, 
1994:113). The institutional changes imposed by the Japanese to achieve their 
wartime output objectives redefined the basis of subsistence production organisation, 
and, reflective of the complex socio-economic relations that underscored the system 
of production and distribution, unleashed political changes that would have a 
profound impact on Indonesia’s political future. 
 
The central authority set purchase targets, purchase quotas, the minimum purchase 
price of paddy, and maximum retail price of husked rice. Senior Dutch state officials 
were replaced by Japanese to enforce the policy through the ‘second tier’ of 
indigenous rule under the dual administrative system – in particular the pangreh 
praja.   Sales centres were established across Java, with mills required to buy paddy at 
fixed official prices, and to sell the processed rice to the central state distribution 
agency, which sold it to wholesalers. With the village as the collection centre for 
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harvested rice, the pangreh praja were granted increased authority and financial 
power to carry out requisition and distribution (Sato, 1994:116).   
 
The scarcity of rice generated a high black market price and its widespread use as a 
means of exchange. The pangreh praja often tapped the growing black market by 
filling quotas with other villagers rice and black-marketing their own, often in 
collusion with Chinese rice dealers (Benda, 1958:46).  Although the pangreh praja 
system of middle-management was seen by villagers as corrupt, the Japanese 
nevertheless extended the arrangement, substituting pangreh praja for Chinese rice 
millers as agents in the rice delivery system. The village then became the collection 
centre for harvested rice. The pangreh praja were given the important role of 
distribution, with increased authority and financial power. They were also obliged to 
act as rice requisitioners (Sato, 1994:116). Nevertheless, the Japanese attempt at 
‘Indonesionisation’ of requisition and distribution served to locate the pangreh praja 
in a position of apparent complicity with the occupation regime, thus further 
undermining their traditional status in the eyes of the peasantry.  
 
There is no doubt that many pangreh praja exploited their intermediary role and 
proved the public image of them as profiteers and willing accomplices of the 
Japanese. Nevertheless, the problems of rice distribution and declining incomes 
resulted more from Japanese administrative incompetence. The administration had 
failed to anticipate either the difficulties in transporting rice between the huge number 
of islands, especially with the Allies’ wholesale destruction of the merchant shipping, 
or that huge supply discrepancies between regions that would lead to substantial price 
differences between black markets and the official market, and smuggling of rice to 
the areas of high demand and ability to pay (Nishijima  and Kishi, 1965:281). As the 
difficulties with rice distribution grew, the Military administration forced the pangreh 
praja to increase their collections. Forced deliveries ranged from 10 per cent to 30 per 
cent of the harvest irrespective of grades of rice fields. Large holders were mostly left 
with large amounts of rice for self-consumption (or the black market) whilst small 
holders had a minimal amount left for subsistence (Nishijima and Kishi, 1965:283). 
The inability of the Japanese to ensure an adequate and equitable distribution of rice 
emerged as a fundamental obstacle to the national productivity objectives, and serve 
to consolidate the growing antagonism towards the Japanese.  
 134
 
Sanyo 
Clearly unable to overcome the production and distribution constraints on the supply 
of food that were a legacy of colonial rule, the Japanese employed Sanyo - Indonesian 
political advisers – to advise them of ways to overcome these (Sato, 1994:22).  Sato 
contends that Indonesian nationalist representatives supported the Japanese 
centralised rice production and distribution arrangements in a ‘near universal 
consensus’ that the problems of distributing food to the peasants were solely a matter 
of technical organisation, resolvable by tightening central control (Sato, 1994: 141).  
As Sanyo were generally drawn from the Dutch-educated intellectual elite, it is likely 
that they were out of touch with the general population and the processes, attitudes 
and approaches operating at village level. Hatta opposed the general Sanyo opinion 
and argued that rice production ‘had intricate relations with the entire economic and 
spiritual life in the village, and therefore at least some degree of freedom should be 
left to the villagers’ (Sato, 1994: 140). The ‘technical’ explanation also did not take 
account of the fact the population believed - as we have seen - that the Japanese were 
taking rice ‘out of their Residencies, and even outside Java itself’ (Sato, 1994: 140). 
 
Whatever the logic underlying the contested understandings of the reasons for the 
problems of rice distribution, it is clear that the changes instituted by the Military 
administration had momentous implications for subsequent systems of subsistence 
production and distribution. The Chinese dominance and institutional linkages 
defining the pre-war rice production and distribution system were now largely 
undermined or destroyed. The traditional indigenous elite was now in disrepute, 
consolidating the political antagonism that grew from its role as agents of the Dutch. 
The nationalist movement was clearly supportive of a centralised restructuring of 
agricultural production and surplus distribution. The most significant impact of the 
occupation is thus seen as the ‘freeing up’ of institutional and political relations in 
order to accommodate the Japanese regime’s centrist war-goals.  
 
Rupturing of the exclusionary process 
This severing of some of the fundamental institutional and distributional ties that had 
locked systems of production into the Dutch world economic system played a vital 
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role in revitalising and mobilising the anti-colonial political forces that were to erupt 
in the struggle for independence. The way in which these political connections 
developed constitutes this analysis of the final phase of the Japanese military 
occupation.  
 
The general objective of Japanese imperialism was to create the political acceptance 
of Japanese expansionism and thus secure the productive base and the reproduction of 
labour force. The most crucial politically destabilising dynamic inherent in the 
Japanese system of appropriation was the cementing of an anti-imperialist sentiment 
and the creation of an indigenous political mobilisation. Designed to stabilise the 
occupation regime and create a physical and ideological environment to best serve the 
needs of Japan, mobilisation acted to reinforce popular antagonism and motivate and 
unify the population for independence. Based on the presumption that people still kept 
the illusion of Japanese benevolence and mutual support, the Japanese put major 
effort into creating a mass political mobilisation towards economic self-sufficiency 
and defence against the Allies.   The Dutch had destroyed any potential for mass 
political mobilisation, with exclusion depending on an apolitical workforce, but a key 
strategic component of Japanese rule was mass political mobilisation.  Thus whilst the 
Japanese did not intend to enable direct independence, the substantive force they 
unleashed was a strong and united national anti-colonial ethos.  
 
The social and economic chaos arising from the rice delivery and romusha programs, 
and the acute shortage of consumer goods, and the brutal treatment of the population 
by the occupation force, each placed pressures on the mobilisation of resources. The 
inability to generate adequate supplies was followed by increasingly oppressive 
production demands on the Indonesian population.  
 
One of the most noteworthy paradoxes of the Japanese Military administration’s 
endeavours to assert its authority over the economic landscape was that it sought to do 
this in conjunction with and through managing indigenous political forces. The 
administration did this directly. It repressed pro-western and pro-socialist supporters, 
prohibited all political activity, and imposed capital punishment for any actions seen 
as anti-Japanese, on the basis that such groups could frustrate its economic objectives. 
On the other hand, it strongly supported Muslim groups including politicians, 
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religious teachers, landowners and businessmen and nationalist supporters. Muslim 
groups were seen as a useful means of unifying the population as part of the general 
strategy of war mobilisation against the Allies, and in the implementation of national 
productivity objectives. One of the consequences was that the key Islamic 
organisations of Kiai and Ulama emerged as the elite classes.  
 
The administration also launched more broadly based programs designed to win 
Indonesians’ hearts and minds to the Japanese cause. It undertook an ideological 
campaign based on a ‘peoples’ mobilisation. This was launched in April 1942 with 
the AAA Movement: Japan the Leader of Asia, Japan the Light of Asia, and Japan the 
Protector of Asia. The official objective of the organisation was the elimination of 
western influences, and the dedication of their labour to the Japanese empire (Fischer, 
1959:71). As the war proceeded and Japanese oppression of Indonesians increased, 
any popular support for the AAA collapsed. The failure of the AAA drove the 
Japanese to attempt a further general mobilisation for the war effort by increasing the 
popular expectation for post-war political independence. This mobilisation support 
campaign was carried out from March 1943 by the Poetera (the centre for People’s 
Power) (Nishijima and Kishi, 1965:346).  
 
In 1943 as the war in the Pacific was being lost for Japan, the regime increasingly 
turned to the use of local people to bolster defence.  Japanese political mobilisation 
was largely directed to the youth, as opposed to the older generation who were said by 
the Japanese to have been ‘contaminated’ by the Dutch colonial system (Said, 
1992:6). The Japanese began to recruit, train, arm and organise pemuda  (Indonesian 
youth activists) into battalions. These young activists became a unified, well-trained 
and motivated group of defenders of independence, who would brook no reservations 
about the need for a fierce struggle both against the Japanese remaining in the country 
to ‘pass it back’ to the Dutch; and the Allied forces determined to re-assert western 
colonial control. There were several military youth organisations such as Peta sent to 
training centres to build expertise as guerrilla fighters and later to fight the Allies as a 
‘People’s Army’ (Moenandar, 1969:13).  
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Tightening the screws: a lost war 
In early 1944, the colonial regime worked with indigenous business to propagandise 
plans for a new economic order. The Military Government regime decreed that the 
economic order should be based on an ’Oriental Morality’, where ‘loyalty, and public 
service comprised the essential elements’ (Post, 1997:106). This was strongly 
supported by local entrepreneurs as a means of building economic strength in 
opposition to the return of Dutch and Chinese economic control (Post, 1997:106).  
 
As the Allies came closer to defeating the Japanese, the Japanese supported the 
development of an active militarist independence movement to protect Indonesia from 
the ‘western imperialists’.  In early March 1945 the Japanese regime formed a 
committee of Indonesians and Japanese under the Chairmanship of Sukarno to 
investigate preparations for independence (Kanahele, 1967:184).  The Japanese 
imposed the condition that an independent Indonesia would remain a member of the 
Japanese alliance (Kanahele, 1967:197). On the 28th May Sukarno urged Indonesian 
nationalist leaders to form a ‘constitutional congress’ to negotiate a formal 
constitution for an Indonesian Republic (May, 1978:60). However, Muslim leaders 
insisted on an Islamic state. The compromise Independence credo of the ‘Jakarta 
Charter’ (Appendix 2) was hammered out providing Islamic law as ‘only binding on 
those professing the faith’ (May, 1978:60).  
 
Defeat of Dutch and dawning of independence 
Following the Allies’ defeat of Japan on 15 August 1945, Japanese commanders were 
instructed by the Allied forces not to grant independence to Indonesia. Nevertheless, 
on 17th August Indonesian leaders broadcast their Proclamation of Independence 
(Appendix 1). This was followed by the Preparatory Committee’s appointment of 
Sukarno as President and Hatta as Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. 
British troops began landing in Java in September. Indonesian guerrillas launched 
attacks on British positions but the British, despite their superior weapons and forces, 
including crack Punjabi troops, took three weeks to subdue them. Subsequently the 
British facilitated the return of the Dutch (May, 1978:62). 
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Conclusion 
The Japanese military occupation had substantive impacts on Indonesia’s political and 
economic organisation. This has given rise to the perception that this era represented a 
watershed in Indonesian politico-economic relations, where the monolithic militarist 
apparatus of Japanese imperialism demolished long-running systems of European 
appropriation.  This research suggests, however, that the basic elements of 
production-organisation were not destroyed but regenerated in a form that superseded 
the Dutch constraining system of exclusionary-extraction to form the foundations for 
post-war centralised systems of economic organisation.  
 
This conclusion is derived from an understanding that the pre-war Japanese business 
intervention defined and consolidated tendencies for indigenous economic dynamism 
inherent in the Indonesian indigenous politico-economic system but restrained by the 
exclusionary character of Dutch rule. In this understanding the Japanese pre-war 
business forays occurred at a strategically and financially propitious time both for the 
Japanese state and business, and, importantly, for the indigenous nationalist 
movement and Indonesian business. The Japanese business intervention, the direct 
Japanese support for indigenous industry, the expanded opportunities for Japanese 
intervention under the imprimatur of the colonial state, and the Chinese boycott threw 
into stark relief the possibilities for a Japanese-supported undercutting of the Dutch 
state and class system of colonial appropriation.  For indigenous business, it 
illuminated the possibility that indigenous businesses could overthrow Chinese 
markets and scale the corporate heights of capital control in Indonesia. For 
nationalists generally, it supported the conception of an overthrow of Dutch political 
and economic exclusion to underpin nationalist sovereignty. 
 
In this latter regard, the Japanese business challenge to Chinese commercial 
dominance constituted a challenge to the exclusionary system of colonial 
appropriation. Colonial exclusion depended upon the Chinese commercial 
intermediary role in the running of the internal, subsidiary economy. The Chinese 
supply of credit, other commercial facilities, and mass-consumption goods for 
Indonesians was essential for the ordering of the colonial economy, especially in an 
era of increasing labour commodification and the erosion of village systems of 
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subsistence-support. Japanese merchants symbiotic relationship with Indonesian 
producers, consumers, and independence movements undermined this Chinese 
financial dominance.  
 
The pre-war ‘waves’ of Japanese engagement precipitated a symbiotic relation 
between the Japanese and the Indonesians where Japanese’ politico-economic 
ambitions melded with Indonesians’ political economic ambitions to dismantle the 
Chinese/Dutch monopoly. Japanese corporate consolidation of internal markets 
through joint capital enterprise with indigenous entrepreneurs and direct sale of 
Japanese products to Indonesians allowed Japan to enter the window of opportunity 
presented by the colonial regime’s exclusionary preoccupation with commodity 
appropriation.  
 
On the Indonesian nationalists’ side, the Japanese pre-war intervention inspired and 
supported anti-colonial mobilisation and indigenous capital development. These 
interventions is seen as crucially important in the overall investigation of continuities 
across succeeding ruling systems, especially with regard to the way states order and 
reorder the regulatory system to facilitate capital accumulation. In this instance the 
intervention is seen as shining a beacon-light of indigenous business accumulation 
possibilities that could accrue from the white-anting of the exclusionary system. In the 
political context, the Japanese investment and political liaisons with Indonesians and 
Indonesian political associations consolidated independence activism. Japan’s 
growing international status as a world power created a greater local appreciation of 
the possibilities for an Asian-led regional political and economic dominance to 
replace European colonial control.  
 
This brief history of the Japanese occupation reiterates a key element of the analysis, 
namely, the destabilisation or rupture of successive regimes of appropriation and the 
implications of this change for the development of the subsequent regimes. In 
hindsight, it is perhaps evident that whilst the Japanese commercial intervention was a 
provocative threat to colonial rule – especially given the rise in industrial and 
independence activism – the Dutch colonial regime did little to inhibit Japanese 
access or develop counter-strategies of competitive industrialisation. The Dutch 
remained intransigent, resistant to effecting changes to the regime of appropriation on 
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which their former success had been built, and this was notwithstanding the onset of 
the Depression nor of signs of impending political challenge. Indeed, it was this 
inflexibility that consolidated nationalist antagonism to Dutch rule and laid the basis 
for the reception of the Japanese business expansion into Indonesia, thereby providing 
a greater entré for a developing Japanese imperialism to effect a rupture in Dutch 
economic and political rule.  
 
The Dutch acquiescence to the Japanese political and economic intervention is only 
explicable when considered in the light of a major conceptual theme of this research 
that the fundamental conditions defining the success of ruling regime tend to inhibit 
the regime’s ability to transform the system to accommodate internal or external 
threats. Thus the Dutch presumed that a colonial surplus could only be generated from 
the extraction of commodities employing an exclusionary system of production-
control and trade.  The Dutch colonial preoccupation with maintaining resource 
appropriation and the exclusionary apparatus as the mainstay of colonial wealth-
generation led to an inability to compete with the Japanese or even perceive a threat 
posed by the Japanese pre-war intervention.  
 
The Japanese militarist occupation of Indonesia gave direction and impetus to these 
pre-war strands of political and economic change. The Military Government’s 
destruction of the exclusionary chains restraining production and distribution systems 
under Chinese and Dutch control presented new economic possibilities for post-war 
production organisation.  No longer would these chains determine Indonesians as 
producers, and foreign interests as owners and controllers of the production process. 
The occupation, by overthrowing the exclusionary system of centralised production 
organisation, opened the productive apparatus to the potential of national control.  
This, however, foreshadowed the use of these institutional changes to construct a 
manufacturing base of a strongly disciplined, cheap and plentiful labour supply.  
 
Whilst the price of this demolition was the romusha system of centrally controlled 
and coercive labour disciplining, the fact of Japanese oppression as an overwhelming 
feature of the Military administration’s control affirmed the nationalists’ 
determination to break colonial ties of whatever origin. The Military administration’s 
overall campaign of bringing Indonesians’ into the political process, albeit as a means 
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of supporting the Japanese as a foreign and brutally repressive, power, was the means 
by which the pent-up nationalist aspirations could be liberated. This mobilisation of 
the masses, later supported by the Military administration’s decision to arm 
Indonesians to oppose the Allies, became the politico-military agency that 
underpinned the post-war revolutionary movement for national independence.  The 
Japanese occupation had, in effect, transformed an impotent independence movement 
that the Dutch had been able to repress with only 40,000 troops. By the end of the 
Japanese occupation, Allied forces had major difficulties in militarily wresting post-
war territorial control from the Indonesians with 145,000 troops (Gotta Ken’ichi, 
1997:15).  The legacy of Japanese imperialism was that it had acted as a catalyst in 
mobilising mass action against any form of foreign intervention and politico-
economic control.  
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Chapter 6  
Revolution and Independence: the seizing and 
entrenchment of nationalist power 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
“The Netherlands East Indies were … in essence an extension of metropolitan 
Netherlands in Europe and of its economy, its energies, enterprise, indeed of all its 
intrinsics. It was we who made this archipelago what it is. It was we who fashioned its 
great and modern agricultural structure, we ordered its communications, we gave it a 
clean bill of health, our technicians worked wonders in every field. We made the 
Indies.” From the Netherlands WWII Prime Minister’s Autobiography (Gerbrandy, 
1950:28). 
 
Following the defeat of the Japanese, Indonesians united to seize national sovereignty 
for their country.  Republican leaders set in place the institutions and procedures 
necessary for the assumption of government and the securing of international political 
recognition for the Republic.  This chapter describes how these plans were frustrated 
by international strategic and economic objectives for Indonesia. It describes the 
Republicans’ ‘trial of fire’ as they fought to gain territorial control in the face of 
Allied nations’ political and military determination to reimpose Dutch colonial 
authority.   
 
The eventual achievement of independence, and the setting in place of national 
political and economic agendas, is considered in this context of international strategic 
and corporate objectives. The US’ political, strategic, and economic objectives for the 
region are located as part of the international systemic struggle against the ‘old guard’ 
of colonial European state and corporate interests. The substantive theme is the 
association between international capital’s re-engagement and intervention into the 
Indonesian political economy and the impact of this intervention on the character of 
nationalist economic organisation. A primary focus is on the way in which the 
Japanese demolition of colonial organisational relations and distributional linkages 
presented new opportunities for international interests as well as Republican policy-
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makers. This establishes the basis for a determination of the character of the 
developing forms of production and distribution.  
 
The Indonesian state faced competing class interests in the struggle for control over 
the distribution of the national surplus. The endeavour to strike a compromise 
between the demands of international capital and a populist demand for economic 
sovereignty forms the core focus of this chapter. This analytical focus seeks to 
develop an alternative appreciation of the political tensions of post-war Indonesia to 
those provided by established interpretations that explain the conflicts as purely a 
contest for political power.  
 
The analysis focuses on comprehending the force of class relations in driving political 
conflict and rupture through an examination of the ruling elite’s enforcement of a 
strongly regulated labour supply for foreign corporate interests. It will then explore 
the ways in which the Republican state’s re-establishment of colonial systems and 
agencies of wealth appropriation contributed to the compromising Indonesian 
economic sovereignty. The chapter then explores the consequences of the re-
establishment of colonial relations, especially in terms of how this was reflected 
through the reinstitution of colonial forms of class control, specifically over labour. 
The emphasis seeks to draw out the importance of the influence of the multiple actors 
in defining reactions to this, especially in terms of the ways in which the opposition to 
the endeavours to rebuild the colonial system were manifested through political and 
industrial challenges.  In doing so, the analysis will provide a basis for reinterpreting 
the perceived schism between national and international corporate and strategic 
interests, as more fundamentally a contest over the control of the production apparatus 
and labour-force.  I will examine the significance of this class-based process through 
an examination of the conflict between provincial separatist movements and the, 
largely Java-based, mass movement for national unity.   
 
Much of the literature has characterised this era as merely a ‘political interregnum’ of 
intense political conflict. This perspective posits the ruling elite’s lack of resolution as 
the source of succeeding regime’s inability to enforce political calm and orderly 
economic growth. This thesis, however, seeks to develop an alternative interpretation 
that shows on the one hand that the regime faced irreconcilable expectations and 
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demands from conflicting class interests. This is portrayed as the ‘working out’ of the 
competing class interests of labour and capital that led to the national unification 
agenda as epitomised by Sukarno’s NASOKIM credo On the other hand, whilst the 
ruling elite faced largely insurmountable problems of post-war reconstruction, I want 
to explore how successive regimes laid the vital foundations for subsequent economic 
growth and capital accumulation. 
 
Revolutionary war  
On 15th August 1945 Japan surrendered to the Allies. On 17th August 1945 Sukarno 
and Hatta attempted to forestall Dutch recolonisation by broadcasting a formal 
declaration of National Independence (the Proclamation, Appendix 1). Sukarno and 
Hatta also released the key elements of the nationalist credo encapsulated in a 
Constitution for the sovereign state of Indonesia.  The 1945 Constitution remains a 
core component of Indonesian nationalist ideals for Republican rule. On 18th August, 
the Nationalist representative body, the Panita, appointed Sukarno President, and 
Hatta Vice-President, of the Indonesian Republic.  The Proclamation, Constitution, 
and appointment of these leaders signified that Sukarno and Hatta were now the 
formal representatives of a vast, nationally unified and mobilised force of nationalists 
and their supporters.  On the 5th October, Sukarno consolidated the military 
components of this force within a national army called the Tenteral Keselamatan 
Rakyat or the Army of Peoples’ Security (Said, 1991:25).   The incorporation of this 
national military force within all aspects of political organisation and international 
relations set in train the dual role of the military as a political as well as a security 
force. The melding of the youth military-forces (the pemuda) into a ‘well-trained and 
highly motivated entity’ by Japanese-occupying forces had spearheaded this role, with 
the more dynamic and vigorous element of the nationalist movement mobilised as a 
military force against Allied attempts to recolonise their country (Said, 1991:6).  
 
Sukarno and Hatta’s endorsement of the 1945 Constitution represented their intention 
to accomplish the masses’ aspirations for economic, as well as political, sovereignty.  
This aspiration was a core credo of the nationalist movement from its earliest phase 
when the founder of Sareket Islam, Hiji Salim, promoted the concept of economic 
sovereignty (Hadiz and Chalmers, 1997:9). The Constitution incorporated this 
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aspiration by calling for the destruction of the ekonomi kolonial and the establishment 
of an ekonomi nasional (Hadiz and Chalmers, 1997:8).  The system of Dutch 
exclusionary extraction had to be swept away as an anachronistic obstacle to 
indigenous economic dynamism and social justice.  The Constitution promoted the 
breaking of the shackles of western imperialist control over key economic sectors in 
order to allow the economy to be redirected by the state towards satisfying 
Indonesia’s material and reproductive needs. The colonial reliance on primary exports 
was to be replaced by economic ‘diversification’.  The demolition of restrictions on 
indigenous investment would free the entrepreneurial initiative previously constrained 
by the exclusionary system, and allow Indonesian business to generate the profits 
necessary for capital development and economic advancement.  
 
Whilst economic sovereignty was introduced as a rallying-cry for indigenous business 
as they struggled to expand in the face of colonial exclusionary systems, it was seized 
upon by Marxist and socialist nationalists to justify state economic control.  They 
rejected the path of parliamentary reformism towards political sovereignty whereby 
the Republican state would merely supervise the transition from a foreign corporate-
dominated economy to one that allowed unrestricted indigenous private corporate 
activity. They equated this with a return to the systems of colonial economic control 
with indigenous business merely ‘adding on’ a layer of Indonesian economic 
participation whilst reasserting the forms of labour-control. The Marxist and socialist 
agenda proposed a broad state interventionist program incorporating the state-
ownership and control of key economic sectors. This is evident in Article 33 of the 
constitution where: 
1. ‘The economy will be organised collectively on the basis of the Family 
Principle; 
2. The state will control (menguasai) branches of production which govern the 
lives of the masses; and 
3. The earth, water and the natural resources they contain will be controlled by 
the state, and used, as much as possible, for the welfare of the people’ (Hadiz 
and Chalmers, 1997:9). 
 
Whilst there was a degree of unanimity across the Indonesian class spectrum in 
support of economic sovereignty, this appears as an artificial alliance of essentially 
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opposed class interests.   The chasm between the indigenous capital interests and 
those supporting strong state economic intervention, ownership, and control would 
break open once political sovereignty had been achieved. In the meantime, however, 
it was imperative for all nationalists to maintain national unity in the face of the Allies 
war against the Republic.  Again, however, the ‘class-threat’ character of the 
Republican agenda represented the key element of Allied opposition to Indonesian 
independence. This foreshadows the Allies’ military and political resistance to those 
elements of the nationalist leadership, and to the Republican credo that threatened 
private corporate ownership in Indonesia.  
 
The post-war reassertion of western political and economic power 
This analysis of Indonesian production organisation has focused on the Asian arena 
where the locus of control appeared to be moving in Indonesians’ favour, largely as 
the result of the Japanese regime’s rupture of Dutch systems of appropriation. The 
defeat of the Japanese shifts the analytical focus back to the European arena of 
political and economic power-relations as western forces moved to re-assert their 
control over Indonesia’s political and economic future.  The first indication of this 
shift was the Allied order to the defeated Japanese forces to secure the colonial status 
quo in Indonesia (Said, 1991:10).  Taking no account of nationalist ambitions, the US-
led Allied powers used their military, political, and economic might to place the 
future of Indonesia in a  ‘holding pattern’ whilst final decisions were made about the 
nation’s place in the global political economy.  This treatment provoked Indonesian 
outrage and an archipelago-wide violent confrontation with the Japanese forces.  
 
The nature of the international power-plays over Indonesia’s post-war future is 
illuminated by an appreciation that the Allies’ policy decisions regarding Indonesia’s 
future, especially those concerning political sovereignty, primarily turned on the issue 
of access to Indonesia’s resources.   The western-Allies’ post-war strategic and 
economic agenda was vitally dependent on the unrestrained supply of the sorts of 
resources that Indonesia could provide, and on a secure state-control of the production 
and extractive apparatus.  In the strategic context of the post-war territorial division 
between the major Allied and USSR powers, the US’s prime concern was to combat 
communism by restoring capitalist production and reviving regional markets. The US 
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determined that Holland was to be restored as a major bulwark of the western-
European trading, business and security regime.  This could only be accomplished by 
restoring Holland’s fortunes, in particular through the restoration of the Dutch East 
Indies to Dutch ‘ownership’.  To accomplish the resource-extractive imperatives it 
was vital that all nationalist opposition be demolished. The final US decision to 
support Dutch recolonisation of Indonesia was contingent not only on their ability to 
suppress nationalist opposition, but also on the Netherlands’ acceptance of the US 
condition to open unrestricted US and Japanese access to Indonesian resources.  
 
Recolonisation 
Following the Allies’ agreement on Dutch recolonisation, western states and 
corporations moved quickly to stifle Indonesians’ ambitions for economic and 
political sovereignty.  Those European resource-extractive and distributive firms that 
had been a mainstay of colonial wealth-generation re-established their Indonesian 
bases, and Allied forces commenced their military offensive against the Indonesian 
nationalist forces.   
 
Foreign economic control was affected through the power of large merchant houses 
drawing on their international trading connections to assert considerable financial and 
technical dominance over Indonesian markets.  The major companies were the Dutch 
‘Big Five’ of Borsumij, Jacobson van den Berg, George Wehry, the Internationale 
Crediet en Handelsvereniging 'Rotterdam' (the Rotterdam Trading Society or 
Internatio, as it is commonly called), and Lindeteves and the English merchant house 
of MacLaine Watson (Furnivall, 1969:167).  The interests of these companies 
extended throughout Indonesia, principally dealing in commercial activities, but also 
incorporating manufacturing industry and agricultural estates (Allen and Donnithorne, 
1962:61). The Company of Jacobson van den Berg is a strong example of the 
international connections of the ‘Big Five’.  Incorporated in 1860, the Company was 
affiliated with many companies throughout the world, and had offices in most 
Indonesian trading centres.  Prior to World War II the Company was a major importer 
of manufactured goods, and exported most types of Indonesian produce. In the post 
war period it extended its operations to manufacturing, owning or acting as sales 
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agent to a wide variety of manufacturing establishments  (Allen and Donnithorne, 
1962:61). 
 
The pivotal consideration for Western Allied powers resided in their need to satisfy a 
vastly expanded demand for a secure supply of resources for post-war 
industrialisation.  During the War the US State Department’s Political Adviser on Far 
Eastern Affairs warned the US government that ‘only on the lands west of the Pacific, 
and especially in South East Asia is our dependence so vital and complete that our 
very existence as a great industrial power, and perhaps even as an independent state, 
is threatened if the sources (of raw material) should be cut off’ (Caldwell and Utrecht, 
1979:71). To ensure this supply, the Allies had to effect control over Indonesia’s 
productive apparatus and resource-base and block Indonesian nationalists’ moves to 
establish indigenous economic sovereignty or to nationalise foreign firms. The US 
believed that a Dutch regime, strongly dependent on the US for finance and military 
equipment, would be prepared to countenance US access to its resources and not 
reinstate pre-war Dutch-style cartels and constraints on US and Japanese trade. 
 
Secondly, there were European strategic considerations involved with the restoration 
of Indonesia under Dutch rule. The US determined to establish a capitalist-state 
bulwark against the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism. This formed the basis 
for Marshall plan aid, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation alliance of anti-
communist states (Said, 1991:93). The Netherlands – and Dutch cooperation – was a 
vital strategic component of these Cold War ‘containment’ strategies (Said, 1991:93). 
The success of this policy depended on the restoration of a major source of Holland’s 
wealth and resources, the Dutch East Indies.  Thus the US State Department had no 
intention of intervening in support of the Indonesians resistance to the harsh militarist 
reimposition of colonial rule. A further strategic consideration reinforcing the US 
commitment to the re-establishment of Dutch rule emerged with the USSR’s move to 
extend its regional support for post-colonial development in the Asia Pacific.  The 
USSR’s ambitions posed a threat to capitalist expansion and regional security.   
 
Finally, the US determined that it was strategically and economically imperative for 
Japan’s industrial base to be restored to enable its full participation in the proposed 
new international capitalist economic order. Thus the War reparations negotiations 
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with Japan, encapsulated in the San Francisco Peace Treaty’s indemnity arrangements 
for Japan to pay compensation for their military invasions in the region, included a 
US guarantee that Japan would gain open access to South East Asian resources and 
markets. Japan used the indemnities to negotiate the promotion of Japanese heavy 
industries in Indonesia. This then became part of mutual economic cooperation 
policies, and official development assistance, where indemnities and development aid 
‘were tied up with the export of equipment and sometimes whole plants from Japan’ 
(Caldwell and Utrecht, 1979:68).   
 
Allied war against the Indonesian Nationalists 
Within two months of the Japanese surrender the US moved to support the Dutch re-
colonisation objective. On 29 September 1945, the Allied commander Mountbatten 
deployed airborne commandos to transfer Indonesian territory and resources from 
Japanese to Allied forces. The Allies were confronted by a politically mobilised mass 
of Indonesian smallholders, peasants, students, and indentured and industrial labour. 
The Allied command gave the task of ‘restoration of law and order’ to the British, 
with the immediate imperative to control the chief cities and ports of Java and 
Sumatra rather than the disarming of Japanese forces. Further, the British Command 
took the highly provocative step of employing Japanese forces to repress Indonesian 
Nationalist forces by ordering Japanese commanders to recapture Indonesian-held 
cities (Kahin, 1969:144).  
 
Indonesian nationalist militancy was a major threat to Dutch plans for peaceful 
reoccupation. The Dutch clearly presumed that the independence movement would be 
weak, divided and non-confrontationist. The Proclamation, however, triggered 
nationwide mass actions against foreign domination. Indonesians saw the Constitution 
and Proclamation as the final phase in their long-term struggle to dismantle colonial 
political and economic controls and to return peasant lands that had been alienated to 
foreign corporate-plantations. The Republican struggle took a variety of forms, such 
as trade-union militancy, the seizure of Dutch and Japanese property, and huge 
demonstrations that led cities and towns declaring themselves for the Republic and to 
be controlled by Indonesians (Bey, 1961:82). The immensity of this opposition and 
the Dutch determination to quash it led to Holland’s spending eighty four million of 
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the total $ 506 million US Marshall Plan post-war reconstruction aid to finance the 
war against the Indonesian independence forces (Bey, 1961:82). 
 
The revolutionary struggle 
The state of military preparedness and evidence of a measure of pragmatism among 
the Indonesian national leadership prompted an attempt to compromise over the terms 
of achieving a form of Indonesian rule. The division within the Revolutionary Cabinet 
over the responses to the Allied attempts to recolonise the country can be baldly 
described as based on the pre-War group of nationalist leaders and the pemuda youth 
forces. Whilst Sukarno and Hatta took the side of the pemuda, the pragmatists of the 
nationalist ‘old guard’ moved to mollify international political concern over the 
character of the leadership and its economic direction. This pragmatism was made 
explicit in the public statement by the factional leader – Syahrir – that ‘Indonesia is 
geographically situated within the sphere of influence of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and 
imperialism. Accordingly, Indonesia’s fate ultimately depends on the fate of Anglo-
Saxon capitalism and imperialism’ (Said, 1991:40).  With the Allies believing that 
Sukarno and Hatta were ‘puppets’ of the Japanese, apparently supporting Japanese 
wartime imperatives in Indonesia, these leaders were forced to stand aside from 
leadership decision-making.  In November 1945 the majority in Cabinet made 
Syahrir, a former militant opponent of Japanese imperialism and a member of the 
nationalist underground, Prime Minister.  
 
The Allies also rejected the Proclamation of Independence and the Constitution 
representing them as part of the Japanese strategy to retain territorial and political 
control over Indonesia. The leadership under Syahrir now declared their opposition to 
the nationalisation of foreign corporations and any restrictions on the terms of foreign 
investment within Indonesia. Syahrir promulgated a new constitution excluding any 
reference to nationalisation. The new constitution completed the transformation from 
a position asserting a strong interventionist state to western-style reformist, market-
liberal, parliamentary democratic systems by scrapping the clause giving the President 
power over Cabinet and by making Cabinet-members responsible to the parliament 
rather than the President (Oey, 1981:32). The new Cabinet’s priority was to represent 
itself to the UN as a western-style democracy, supportive of western alliances and 
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presenting no threat to foreign capital ownership.  The leadership was determined to 
convince world-forums, such as the United Nations, of the Republican movement’s 
aspirations to progress peacefully towards a political democracy. This appeal for an 
international acknowledgement of Indonesians rights of self-determination was 
designed to conform to the ideals of the Atlantic Charter (Cribb, 1991:58).  
 
Nationalist ambition 
The leadership’s pragmatism belied a mass-determination to expel all foreign 
corporate owners and assert indigenous control.  The pre-war united campaigns with 
nationalist political organisations were predicated on a post-war promise of fairer 
working conditions, higher pay, and the demolition of colonial systems of labour-
regulation. Many workers were in no mood to brook a gradualist industrial program of 
accommodation with a returned foreign apparatus of labour regulation. Workers and 
peasants led militant campaigns to take over foreign enterprises, eject foreign owners, 
and overturn colonial systems of production control especially in the corporate 
plantations of Java and Sumatra. Industrial unions led national campaigns for 
industrial reform.   
 
In September 1945, workers’ representatives travelled to Jakarta to attend a 
conference dedicated to the promotion of a major role for labour in the management 
of the Republican state. There was substantial pressure by the conference to transform 
the labour movement into a political party.  In November, the leaders of the General 
Indonesia Trade Union (Barisan Buruh Indonesia) set up the Indonesian Labour Party 
(Party Buruh Indonesia), largely following the direction of, and supporting, the 
Socialist Party (Kahin, 1969:161).  
 
Dutch re-occupation - ‘Police Action’ 
Whilst Indonesians moved to create the essential components to institute a Republican 
state, and whilst international negotiations for a peaceful solution were underway in 
Europe and the U.N., the Dutch moved to impose their re-occupation through military 
force. Consistent with their belief that the benevolence of their colonial regime was 
sufficient cause for the Indonesian people to accept their post-war return, Dutch 
authorities represented the Republican opposition as a minority of dissidents and 
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criminal elements. This justified the representation of the military confrontation with 
the Republican forces as not a ‘war’ but a ‘civil disturbance’, punishable by ‘police 
actions’.4   
 
In contradistinction to this façade that the Dutch military interventions were merely 
‘police actions to restore law and order’, the Dutch forces used whatever war-tactics 
deemed necessary to expand territorial control. This included the colonial tactic of 
building regional allegiances with sympathetic bupati, and, having achieved military 
control, declaring these ‘pacified’ regions part of a federation of Indonesian states 
under Netherlands sovereignty. However, whilst the Dutch imposed rule by absolute 
force in key areas of Java and Sumatra, for many, largely Outer Island, provinces the 
indigenous elite were not opposed to Dutch colonial reoccupation.  These bupati 
believed independence – especially under Java-centric rule – threatened their wealth, 
status, and tribute that had been cultivated by the Dutch colonial rulers. The Dutch 
pledged to return this traditional privilege and affirm their political power over the 
peasantry (Caldwell, 1970:77). With this provincial support by December 1946 the 
Dutch had seized control of several Javan regions and created the Dutch state of East 
Java.  
 
The brutality of the Dutch campaign, and the contradictions between the imagery of a 
benign colonial power and the ruthless methods by which that former power 
reimposed Dutch rule, mobilised a nationalist activism largely overriding internal 
political divisions.  Three years of unsuccessful attempts by the Dutch to reimpose 
colonial rule convinced their US allies to caution more diplomatic ways of 
proceeding. Certainly the degree of Indonesian hostility towards the Dutch would 
have indicated to the US administration the futility of pouring further Marshall aid 
into this ‘black hole’ of defence expenditure, without any guarantee of future 
assurance of secure extraction of Indonesia’s resources. 
 
On the 17th of January 1948 the US government withdrew political support for 
Holland, and facilitated peace talks between the Dutch and Indonesians on the US 
                                                 
4 This representation continued to influence interpretations of post-war Indonesia, as might be noted by reference 
to a western economic developmentalist text that refers to the occupation of foreign companies by nationalist 
forces as ‘the activities of bandits’ and ‘marauding bands’ (Allen and Donnithorne, 1962:134).  
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warship, Renville. The consequent  ‘Renville Agreement’ -defined the terms of a 
future independent Republic. When the Dutch broke the Agreement, the US 
threatened to remove Marshall Plan aid. By November 1949 the Dutch reluctantly 
acceded to the US pressure and organised a peace conference at The Hague. At this 
Roundtable Conference Agreement (RTC) the Dutch finally acknowledged 
Indonesian’s right to political sovereignty, albeit within an Indonesian-ruled 
‘federation’ of the United States of Indonesia that included several pro-Dutch states.  
 
The US pressure to call a halt to the Republican revolutionary war reflected well-
defined economic and strategic objectives with respect to Indonesia’s future.  In 
return for US support for a degree of political sovereignty, the RTC Agreement 
imposed conditions on the Republican leadership to restrict the scope of its 
independence ambitions.  A crucial element of the RTC Agreement was the obligation 
for the Indonesian leadership to renege on all aspects of the nationalist revolutionary 
credo relating to state economic intervention and control of foreign-owned extractive 
industry, financial and trading institutions. Republican leaders agreed to return 
foreign-owned property seized during the Revolutionary period and to guarantee all 
private company ‘rights, concessions, and licenses granted to private organisations 
according to law and still in effect at the time of the transfer of sovereignty’ and to 
restore these rights (Furnivall, 1969:154). In other words the Republican 
representatives were forced to guarantee the safety of all Dutch capital invested in 
Indonesia (Oey, 1981:40). In August 1950 the aspirations embodied in the 1945 
Constitution were buried with the promulgation of a new Constitution incorporating 
the major tenets of the RTC Agreement.  
 
The Dutch war of reoccupation was a struggle for the political and economic control 
of Indonesia’s resources. The Dutch conducted a vicious war of political duplicity and 
military brutality towards this end. The callous indignity of the war’s resolution, in 
the wake of years of deprivation and destruction during the Japanese occupation, left 
anti-colonial scars and a growing determination to assert economic as well as political 
sovereignty. 
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Parliamentary Democracy: 1949 – 1957 
The Republican state’s urgent task was to build a strong self-sufficient economy by 
regenerating the production apparatus to obtain economic self-sufficiency whilst 
paying off the debts to Holland imposed by the Round Table Agreement. A major 
debility was the RTA clause binding the Indonesian state to pay Holland the full costs 
for the Dutch war against the nationalist forces and to cover the debts of the former 
colony (Zainu’ddin, 1968:238).   
 
The Dutch and the Japanese had left a legacy of low standards of living, inadequate 
food production and an almost non-existent industrial sector.  Most colonial 
institutional and distributional ties locking Indonesian export production into the 
Dutch world economic system had been destroyed by war and revolution, and there 
was a need for massive re-capitalisation for repair, reconstruction and expansion of 
Indonesia’s productive base. Whilst Republican policy options were clearly and 
severely constrained by the western Allies’ strategic and economic agenda, the 
dominant element of the Republican leadership appears to have largely 
accommodated that agenda. This process of accommodation, and the interests it 
served, reflected the changing class interests in Indonesia with some groupings 
perceiving advantage from the western-determined economic parameters and 
institutions. This clear rejection of the nationalist ideals that lay at the core of the 
1945 Constitution underscored the fundamental shift from an exclusionary system of 
colonial appropriation with Indonesians as the production force, and Europeans as 
owners of the productive apparatus, to the leadership’s aspiration for the development 
of an indigenous bourgeoisie.  With evidence of a growing chasm between popular 
aspirations for economic as well as political sovereignty, the development warrants 
further closer consideration. 
 
The direction and impact of state economic policy 
The accommodation with the US and the subsequent direction of the Republican 
leadership’s policy directions could be attributed to the ideological and political 
orientation of those Indonesians who had assumed leadership.  Most leaders were 
tutored in western educational institutions and inclined towards western 
parliamentary, legal, and administrative systems (Kahin, 1963:477).  These 
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inclinations were reflected in the tenor of Republican policy, but also became 
encapsulated in the regime’s economic policies, which had very definite class-
implications.  Most notably, the regime promoted private enterprise and market-led 
solutions as the optimal means for promoting economic development.  The core focus 
on Republican economic regeneration programs effected changes in the organisation 
of production and the changed production-relations underpinning that organisation, 
and this will now be considered.   
 
Indigenisation of the trading sector 
The character of Republican economic development in Indonesia was underpinned by 
the colonial legacy of state corporate ownership. The Dutch colonial state’s 
continuing role as entrepreneur created vast opportunities for the post-colonial state 
that signal an appreciation of the potential for national control over the major heights 
of the processes of capital accumulation. We are reminded that at various stages in 
colonial history, the Dutch state owned and operated not only public utilities but also 
agricultural estates, mines, trading and financial companies – such as the Java Bank 
and the N.H.M., and manufacturing concerns.  The RI government inherited these 
estate properties, companies and infrastructure including dockyards, railways and 
airlines (Allen and Donnithorne, 1962: 60). In 1950 the government introduced the 
Benteng ('Fortress') program of indigenous business support. The program was 
introduced in response to Indonesian business’ concern about the post-independence 
continued economic dominance of foreign economic interests.  It was also moved by a 
demand to counter the imbalance of this dominance through the provision of state 
loans. The government determined to allocate funds to expand indigenous 
participation in the trading sector as giving the greatest opportunity for success with 
relatively low requirements of capital and business-expertise and experience.   
 
The Benteng program provided credit from state banks and credit agencies and 
selectively applied import restrictions to protect indigenous traders.  Protected firms 
had to be 100 per cent managed and 70 per cent owned by Indonesian indigenous 
nationals (‘bangsa Indonesia asli’) to receive state-support.  Between 1950 and 1953 
about 700 firms benefited from the plan (Furnivall, 1969: 168). 
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The allocation of state-funds towards securing the competitiveness of local firms 
within the strongly foreign-controlled trading sector was fraught with difficulty. The 
industry’s dependency on consumer-good demand meant that when the substantial 
state expenditure for infrastructural redevelopment created inflation and increases in 
the prices of subsistence commodities, especially rice, the mass demand for imported 
goods declined.  Furthermore, the limited supply of foreign exchange caused the 
government to ration credit to the local trading-firms. This limited the success of the 
Benteng program – with only about 10 per cent of total imports covered by the 
program at the end of 1951 – and this was compounded by, the lack of indigenous 
commercial and management expertise and international trading-links which 
disadvantaged local firms in the competition for market-share (Furnivall, 1969: 168).    
 
Rural sector regeneration 
The government followed the Benteng project by establishing the Central Trading 
Company to also sponsor indigenous trading enterprise but within the agricultural 
export sector. This Company facilitated the export of Indonesian agricultural products 
and factory produce and the import of the raw materials. The CTC was more 
successful than Benteng and by 1952 sixty per cent of national export income was 
generated by indigenous smallholder agricultural produce (Utrecht, 1987:178).  The 
wartime demolition of exclusionary constraints meant that in the post-war 
environment, indigenous participation in world markets generated a massive 
expansion of output from small landholders.  Smallholders’ rubber production rose 
from 264,000 tons in 1940 to an average of 458,000 tons in 1950-57 (Furnivall, 
1969:156).  This increase represented a significant indication of the potential of 
unrestrained indigenous productivity, especially in contrast to the largely foreign-
owned estates where exports for the same period declined from 281,000 to 242,000 
tons (Furnivall, 1969:156). Peasant-owned areas under sugar cultivation grew from 71 
hectares in 1950 to 24,031 hectares in 1955 (Furnivall, 1969:156). 
 
Industrial projects 
A further major state initiative was the Economic Urgency Program (Program 
Urgensi Perekonomian). This project was also designed to support indigenous 
business but concentrated on the manufacturing sector by cultivating small-scale 
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semi-rural 'people's industries' (Chalmers and Hadiz, 1997:11).  The state supported 
the modernisation of cottage and handicraft industries from leather workshops to 
bronze smelters by providing technical aid, capital assistance and credit, and 
prohibiting non-asli investors and producers from access to the industry (Glassburner, 
1962: 123).  Again, however, the program was plagued by management problems, 
such as ‘inexperience, administrative incompetence, and inadequate planning’ 
(Furnivall, 1969:163).  The program was abandoned in the mid-1950s (Chalmers and 
Hadiz, 1997:11).  
 
The EUP also cultivated indigenous entrepreneurial penetration in the large-scale 
manufacturing sector. The government aimed to replicate the growth of Western 
industrialisation by expanding industrial manufacturing of consumer goods vis-à-vis 
rural unprocessed and part-processed commodity production. The government funded 
the establishment of large industrial plants intending to transfer the management of 
these firms to private, co-operative, or joint public-private ownership as they became 
economically viable. Government policy restricted foreign investor access, requiring 
that Indonesians own a majority of the stock. The state gave priority in the allocation 
of new enterprise’ licenses allowing a graduated preference for indigenous nationals, 
non-indigenous nationals, and foreigners (Palmer, 1978: 164).   
 
The state allocated more than five times as much finance (Rp.160 million) into the 
large-scale manufacturing as it did into the village cottage industry. Whilst showing a 
clear ability to become economically viable, these large firms did not precipitate the 
flurry of private entrepreneurial activity predicted by government planners. The state 
was forced to maintain government ownership of these new rubber remilling, printing, 
cotton spinning, cement, caustic soda, and coconut flour firms (Palmer, 1978: 163).  
Inflation also inhibited the success of these industrial projects and from 1956 the state 
reduced its expenditure in manufacturing production.  
  
Problems of indigenous economic development – credit   
Apart from a lack of entrepreneurs and expert managers, economic planners faced a 
severe lack of funds to provide credit for private investors. Credit restrictions 
inhibited most post-war expansion. Indonesian smallholders could not obtain the 
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capital necessary for replanting and proper agricultural support.  It was estimated that 
about a quarter of smallholders plantings engaged in rubber cultivation and harvesting 
had become worthless due to lack of capitalisation (Allen and Donnithorne, 
1962:137). Villagers and tool-owning cottagers were hardest hit by the credit 
restrictions.  Credit bondage returned as the only means by which peasants could 
generate the exchange necessary to purchase household and capital-good necessities. 
Consequently most peasants with land titles allowing some legal protection from the 
takeover of their land were tied to a generally Chinese merchant or lender.  The 
peasantry pledged unharvested crops for credit. Working capital for cottage industries 
was generated in the form of raw materials where credit was advanced through a 
putting-out system under which Chinese merchants supplied the goods and sold the 
product.  
 
The Chinese were regarded as exploiters who, returning to the commercial 
intermediary role that had underpinned colonial appropriation, prospered whilst 
Indonesian producers starved.  Indonesian expressions of antagonism towards Chinese 
lenders forced many Chinese to move into the urban areas with a view to seeking the 
protection of their urban communities. The ‘urbanisation’ of Chinese capital led to 
expanded investment in small manufacturing companies and the takeover of Dutch 
shops. By 1952, 138 out of 154 rice mills had returned to Chinese ownership, as well 
as the majority of printing presses, trucking companies, and weaving mills (Furnivall, 
1969:182). The Chinese also bought up wholesale, import and export trading 
companies as well as smaller estates left by departing Dutch.  By 1956 indigenous 
business had not made inroads into this Chinese economic dominance, and failed to 
challenge the Chinese indigenous rural credit institutions hold on village credit 
(Furnivall, 1969:182).  
 
There was strong public pressure on the government to undermine the commercial 
dominance of Chinese merchants by supporting the establishment of financial 
cooperatives and monopolising state marketing agencies. The state introduced rubber 
and other rural-produce cooperatives to control the quality and pricing of the product 
and to impose collective price-setting to maintain the export value of Indonesia’s 
commodity.  As the state moved to stimulate local processing by, for example, 
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prohibiting the export of raw rubber these cooperatives took over the collection of the 
primary commodities (Furnivall, 1969:157).  
 
However, the highly productive and competitive indigenous primary producers were 
financially disadvantaged by being obliged to sell their commodities through 
inadequately funded and inefficiently managed state-run trading-concerns. These 
trading houses could not compete against the technical expertise, experience and 
strong financial leverage of Western and Japanese trading companies.  
 
Implications of the indigenisation policy  
The results of the state policies suggest an interesting irony whereby state policies of 
protection and subsidy designed to create an indigenous manufacturing and importing 
sector capitalist class failed whilst unprotected and un-subsidised rural producers were 
highly productive and competitive. Clearly the program of supporting indigenous 
entrepreneurial activity did not lead to the expansion of a national-surplus and the 
improvement of living standards. It generated no substantive tendency for a national 
bourgeoisie to emerge from the indigenous business-strata and take advantage of the 
state largesse and protection.   
 
The state’s perseverance with this policy orientation in the face of growing popular 
antagonism with the leadership’s refusal or inability to address Republican economic 
ideals represents a clear contradiction. This contradiction is only explicable in the 
context of external political demands, the leadership’s ideological orientation, and the 
constraints to changing the structural basis upon which production was organised.  
The first two points have been canvassed above. In this latter context there appear to 
have been three factors at work: the impenetrability of foreign financial control within 
the reformist policy context, the technical-philosophical-practical problem where 
Indonesians were not versed in the processes of capitalist accumulation, and the 
leadership’s ideological-based policy ‘leanings’.  
 
Whilst the Japanese interregnum had opened a window of opportunity by breaking 
colonial distribution systems, Western and Japanese trading systems and the Chinese 
diaspora had reimposed their systematic dominance, with western companies setting 
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monopolistic price-setting constraints on the exchange that could be available for 
internal recapitalisation (Palmer, 1978:14).  This determined a continuing dependency 
on agricultural exports, consolidated by rising costs of the industrial technology 
necessary for expanded capital accumulation within Indonesia.  It presented a 
continuing obstacle to the creation of an Indonesian capitalist class.   
Indonesia’s leading decision-makers presumed that once colonial inhibitions on 
indigenous access had been removed, market driven entrepreneurial initiative would 
allow the modernisation and development of the Indonesian economy.  Given the 
stage of Indonesia’s economic development, the state’s ideologically-based leanings 
towards western developmentalist and liberal-market principles were inappropriate for 
Indonesia.  The state policies took little account of the fundamentally different 
historical, social and economic relations that determined Western economic 
development.  Colonial appropriation had created an environment of marked 
difference to the base of European and Japanese industrialisation. Foreign owners 
controlled the credit system that might otherwise have provided a source of funds 
necessary for industrialisation. The Chinese-dominated financial infrastructure 
obstructed the indigenous population’s ability to assert control over major rural 
sectors on the departure of Western capital.  It determined that the problem of 
inadequate training, and experience, for technical staff in the developing industries 
could not be addressed by supplying credit to indigenous firms. Finally, it determined 
that state credit to create indigenous capitalist activity would tend to go to the Chinese 
corporate sector, to military spending, or into corruption. 
 
A corollary of the state’s policy priorities was an inability to establish the linkages 
between all sectors to control production and distribution and overcome foreign-
dominated major structural and market constraints. The end result was massive state 
spending with little to show for in terms of national income or indigenous ownership. 
Thus, with all the state-engendered projects to develop industry by 1952, the income 
generated by manufacturing amounted to only about 9 per cent of national income, 
with the capital almost totally foreign owned (Furnivall, 1969:162).  
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Summary of economic policy under the reformist state-regimes  
There is no doubt that the RTA severely inhibited economic sovereignty.  However, it 
is also clear that state intervention to enforce the tenets of the 1945 Constitution was 
not only anathema to western states and corporate interests but also to the leadership 
of the new Indonesian regime. Consequently the Republican government did not take 
advantage of state-powers to challenge the corporate advantages that accrued to 
foreign investors. The implementation of a moderately reformist Republican program 
attempting to enable indigenous business to grasp a larger share of the economy 
whilst maintaining the system of production relations that generated the surplus re-
defined the class relation between Dutch and Indonesians to that of employers and 
workers. The growing existence of credit bondage was evidence of this process at 
work.  
 
The reassertion of the Chinese financial diaspora as part of the agency of national 
economic organisation completed the new productive relation between the Republican 
regime, acting in effect as agents of international companies, indigenous business 
interests and the masses. This clarified a continuing political power relation whereby 
the urban business-agenda did little to confront the sources of the post-colonial 
economic inequality. More particularly, it illuminated the continuing process of 
foreign owners – as a class – appropriating and exporting Indonesia’s surplus 
production. In these terms the shift to political sovereignty served to facilitate the 
transfer of Indonesia’s productive labour to a broader bourgeoisie, one that could no 
longer be characterised as purely ‘Dutch’ or ‘western’. 
 
Regional rebellion and class struggle 
The economic dislocation resulting from the constraints on constructing the 
fundamental conditions necessary to construct a basis of capital accumulation within 
Indonesia determined an increasing national reliance on the exchange generated from 
the foreign-controlled extractive industries. However, whilst these industries were 
largely located in low-population Outer Island areas, the states’ priorities were for the 
needs of the centrally-located political and corporate constituency. The centrally 
based spending priorities, and the corporate-distribution bases located in the centre, 
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determined a major friction between regional and central economic priorities and 
imperatives.  
 
The highly capital-intensive industries of bauxite, tin, and fossil oil and rubber 
processing were located in the sparsely populated islands of Sumatra, Sulawesi, and 
Kalimantan. Other valuable export earners from these regions included copra, edible 
palm oil, coffee, and tea. The crucial financial role of Outer-Island production is 
evidenced by the fact that Sumatra and Sulawesi produced more than 80 per cent of 
exports on which foreign currency reserves depended (Zainu’ddin, 1968:246). The 
Republican state’s inheritance of the Java-based financial and infrastructural systems 
monopolising trade between the colony and world markets, determined that the 
resource-rich Outer Island surplus could only be realised through the central 
commercial infrastructure.  
 
The Indonesian Treasury was vitally dependent on the foreign exchange generated by 
these exports, especially for defence weaponry, consumer and capital goods such as 
textiles, machinery, and motorcars. These imports largely went to the central 
industrialising regions of Java and Madura.  Further, the achievement of centre-based 
development goals and the provision of infrastructure and services for the masses of 
the population determined that the bulk of this export income flowed to the highly 
populated regions such as Java-Madura which contained more than 60 per cent of the 
entire Indonesian population. The central utilisation of the outer islands’ commodity 
surplus for central priorities of infrastructure and welfare spending consolidated the 
economic neglect of outer islands and the uneven development across the archipelago. 
 
The disparities in distribution acted as a catalyst that fired political and social struggle 
against the inequitable Java-centric distribution of both political power and material 
resources. With the country still reeling from the revolution and regional elite 
allegiances allied with local military forces jockeying to maintain their power-bases, 
the central regime faced a series of regional rebellions based on resource-ownership 
and the distribution of surplus (Kahin, 1994:206).  
 
The ability of provincial elites to wage war on the central authorities was a function of 
the distinctive pattern of class-relations in the outer regions vis-à-vis the mass class 
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aspirations as epitomised by the 1945 Constitution. An investigation of these relative 
power relations is seen to illuminate the character of these regional rebellions 
establishing the basis for continuing region-centre strife.  
 
The mass political struggle against oppressive colonial-class relations that culminated 
in the mass mobilisation for nationalist independence had its greatest successes in 
East and Central Java. Many of the less populated, politically-marginalised regions 
remained under the sway of anti-Republican provincial indigenous elites in league 
with European corporate, especially plantation, interests.  Political sovereignty meant 
the withdrawal of Dutch forces, but maintenance of western-allied indigenous elites 
supported by local military forces.  These provincial indigenous elites remained 
intractably opposed to the Republican central regime and fought for regional 
autonomy.  
 
Regional elite power continued to be based on the colonial system of hierarchical 
production relations.  Labour and nationalist organisations had fought since the 
nineteen twenties to overthrow these outer regions forms of colonial control but could 
not achieve the unity and political mobilisation necessary to challenge state and 
corporate rule (van Langenberg, 1985:113-143). The unified Republican forces of 
labour and the peasantry’s inability to penetrate these regions resulted from a complex 
mix of factors, such as the strength of regional forces based on island-based 
strongholds, rural isolationist and anti-Javan perspectives, the socio-political 
allegiance of provincial military forces and the alienated and divided origins of the 
estate workforce.  
 
These processes put the regional question in the spotlight. As emphasised throughout 
this thesis, Java has been the key arena of major social, political and economic 
change. Change has been specifically tied to the political power of the peasantry and 
organised labour that grew from the colonial exploitation of the masses of Javanese, 
Madurese and Sumatrans coerced to cultivate export crops.  This availability of labour 
for colonial appropriation was in marked contrast to the Outer Islands where a limited 
labour supply and the refusal of local Indonesians to work on plantations led estate-
owners to import indentured and forced-labour from Java and China to work the 
plantations. We have seen that workers were transported to remote regions to work 
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the plantations under prison-camp conditions. All aspects of plantation life were 
regimented with the forced-labour living in barracks. Any attempt at political 
association was brutally repressed (Stoler, 1979 and 1985; Breman, 1989).   
  
The local elites’ antagonism towards the central regime, whilst ostensibly based on an 
historical fear of Javanese political domination, was more concerned with the threat to 
their labour-control regime posed by Republican industrial reforms and the flow-on of 
industrial activism at the centre. This threat underpinned the provincial elites’ alliance 
and mutual class-interest with foreign corporate owners. The strength and perceived 
‘contagion’ of the mobilised revolutionary forces represented a threat to the relative 
proportion of surplus that could be extracted from local labour, as could possibly 
result from the reform of industrial conditions and land ownership, and also to the 
ownership of the means of production, such as through nationalisation and the seizing 
of plantation land. 
 
The regional elites’ response to the central Republican political and economic 
dominance was to endeavour to seize the surplus generated from labour-exploitation 
by avoiding central appropriation and directly trading with overseas buyers.  
Smuggling and barter by local military commanders in Sulawesi and Sumatra were 
reported manifestations of this endeavour (Feith, 1962:487)   
 
By the end of 1956 West and Central Sumatra and North Sulawesi military forces 
were at war with the Republic (Zainu’ddin, 1968:254, 155). In January and February 
1957 conflict had spread to encompass other Outer Islands, where local commanders 
demanded Jakarta allow them the right to levy taxes, raise finances for the military 
and East Indonesia reconstruction, and deal directly with international markets. 
Jakarta’s rejection of all regional demands for political and economic autonomy 
inspired the provincial authorities to create an independent state rule of Perjuangan 
Semsta (‘Common Struggle’) or Permesta (Zainu’ddin, 1968:255). They asserted 
their own regional power to raise funds and assert economic autonomy. They directly 
traded commodities, such as East Indonesian copra with foreign buyers, and used the 
exchange currency to purchase imports directly from international suppliers. In other 
instances a barter system of exchange was employed. The loss of this vital foreign 
exchange currency to the provincial ‘black markets’ severely depleted the national 
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Treasury’s vital reserves. On 14 March 1957 Sukarno, on the advocacy of Army 
Chief of Staff General Nasution, imposed Martial Law and proclaimed a nationwide 
State of War and Siege (Zainu’ddin, 1968:256). 
 
Global forces also came to bear on the struggle, with US-led support for the separatist 
groups. The Sumatran forces were supplied with armaments from British and US 
bases in Malaysia and the Philippines, and US pilots in US warplanes flew missions 
on their behalf (Caldwell and Utrecht, 1979:93). The major consideration for US and 
British interests was to protect the direct supply of Sumatran rubber, copra, oil and 
other important products against the threat of Republican nationalisation. It appears 
the motive for Western, especially US, financial and military support for regional 
anti-centre campaigns was to shift political and economic power back to the 
traditional elites. It was considered that these elites were more easily controllable for 
US resource extraction interests and that they would maintain traditional labour-
control systems. US-British interests were clearly prepared to support the toppling of 
the central regime to secure local appropriation (Caldwell and Utrecht, 1979:92).  
 
The foreign support for the regional rebellion served to strengthen the state’s and the 
Republican movement’s resolve to defeat ‘neo-colonialism and western imperialism’. 
The national army succeeded in defeating the rebellions with the assistance of an 
underground guerrilla force of local peasantry, the Barisan Tani Indonesia (Caldwell 
and Utrecht, 1979:92).   The Barisan Tani Indonesia was an organisation of peasants 
supported by communist and trade union organisations. Whilst the forces and interests 
of the regional elite were repressed, the class-character of the struggle remained the 
basis of a continuing political struggle.   
 
Conclusion 
The Japanese military regime abolished western colonial exclusionary systems that 
had fed off the Indonesian politico-economy for more than four centuries. It replaced 
them with a central military control of all aspects of production and distribution. This 
transformation convinced Indonesian nationalists that a post-war republican regime 
could assert central control for national economic ends.  This ambition was destroyed 
when the Allies rebuffed nationalist independence aspirations and militarily 
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reoccupied the country.  The eventual repulsion of the western forces and the 
achievement of political sovereignty was accompanied by the loss of economic 
sovereignty. The leadership supported a liberal form of economic and industrial 
organisation, and pragmatically determined to accept the terms of the Round Table 
Agreement. The imperative to re-open trade with Europe and the US with the support 
of Dutch companies, and in the face of a clear lack of indigenous expertise and 
financial backing, would have persuaded the leadership to accommodate foreign 
corporate intervention.  
 
The Republican leadership’s refusal to institute those elements of the 1945 
Constitution supporting economic sovereignty was a tacit support for the maintenance 
of colonial systems of production organisation and capital-labour production relations. 
This represented an accommodation of the various local and international forces 
aspirations for the Indonesian economy. In the first instance, the RTA conditions and 
western extractive ambitions turned on access to Indonesian resources, and on the 
control of the local workforce to extract these resources. Thus, the state’s maintenance 
of the necessary discipline and work-relations to support foreign enterprise was a 
crucial element of the western corporate agenda. Secondly, Indonesian business 
required a secure supply of disciplined labour in the ‘indigenisation’ programs of 
industrial and commercial development. Finally, the state itself – especially given its 
inheritance of formerly Dutch state owned commercial and industrial enterprise – 
wished to maintain these production-relations to maximise productivity and surplus. 
To accommodate these ends, as Caldwell argues, the ‘bourgeois western-orientated 
officials’ appeared to be in ‘complete agreement that the proletariat, whether rural or 
urban, should be kept in its place’ (Caldwell, 1970:393).  The leadership’s perspective 
encapsulates the transition from the western colonial system of ‘foreign’ corporate-
class’ production relations to a national class-relation whereby the state supported 
colonial forms of production relations, excluding race differentiation.   
 
The class-basis of the parliamentary state was also evidenced in the provincial wars 
against central control. These wars have been shown as partially driven by a 
provincial fear that the Republican regime represented an urban industrial and 
communist threat to the control over ‘their’ workforces. A key theme of this chapter 
has, however, been to show that the central regime was complicit in the maintenance 
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of pre-war systems of production regulation and labour control. The provincial 
conflict thus represented a ‘fracture’ between elements of national capital, and the 
defeat of the rebellions constituted the affirmation of a central control over the 
distribution of surplus rather than an enforcement of more equitable social and 
productive relations in the provinces.  
 
The parliamentary regime’s accommodation of the interests of capital and refusal to 
challenge the fundamental structural impediments to indigenous capitalist 
development were clearly designed to preserve foreign investment and the income 
that accrued from that investment. This ensured some opportunities for the restoration 
of national economic activity but did little to counter the political groundswell of 
opposition to the continuing foreign economic control. The masses were united 
behind a campaign to confront the tightening of the foreign and military control of the 
production apparatus and to reject parliamentary reformism as the means of achieving 
economic sovereignty.  This is evidenced by the polling figures for the last election 
prior to the overthrow of parliamentary democracy, where a vast majority of 
Indonesians supported parties who promoted economic nationalism and the 
implementation of structural changes to the economy (Feith, 1957: 58).   
 
The parliamentary leadership had been clearly under the apprehension that the 
achievement of political sovereignty spelt the completion of the nationalist revolution. 
The voting figures and the subsequent popular confrontation with foreign capital 
interests affirmed that the masses of Indonesian people believed that the revolution 
was not complete whilst the fundamental forms of colonial control remained in place.  
 
The political dissent arising from the parliamentary regime’s inability to reconcile 
mass ambitions for economic sovereignty and improved standards of living was 
brought to a head with the military overthrow of provincial corporate and political 
opposition to central rule. The defeat of regional rebellions endorsed the centrist 
regime’s domination over provincial capital interests and assured the military’s future 
role as a key player in all aspects of state policy. The rise of the military as a key 
political, as well as security, player underpinned the popular challenge to foreign 
control and predicated a growing military engagement in corporate enterprise that 
culminated in the Indonesian takeover of key sectors of the economy.  
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The state’s refusal to fundamentally address the question of foreign control, and to 
acknowledge or incorporate the mass aspirations for economic sovereignty, 
precipitated a mass challenge to their political control that culminated in the 
overthrow of the Republican system of parliamentary democracy. 
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Chapter 7 
‘Guided Democracy’ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
“For the umpteenth time (I tell you) that the most important source of production (is) 
the workers and peasants. It is not enough to say negatively that efforts to increase 
production must not be hostile to the workers and peasants. These efforts must 
develop the productive powers of the workers and peasants in a positive way.” 
President Sukarno, Independence Day address, 17th August 1963 (Day, 1978:83). 
 
Successive parliamentary regimes’ inability to address the nationalist agenda of 
economic sovereignty and to enforce a strong and centralised control over the 
economy and the body politic led to political and economic instability.  Sukarno’s 
ascendency as ‘Supreme Commander’ reflected an astute manipulation of the major 
political forces to form a coalition under the banner of ‘national unity’.  This 
achievement prefaced an era of strong central control underpinning political and 
economic change. This research locates the apparatus of rule and process of change in 
the context of the production, control and distribution of the national surplus.    
 
The most powerful force in the political drama of this period, and the one representing 
the greatest threat to a democratic resolution of class struggle, was the military. The 
military secured the dominant place in the Republican political arena primarily 
because of its crucial role in the process of national unification and, in the course of 
seeking to preserve the material foundation of its power base, in shaping the drive for 
economic advance.  In the first instance, the military’s defeat of the Permesta 
Rebellion went hand in hand with the military leadership’s success in securing the 
national unity of military forces in the face of civil war. This provided the military 
with the political means to force the state to accommodate its long-sought goal to play 
a dominant political role in Republican rule.  In the second, the military’s seizure of 
key elements of corporate enterprise defined its dominant economic and industrial 
role. 
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The military represented a powerful countervailing force to that of labour and the 
peasantry. The parliamentary regime’s inability or refusal to address the aspirations of 
the mass nationalist movement for economic sovereignty provided the political 
context in which Sukarno was able to mobilise the masses under the banner of 
‘constant revolution’ for the nationalist cause. The defeat of the provincial elite, the 
final representatives of the maintenance of colonial production relations and working 
conditions promised the realisation of nationalist economic aspirations as epitomised 
by the 1945 Constitution.  The support of the peasantry and industrial labour for the 
central regime was contingent on the state’s demolition of these production relations 
and of western control over key economic sectors. The parliamentary regime’s refusal 
to address these concerns precipitated a massive rise in support of the PKI and direct 
actions to takeover foreign-owned enterprise.   The regime’s inability to resolve the 
class struggles for economic and political power foreshadowed the demolition of the 
multi-party system of representation.  
 
This introduces the core issue of the challenge to foreign economic control with the 
workers and peasantry moving to overthrow the parliamentary democratic regime’s 
reformist agenda and install strong and supportive representation. The way this 
challenge conflicted with the aspirations for economic control by indigenous and 
foreign corporate interests, and the implication of these conflicts for the regime of 
production and labour regulation is the major concern of this chapter.  The significant, 
if shadowy, role played by foreign state and corporate interests is considered in the 
context of foreign corporate and strategic ambitions for control over Indonesia’s 
resources and labour-power.  
 
A key focus is on Sukarno’s attempt to reconcile fundamentally opposed class forces 
through the state ideological apparatus. This incorporates an appreciation of the 
variety of tactics initiated by Sukarno with the prime strategic imperative to achieve 
national unity, dissolve class-conflict and inhibit sectional division. This is in direct 
critical counterpoint to those authors who represent Sukarno as a megalomaniac 
wielding absolute power for selfish ends. The continuing theme of competing class 
interests is addressed in this Chapter with an appreciation of the character of 
competing class interests and an assessment of Sukarno’s role in reconciling these 
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interests.  The Chapter plumbs the depths of these differences, emphasising the role of 
external forces in challenging the control of Indonesia’s production apparatus.  
 
The consideration of Sukarno’s project to secure the Republic as an autonomous 
economic as well as political entity through a program of national unity establishes 
the foundation for the understanding of the role of national institutions and the 
creation of a national ethos in stabilising subsequent regimes. Thus, and contrary to 
established texts, this chapter considers the importance of the Sukarno era in the 
context of the establishment of institutions and structures of national unity, 
endeavour, and productivity.  This foreshadows the import of these systems for the re-
establishment of processes of ‘exclusion’, this time for the Indonesian military and 
patrimonial clique.   
 
Paths to autocratic power – the origins of Guided 
Democracy   
President Sukarno is often represented as an erratic and economically illiterate figure 
who alienated western investors and brought Indonesia to the brink of economic ruin.  
This erraticism is generally contrasted with his successor, President Soeharto, who is 
characterised as the ‘quiet achiever’, who brought to Indonesia ‘a stable economic and 
political environment (where) property rights were respected’, enabling the country to 
‘re-enter the international community’ (Hill, 1994:55).   A more critical perspective, 
however, sees Sukarno’s policy as defined by the mass economic nationalist 
aspirations in the struggle for control of Indonesia’s resources.  An investigation of 
Sukarno’s regime, and of how it asserted national economic control over the 
production apparatus to address these aspirations should commence with a discussion 
of these political and economic power-struggles.  
 
The military’s role in Sukarno’s ascendency 
The military’s frustration at the parliamentary regime’s refusal to allow it a dominant 
political role came to a head in the late 1950s following its success in repressing civil 
rebellion. However, the military leadership’s campaign to achieve political power was 
only one aspect of the internal struggles within the Indonesian body politic. Urban 
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labour and the rural small land holding or landless peasant-class also mobilised to 
gain greater political power and improved standards of living.  Succeeding 
parliamentary government’s inability or refusal to address their needs led peasants, 
with support from the PKI, to step-up the campaign to assume control of foreign 
estates (Utrecht, 1987:178). This campaign was strengthened when the government 
evicted peasants from those plantation estates previously occupied by the Japanese-
occupied estates and lands, and from estates abandoned by former western owners.  
This political movement by labour and the peasantry developed as a clear threat to the 
military’s political and economic ambitions.  These challenges to national unity and 
parliamentary rule are considered in the context of the development of the autocratic 
state.  
 
When the first parliamentary regime moved to impose civil rule over the military, 
there was little doubt the military would work towards overthrowing this constraint by 
securing a key role in government or imposing military rule. The military’s history as 
a “peoples’ army”, fighting a revolutionary war alongside the masses of nationalists, 
and their success in repressing dissident elements, led to the conviction amongst army 
circles that it was their ‘right’ to participate in political rule (Sundhaussen, 1982: 
124). It may have also been a belief that it was their ‘duty’ to do so.  
 
The immediate catalyst that brought to light the military’s articulation of its political 
aspirations was the parliamentary government’s post Revolutionary-war 
demobilisation of the armed forces. The parliamentary government intended to 
transform the revolutionary army into a professional security-force under civil-state 
control.  However, whatever the parliamentary government’s security objectives, state 
policies and regional responses determined that the military would play a key role on 
both sides of the civil war.  With the return of the revolutionary forces to their home-
regions and the Java-centric Republican government’s imposition of central political 
and economic authority, divisions emerged with the major income-producing regions. 
Regional elites, often supported by foreign state and corporate interests, fought for the 
control of the locally produced surplus.  In the 1950s, the US state began covert 
operations to counter communist influence in Indonesia and support rebels opposed to 
President Sukarno. The CIA secretly supplied and supported anti-communist military 
rebels on the outer Indonesian islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi. By 1959, when it was 
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clear the rebellion would fail, the US shifted its support to the Indonesian army, 
hoping the country's military leaders would counter Sukarno's purported communist 
leanings (Los Angeles Times, October 30th 1994). 
 
Given the immensity of the forces poised to undermine central rule, and the strong 
military alliances with these forces, the survival of the Republic depended on 
enforcing military unity. Whilst the complexities of the divisions and alliances require 
an extended treatment, it is sufficient for present purposes to say that this bond was 
partially achieved.   The civil war and the destabilising activities of foreign forces 
threatened national unity and the collapse of the Republic, and this served to 
concentrate the military leadership behind the national cause. This was a temporary 
unity, however, which was sufficient to enable the survival of the Republic, but not to 
fully satisfy the leadership’s aspirations for political power nor constitute the basis for 
long-term unity amongst the hitherto divided military factions.  The conditions 
defining the military’s final achievement of a ‘bond’ of unity will be assessed in the 
context of a vastly expanded corporate-ownership by the military elite.   
 
The Permesta war prompted a military call for the government to declare a state of 
War and Siege. The President’s consequent imposition of martial law prefaced both 
an accommodation of the military’s political ambitions and Sukarno’s achievement of 
absolute presidential authority as envisaged by the 1945 Constitution. Sukarno’s 1956 
criticism of parliamentary democracy was based on his view that it was ‘unsuited to 
the Indonesian national character’ (Zainnu’ddin, 1968:254). This foreshadowed his 
acknowledgement of the imperative of assuring the military’s place as a senior partner 
in Indonesian rule, and thus of the military’s ‘dwi fungsi’ (dual function) securing 
involvement in all major policy-making positions of the state. The Army Chief-of-
Staff General Nasution’s later affirmed this role in his November 1958 proposal for 
an expanded military status as an internal and external system of security order to 
protect the nation from external threat whilst guiding its internal policy direction 
(Said, 1991:135).   
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The role of labour and the peasantry in Sukarno’s ascendency 
Sukarno’s rejection of parliamentary democracy, the imposition of absolute political 
authority and a dominant political role for the military clearly arose from the 
imperative to address the massive conflicts and divisions that were endemic to the 
system of parliamentary democracy. Sukarno saw the parliamentary system as 
inherently conflictual and thus at odds with the Indonesian conception of harmony as 
the basis of order in Indonesian society (Zainnu’ddin, 1968:254). The divisive nature 
of the parliamentary system reflected the inability of the hitherto politically dominant 
to depart from the single-minded preoccupation with accommodating the interests of 
indigenous business. This predilection also entailed accommodating foreign business 
as a continuing entrenched component of the post-colonial Indonesian economy. 
More particularly, this tendency entailed prejudicing the interests of regionally 
located capital and the abrogation of responsibilities for rural and industrial reform. 
Labour and the peasantry perceived this abrogation as a function of continuing foreign 
economic control, and Sukarno’s aspirations of nationalism of economic sovereignty 
appealed to the masses.   
 
Sukarno’s appeal to the peasantry and labour lay in his ability to construct simple and 
direct ideological messages based on images of a national Indonesian identity and 
common interest. The Indonesian political economy at the time is best characterised 
as largely consisting of rural independent small-land holding producers, artisans, and 
petty traders with decisions commonly made through traditional village systems of 
cooperation and consensus (Wertheim, 1986:74).  Sukarno focused his campaigns on 
this perceived common interest that was shared by most Indonesians. In 1949 he had 
characterised the Indonesian national persona as that of Marhaen, a peasant of his 
acquaintance (Zainu’ddin, 1968:238). Marhaen lived on the edge of poverty, relying 
for his income on a few hand-tools and a small plot of land.  Sukarno used this 
characterisation to define the agenda of a populist campaign to unite Indonesia in a 
common cause of peasantry in the struggle against foreign and local exploitation. 
  
Sukarno addressed the issue of resolving national divisions and obtaining unity and 
stability by applying traditional village approaches to resolving disputes in the 
national political arena.  He proposed that national decision-making should be based 
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on the village systems of musjawarah (mutual consultation, discussion, deliberation) 
and mufakat (consensus and agreement).  This formed the basis for his concept of 
cooperative national rule advanced in terms of the uniting of nationalist, religious and 
communist elements called NASAKOM (Zainnu’ddin, 1968:254). He intended that the 
major forces in Indonesian society be brought together in a spirit of mutual advantage 
and cooperation.  
 
Sukarno’s approach was in sharp distinction to other leaders in the parliamentary 
elite.  These leaders largely represented non-agrarian interests, and most notably 
bureaucrats within the state, traders, and industrial capital.  The status of trading 
groups was enhanced through holding a long commercial association with trade 
organisation and by their ability to call on established international support.  Sukarno 
could draw upon the support of the labour movement as a counter balance to these 
interests and also as a vehicle for deepening divisions between the trading groups and 
the bureaucracy (Schmitt, 1971:271).  Foreign capital remained a dominant political 
force by virtue of its economic significance, but political unanimity of purpose within 
the business sector was weakened by competing economic interests and compounded 
by ethnic divisions especially the strained relations between Chinese and indigenous 
Indonesians.  
 
A widespread alienation within the Indonesian body politic was reflected in sharp 
divisions in voting patterns for the major parties. In the first national plebiscite in 
1955 the majority of votes were cast for four major parties: Nationalist Party (PNI) 
22.3 per cent, Modernist Moslem Party (Masjumi) 20.9 per cent, the Moslem 
Theologians’ Party (NU) 18.4 per cent and the Communist Party (PKI) 16.4 per cent 
(Zainnu’ddin, 1968:252).  The Java-based prijaji-abangan class and urban political 
movement were aligned with the PNI’s program of support for the government’s 
western and urban-orientated development program favouring indigenous enterprise 
over foreign ownership. The Outer Island separatist movement supported the Masjumi 
who favoured foreign ownership and limited state economic intervention (Missen, 
1972: 241).  Workers and the peasantry largely supported the PKI and PNI. Following 
the vote, Sukarno put his direct political support behind the PNI (Missen, 1972: 240).  
Sukarno’s alignment with labour and the peasantry, backed by his Pancasila ethos 
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alienated those Muslim political elements demanding a Muslim state and foreign and 
indigenous capital seeking a leader who was unaligned in the class-war.  
 
The economic determinants of a rupture in parliamentary democracy  
There were major economic problems engendered by the parliamentary state’s 
inability to create indigenous economic growth.  These were consolidated by the 
declining demand for agricultural exports and rising prices for capital and consumer 
imports. The regime’s inability to establish firm control over the political divisions 
created popular disaffection for constitutional democracy and the ambition to achieve 
strong, central political-control. The disaffected swung to the Communist Party in 
droves.  The PKI was transformed into a popularly supported political party, a 
communist party that incidentally could count more members than any other outside 
the communist states of China and the USSR.  The evident disenchantment also 
flowed into an expansion of industrial union membership.  By the mid 1950s total 
union membership was of the order of two million workers incorporated within 
thirteen trade union federations. Of this twenty percent of all employees, nearly a 
third were in the plantation sector (Manning 1993:62). 
 
In the light of the popular conception that the chief difficulties facing the economy 
were the result of continuing foreign economic control and the oppressive obligations 
of the RTC, political pressure grew for the government to repudiate the RTC. 
Sukarno’s consequent call for mass public support to reject the RTC obligations led to 
mass anti-Dutch action throughout the archipelago.  In February 1956 the government 
unilaterally repudiated the RTC, and then, in August, annulled Indonesia’s debt to 
Holland. With gold reserves dropping to a critical level, and some military officers 
supporting regional smuggling operations and a series of attempts to assassinate 
Sukarno and install a renegade government, civil war seemed a real possibility.  
 
Nationalisation and the military’s new uniting ‘bond’ 
Holland’s continuing refusal to decolonise the territory of Iryan Jaya, and the United 
Nations’ refusal to endorse Indonesia’s claims of political sovereignty over the 
territory, focused the nationalists’ campaign for the demolition of all symbols and 
trappings of colonial rule.  In December 1957 workers supported by their trade unions 
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seized control of Dutch companies, enterprises and plantations (Utrecht, 1987:178). 
This effectively transferred the control of most Dutch enterprises, covering the 
mining, plantation and foreign trade sectors, into Indonesian hands.  The seizure 
transferred the ownership of capital that generated 70 per cent of the country’s exports 
and foreign currency earnings (Utrecht, 1987:178).  
 
The military responded to the threat of workers’ corporate control by declaring 
Martial Law and imposing military control over the Dutch enterprises. This was 
ostensibly a national security measure to protect foreign citizens and secure national 
control over vital export-income generating enterprise, but the army officers’ seizure 
of Dutch plantations and factories was partly designed to reap private profits that 
would meet some of the costs of paying for military needs (May, 1978:79).  Whilst 
the parliamentary leaders’ views on this military takeover are unclear, they appear to 
have been opposed to private enterprise assuming corporate control. This was said to 
have resulted from Hatta’s ‘bitter experiences’ of inefficiency and corruption, 
especially with the Benteng program of state subsidy for private industry (Robison, 
1986:73)   
 
The takeover was legitimised when Sukarno passed the 1958 Nationalisation Law 
declaring the companies to be public corporations.  The transition to indigenous 
control was completed with the deportation of Dutch technicians and management. 
This resulted in state corporations covering 90 per cent of plantation output and, with 
the takeover of the Big Five trading companies, about 60 per cent of foreign trade. 
This covered 246 factories and mining enterprises, plus banks, shipping and a variety 
of service industries. This ensured that Indonesia dominated the full extent of the 
modern industrial sector, with Indonesian banks covering 75 per cent of all loans 
(Robison, 1986:193).  The army, with the assistance of Japanese capital, redeveloped 
an old oil field in Sumatra to create the new oil company of Permina, which later 
became the state-owned and -controlled oil company Pertamina (Ahmad and Crouch, 
1985:57). In April 1958, the state incorporated former Dutch trading houses into new 
trading corporations (STCs), which constituted the state-owned ‘big eight’. They were 
given a monopoly on the import of thirteen basic commodities, including rice and 
textiles. The trading monopoly meant that the STCs effectively controlled 70 per cent 
of imports (Robison, 1986:73).  
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The economic role of nationalisation 
The nationalisation and restructuring of industrial and trading concerns meant that 
military corporate ownership thenceforth dominated key productive, commercial, 
financial and trade sectors. The Army ran the plantations, the airforce ran the airways 
and the navy ran the shipping. The state gave the military the task of accelerating 
capital formation, and intended to use this infrastructural system to control pricing 
and supply of basic necessities, as well as provide revenue for development. The 
military’s underlying agenda was to generate income for the services on the 
presumption that state funding was inadequate to ensure the accomplishment of its 
dua fungsi, whilst expanding its security reach in the face of threat from foreign 
incursions. This led to profiteering by the military elite and to the growth of systems 
of political patronage that expanded senior officers’ civil power (Utrecht, 1987:180). 
 
The government considered that oil exports earnings would provide 70 per cent of the 
capital for welfare projects, such as education, public works, transport, health and 
production of basic necessities. To further this objective, the production-sharing 
system was expanded to incorporate tin, timber, mining, fishing, edible oils and estate 
crops. Investment and credit advances made by overseas companies were to be repaid 
from the net increases in the production that resulted from the investments (Robison, 
1986:79).  
 
The revival of economic nationalism driving the takeover of Dutch enterprises and the 
December 1957 and January 1958 expulsion of Dutch owners, managers, estate 
managers and technicians caused massive economic dislocation. Holland repatriated 
all Dutch citizens who wished to leave, and 40,000 did so (Tas, 1974:223). Key 
production and distribution sectors were left without trained and experienced 
personnel (Schmitt, 1970:74). Foreign investor confidence and demand for Indonesian 
commodities collapsed (Tas, 1974:286).  The loss of export markets coincided with 
the Sumatra and Sulawesi Rebellions, and the rebellions compounded economic 
difficulties with a 34 per cent reduction of exchange receipts accruing to the central 
government from 1957 levels (Tas, 1974:274).   
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Guided Democracy 
In October 1956 Sukarno advocated the abolition of political parties, the re-institution 
of the 1945 Constitution and a system of ‘Guided Democracy’ under his leadership 
(Zainu’ddin, 1968:257,8). The opportunity to carry out this program arose with the 
continued parliamentary deadlock over whether to introduce Pancasila as the national 
ideology or whether to move towards a Muslim state.  The ostensible trigger for 
Sukarno’s dissolution of the Assembly was its third time rejection of the 1945 
Constitution, where the required two-thirds majority was lost by less than fifty votes. 
In July 1959 Sukarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly (Zainu’ddin, 1968:258).  
He issued a decree banning all political activities and replacing the elected DPR by a 
Gotong-Rojong (‘mutual aid’) DPR with Sukarno ‘guiding’ the process (Missen, 
1972: 243). 
 
However, the more fundamental motivation for the dissolution of the Assembly was 
the military’s fear that the 1959 general election would see the PKI elected to office. 
The military brought considerable pressure to bear on Sukarno to dissolve the 
parliament with a view to forestalling this possibility.  Its success represented the 
culmination of the military’s ambition to achieve political power. The military’s 
intentions had been foreshadowed in the military leader Nasution’s ‘Middle Way’ 
speech of 12th November 1958. Nasution indicated the military’s intention to ‘regain 
the unity and the spirit of national struggle, to cultivate a stable government ideally 
and structurally after the liberal system failed to bring about stabilisation’ (Said, 
1992:136).  
 
In 1960, following evidence that Masjumi and the PSI had stoked the fires of the 
regional rebellion, the government banned the two parties as being ‘contrary to the 
spirit of the revolution’ (Missen, 1972: 243). Sukarno proceeded to limit the power of 
the party system by enforcing the relinquishing of party affiliation and by instituting 
non-political organisations, such as the army, into the machinery of government. In 
Sukarno’s conception of the new parliament (‘Konsepsi’) parliamentary 
representation would be accomplished through the establishment of ‘functional 
groups’ rather than political parties. 
 
 180
Forms of social and production control  
The ethos of Guided Democracy and the conceptual way of achieving regime goals 
was defined by a series of acronyms and key phrases such as NASAKOM, Pancasila, 
Marhaenism, and Manipol (Sukarno’s political manifesto). The unifying and 
mobilising role of these idealist phrases is clear.  What is not so clear is their role in 
redefining social and production relations as part of an agenda of re-organising 
society in order to accomplish national goals. Much of the following discussion in this 
and the subsequent chapter focuses on the way in which the state employed the 
publicity and ‘ideological’ apparatus of the state to inculcate these values as part of 
the agenda of social control for economic development. The analysis examines the 
connection between these value-systems and the institution of state systems of social, 
economic and industrial control. The conceptual basis of this focus is the state’s 
political and economic imperative to order processes of capital accumulation and 
surplus distribution.   
 
NASAKOM, and Pancasila were the key components of the program of national unity 
and development through consensus resolution of divisions and conflict. NASAKOM 
was designed to exclude the destabilising, ‘conflictual’ influence of the party-system 
that had plagued the parliamentary regimes. The institution of ‘functional groups’ 
redirected power from the party system to the political elite, thus creating a political 
structure in which the political parties would subordinate themselves to a central 
national authority (Caldwell and Utrecht, 1979:107). Sukarno determined that the 
numbers of parliamentary members would correlate with a roughly equal 
parliamentary distribution for each of the major forces of the military, labour-
peasantry, and the Muslim groups.  A Supreme Advisory Council and National 
Planning Council was appointed to advise the President on building an integrated and 
planned economy. Sukarno then set up a Kabinet Kerdja (work cabinet) to implement 
urgent imperatives for improving standards of living, such as the provision of basic 
needs, especially food.  
 
Pancasila encapsulated Sukarno’s conception of an amicable and consensus 
relationship to overcome the variety of religious, political, cultural, social and 
industrial divisions that had plagued the Republic since its birth.  Sukarno introduced 
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Pancasila in the last days of the Japanese occupation, and on the dissolution of the 
parliamentary assembly Pancasila was re-introduced as the official State Ideology.  
Based on traditional principles of unity and consensus for family, company, state and 
religion, Pancasila was clearly intended to replace the ethos of western individualism 
placing the concept of loyalty to the nation above that of individual. This loyalty to 
the nation became the catchcry to undermine any conflictual threat to national 
objectives as defined by the state. Thus the implicit ethos of Pancasila is that the 
relation between capital and labour is not inherently ‘class conflictual’. This conforms 
to Muslim concepts of an essential harmony of interest between labour and capital, as 
espoused in an early Muslim union federation’s constitutional objective to promote an 
industrial ‘ideology pursuing a strategy of cooperation between entrepreneurs (as 
“brothers” in Islam) and workers, consequently disapproving of strikes’ (Hossing, 
1989:57). The institution of this ethos into the national lexicon foreshadows its 
consequent role as an ideological underpinning for labour regulation.  
 
Military industrial regulation  
Whilst the military played out its role as ‘enforcer’ of these national credos, it also 
played a direct role in instituting forms of industrial regulation within military-owned 
and controlled enterprise and ancillary companies.  This determined the development 
of a militarist system of industrial relations, with strict hierarchical controls.  The 
boards of management of military-controlled enterprises were composed of state 
officials and military personnel, with most board members appointed by the Supreme 
Martial Law administration (Utrecht, 1987:180). These boards determined production 
priorities and directed production organisation.  Military power, authority, and 
institutions were imposed on workplaces to increase work intensity, to enforce 
production decisions, and to inhibit labour organisation and industrial retaliation. 
Dutch systems of wage-market and workplace regulation were thus replaced by a 
collective system of military coercion to increase output and repress any opposition 
(Utrecht, 1987:180).    
 
This military-imposed production and labour regulation set in train processes and 
systems to expand work intensity and processes of capital formation. However, in the 
context of inadequate management training and expertise and the loss of 
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recapitalisation through corruption and patrimonial relations, their initiation frustrated 
the economic dynamism that was necessary for increasing national productivity and 
capital accumulation. Further, the degree of oppression accompanying the 
intensification of work engendered major antagonism and industrial action against 
military-run enterprise. It was soon apparent that output targets could not be achieved 
due to the managers’ marked lack of experience and training in all aspects of 
corporate administration, production organisation and sales. As a consequence, there 
was a reduction in the quantity and quality of output produced by most nationalised 
companies. It also became quickly apparent that the military agenda to generate an 
income was a mechanism for facilitating corruption and political patronage. These 
factors served to increase costs, reduce capital formation and jeopardise international 
trade relations.  
  
The process of military corruption and profiteering appears to have arisen from within 
the structure of military management. By 1959 the military elite consisted of two 
groups: field officers and corporate managers. Much of the profit generated by 
military-run businesses went to support field officers who were the key officials in the 
military leadership and to maintain the military production managers’ lucrative 
positions. The system thus enabled senior military corporate managers to run 
companies for their personal profit, and they were rarely accountable to the state or 
the military high command. Furthermore, the corporate management used the security 
infrastructure to organise and regulate the supply of jobs through patronage and 
intimidation, to protect the corporate facilities and to enforce workplace discipline.   
 
This system of military coercion to increase output and restrict dissent was replicated 
in the rural sector. In this context, however, the regimen of military discipline was 
imposed on the existing and extremely inequitable system of land-ownership built 
upon the previous system of foreign landlords’ land ownership and that available for 
villagers (Kartodirdjo, 1986:103). Of the rural population less than half owned land, 
and two-thirds were forced to lease acreage to subsist (Tas, 1974:299, 300). This 
meant that most villagers could not generate adequate production for subsistence, let 
alone generate the necessary surplus to purchase capital-intensive production 
equipment or fertilisers.  
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The military authorities were even more severe in the implementation of their rural 
program to expand output. Any right of political association to counter military 
repression was denied with the abolition of the party political system. This repression 
was justified by a senior military official in terms of the contention that: villagers 
‘have not yet freed themselves from tradition and superstition. They have not yet 
‘arrived’; they wouldn’t even want the facilities and luxuries that we (the military) 
need. The task of the peasant is to increase agricultural production, that is his role in 
‘development’. Nothing should distract him from this task; if peasants spend their 
time with politics, as in the past, the result will be as in the past – security problems 
and no increase in rice production. Therefore we shall remove from the sphere of the 
peasant’s life all forms of political organisation’ (McGuire and Hering, 1986:179). 
 
Political rupture to Guided Democracy  
The Guided Democracy regime was predicated on the accommodation of competing 
goals between indigenous businesses, the peasantry and labour, and the military. 
Sukarno attempted to reconcile these goals, but his program of reform was predicated 
on irreconcilable contradictions. Chief of these was the difficulty in restraining the 
military’s aggressive expansion of corporate ownership and repressive labour-
discipline whilst achieving adequate surplus production. On the other hand, Sukarno 
had to respond to the mass aspirations for reform in the rural sector, the 
nationalisation of foreign corporations, and demands for improvements in standards 
of living.   
 
The military’s maximisation of surplus production and extraction through the 
terrorising and oppressing the workforces under their command became a serious 
source of social unrest (Utrecht, 1987:180). Throughout Indonesia vehement conflicts 
erupted between corrupt military managers and workers who experienced levels of 
exploitation that were said to have been harsher than those during the Dutch colonial 
period (Utrecht, 1987:180). Worker and peasant resistance became more organised 
and a united rural and urban-sector campaign was soon mounted against military 
oppression. The PKI played a key role in the unifying of rural and urban workers and 
peasants struggles and developed supportive ties with the Sentral Organisasi Buruh 
(SOBSI - the national association of trade unions) to counter the military’s industrial 
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tactics. SOBSI was the largest trade union federation covering 2.5 million members 
and affiliated with the Barisan Tani Indonesia or Indonesia Peasants Front (Oey, 
1971:76).   
 
The PKI criticised state enterprise mismanagement and corruption in central and 
regional administrations. They publicised the profiteering of Departmental officials, 
their appropriation of state property and the use of official positions to advantage 
private entrepreneurs. The PKI introduced the term Birokrat Kapitalis (Kabir) to 
describe corrupt bureaucrats. This phrase later became identified with Army officers 
employed in the civil administration and State enterprise. The bureaucrats were 
associated with, and supportive of, the growing political and corporate power of the 
‘new rich’ group in society, the Orang Kaya Baru (Robison, 1986:95).  The PKI 
presented a threat to these groups’ corporate privilege and patronage systems. In the 
rural context the PKI campaigned for ‘all lands owned by foreign and Indonesian 
landlords (to be) confiscated without any compensation’, and to be freely distributed 
to all landless and poor peasants’ (Kartodirdjo, 1986:109).  Membership of the small 
land-holding peasant organisations and landless peasant organisations such as BTI 
increased from four hundred thousand to seven million in a decade (Kartodirdjo, 
1986:109). 
 
State response to rural agitation 
In response to the military and large landholders’ resistance to the parliamentary-state 
attempts to distribute land ownership more equitably, the peasantry often took the law 
into their own hands and occupied private land and plantations. In 1962 Sukarno 
promulgated the Agrarian Act and the Share Cropping Act that imposed land-
ownership ceilings and ensured the protection of tenants. Whilst intended to redress 
rural labour-bondage and inequity, the program had the more immediate objective of 
overcoming food shortages endemic to most rural areas. The state believed that a 
more equitable distribution of land would increase rice production by providing the 
peasants with a greater incentive and opportunity to grow rice. It was also thought that 
land redistribution would reduce the allocation to export crops in favour of 
subsistence crops, and reduce the extraction of rural surplus at the expense of 
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producers. A nationally coordinated program to this end would reduce landlord’ 
exploitation of sharecroppers (Caldwell and Utrecht, 1979:109) 
 
The first land reform law introduced by the Guided Democracy regime was the 
Undang-undang perjanjian Bagi Hasil or law on sharecropping agreements. This Law 
stipulated that crops from wet rice-fields were to be divided on an equal basis between 
the landowner and that landowner’s sharecroppers. The distribution from all other 
crops was to be divided so that a third of the crop went to the landowner whilst two 
thirds went to the tenant. The main objective was to eliminate landowners’ arbitrary 
power by imposing contracts, to provide more security for tenants by stipulating a 
minimum leasing period, and to ameliorate the material existence of the tenant and 
family by increasing the tenants’ share of the harvest (Oey, 1971: 96) 
 
The second land reform law, the Undang-undang Polok Agraria or Basic Agrarian 
Law, imposed a maximum land-ownership ceiling that was related to population 
density in each region. The law was intended to provide a more equitable distribution 
of landholding, limiting land ownership from a maximum of 5 to 15 hectares 
depending on the population density. All land in excess of the stipulated maximum 
holding by these laws was to be expropriated and allocated to the landless. Land 
leased to plantations was to be incorporated into the reform process (Kartodirdjo, 
1986:110).  
 
Frictions on land-reform 
Whilst the Central Land Reform Committee set up by the Sukarno regime did its best 
to implement the Acts and impose the statutory ceilings on ownership, landlords and 
elements of the military frustrated the process. They imposed what were effectively 
‘go-slow’ tactics and committed many acts of sabotage against the reform process. 
Thus in West Java by the end of 1963, only 52,000 of the 700,000 existing share-
cropping agreements had been renewed and only 21,750 of these were in writing. By 
the end of 1964 less than one per cent of all landowners in Indonesia had leased out 
sharecropping plots according to the terms of the Act (Oey, 1971: 99). The land-
reform legislation did not fundamentally challenge the inequities in rural economic 
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and social relations and private property ownership that had persisted since colonial 
times.   
 
Most small or medium landowners sided with the landless in conflicts over land 
distribution.  The big landowners’ domination of rice markets prejudiced both small 
landowners and landless peasants alike.  There was a marked maldistribution of 
returns per given acreage as only the big landowners could afford the necessary 
technology.  They thus had the means to evict tenants and buy out poor peasants 
thereby concentrating land-ownership inequality (Kartodirdjo, 1886:110). 
 
The landowners’ refusal to accept the terms of the land reform Acts inspired poor and 
landless peasants to begin a popular campaign to get the state to enforce the 
provisions of the two Acts. This mass movement, the Aksi-sefihank or Unilateral 
Action, and was led by the BTI peasants’ union affiliated with the PKI (Oey, 
1971:100).  The mobilisation was strongest on Java and in regions where the shortage 
of land was most debilitating for the peasant population. The movement sought to 
disrupt the traditional patronage relations that operated between large landowners and 
urban officials. It built on the ongoing urban campaign against ‘city devils’ of corrupt 
kabirs, military and bureaucratic officials with the village campaign directed against 
exploitative landowners, usurers, speculative buyers, bandits, corrupt officials, and 
kabirs (Tas, 1974:299). 
 
The PKI supported this campaign as part of the general struggle against rural 
inequality and the dominant power of the landlord class. In the many instances where 
the landlord refused to carry out the obligations defined by the Act, the PKI 
encouraged peasants to seize the land without waiting for the Central Land Reform 
Committee to decide the matter.  The army and police generally intervened on behalf 
of the landowners. Thus the PKI increasingly became a scapegoat for landowners, 
contributing towards the landowner, small-business class antagonism supporting the 
PKI pogroms following the military coup of October 1965.  
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Political rupture 
The rural reformist preoccupations of the state appear to have been conducted at the 
expense of strong state intervention in the urban sector, especially in the industries 
controlled by the military. I have argued that whilst the state legitimised the military 
takeovers by endorsing them as state corporations, military management did as much 
to prejudice capital formation as accelerate it. Much of the surplus went into 
patronage streams, into corruption or was spent to satisfy military needs (Utrecht, 
1972:63).  All military appropriations served to consolidate the military dominance of 
the civil political system and inhibit the possibility of developing a solid economic 
base for industrialisation.  This financial mismanagement increasingly threatened the 
economic viability of the Republic. Despite, or perhaps because of, this 
mismanagement, US and European states were prepared to covertly support the 
military in their campaign to destabilise the Sukarno regime. 
 
The US played a covert role in cultivating elements of the military opposed to the 
growing power of the PKI and the Sukarno regime itself.  With Sukarno’s categorical 
commitment to unalignment, whilst seeking both Soviet military as well as US 
financial support, Indonesia clearly represented a threat to the US Cold War regime in 
the Asia Pacific. Evidence is coming to light that other Western states were also 
involved in attempting to destabilise the Sukarno regime. MI6 documents showing 
that an amalgam of groups from the Foreign Office, M16, the State Department and 
the CIA were secretly conniving to depose Sukarno, according so some reports.  The 
US State Department was quoted as saying that if ‘Indonesia fell out of Western 
influence, neighbours such as Malaya might follow, resulting in the loss of the 
principle world source of natural rubber and tin and a producer of petroleum other 
strategically important commodities’ (The Independent, December 1, 1998). As 
events unfolded it was clear that the support for the military in opposing the PKI was 
based on the Western imperative to secure the country against an alliance with the 
communist bloc, and to preserve military-corporate control over the productive 
apparatus, Indonesia’s resources and labour.  
  
Whilst the military were moving to seize absolute political power, Sukarno was being 
pressured by labour and the peasantry to confront the military dominance, corruption, 
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and industrial exploitation. Toward this end the Sukarno regime began dismantling 
the military’s corporate and civil regulatory authority. The military retaliated with a 
campaign against the PKI’s support of Chinese Communism. This was a strategically 
astute move to alienate the masses from the PKI by exploiting their traditional 
antagonism towards the Chinese as commercial intermediaries and moneylenders. The 
military forced the liquidation of many Chinese firms and branded Sukarno a ‘slave of 
the Chinese’. They fomented popular antagonism towards the Chinese by instigating 
anti-Chinese riots in Tegal, Cirebon, Bandung, Bogor, Ciandjur, Sukabumi and Garut 
(Caldwell and Utrecht, 1979:88). The PKI attempted to counter this threat by gaining 
Sukarno’s support for the nationalisation of the remaining foreign western enterprises 
before dealing with Chinese capital (Oey, 1971: 78). 
 
As the PKI gained ever-increasing political strength, the military moved to 
consolidate its industrial power by establishing an industrial union confederation 
(Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia SOKSI). The military enforced 
union membership for all employees of enterprises controlled by, or holding 
patronage links with, the military.  SOKSI included management and military 
personnel as officials and organisers. This confederation became the prototype of the 
state-military controlled union confederation, the SPSI, which was later introduced by 
the New Order regime.  
 
Sukarno’s last ditch attempt to preserve national unity 
Indonesia had moved from a relatively strong situation economically where post-war 
exports consolidated by Korean War demand generated adequate exchange earnings. 
By the early sixties, however, the Republic was in dire financial straits. The national 
debt was $US2.7 billion, with more than half of this ($1.4 billion) a debt to the Soviet 
and East European governments for the supply of military hardware (Tas, 1974:289, 
and Palmer, 1978: 7). Exports consisted primarily of petroleum products refined by 
foreign companies and rubber from the outer islands, and did not provide a reliable 
source of exporting earnings with which to meet these debts. The state responded to 
this foreign debt by cutting imports by 36 per cent. Food prices had increased by ten 
times between 1958 and 1961 (Zainu’ddin, 1968:262).  
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The collapse of the NASAKOM alliance, declining standards of living and 
hyperinflation presented a challenge to the Sukarno regime that could not be resolved 
by appealing to musjawarah and mufakat. Sukarno addressed the crisis pragmatically 
by attempting to patch up the economic fissures and by attempting to recreate the 
conditions that had inspired national unity in earlier periods of civil disruption and 
dissension.  In 1959 he introduced the National Planning Council (Depernas).  Its the 
three-point program was to provide adequate food and clothing for all, to promote 
national security and to implement a struggle against economic and political 
imperialism (Zainu’ddin, 1968:258).   A range of urgent economic remedial measures 
were adopted, the most significant of which was the establishment of the National 
Planning Council. In 1961 Sukarno introduced an Eight Year Construction and 
Reconstruction Plan. 
 
The pragmatic imperative to stabilise the economy and improve standards of living 
became embroiled in a state ideological campaign to win popular support for the 
regime through national unity in the face of adversity. Sukarno’s attempt to create 
internal unity by distracting the protagonists with a perceived external threat to the 
Republic signalled the introduction of a complex inter-relationship between the 
Indonesian state and the international political economy. On the one hand, the several 
confrontations with foreign states, especially with Holland and British-controlled 
Malaya, determined a need for a massive supply of armaments that was available only 
from the PRC or the Soviet bloc. Further, the debt that these loans entailed for 
Indonesia consolidated the economic crisis. On the other hand, Sukarno faced the task 
of achieving unity between the most powerful groups in the country, the PKI and the 
military. The severity of the economic crisis, and the effectiveness of the western 
economic, military, and political forces of destabilisation, made the reconciliation of 
these differences all but impossible.  
 
The Eight Year Plan collapsed as the costs of running a military campaign against the 
Dutch over the sovereignty of West Iryan redirected funds to the war-effort.  A 1961 
Soviet loan of US$450 million for arms purchase boosted financial reserves, but 
constituted a regional strategic threat to the US. There were two profound effects of 
the Soviet support: it caused the US to persuade the Dutch to withdraw from West 
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Iryan (August, 1962), whilst state spending of the Soviet loan created inflationary 
pressures further crippling the Indonesian economy. 
 
The immediate external threat to Indonesia’s interests was presented with the 
institution of the Federation of Malay states in September 1963. Foreign Minister 
Subandrio saw Malaysia as a neo-colonial threat to Indonesian economic autonomy 
and broke off economic ties with the new nation. The government represented this a 
positive move, contending that the ties had resulted in ‘as much as one-third of 
Indonesia’s total export (apart from oil products) [being marketed] through foreign 
middlemen’. The breaking of ties was said to have ended ‘the unhealthy over-
dependence upon foreign processing of export products, especially small-holders 
rubber’ (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1964, vol 4: 57).  Nevertheless the 
loss of Indonesia’s two biggest partners in South East Asia was a severe blow to 
regional trade. The Confrontation engendered mass popular actions to confiscate 
English and US investments. The U.S. was seen as an accomplice in the creation of 
Malaysia as a neo-colonial state, and in March 1965 the US-owned Goodyear and US 
Rubber, Caltex and Stanvac and British/Dutch Shell firms were nationalised (Utrecht, 
1987:178). Utrecht and Caldwell contend that the military management of the seized 
US and English companies ‘ruined’ them, and as a result there were no really tangible 
economic benefits from the takeover (Utrecht and Caldwell 1979:115). 
 
The costs imposed on the nation by the imperative to achieve national unity against 
foreign threats led to the introduction in March 1963 of yet another plan to reduce 
food shortages and inflation.  Sukarno’s Deklarasi Ekonomi, or Economic Declaration 
(DEKON), was intended to expand State income through tax changes and protect the 
living standards of the working masses by stabilising prices for most essential 
consumer goods (Utrecht and Caldwell, 1979:115). The plan was supported by 
foreign aid in credits for the import of consumer goods and for launching projects to 
increase food production The US provided the greatest aid to avoid the Republic 
seeking further Soviet financial support (Caldwell and Utrecht, 1979:116).  With the 
declaration of Konfrontasi the US withdrew its aid, thereby placing the DEKON 
policy in jeopardy. The government then toughened its tax policies to increase 
revenue, leading to price increases, abolishing price controls on essential on consumer 
commodities and imposing limits on wage increases. Basic consumer commodities 
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had to be rationed.  The resulting industrial action prompted the Army to decree as 
illegal labour strikes in all ‘vital industries’ (Oey, 1971:58). The Government 
distributed essential consumer goods to the armed forces and government officials, 
and then state enterprises. The resulting economic crisis precipitated a massive 
political crisis.  
 
As the economy deteriorated and labour-peasantry increasingly challenged the 
military’s right to restrict reform, no rubric of national unity and mutual interest could 
restrain class conflict. The military moved in to repress opposition and impose ‘the 
rule of law’. This meant the destabilisation of the Sukarno regime with the military 
achieving absolute political and economic power. The murder of leading TNI 
Generals and an attempted coup by a military clique led to a nation-wide military-led, 
Muslim-supported massacre of most communists, their supporters and opponents of 
the military. Cribb ranks the 1965 killings as ‘one of the twentieth Century’s more 
extensive mass murders’ and notes the lack of precise information about the numbers 
involved (Cribb, 1990:1,3).  Caldwell refers to the murder of  ‘up to a million 
Indonesian citizens’ within the space of four months from the coup attempt on the 1st 
of October 1965 (Caldwell, 1975:13). Although ostensibly a war over ‘godless’ 
Communism, this was a war over the ownership of the means of production, and the 
destruction of any authority or effective voice for labour.  
  
Conclusion 
The parliamentary system’s inability to bridge the schisms within society and 
engender a national unity that could restore economic growth, led to a popular 
endorsement of the charismatic leader, Sukarno. The people believed Sukarno could 
inspire and impose national unity thus restoring the country’s fortunes. It was 
believed that he could reconcile the competing ambitions of the major power groups 
and bridge divisions within the body polity to accomplish the aims of the Revolution.  
 
In a direct critical confrontation with those theorists who argue that personal political 
power can explain the character and tensions within political systems, I dispute the 
presumption that the Sukarno regime’s failures resided in Sukarno’s personal foibles, 
incompetencies or megalomania. It is argued that such a conception misapprehends 
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the strength and depth of those differences, and certainly of the historical politico-
economic tensions that characterise this relatively early stage in national political and 
economic development. Further, those critics who believed that Sukarno could not 
resolve these differences because of leadership flaws also overrate the ability of any 
leader to resolve the problems facing the Republic. A more critical analysis of the 
character of Sukarno’s rule and policies must take account of the forces defining the 
nature of the nationalist movement and the popular ambition for economic 
sovereignty. It must also take account of the historical and material conditions that 
enabled his ascendency and which defined his policy-directions and philosophy.  
 
Sukarno gained absolute authority as the ‘Supreme Commander’ due to a combination 
of complex factors, but primarily due to his ability to represent national aspirations 
over the divisions implicit in the Indonesian body politic. The broader considerations 
included his consistent revolutionary nationalist appeal, successive parliamentary 
regimes’ inability to address nationalist ambitions or bridge national differences, the 
real threat of western re-colonialisation, and the political and corporate strength of the 
military apparatus. The most persuasive explanation for Sukarno’s ascendency, 
however, was his ability to balance the competing interests of the military and labour-
peasantry. This was not just the talent of a skilled mediator balancing the ambitions of 
two dominant groups amongst a plurality of competing interests. It represented a 
deeply committed and involved determination to achieve cooperation between the 
major political forces within Indonesia. Sukarno’s manifesto encapsulated mass 
aspirations for national economic sovereignty. Further, his allegiance to the landless 
and the small land-holding peasantry was evidenced by his commitment to Marhaen 
as the archetype Indonesian. Building on this basis of mass-appeal, and whilst no one 
grouping could exert absolute power, Sukarno was in a strong political position to 
enforce compromise and cooperative dealings between the competing forces.  
 
A key conceptual understanding underpinning this research has been that change 
reflects an economic and political struggle over control of the productive process and 
shares of surplus from that process. With the collapse of parliamentary democracy 
and Sukarno’s ascendency this struggle is seen to have been engineered by the 
military on behalf of capital, confronting labour and the peasantry over the control of 
and shares from the production system. The inherently oppositional character of these 
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dominant political groups meant that Sukarno’s contrived ‘cooperation’ between them 
could only be a temporary ‘holding operation’.  The objective of negotiating a balance 
of power to affect some influence over the production and control of the national 
surplus was always going to be an elusive one.  The support provided by Western 
corporate and military agencies to the military once the secessionist rebellions had 
been defeated indicates further the depth of the schism between the military and the 
masses and confirmed the military’s corporate-class allegiance. Thus, whilst 
Sukarno’s ‘Marhaenist’ credo defined the possibilities of cooperation and consensus 
to resolve divisions within society, there could be no consensus over the ownership 
and control of the system of production and the distribution of the surplus that it 
generated.   
 
The irreconcilable nature of this struggle for productive and distributive control came 
clearly to the fore when the military increasingly dominated the heights of capital 
ownership. The military elite made no bones about their claim to the right to control 
the generation and distribution of the surplus generated by ‘their’ companies. This 
transcended the Government’s ownership and distribution of the surplus, or the right 
to determine the distribution of that surplus to the community and labour. The 
corporate ascendency of the military represented a rupture in the state’s ordering of 
the system of production organisation and, more particularly, an expression of the 
state’s inability to reconcile the competition for the ownership and control of the 
country’s resources The nationalists’ agenda of economic sovereignty was thus 
hijacked by the military as they increasingly added a dominant capitalist role to that of 
the dua fungsi.  Under the NASAKOM façade of an alliance of mutual interest lay a 
bitter war for control over the production process and the distribution of surplus.  
 
Overall, whilst Sukarno’s strong centrist control effectively suppressed class struggle 
and dissidence, as well as challenged foreign economic dependency and control, these 
manoeuvrings could not ensure a resolution of the struggles let alone address the 
sources of dissent. Whilst he made various attempts to ameliorate the economic 
hardships and distract the power interests from their struggle, these initiatives only 
served to postpone the inevitable conflict between labour and capital precipitated by 
the 1965 military coup. Thus the state maintained a form of national political control 
by rallying popular support for unifying campaigns against national threats such as 
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civil war and imperialism. The achievement of national unity and the defeat of 
imperialist powers would enable national development and improved standards of 
living, thus obviating the need to challenge capital ownership. Whilst the state was 
ostensibly balancing the competing interests, its orientation, predilection, and the 
environment determined that it would serve indigenous business interests first, and 
foreign interests where they advantaged local capital interests.  
 
A further key conceptual theme of this thesis has been that the material conditions 
determining national policy direction have defined the character of the production 
apparatus as a developing system of production organisation. Thus, whereas historical 
discourse often suggests that a regime-overthrow marks the institution of completely 
new political and economic systems, this research has suggested that there is 
generally a marked continuity across ‘watersheds’ of political change. In the context 
of a rupture to Guided Democracy, whilst Sukarno was unable to reconcile the 
irreconcilable competition for control of the production apparatus, his regime 
instituted systems that can as seen as crucial for New Order rule.  The next chapter 
develops an appreciation of the role of Sukarno’s ideological campaigns for national 
unification and solidarity as a case in point.  The more oppressive, and unintentional, 
material condition was the reintroduction of the exclusionary process with the 
‘exclusion’ in this context transformed from the system of colonial appropriation 
excluding Indonesians, to a military-dominated system of private capital 
appropriation. The next chapter considers the process of exclusion, including the 
exclusion of indigenous business.   
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Chapter 8 
The New Order 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
“Capitalist development is accelerating in Indonesia due to the economic, political, 
and social policies implemented by the New Order since 1967. These policies have 
facilitated the development of classes associated with the maturation of capitalism – a 
bourgeoisie, growing salaried and professional middle classes, as well as a steadily 
growing working class ” (Hadiz, 1992b: 64). 
 
“He (President Soeharto) was not a sophisticated thinker, but he was ready to listen 
to the right people.” Mid-1960s US Ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green 
(Winters, 1996:48). 
 
Following its seizure of power in 1965 the Soeharto military regime demolished 
labour and political institutions, and jailed or killed labour-peasantry class’ leaders 
and cadres deemed a threat to private corporate interests. The banning of any left or 
communist political or industrial associations was supported by a coalition of 
indigenous business, dominant political and economic groups such as Muslim 
political parties, small and medium business and anti-communist trade unions. There 
has been overwhelming evidence proving a strong, if covert, western – especially 
English and US’ – government role in this elimination of leftist opposition. This 
culminated in the US government’s formal ‘warm welcome’ for the military 
leadership in its takeover of the Indonesian state (Crouch, 1985:297).   
 
This takeover by the New Order regime forms the background to this Chapter’s 
investigation of the character of the regime, its ambitions, and most importantly, the 
interests served by the autocratic rule. It postulates a specific rationale for the 
destruction of the representative systems of a particular group in society that not only 
demanded a greater share of the wealth, but also demanded an equitable voice in the 
ownership of the productive and wealth-generating apparatus. This forms the crux of 
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this analysis of the political and economic authorities in charge of the production and 
distribution of the national surplus.   
 
The primary consideration concerns the role, influence, and objectives of foreign 
powers and corporate interests in the shaping of New Order national and international 
political and economic policy. The following brief survey of key Soeharto-era events 
is thus illuminated by an appreciation of the regime and its international allies’ class-
objective and motives in not only rejecting Sukarno’s attempts at reconciling 
divergent interests, but enforcing a system of class dominance.     
 
This class-perspective of political change goes to the core of the fundamental 
difference between this thesis and the established conceptual understanding.  Whilst 
the New Order state ideological credo represented Soeharto as bringing ‘economic 
order’ to the Indonesian people as a welcome rejection of Sukarno’s megalomania and 
economic incompetence, the contrary appreciation of this thesis concerns the 
application of social control to serve sectional interests.  This regulatory role is 
considered in the context of international corporate pressures to shift Indonesia’s 
productive base to serve the needs of changing international market demand, and – as 
a corollary – international corporate management requirements for low-cost, 
manufacturing industry, labour.  The investigation charts the way in which the 
Soeharto ruling regime moved to accommodate and engage with these international 
pressures. 
 
The investigation of state-controlled processes of accumulation is juxtaposed against 
the contradictions between international and national corporate objectives of securing 
a ready supply of low-cost labour in an environment of strict social controls, and a 
growing international campaign to ameliorate Indonesia’s harsh working conditions 
and soften the repressive autocratic state rule.  Social divisions and contradictions in 
the system are illuminated by an appreciation of these conflicting imperatives. This 
forms the background for an explanation of the deep schisms in Indonesia’s body 
politic leading up to the Asian financial crisis of 1997.  
 
The primary theme of the institutional, political and industrial organisation of labour 
as a mechanism of class-control and the prime agency of accumulation is counter 
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posed as a critical alternative to the literature that ascribes capital accumulation to 
business’ initiative and dynamism. This prefaces a critique of those theorists who 
attribute the continuing intractability of Indonesia’s economic crisis following the 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 to the Soeharto clique’s ‘corruption, collusion and 
nepotism’. In other words the source of Indonesia’s continuing economic problems 
resides in distortions and frictions to sound business practice. This is juxtaposed 
against my dominant theme that the essence of accumulation resides in labour 
exploitation.   
 
The chapter concludes with some consideration of the impact of the massive changes 
resulting from the Asian financial crisis on systems of production control and 
regulation, and the possible future implications of the resulting changes to the 
political and corporate system. 
 
Setting the corporate agenda 
Having defeated the forces representing the interests of labour and the peasantry the 
Soeharto government determined to replace the broad-based ‘cooperative’ system of 
politico-economic administration of earlier Republican regimes with a system of 
corporate control. The immense complexity of imperatives facing government was 
addressed within a framework of maximising the possibilities for accumulation of 
indigenous capital interests. We shall see, however, that only enterprises and support 
organisations associated with the military-state government gained preference in the 
allocation of business opportunity.   The motivations for this preference, the character 
of the enterprises, and the effect of the preference will be examined in the context of 
the developing form of production control and labour regulation.   
 
Kadin  
To facilitate business expansion, the government established the enterprise association 
of Kadin. Kadin was run by Cabinet-appointed military-business executives and was 
the forerunner of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The association 
defined the ‘inner circle’ of state supported enterprise.  Robison contends that Kadin’s 
primary aim was to bring business class’ ‘influence to bear in a concerted way within 
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the existing structures of power’ (Robison, 1990:142). This ‘business class’ did not, 
however, include indigenous Muslim small and medium enterprises.  
 
Kadin played a vital role in driving the substantial domestic investment growth that 
occurred between 1965 and 1975, coincidently facilitating the re-engagement of 
foreign capital investment into the Indonesian economy, as well as excluding other 
indigenous business from this engagement. Growth was thus largely led by state 
investment and by a large number of private corporations enjoying ‘political 
patronage, located not only in trade, but in manufacturing, forestry, property, and 
transport’ (Robison, 1990:143). Robison argues that as a consequence the Muslim-
oriented petty bourgeoisie ‘continued on its path of gradual decline in trade and small-
scale manufacture’ (Robison, 1990:143).  In 1987 Kadin was officially accorded the 
status of sole channel of communication between government and business. 
 
Political patronage and state protection provided privileged access to credit, 
concessions, trade and manufacturing monopolies, consumer good distribution, and 
state supply and construction contracts. Chinese-owned businesses took a large share 
of the indigenous investment. Corporate directors generally enjoyed long associations 
with the military, acting as financiers for army commands and individual generals, 
and de facto managers for corporations owned by the military. This patrimonial 
corporatist control was the ‘principal mechanism for the advancement of business 
interests in the policy process’ (Robison, 1987:143). 
 
There was a massive expansion of the patrimonial capital group of Soeharto 
associates and family members, such as those ‘led by Liem Sioe Liong, Willem 
Soerjadjaja, Tan Siong Ke, Bob Hasan, Hendra Rahardja, Ciputra, and various 
Soeharto family interests including the Bimantara group’ (Robison, 1990:145) These 
companies extended their industrial endeavours with foreign partners into vehicle and 
component manufacture, cement, electronics, oil-associated industry, and steel 
manufacture (Robison, 1990:145).  The capital accumulation of these corporations 
was made possible by the strict regulation of foreign capital towards enabling the 
dominance of the patrimonial group in the nominated sectors. Foreign access was 
facilitated in those instances where imported technology and skills was required. 
Overall, Robison considers that the growth of the indigenous capital groups was made 
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possible by the ‘privileged permission to form monopolies,’ and by the ‘concessions, 
licences and credit made possible by political patrons in a heavily regulated economy’ 
(Robison, 1990:143). 
 
Rudner has identified a direct connection between the business grouping and the 
military, where the ABRI leadership reaped political and economic advantages from 
its association with a ‘small coterie of entrepreneurial generals, managers, of large 
business enterprises, and most notably, the Pertamina state oil monopoly, which (had) 
financed the army’s political take-over’ (Schiffrin, 1976, 217).  
 
Re-engagement with international capital  
To establish the economic fundamentals necessary for capital accumulation, and to 
politically justify its authoritarian rule, the government had to address the economic 
crisis, especially problems of hyperinflation, the budgetary deficit, and the flight of 
international investment.   The state created organisations to plan appropriate 
economic directions and priorities, and investigate ways and means of obtaining aid 
and ‘winning back’ foreign investment. At the same time, the state instituted agencies 
intended to consolidate existing systems of social regulation and labour control. The 
state’s corporate accumulation ambitions and priorities are seen in the form and 
character of the institutions such as Kadin, the Supreme Advisory Council, and 
BAPPENAS, set up to deal with economic problems, and in the methods by which 
these institutions addressed them.  
 
Planning 
An urgent imperative for an integrated system of economic, social, and industrial 
planning and re-organisation was the establishment of the economic fundamentals that 
would appeal to the corporate objectives of foreign investors on the one hand, and 
those that would maximise corporate-state capital accumulation on the other.  In the 
establishment of these fundamentals the planners had to account for economic 
nationalist sentiment and interventionist predilection, but exclude any Sukarnoist 
implication of cooperative, equitable distribution of the surplus. To accomplish this 
multifaceted objective, Soeharto appointed a group of Jakarta University, US Ford 
Foundation trained, economists – dubbed the ‘Berkeley Mafia’ – to run the new 
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national development planning agency called BAPPENAS (Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Nasional). The academic planning team formulated national economic 
policy with advice from IMF and the IBRD economic technocrats. Indonesia had re-
signed with the IMF in February 1967 and the World Bank in May of that year.  
 
The military government adopted the Agency’s recommendation for a new economic 
regime of ‘fiscal responsibility’ through economic deregulation and market orientated 
developmentalist policies (Utrecht, 1987:182). In 1968 the World Bank set up a 
permanent mission in Jakarta and worked closely with the nation’s national planning 
apparatus.  Between 1968 and 1972 the World Bank and its affiliate, the International 
Development Association, provided $350 million in loans for repair work, 
rehabilitation of roads, agriculture, electricity, telecommunications, and other 
infrastructure (Palmer, 1978:31). 
 
Negotiation of aid/investment agreements  
Aid was also provided separately by the Japanese and Western nations, but on 
different terms than those of the international agencies. Japanese and Western aid was 
more specifically designed to re-establish foreign corporate links and opportunities 
within Indonesia.  In the competing ambitions of the donors and Indonesia, donors 
were in a strong position to dictate terms advantaging their national corporate 
interests. The Indonesian state, on the other hand, could offer the industrial security of 
a ‘pacified’ political and industrial environment. The power of the military state had 
enabled the institution of perhaps the most important economic ‘fundamental’: a 
tightly controlled, ‘depoliticised’, workforce.  The nature of this labour-regulatory 
framework will be discussed below. The issue here is the aid-provision mechanism.  
 
Once the wealthy nations were assured the Indonesian state had set in place a secure 
industrial, political and economic environment for investment, they commenced 
negotiations over the terms of their aid/investment. They supported a ‘U.N. circles’ 
idea of a ‘Country Program’ whereby ‘various bodies giving project aid compare(d) 
notes so that all aid … (fitted) … into a recognisable national plan of the recipient 
country’ (Palmer, 1987:26). The US provided emergency credits of $US 174 million 
in September 1966. This was followed by a meeting to reconcile the investment 
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objectives in Indonesia with the major Western creditor nations (US, United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Western Germany, Japan and Italy with Australia 
and the IMF as observers). Known as the Paris Club, these meetings led to the 
formation of the creditor consortium IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia), 
with Australia joining as a full member, and Canada and many West European nations 
coming in later. The observer status of the IMF and the World Bank became that of 
guide, secretariat, and broker. Aid was tied to access to Indonesia’s natural resources, 
to the rejection of external political campaigns (such as ‘Confrontasi’) that could 
threaten corporate and strategic interests, the guarantee that nationalisation of foreign 
enterprise would not occur, and that US aid would not be used to repay debts to 
communist lenders. 
 
In October 1966 IGGI granted a $US200 million ‘stabilisation’ loan. In 1968 a $325 
million loan with $250 for stabilisation and $75 million for the ‘rehabilitation’ of 
infrastructure, particularly roads, communications, irrigation systems. The loans were 
in two parts: credits for the import of consumer or capital goods produced in the 
lending country, and credits for ‘developmental projects’ that tended to be in those 
sectors that constructed the infrastructure necessary to facilitate the extraction 
industries dominated by the foreign companies whose country of origin were the 
principal aid-donor states (Utrecht, 1987:191). The loans enabled the resumption of 
commodity imports, the stabilisation of the domestic economy and thus the reduction 
of inflation, and encouraged private investment in the consumer goods industries and 
agricultural sector. 
 
The overall result of this re-engagement with international capital was to create long-
term economic growth. Gross domestic investment as a share of GDP grew from 4.5 
per cent to 15.8 per cent between 1966 and 1971 (Hill, 1994:65).  Robison notes, 
however, that the influx of substantial levels of foreign investment was essential for 
the advancement of capitalist accumulation, creating growth without redistributing 
wealth or power (Robison, 1986:110).   
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Aid and the development of the patrimonial state 
The next phase of the regeneration of state-controlled capital accumulation, as part of 
the restoration of the economic system, was determined by the conditions and 
allocation of aid. This became the basis for the development of a new corporate 
‘rentier’ power-elite within the Indonesian ruling class.5 This elite consisted of 
‘influential persons’ within the state apparatus who were able to ‘demand rent from 
outsiders, and who were reliant on ‘favourable’ regulations and/or required to give 
something in return for getting access to the remaining resources’ (Budiman, 
1990:32,3).  The Indonesian rentier class consisted largely of the military’s senior 
officer corps. The money from military corporations flowed to the army through a 
series of foundations and business ventures, such as banks and pension schemes, 
which were supporting its military operations. This income was not restricted to the 
generals, with even the lower ranked officers relying (and continuing to rely) on 
business links to supplement their incomes and their pensions. Politicians, civil and 
military state personnel determined patronage or ‘tributary’ relations of political and 
economic influence through the allocation of licences, contracts and quotas. Their 
bargaining strength lay in their ability to provide the necessary preconditions for 
production, trade, and internal commercial operations such as through the state-
nominated authority to influence or control financial institutions.  
 
Metropolitan donor countries deployed aid to leverage access for their national 
capitals in particular situations of Indonesian state support for foreign, over 
indigenous, investment.  An example was the ICI - Dulux pressure determining the 
government’s decision to prohibit exports from an indigenous-owned plant as that 
plant supplied more than 50 per cent of the market. Palmer argues that the state 
program supported foreign investment in low-risk, high profit sectors, and that this 
investment did not create flow-on incentives for local enterprise, especially in the 
high surplus generating extractive industries. Foreign interests with Indonesian 
administrators obliged indigenous interests to negotiate with the foreign ‘owners’ as 
corporate producers in Indonesia and as marketing agents of the product (Palmer, 
1987:104). 
 
 203
Throughout the period covering the entrenchment of the New Order state, power 
relations between rentier interests and international capital denied the possibility of 
substantial indigenous capitalist accumulation in key sectors of the economy. A 
corollary of this failure to reinvest in capital intensification was the relative decline of 
productivity for comprador capitalist enterprise vis-à-vis its international competition. 
This will be shown to result in the intensification of workloads through increasing 
labour repression as military-controlled enterprise management sought to maintain 
surplus production in the face of declining output.  
 
Competition for extraction 
An important factor contributing towards the consolidation and transformation of the 
New Order state was the growing strength of Japanese investment in Indonesia vis-à-
vis the US and Western European corporate investment. The Soeharto regime’s 
resolution of this national corporate jockeying for control of Indonesia’s resources 
indicates it held sufficient political strength to advantage indigenous rentier interests 
in the process of negotiation between US, Japanese and Western European corporate 
powers. This negotiation signalled a momentous change in the financial base of the 
regime through the advance of New Order corporate-state accumulation. 
 
Japan had initially acceded to the US imposed order of metropolitan state dominance 
in the organisation and coordination of a ‘national plan’ to advance Indonesia’s 
development through aid. As Japan re-established its metropolitan industrial base and 
moved to expand its sources of energy and raw materials supplies, there was a critical 
breakdown between the aid partners over access to Indonesian resources. Japan 
attempted to utilise IGGI to allow direct private investment, including joint venture 
capital, to constitute official aid. This would have allowed Japan to classify funds lent 
to its own companies as aid. These Japanese ambitions led to a growing Western 
European and US hostility, but Japan considered it was discriminated against by the 
US domination of the extraction of particular commodities, especially oil (Robinson, 
1985:198). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
5 Tanter (following  Mahdavy) describes rent as income used to create an entity of mutually-advantaging political 
and corporate interests (Budiman, 1990:59). 
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Whilst still playing a key role supporting the IGGI program, Japan determined to 
expand its access through a special Japan/Indonesia partnership that would 
subordinate links with other capital interests ‘to a programme of accelerated state-
capitalist industrialisation’ (Robinson, 1985:196). Japanese lobbyists and corporate 
representatives sought privileged access to Indonesian commodities, and developed a 
liaison with supportive elements within cabinet, and senior bureaucratic officials, 
Chinese, and ‘marginalised petty-bourgeois elements, hostile to the “liberal” western 
strategy’ (Robinson, 1985:196). This liaison led to an expansion of Japanese 
investment opportunity, in association with Chinese and comprador-rentier capital. 
Between 1972-6 there was a rapid expansion of Japanese investment relative to US 
and Western Europe. Japan achieved a near monopoly interest in the major 
Indonesian exports of timber and oil, and dominated secondary industry investment.  
 
The latter companies channelled funds to affiliates in Indonesia set up to promote 
exports. This led to a program of heavy borrowing that Robinson associates with a 
dramatic rise in private Japanese investment in Indonesia (Robinson, 1985:199). This 
is reflected in the subsequent growing disparity between Japanese and US aid, so that 
by 1973-4 Japanese investment presented a serious challenge to Euro-US capital 
dominance of the Indonesian economy (Robinson, 1985:197).  
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Table 8.1: Investment in Indonesia by IGGI members: 
1967-1976 (US$000) 
 
Country Amount Projects 
Britain (excl. H.K.) 36725 31 
West Germany 28744 14 
Japan 1030424 162 
Canada 96203 4 
Netherlands 77412 28 
New Zealand 70 1 
France 11959 4 
Belgium 77854 15 
United States 147659 45 
Australia 64794 23 
TOTALS 1571880 327 
 
Source: Robinson, 1985:204 
 
Indonesia’s support for Japan, in promoting a corporate advantage over other national 
capitals in the competition for the extraction of Indonesia’s resources, played a crucial 
role in the transformation of the Indonesian state from a rentier-based, to an industrial 
capitalist based system. This creation of a capitalist-state system is considered in a 
following section describing the oil-boom consolidation of indigenous capitalist 
power, but it is appropriate to signal the important role that aid played in this 
transformation, especially through contributing to a tightening association between 
the corporate-state and foreign private capitalist accumulation (Budiman, 1990:39).  
 
Disciplining labour and society 
The chief objective in the New Order state’s program to create the necessary 
‘fundamentals’ for capital accumulation was the institution or extension of a regime to 
discipline society and labour.  The state’s ability to crush the more radical sections of 
the labour movement, to establish firm controls over labour and the peasantry, and to 
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deny dissident political activity, was a major consideration in the foreign corporate 
decision to reinvest in Indonesia. The nature of the regulatory system, how it was 
applied, and its impact on labour is thus considered in relation to foreign and 
indigenous capital accumulation.   
 
The military overthrow of the Sukarno regime and the subsequent massacre and 
gaoling of political opponents formed the basis of the Soeharto regime’s political 
power. This obliterated most critical systems of industrial or political representation 
for labour and the peasantry.  It prevented any possibility of a revival of Sukarno-era 
labour activism and of opposition to foreign investment during the introductory phase 
of the New Order’s program of social regulation.  To secure its political and economic 
objectives the state reconstructed existing systems of social, political, and industrial 
organisation. It strengthened the state security apparatus to repress internal dissention, 
it redeveloped the unifying ideology initiated by Sukarno to support the 
developmentalist goals and production relations, it instituted a common system of 
industrial representation controlled by the state and run by the military as part of the 
agenda of industrial repression, and it denied a political voice for labour and the 
peasantry. Hadiz characterises the campaign as aiming to ‘exorcise the spirit of 
militant unionism from the body, as well as the collective memory, of organised 
labour’ (Hadiz, 1997:62) 
 
Strengthened state repressive apparatus 
The state security apparatus was the paramount institution employed by the state to 
enforce its developmentalist agenda. The military/police enforcement of systems of 
industrial and social regulation was a logical extension of regulatory processes that 
were an inherent part of the development of the Republican state.  In the first instance, 
the military was an intrinsic part of the revolutionary forces, and as such instrumental 
in fomenting the political mobilisation for Republican unity in the face of foreign and 
internal opposition. The military remained committed to what they perceived to be the 
political imperatives of the developmental objective. As the military assumed 
domination of the commanding heights of corporate control, it instituted a hierarchical 
system of industrial regulation over those corporations, which followed on as a 
general system of industrial regulation. The Sukarno-era military formation of a union 
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confederation in competition to other union organisations such as the PKI formed the 
final component of a system of industrial regulation instituted by the military.  
 
As Soeharto’s New Order was now firmly within the aegis of the Western strategic 
alliance, there was little apparent requirement for an extensive force to protect the 
country from an external threat. The military ‘security’ role was now dedicated to 
ensuring that the state’s developmentalist objectives were implemented without 
political or industrial opposition. Thus the training, equipping, and mobilisation of 
military forces backed by its intelligence apparatus was extended at both the national 
level of the military-state, and at the village level through a ‘skeleton structure’ or 
‘shadow government’ controlling civilian institutions. With the large numbers of 
active-duty and retired officers serving on boards and in the management of both 
private corporations and state- owned businesses, ‘the lines between public and 
private, and military and civilian, duties (were) constantly blurred’ (GSP 
Subcommittee, 1992:71). 
 
The military apparatus imposed on Indonesian society a hierarchical regime of 
regulation and control, from the village to the capital-intensive manufacturing 
production line. Active-duty and retired officers were appointed as governors and 
regents of districts and villages, ensuring military control of the population through 
the state apparatus and through civilian administrations. In 1992, military officers 
accounted for 12 out of 27 governors, 134 of 299 district regents, and 12 of Soeharto's 
41-member cabinet ministries, including the important ministries for Home Affairs, 
the judiciary, and Political and Security Affairs. There was a cynical saying in 
Indonesia: ‘Under colonialism, we had a governor-general; now that we're 
independent, we have general-governors’ (Rossiter and Lee, 1994).  
 
Military regulation of industrial relations occurred through the hierarchy of 
production and social organisation from the level of Cabinet representation, and 
senior union management, and through the line-relations at workplaces and corporate 
plantations.  Thus top personnel in the Ministry of Manpower were men who had 
made their careers in the state security apparatus, and asserted a military dominance 
over labour affairs.  A 1986 Minister of Manpower Bill legitimised the military’s role 
in quelling strikes (Hadiz, 1992a).  
 208
Developmentalist ethos 
The New Order’s developmentalist values appear to have been shared by the 
leadership of the anti-communist Muslim community, the unions, and the military- 
union federation of SOBSI. These shared values facilitated the introduction of 
systems of social and labour regulation supporting the New Order’s corporate 
objectives. During the New Order state’s political and economic entrenchment and 
following the repression of left-wing unions, the remaining union leadership provided 
their full support for the corporate state’s program of labour regulation, 
developmentalism and foreign investment in the Indonesian economy. Senior union 
officials enthusiastically accepted their state-anointed roles as emissaries of the New 
Order in the international campaign to convince foreign investors of the viability, 
stability, and security of the industrial environment.  A 1969 union representatives’ 
visit to Europe advised investors that Indonesian workers were ‘patriotic and bound to 
the national interest’ (Palmer, 1978:100).  The leadership group, led by Agus Sudono 
of the Amalgamation of Indonesian Islamic Workers Organisation (GASBIINDO), 
told European corporate leaders that Indonesian workers were ‘conscious of the fact 
that the struggle of the Indonesian nation had entered upon a phase of development 
that badly needed capital’ (Hadiz, 1997:64).  
 
These economic goals were promoted through a national ideological campaign 
supporting developmentalism and a corporatist ethos that incorporated the elements of 
mutual cooperation and the common interests of labour and capital. Thus the 
achievement of state labour-regulatory objectives must be seen in the general context 
of the overall hegemonic system of social and political control. This campaign built 
on the formula used by Sukarno to gain national unity in the achievement of state 
goals. This regime, however, enforced the ethos as an obligatory element of social and 
political behaviour, with the intention of marginalising dissident forces and voices.  
Sukarno’s Pancasila ideology excluded labour and the peasantry as a class power. 
Under the Soeharto system reference to class power or struggle was ‘unpatriotic’ and 
punishable by law. This reversed the Sukarnoist unifying mechanism of the external 
‘enemy’ of the Republic, to portray those opposing or criticising state policy as 
internal enemies of the state.  
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The state promoted a national ethos to foster a unified national commitment to the 
ideals of productivity.  This ethos incorporated the two ‘guiding tenets’ of bangun 
(adjective pembangunan means development, from bangun to uplift awaken or 
emerge, to wake up, structure; and pem - an to build, develop) and Pancasila, as 
discussed in the last chapter.  The origin of pembangunan lies in independence ideals 
of a national common purpose of self-determination and a rejection of foreign 
economic dominance.  This was incorporated in the state ideal of the creation of 
national economic resilience, economic development, and nation building.  Whilst 
Sukarno stressed the use of the term to promote the idea of equitable development 
emphasising the necessity to assist the economically disadvantaged, Soeharto 
transformed it into an ideological justification for private enterprise and legitimisation 
of the state emphasis on nation-building development (Chalmers and Hadiz, 1997:3-
5).  
 
The New Order incorporated Pancasila into all aspects of state policy making, but 
specifically re-designed and codified the ethos in the context of industrial regulation 
as Hubungan Industrial - sebuah pengantar: Industrial Pancasila (HIP). Industrial 
relations academic Dr John Suprihanto codified HIP for the workplace (Suprihanto, 
1985). It emphasised traditional Indonesian values of harmony and consultation 
leading to consensus. The aim of working was held to be human dedication to God, 
for other people, for society, and the nation. As with Pancasila it represented a clear 
denial of conflicting class-interest in that workers and entrepreneurs were seen to have 
the same aim of community progress for mutual welfare. Thus Mursalin, the Minister 
of Manpower during the late 1960s, stated that  ‘interpretations of labour relations 
based on class conflict and free fight liberalism must be immediately wiped out and 
replaced by interpretations of labour relations based on Pancasila’ (Hadiz, 1997:65).  
Conflicts were seen as sourced in individual situations, and thus resolvable through 
musyawarah to achieve mufakat. In HIP there was a balance of ‘fairness and 
properness’ between the workers’ and entrepreneurs’ rights and obligations to the 
company. ‘One sided’ actions like oppression, strikes, and lockouts did not conform 
to HIP principles. The author of the HIP referred to the responsibility of workers ‘for 
their working place, for their family, for their trade union, for the interests of society 
and state, and to bear responsibility in respect to God’ (Suprihanto, 1985:92-94). It is 
also of interest to note that key ideological components of the document were written 
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in the Javanese language, reflecting the Java-centric dominance of the Soeharto 
regime. 
 
The state conducted regular campaigns in a general program of social organisation 
supporting developmentalist goals. The final campaign before the Soeharto regime 
lost government was based on promoting national discipline for development. Just 
prior to the Asian financial crisis in June 1997 the government led a campaign 
promoted on billboards, banners and television exhorting Indonesians to be self-
disciplined in working for national development. For example, the slogan of ‘disiplin 
nasional, syarat mutlak suksesnya pembangunan nasional’ (national discipline, the 
core prerequisite for successful national development).  
 
State unionism 
The state’s general program designed to ensure labour’s non-conflictual and 
cooperative role in national development was predicated on a state-defined and 
imposed distinction between political and economic rights and responsibilities. All 
aspects of the organisation and regulation of the workforce were represented as an 
integral part of the developmentalist economic agenda, and as such it was 
inappropriate to allow political party association with organised labour or the 
peasantry.  On assuming political power, the New Order regime moved to inhibit 
‘political’ activism from the rural and industrial base by breaking the nexus between 
industrial and political aspirations of labour and the peasantry (Manning, 1993:67).  
 
Political and economic conditions determined a more gradual move by the state to 
‘drain’ the industrial system and union representation of any ‘non-economic’ 
association, such as through the political associations of Muslim-based unions.  The 
objective was to control the entire union movement by replacing the numbers of 
independent unions with a centralised and hierarchically regimented entity, under the 
authority of state appointed officials.  The vehicle for this transformation was the pre-
coup, military-union of SOBSI, described in the last chapter as the major labour-
controlling system in military-controlled enterprise. To ease the transition the state-
military apparatus encouraged the participation of prominent, pro-Islamic union 
leaders in the state management of industrial relations affairs.  Union officials appear 
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to have accepted the government position that the coordination of the union 
movement under the one federation, overseen by the Minister for Manpower and 
responsible to the government, would advantage industrial labour in the New Order 
state. Prominent union leader Sudono could then argue his belief that the state would 
support industrial rights – such as the right to strike – given the ‘aspirations of the 
New Order to establish a democratic and constitutional way of life’ (Hadiz, 1997:36). 
As part of the state-supported attempts to establish the legitimacy of its industrial 
relations regulatory system, Sudono and other union leaders put their efforts into 
expanding links with foreign union federations such as the ICFTU and AFL CIO.6  
 
In 1972 General Ali Murtopo, the leader of the army’s political intelligence group 
(OPSUS – Operasi Khusus), forced all unions into a single labour federation (Hadiz, 
1997:47). In 1973 the government consolidated the existing 19 trade union groups 
under the central authority of the FBSI, with the leadership determined to reconstruct 
union systems to reflect the state’s developmental ambitions. Thus ‘the mental 
attitudes and ways of thinking of organised labour had to be revamped so that workers 
could better participate in development’ (Hadiz, 1997:48) The SPSI remained the 
bulwark of state developmental priorities related to labour organisation until the state 
allowed alternative union representation in the mid 1990s. Until then, any attempt to 
promote alternative union organisations was limited by state legislation requiring any 
new trade union federation to include unions from at least 15 industries and to have 
branches in at least 20 provinces.  
 
The SPSI federation played a consistent role in facilitating industrial regulation on 
behalf of corporate interests. SPSI units at the workplace, where they existed, have 
often sided with the company. The presence of soldiers and police during negotiations 
between workers and management served as form of intimidation and robbed the 
industrial relations process of any meaning. It was standard practice for union 
workplace-committees to have leaders appointed by management, or to be 
management staff (Mack, 1995:4).  
 
                                                 
6 Interview with Agus Sudono, Industrial advisor to President Habibie, Director State Supreme Advisory Council, 
Jakarta, 28th July, 1998 
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In the 1991 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the US State Department 
noted: ‘The Government and employers have considerable influence over SPSI 
affairs; a retired military lieutenant colonel and GOLKAR district chairman with some 
prior union experience is chairman of the largest provincial branch of SPSI, primarily 
due to government backing. The Minister of Manpower is a member of the SPSI 
Consultative Council.  SPSI officials are pressured to join GOLKAR and GOLKAR 
members dominate the SPSI leadership’ (US Department of State, 1992:870).  
Manning contends that the military role included vetting of appointments of union 
leaders and officials, detention of labour activists and active participation of military 
and police in the settlement of disputes  (Manning, 1993:67).  
 
In 1992 the SPSI military leadership – in full military uniform – addressed an 
Australian delegation of which I was a member.  They argued the appropriateness of 
the military role in the union, both as officials and in workplaces as shop stewards, to 
provide ‘secure’ workplaces and ensure that management and employees strictly 
adhered to HIP. The military apparatus ensured adequate funding for its union 
operations by enforcing the state directive for companies to extract union dues from 
the annual Liburan (religious holiday) bonus and pay them directly to military 
officials. In the event an employer refused to comply with this requirement, then the 
Government applied production licensing restrictions and other ‘sanctions’ on that 
company (Mack, 1993:2).  
 
Rural developmentalism 
The coup that ushered in the Soeharto regime prefaced the destruction of all political 
opposition to corporate ambitions to reassert absolute control over rural production, 
surplus appropriation and distribution. The degree to which the political mobilisation 
of rural labour and peasantry was perceived as a threat to this appropriation is shown 
by the extent to which the massacre of rural workers was concentrated on left-wing 
groups, land rights associations, and industrial activists. A foreign journalist reporting 
on the pogroms of North Sumatra cited an army official document recording the 
military murder of ‘twenty-two percent of the plantation workers in the Medan area’ 
(Stoler, 1985:163) Most SARBUPRI union leaders, branch heads, or estate division 
representatives were killed or imprisoned. All left-leaning labour unions and other 
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associations were outlawed with estate union members dismissed and blacklisted from 
further estate employment (Stoler, 1985:163).  
 
As all forms of representation of rural-workers were demolished, the state moved in to 
control the workforce in a program that superseded traditional production relations 
with capital intensification packages and mechanisms to enforce labour 
commodification. These developmentalist programs were applied in the mass-based 
subsistence production sector as well as in the corporate estates sector.   
 
Estate-sector extended appropriation through capital intensification 
and labour-commodification 
The state’s agenda to reassert private corporate control over the estate sector included 
the re-establishment of landholder ‘sovereignty’. This was carried out by plantation 
company employed and military-supported gangs, who ejected squatters from Dutch 
colonial-era estate land that had been occupied since the Pacific War.   
 
Rural sector rehabilitation was an intrinsic part of the international aid/investment 
program. Following World Bank and International Development Agency acceptance 
of the ability of the New Order state to ‘stabilise’ the political and economic climate, 
the development-lending program to increase foreign exchange earnings prioritised 
the revival of the estate industry (Stoler, 1985:165).  Other than road construction 
loans, the single largest loan ($59 million) went towards the restoration of 
government estate production. The Bank and Agency supported this particular 
spending on the presumption that this industry provided the best opportunity for the 
rapid regeneration of export earnings. Spending was also based on the assumption that 
credit would flow to smallholders and expand the rural sector generally. 
 
State and international agency policy was directed towards reducing estate industry 
costs and increasing labour productivity. To reduce labour costs, the World Bank 
promoted the ‘retrenchment of labour… (through)… improved management 
practices’ (Stoler, 1985:166). Between 1965 and 1968 the estate workforce was 
reduced by 34 per cent, and to less than half of the 1965 workforce by 1974 (Stoler, 
1985:165, 6). That this was not the result of a downturn in demand or output is shown 
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by the strong increase in rural commodity exports (44 per cent in rubber) and in 
replantings over the same period (Stoler, 1985:165).  
 
Capital intensification, technological innovation and labour reorganisation were 
employed to reduce labour and increase output. Thus, for example, the introduction of 
chemical weeding by the Belgian-Indonesian joint venture, SOCFINDO, enabled the 
company to reduce the number of workers per hectare by up to 60 per cent (Stoler, 
1985:167). This process was reinforced by the general trend to shift production from 
labour intensive crops, operations, and cultivations. There was a shift from rubber to 
palm-oil production, and the replacement of permanent with temporary labour. A 
report by the Indonesian Department of Agriculture showed that between 1972 and 
1976 the area allotted to palm oil cultivations increased by 25 per cent (with a similar 
decrease in rubber cultivation), but its production increased by 250 per cent (Stoler, 
1985:167).  Oil palm provided a quicker return on investment, and has the lowest 
labour intensity of any crop. Its harvesting operations are simpler, leading to the 
replacement of skilled, permanent staff with casual unskilled and lower paid workers.  
 
Government reports show that temporary plantation workers increased from 10 per 
cent to 29 per cent of the total government estate workforce between 1973 and 1976 
(Stoler, 1985:168). Stoler considers this a ‘highly conservative’ figure and provides 
evidence to show that temporary workers constituted more than half the workforce on 
private estates, leading to a reduction of labour costs by up to 70 per cent (Stoler, 
1985:168). 
 
Lower paid, temporary workers were drawn from the villages around the estates and 
recruited and managed by labour contractors (pemborong). Workers are responsible to 
these contractors, who pay their wages. The employment relation having moved from 
the estate to the sub-contractor, the estates denied responsibility for temporary 
workers’ housing, family support, terms or conditions of employment or any 
disabilities resulting from their employment. State employment standards such as 
minimum age or pregnancy leave have not applied for casual employees (Stoler, 
1985:170). Whilst there was great difficulty in obtaining information on under-age 
employment, Stoler points to a sharp decline in estate-area school attendance from the 
mid-1970s, and quotes Tempo magazine’s 1977 evidence showing that the US 
 215
Uniroyal estates employed children ranging from the age of 7 to 12 (Stoler, 
1985:171). 
 
The changes in the estate sector were symptomatic of the extensive and systematic 
pressures on work relations to transform rural labour into wageworkers. The state had 
the clear objective of increasing productivity by replacing socially organised 
production relationships with expanded employer control over the workforce.  
International agencies apparently had the same objectives but employed orthodox 
economic rationalisations to support labour commodification. Evidence of their 
motivation is seen in the agencies’ pressure to replace traditional forms of ‘in kind’ 
payments with wages. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) contended that 
the traditional ‘needs-based’ form of exchange was an ‘inefficient use of labour 
restricting the free flow of market forces,’ and thus the expansion of the capitalist 
sector. The economy ‘requires a free and available labour force, unfettered by what is 
essentially a pre-capitalist wage system’. In short, the wage system must be  
"relieved" of its social policy functions to maximise economic development (Short, 
1977:221) The consequent public and private estate replacement of all ‘in kind’ 
payments with wage-payments consolidated the decline in the share of the surplus to 
rural communities arising from specialisation, casualisation, and job losses.  
 
The overall effect of these changes was to reduce wage-costs and shares of the surplus 
previously available to the village community, to women, and to families. An IBRD 
evaluation of the impact of its loans on North Sumatra estates showed a decline in 
estate worker’s hourly real wage (Stoler, 1985:171). 
 
The ability to impose cost savings by rejecting or bypassing previous employment 
standards and by employing casual labour epitomised the way in which the estate 
sector benefited from the state destruction of systems of industrial representation, and 
its representatives. Thus the new political environment removed the industrial 
resistance that had prevented casualisation prior to the coup, and ensured that there 
would be little opposition to the estate’s campaigns to increase productivity per 
worker at reduced costs. The consequent growth in unemployment became an 
additional powerful mechanism for inhibiting opposition and restraining wage costs, 
and an important source of industrial labour. 
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Developmentalism in the small-holder sector 
The state’s regime of production ‘discipline’ applied in the mass-based smallholder 
production sector as it did in the estate sector, but with the difference that the state 
had to shape its policies to reflect the situation of largely village-community and 
smallholder production.  In this context the state’s imperative was to create price 
stabilisation and self-sufficiency of food supplies from the largely depressed food 
crop economy. To this end technocrats, supported by foreign corporations, applied the 
technocratic developmentalist solutions of capital intensification, technological 
change, and labour-commodification to increase labour productivity. As with much of 
the urban developmentalist agenda, however, the notion that productivity goals could 
be achieved by allowing the market to regulate economic organisation was largely 
overridden – at least for the production process– by administrative enforcement of the 
new policies. Rudner argues that there was a clear technocrat/military appreciation 
that demographic considerations and rural attitudes prevented the effective use of the 
market to adequately generate strong productivity advances in the rural sector 
(Schiffrin, 1976:211).  
 
The primary consideration was to remove production ‘inefficiencies’ perceived to be 
endemic in traditional systems of village production, especially in cultivating and 
harvesting. The traditional system of village cropping and cultivation included all 
able-bodied members of the community who received a share, generally a ninth, of 
the surplus from the crop. State planners determined to replace these village systems 
of production organisation with market systems of labour regulation. The state 
introduced the tebasan system whereby the crop was sold to a trader before it was 
harvested. This expanded the farmer’s control over the work by enabling the paid 
employment of a team of skilled harvesters to do the harvesting.  This increased 
productivity per worker, and increased returns for the farmer. This accounts for the 
early 1970s spread in this sector of what Manning refers to as ‘discriminatory’ or 
‘exclusionary’ labour contracts which discriminated in favour of small, often better-
off, groups of wage workers in rice farming (Manning, 1993:54). Other components 
of this change included ‘sharecropping, land-labour interlinkages binding labourers to 
landowners in the wet season through the offer of sharecropping rights in the more 
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risky dry season, and labour-credit linkages tying labourers through indebtedness’ 
(Manning, 1993:54). 
 
The overall effect of the tebasan system on the peasantry was to reduce the share of 
surplus available to villagers, and remove the share that had been available to those 
without alternative sources of income or subsistence production. Palmer shows that as 
a consequence, women and those not generally employed in harvesting after the 
change were worse-off (Palmer, 1978:90). This led to a decline in income and 
employment in villages that consolidated the pressures forcing the rural workforce to 
seek industrial employment. 
  
The spread of labour commodification to regions where traditional rural production 
and distribution systems had previously prevailed, served both to facilitate and expand 
the supply of wage labour. As well, the commodification of labour forced an 
increasing body of the rural population to rely on wage-relations to survive.   
 
The program of capital intensification in the food-crop sector was achieved with 
direct state support for technological advances, through foreign corporate investment 
of capital goods.  Government credit policies enabled the replacement of traditional 
hand-pounding methods of rice manufacture with new small village rice mills. The 
introduction of mechanical rice-hullers increased worker productivity but reduced 
employment for village women. The technology is estimated to have eliminated 125 
million days of wage-labour previously open to women on Java (Higgott and 
Robison, 1985:135). Thus whilst in 1971 about 80 per cent of Java’s rice crop was 
hand-pounded, this had dropped to between 10 and 50 per cent by 1973 (Palmer, 
1978:90). Warren refers to the ‘well documented labour displacement effects of 
mechanical rice hullers and tractor-tillers’ and quotes Sinaga: ‘[o]ne tractor in normal 
use… replaces 2,210 man-days of human labour per year if replacing cultivation by 
hoe, or 650 man-days per year if replacing a combination of plough and hoe. This 
represents a potential shift of more than Rp. 1 million per tractor per year away from 
the pockets of labourers.’ (Warren, 1985:135)  
 
Rudner sees a major objective of the military elite’s ‘predilection for closely-
governed, ideologically-neutral, technical policies of modernisation’ was to provide 
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‘cheap rice for official consumption’. Agricultural policy was ‘turned into an 
instrument of the military and civil establishments’ to serve its needs and interests… 
with considerable agricultural resources transferred to the government, especially the 
military’ (Schiffrin, 1976:212) This created increasingly retrogressive social 
allocations of income and land, with benefits tending to accrue to the wealthier 
farmers (Schiffrin, 1976:212). Overall the process created a ‘growing rural inequality, 
with poorer peasants suffering unemployment, a decline in real incomes, increasing 
debt-bondage and worsening conditions of land tenure’ (Schiffrin, 1976:213). 
 
Green Revolution 
The state-engendered rural program to support the regime through the expansion of 
the rural surplus was dwarfed by the capital inputs provided by foreign aid and 
investment. The most pervasive was the ‘Green Revolution’ developmentalist 
program providing aid and investment for new technology such as high yielding 
varieties of rice, pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers and improved irrigation. The aim 
was to force food production to outstrip the increase in population, with the surplus 
providing a base for indigenous capital accumulation and supporting the relocation of 
labour from agriculture to industry. At the same time, it was believed a rise in farm 
income associated with a wider availability of consumer products would encourage 
individual incentive and ‘unlock’ the peasant from subsistence to profit-oriented 
farming (Warren, 1985:133).  
 
In 1968 the Green Revolution program was adopted in Indonesia to intensify rice 
cultivations by enforcing the introduction of fixed input packages. These packages 
were developed by international companies such as ICI and paid for with ‘in kind’ 
contributions from the surplus production.  Inputs were delivered through the 
Government’s Bimas Gotong-Royong agricultural development program (Robison, 
1986:253). Farmers were obliged to provide fixed procurements of paddy on a per 
hectare basis as repayment, and in 1969 this was fixed at one sixth of a presumed 
local average yield.  
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Impacts of state/corporate developmental programs 
There were three major impacts of state and foreign aid and investment rural 
developmentalist programs on accumulation systems. They advanced the business 
connections of state-corporate interests arising from the expanded foreign investment 
in the rural sector, they developed the rural corporate elite’s capital base; and they 
precipitated a shift of rural labour to industrial employment. A brief description of 
costs of these programs serves to indicate their implicit economic priorities and re-
distributive effects. In the first instance, the ability of a farmer to gain from the inputs 
depended on the relative skills in making the best use of the packages, on the differing 
quality of land, and the overall relative ability to achieve the stipulated increase in 
yield (Palmer, 1978:83).  This created a differential access to the resources, finance, 
credit and infrastructural requirements necessary for the High Yielding Varieties 
(HYV) of rice to succeed. More powerful farmers gained privileged access to the best 
of government services. Farms below a certain size had difficulty in becoming viable 
under the new technology. The peasant with a very small holding usually had no 
access to the new technology. In Java and Bali it is estimated that more than half of 
the rural families were unable to subsist on the output from their own fields (Warren, 
1985:134).  Warren argues that it was these people who were most disadvantaged by 
the capitalisation of agriculture with their earlier heavy reliance on village 
redistributive practices and customary rights for the distribution of the village surplus 
(Warren, 1985:134).  
 
Overall these programs served to consolidate the wealth and influence of farmers able 
to utilise them. Further, these farmers consolidated their advantage by investing the 
agricultural profits into capital intensive, high return, trading, money lending and 
secondary production investment, such as rice hulling equipment (Hill, 1994:287,8). 
Thus the programs expanded the rural surplus but displaced the landless and poor 
from the rural sector. The proportion of agricultural workers in the national labour 
force declined from 74 per cent to 51 per cent between 1961 and 1990 (Manning, 
1993:67).  This impelled the movement of labour into industrial employment. 
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Agriculture-sector related industrialisation 
The ruling regime moved to support the production and appropriation of an 
agricultural surplus by providing protectionist, and monetary/fiscal subsidies to build 
the rural sector’s industrial manufacturing and service base (Schiffrin, 1976:213). The 
state restricted foreign investment in this sector and in associated commercial 
industries, such as trade, finance, construction and distribution (Schiffrin, 1976:215). 
The Ministry of Trade endorsed state-corporate enterprise’s setting up of cartels and 
syndicates to control trade in traditional commodity exports, and main imports. The 
infrastructure supporting this urban industrialisation was largely built by unpaid 
village labour (‘gotong royong’). Political prisoners were frequently forced to work 
on road construction and other public works (Schiffrin, 1976:215). The savings 
gained by employing this cheap or unpaid labour went towards the cost of public 
utilities, largely electric power (Schiffrin, 1976:215). Returns to manufacturing 
owners were subsidised by the state, and the foreign aid-supported development of 
infrastructure supported the energy needs of these companies. The state imperative to 
advantage indigenous investors appears to have been designed to maximise the flow-
on potential to state-corporate enterprise of foreign aid and investment in the rural 
sector. Importantly, the military emerged as the prime beneficiary of these 
industrialisation policies (Schiffrin, 1976:217). 
 
The rentier-state under attack 
Indonesia’s re-engagement with the world economic system served both to 
consolidate the military-corporate political and economic power of the state, and to 
generate substantial wealth for foreign extractors of Indonesia’s wealth. The control, 
appropriation, and distribution of the surplus fed the popular disenchantment with the 
corruption and cronyism of the Soeharto regime. The President of the University of 
Indonesia Students’ council condemned the state’s ‘expropriation of land, forced sales 
of rice to the government (creating an) increasingly difficult life in the villages’ 
(Palmer, 1978:153). A student Petition (The 24th October Petition) called on the 
‘Military Government, Intellectuals, Technocrats and Politicians to review their 
development strategy to remove inequalities, free the people from corruption and 
abuses, and strengthen representative institutions’ (McDonald, 1980:136).   
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The primary target for public antagonism was, however, foreign, chiefly Japanese, 
corporate intervention in the Indonesian economy.  The state was believed to be 
working with foreign investors to impose a form of neo-colonial political and 
economic domination for the extraction of Indonesia’s wealth. The most common 
targets of public anger were the presidential advisers benefiting from foreign 
investment (the cukong), the cronies and relatives of those in power, Chinese brokers 
to the military elite, and foreign investors. A series of riots, student and press criticism 
of economic policy began in 1973, and culminated in the January 1974 Malari Affair. 
There was unambiguous evidence of Japanese economic involvement and control: 
Japanese investment was concentrated in ten giant keiretsu with involvement in most 
sectors of the Indonesian economy (Palmer, 1978:161). Thus between 1967 and 1974 
Mitsui invested the equivalent of more than a quarter of all foreign investment 
approvals, utilising Japanese banking, shipping and insurance agencies in Indonesia to 
carry out the investments. The Japanese effectively controlled the demand for goods 
in key sectors of the export market (Palmer, 1978:160). Japanese moves to dominate 
shipbuilding and the management of the inter-island fleet was clearly intended to 
provide a greater opportunity for Japanese corporations to dominate the Indonesian 
export market in an economy largely dependent on sea-transport for international 
trade.  
 
The strength of Japanese economic dominance triggered popular indigenous business’ 
outrage at the discriminatory allocation of business opportunity by Kadin and state-
IGGI through aid and investment agreements. As public antagonism increased, a 
January 1974 visit of the Japanese Prime Minister generated the Malari (Malapetaka 
Limabelas Januari the 15th January disaster) mass demonstrations in Jakarta and 
attacks on Japanese corporate offices, Japanese cars and shopping centres. The 
government forced the closure of critical newspapers and journals and jailed many of 
its critics (McDonald, 1980:138).  
 
The Malari Affair represented another major turning-point in Indonesia’s political and 
economic development. Most importantly it encouraged the state to improve 
opportunities for indigenous capital accumulation, and it led to a greater state 
determination to ‘indigenise’ a greater share of the capital development arising from 
foreign investment.  
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Oil and the transformation from rentier to capitalist-state 
The government’s greater preparedness to accommodate some of the political and 
economic concerns of its constituency did not represent any shift from its 
accumulation agenda, and thus of the regulation systems supporting that agenda. 
Whilst the pledges given to the economic nationalists required additional finances, 
these were made possible by a fortuitous influx of revenues from the 1973/4 
international oil price rises. In fact, these revenues enabled the state to consolidate its 
political and economic power vis-à-vis foreign state and corporate interests, by 
allowing it to be less reliant on aid and low-wage manufacturing exports. Robison 
contends that the oil earnings and revenues served to consolidate the ‘power of the 
state and its officials, the process of industrialisation and the emergence of major 
domestic corporate groups’ (Robison, 1990:101)  
 
The support for indigenous investment incorporated firmer controls over the 
investment activities of foreign corporations, the allocation of licences for state-
nominated indigenous corporate monopolisation over production and distribution, and 
the tightening of the system of labour regulation. The application of ‘stringent 
requirements on foreign investors’ led to the expansion of indigenous entrepreneurial 
activity, and a relative decline in foreign dominance of the food, import and domestic 
distribution, logging, plywood and cement production industries (Robison, 1987:145).  
The state imposed controls on the access to technology and capital intensive sectors 
where domestic capital needed foreign technology, organisation, and skills. That these 
expanded opportunities represented a consolidation of the corporate-state rather than 
indigenous enterprise generally, is evidenced by the Government granting of 
monopoly privileges, concessions, licenses, and credit to political patrons.  
 
The state’s determination to retain and extend its control over the production process 
and labour is shown by official declaration that government was not ‘particularly 
concerned’ about aid-donors’ political pressure to relax labour controls (Manning, 
1993:74).  The political and economic autonomy enabled by the oil revenues, and the 
high level of unemployment in the mid to late 1970s, created the conditions for the 
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state to impose even greater labour controls, such as by imposing central control over 
wages and through the mass dismissals of striking workers (Manning, 1993:74).  
 
New engagement with international capital  
The state’s ability to shape national economic policy was dependent on maintaining 
an adequate supply of income from the exchange of Indonesia’s commodities on 
world markets.  With the evaporation of this supply following the mid-1980s oil price 
collapse and a general world recession the state strategy of creating an integrated 
industrial base of consumer and capital goods supporting the interests of the state 
bureaucrats and corporate groups was under threat (Robison, 1990:101). A November 
1982 US Embassy report noted that Indonesia had gone from a current account 
surplus of nearly $500 million to a deficit of more than $7 billion in two years 
(Utrecht, 1987:193). The IMF, IBRD, and aid-donor countries were again in a strong 
position to pressure the New Order state to reduce protection and open access to 
Indonesia’s resources. The IBRD argued that the subsidised and protected economy 
created an inefficient and uncompetitive manufacturing sector ‘that was unable to 
constitute an alternative sources of export earnings’ (Robison, 1987:386). More 
importantly in terms of the impact of the re-engagement with international capital on 
systems of labour regulation, the World Bank urged ‘that the Indonesian economy be 
allowed to respond to the free operation of the international division of labour’ 
(Robison, 1990:108). 
 
In response to this pressure, the government devalued the currency by 27.6 per cent to 
expand non-oil exports (Robison, 1990:109).  It reduced government spending, 
subsidies to basic food and fuel, and shelved public project investments. Further, it 
reduced the number of import monopolies and allowed downstream7 producers to 
independently import capital goods needed for export production. It provided 
concessions for foreign investors, lowered tariffs, relaxed existing limits to foreign 
equity, and cut corporate tax and protection for indigenous business. 
 
                                                 
7 ‘Downstream’ (‘Industri Hilir’)  is manufactured goods:electronics, consumer goods, and footwear. ‘Upstream’ 
(‘Industri Hulu’) is chemical steel, heavy industries, goods and some manufactured goods. Television and 
communications are also regarded as hulu. As President, Soeharto expressed his ‘preference’ for continued protectionist 
policy supporting upstream industry, which formed the bulk of Soeharto conglomerate capital (Jakarta Post, 26 
December 1994). 
 224
The state’s program of expanded opportunities for international investors appealed to 
international investment of markedly different character to that previously seeking to 
extract a surplus from Indonesian production. Winters refers to the growing 
international power of ‘mobile’ investment funds dedicated towards manufacturing 
consumer goods in low-wage countries (Winters, 1996:190). Robison makes a further 
reference to the pressures to shift Indonesia’s industrialisation emphasis from import 
substitution to export-orientation, with Indonesia forced to accomplish ‘a greater 
integration with the new international division of labour’ (Robison, 1990:101). 
 
In more specific terms, mobile international capital’s primary objective was to exploit 
Indonesian-state support for access to the prime production factor for wealth 
appropriation: a cheap and rigidly controlled workforce. Foreign investors were 
seeking competitive low-wage opportunities, especially given recent wage rises and 
growing industrial activism in the NICs. The systems of labour control developed by 
the New Order had created an ideal industrial basis on which to construct the export-
orientated light-manufacturing industrial development envisaged by mobile capital 
and the IMF.  
 
The New Order accommodated the imperatives of the international institutions, with 
the proviso that new foreign investment was to be primarily towards expanding 
downstream production, and with the usual caveats to provide a share of the surplus 
as rent and patronage to state and crony companies. On this basis the government 
supported the World Bank’s loan condition to introduce a ‘structural adjustment 
program’ facilitating the shift of rural labour to supply urban industrialisation 
(Lambert and Casperz, 1995:577). The World Bank justified this shift in terms of the 
conventional economic rationale of comparative advantage arguing that the low 
export earning potential of agricultural labour was an inefficient use of Indonesia’s 
comparatively advantageous factor ‘endowment’ of cheap labour.  Export earnings 
would increase by shifting rural labour to efficient and productive work in ‘modern’ 
sector manufacturing factories (Sjahir, 1993:25). This logic became part of the New 
Order regime’s campaign to expand foreign investment by promoting Indonesia’s 
comparative advantage of cheap, docile labour in the manufacturing sector (Winters, 
1996:64).  
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The state’s tight regulation of labour supply and workplace-discipline led to a massive 
influx of foreign investment funds. There was an increase of gross private, primarily 
downstream, investment from Rp. 571 billion in 1975-76, to Rp. 5,584 billion in 
1980-1981 (Robison, 1990:149).  From 1965 until 1991 Indonesia’s manufacturing 
industry grew at the rapid pace of 12.5 per cent annually (Hill, 1994:78). This 
represented a major shift in Indonesia’s system of labour organisation, especially 
through a proletatarianisation of the workforce.  
 
The corporatist-state retained dominance over protected, large primarily upstream 
conglomerate enterprise, and export-orientated new foreign investment was 
concentrated in the labour-intensive low-wage export-orientated light manufacturing 
industries such as textiles, garments, and footwear. The influx of manufacturing 
investment was largely sourced in the Newly Industrialised countries of Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and South Korea. This was largely labour-intensive, export-orientated 
industry such as footwear, clothing, electronics, toys and agri-business (Schwarz, 
1994:258). 
 
The continuing protectionist support for upstream, largely family and patrimonial, 
corporate control has remained a thorn in the side of downstream investors. They have 
argued that this protection and corruption imposes extra costs on inputs, limits 
competitive investment opportunity, and – through Kadin – prevents downstream 
access to the ‘select circle’ of dominant capital interests (Robison, 1990:149, 150). 
Nevertheless upstream entrepreneurs promote the continued application of 
protectionist measures ‘as long as it is necessary to benefit the country’ (Jakarta Post, 
6th January, 1995).  
 
Thus, overall, the influx of foreign investment, rather than threatening the 
independence of the Soeharto patrimonial system of corporate ownership entrenched 
and extended its capital base. The government sought to represent these as being in 
the national interest, justifying the selective application of economic nationalism.  
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From comprador-rentier to capitalist state  
The New Order’s corporate-state power base did not suffer from the oil price collapse. 
It used the opportunity to reconstruct its accumulation processes to build on the 
capital consolidation enabled by the oil boom and decades of rent from foreign 
extraction investment. These factors and the patronage relation with foreign 
manufacturing companies ensured that the corporate-state was now solidly entrenched 
as the dominant element of the capitalist class. This economic power was 
consolidated within the family conglomerates through legislation requiring wealthy 
Indonesians to invest in ‘family-based companies or international corporations’, with 
the latter obliged to take on a proportion of indigenous capital ownership (Robison, 
1986:349). The dominant political grouping included the politico-bureaucrat 
controllers of the state apparatus, an upper bourgeoisie of major domestic client 
corporate groups, and the international corporate capital interests integral to the state’s 
industrial strategy. 
 
Robison’s 1984-5 interviews with HIPNI (Young Businessmen's Association of 
Indonesia) entrepreneurs support the argument that the resource rent and extractive 
industry ownership by the military-corporate-state enabled the long-term 
entrenchment of that class power. The contemporary generation of young rich and 
influential indigenous capitalists are the progeny of prominent Indonesian families 
who built their corporate ownership on Pertamina oil-wealth. According to Robison’s 
HIPNI sources, ‘the power and resources to launch indigenous Indonesians into 
business on a competitive basis was in the hands of no more than half a dozen 
individuals, including the President and one or two of his closest advisers (probably 
Metope and Hemaden), the Governor of Jakarta, and the President Director of 
Pertamina. With these few men rested the power to give contracts for supply and 
construction, directorships, and even to provide finance’ (Robison, 1986:356). 
Robison contends that the HIPNI entrepreneurs were quite open in their affirmation of 
the importance of political patronage to private capital accumulation (Robison, 
1986:356).  
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Conclusion 
The 1965 military coup signalled the demolition of the post-war political interregnum 
that had allowed a political voice for labour and the peasantry. The state-initiated 
pogroms against labour/ peasantry’ class organisations removed all opposition to the 
capitalist class’ domination of the apparatus and machinery of production control and 
appropriation.  
 
The coup was the culmination of foreign and local corporate political and economic 
campaigns to gain control over the apparatus of the state to establish absolute control 
over the production and distribution of a national surplus.  It enabled unfettered state-
control over labour and the peasantry as a productive resource.   This was the key 
condition for the return of foreign investment. The state’s repression of labour and the 
peasantry thus underpinned the achievement of the Indonesia ruling elite’s ambition 
to re-engage with the international capitalist system. This prefaced the transformation 
of state-corporate accumulation from a system primarily dependent on rentier income 
to an increasingly industrial capitalist-based regime. 
 
In the competition between national capital and indigenous interests lay the elements 
of conflict. This conflict is seen to facilitate competitive bidding by the Soeharto 
regime, especially between Japan and the US, allowing the Indonesian corporate-state 
to consolidate its interests. These state initiatives created significant corporate 
linkages and income flows for international and Soeharto crony enterprises. However, 
this chapter has described the more substantial corporate opportunities accruing from 
the Indonesian state’s selective provision of corporate access to, and control over, 
Indonesia’s productive resources, especially the supply and disciplining of labour. 
This highlighting of the necessity to understand the organisation of capital alongside 
the organisation of labour has provided a critical counterpoint to the literature 
emphasising entrepreneurial initiative as the primary basis of wealth generation. 
 
The re-engagement with international capital was underpinned by the strongly 
enforced infrastructure of social and industrial controls. This social/industrial 
regulatory regime incorporated the concept of development (pembangunan) as 
justifying rigorous controls over society and the workplace. This concept worked to 
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the extent that the ruling regime was able to create national income, and allow the 
‘trickle down’ of a proportion of the surplus to advance the interests, primarily of the 
middle class, but, in terms of the important function of maintaining a peaceful 
political and industrial system, the working class and peasantry.  
 
An intrinsic component of the state’s national economic project was the introduction 
of developmentalist logic and regulatory systems into the smallholder and plantation 
sectors. In the former this change was intended to provide a means of creating a rural 
surplus, to expand production to feed the population, to transform production relations 
to build a rural system of corporate organisation and capitalisation, and to enforce the 
movement of the resulting excess rural labour into the developing manufacturing 
sector. This allowed the Indonesian economy to gain advantage from international 
capital’s demand for low-cost labour to work in the burgeoning consumer goods 
manufacturing industries.  
 
The New Order state entrenchment was consolidated by the oil-boom and could 
survive the post-oil boom return to a dependency on foreign capital investment and 
aid. This ‘dependency’ was, however, contingent on the ability of the state to 
determine the allocation of the spending into the new international economic order 
without jeopardising its existing patrimonial corporate interests. With the post-boom 
re-engagement of the Indonesian economy into the international political economic 
system, patrimonial state rentier interests were transformed from parasitical ‘rent 
extractors’ to become Indonesia’s first dominant indigenous bourgeois political and 
economic power. It was this re-engagement, however, that sowed the seeds for a 
developing challenge to the system of regulation that supported this new bourgeoisie.   
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
By chronicling the driving forces defining the material basis of Indonesian society and 
structural transformations to this base over time, I have argued that the single most 
important factor determining what Indonesians produce and how they produce it has 
been the surplus appropriation ambitions of the respective ruling regime.  I have 
emphasised that the defining characteristic of the economy for the different colonial 
and postcolonial regimes was the manner in which the regulation of labour for surplus 
appropriation was organised.  The prime focus of my research has thus been on 
elucidating and analysing the developing politico-economic structures and institutions 
imposed by succeeding state regimes as the instruments for ordering capital and 
labour for wealth extraction from Indonesia. These structures and institutions were 
seen as embedded in the mode of production as the historical environment defining 
dominant forms of economic organisation.   
 
This conceptualisation of labour as the key force in wealth-creation and the state as 
‘enforcer’ of surplus production and appropriation illuminated a fundamental 
difference between this research and much of the literature on Indonesia’s 
development.  Whilst the literature generally accounts for the crucial role of the state 
in establishing the fundamentals for economic development, it rarely takes account of 
the state’s labour-regulatory role or of labour’s pivotal role in surplus production.  
Thus, for example, Robison’s seminal text The Rise of Capital in Indonesia makes no 
reference to labour’s role in the ‘rise’ of capital (Robison, 1986).  By contrast, Hadiz 
acknowledge labour’s input as a technical factor of production but not as a core 
element in wealth-generation (Hadiz, 1997).  This essential denial of a class relation 
between labour and capital constitutes the core difference between the central thesis 
of this study and the orthodox conceptualisations of the sources of wealth and 
character of the dominant economic order.   
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The alternative perspective of this thesis not only provided an appreciation of labour’s 
economic role in surplus generation, but also deepened the understanding of the 
political processes underpinning Indonesia’s economic development. Labour was seen 
as playing a key role, not only as chief protagonist in the struggle against surplus 
appropriation by the ruling regime, but – as a corollary – in the collective organisation 
to challenge regulatory systems and with its broader political participation in broader 
social struggles against exploitation and oppression. This conception made for a more 
critical appreciation of the sources of tension in the Indonesian body politic, 
especially of the periodic political upheavals against ruling regimes.    
 
This study of succeeding systems of labour-regulation has shown a strong link 
between production and regulation.  It has also highlighted Indonesia’s engagement 
with the world economy, an engagement that led to the evolution and systemic shift in 
what Indonesians have produced and how they have produced it.  The research 
outlined the development of regulatory systems from traditional hierarchical tributory 
relations to contemporary-state regulatory regimes. These developments, it has been 
argued, were closely related to the commodification of labour, and, with Indonesia’s 
engagement in the world economy, a consequent dependency on labour, export, and 
consumer-good markets.  
 
These conceptual themes have contributed to illuminating the way in which 
Indonesia’s productive apparatus has developed, the character of regulatory systems 
underpinning surplus production and appropriation, and the sources of tension and 
rupture that undermined successive ruling regimes.  
 
The study analysed the political economy of Indonesia in terms of discrete eras of 
production organisation and appropriation with the object of charting how succeeding 
regimes regulated the population to extract wealth from the country. Whilst it is 
acknowledged that the respective eras incorporated several forms of production 
organisation, the analysis concentrated on the dominant forms of production 
associated with profound shifts in the system of appropriation arising from 
Indonesia’s historically developing engagement with the international economy.   The 
thesis charted the common forces that emerged from each regime to define a 
particular form of labour control and its dynamic.  Each particular regime’s decline 
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was marked by a major rupture that set in train a new regulatory regime.  These 
ruptures have been characterised as ‘Sequences of Crises’ (Yasunaka, 1978), arising 
from haphazard circumstance or accident. This research showed they were not 
accidental but symptomatic of struggles to control the wealth-generating system, that 
is the system of production organisation and appropriation.  
 
The eras 
The Dutch corporate seizure of the highly valued Indonesian spice-trade from their 
many European and Asian competitors marked Indonesia’s initiation into the 
European imperialist arena. More specifically, this drew Indonesia into the socio-
economic framework of the dominant European mode of production that had spawned 
long-distance trade. The VOC’s utilisation of the local elite to facilitate the extraction 
of a surplus from traditional tribute-producing systems was a function of the character 
of Dutch metropolitan commercial and production organisation. Holland’s significant 
industrial strength not only determined a powerful international corporate presence of 
the joint-stock company, but also determined that the VOC gradually translated its 
trade-presence into political rule and territorial occupation by relating to the 
Indonesian economic environment in terms of business imperatives rather than 
expanding territorial control through imperialist conquest.  
 
This both defined the difference between the Dutch enterprise and its European 
mercantile competitors and the subsequent forms of economic intervention and 
production regulation. The bringing of European economic forms to Indonesia 
translated into a ‘hands free’ production relation between the peasantry as surplus-
producers and the Dutch corporate representatives. This precluded a need for the 
VOC to outlay resources to obtain forced labour, or to expend resources on territorial 
conquest and labour-management.  This understanding of the early stages of Dutch 
economic penetration formed an important defining-moment on which was built a 
conceptual understanding of the overall power-relations through which the Dutch 
colonial regime extracted wealth from Indonesia.   
 
Stresses and changes in the mode of production were seen as reflected in an 
expanding Dutch colonial state intervention accompanied by a shift to more liberal 
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forms of production organisation. The VOC’s late 18th Century inability to retain 
commercial viability led to Indonesia’s takeover as a production entity by the Dutch 
metropolitan state.  The brisk winds of competitive capitalism and an increasing 
dominance of the ideology of economic liberalism had determined a shift in state 
policy towards direct production and appropriation relations between Indonesian 
producers and the colonial authorities. The history thus affirms a connection between 
shifts in the mode of production and the forms of production regulation applied in the 
periphery.   
 
Establishing the foundations for expanded capital 
accumulation  
I have characterised the Cultivation System as an agency for establishing the 
conditions for the rise of capitalist production relations through the widespread 
entrenchment of a repressive state apparatus. This formed the production-regulation 
basis for the massive profits of the Corporate Plantation system. The Cultivation 
System thus provided the regulatory framework within which vast areas of Java’s 
arable land were converted from subsistence to world-market crop production. The 
inability of liberal reformist policies to generate sufficient income for the centre 
indicated that Indonesia’s social, political and economic system was not ready for 
transformation to a market economy.   
 
This is affirmed by those economic histories showing an appreciation of the 
Cultivation System as a stage in Indonesia’s economic development.  Thus Booth 
argues that as ‘a cost-effective and ample labour supply was a prime requisite to 
export oriented cultivations [and as] control over [Indonesian] labour ... was difficult 
to manage and exploit’, it was necessary to impose a severe labour-regulatory system 
to enforce that supply.  Severe labour coercion was thus vital for Indonesian economic 
development, as it drew ‘many millions of Indonesians into increasing dependence on 
the world economy for their livelihood’ thus enabling a ‘closer engagement in the 
world economy’ and (implicitly) national economic development (Booth, 1990:274). 
This affirms the logic firstly that the Cultivation System established the conditions for 
capital accumulation, and that labour-regulation was a prime consideration in this 
establishment.  
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It also conforms to a central theme of this research of the priority of ordering labour 
for the production and extraction of a surplus.  The den Bosch regime sought to 
maximise production and surplus extraction by regulating and disciplining labour as a 
class. Further, by establishing this state apparatus of class control the Cultivation 
System supported the subsequent successful penetration of private corporate 
investment in Indonesia. We recall that it was the lack of this fundamental condition 
that precluded private accumulation under the early 19th Century colonial regimes.  
 
Having imposed this regulatory infrastructure the state moved to open its surplus 
extraction operation to private investors. Whilst the Cultivation System created the 
opportunity for private corporate accumulation there were continuing restraints to its 
accomplishment.  Labour and land had to be ‘liberated’ from the institutional 
constraints of village community systems and state-control.  The role of the state in 
facilitating this transformation, especially through the 1870 Land Act, and labour with 
the shift to plantation production and state-enforcement of work-contracts was 
examined in Chapter 3. These state-engendered institutional changes freed labour 
from the village support base, and land from crown or traditional collective 
ownership.   
 
Capitalist production and financial organisation  
The shift from a largely state-owned and smallholder system of export-crop 
production toligopolist regulation led to a massive influx of capital and the conversion 
of small estates into metropolitan-controlled combines. The Corporate Plantation 
system marked the final transition from mercantilist production organisation and 
labour regulation to capitalist wage-relations and market regulation.  
 
The Corporate Plantation regime’s underpinning of a system of exploitation secured 
through uncontrolled factor commodification undermined Indonesian villages’ 
institutional subsistence and defence systems. This led not only to marked declines in 
standards of living but the erosion of the basis of social organisation.  As Polanyi 
affirms: ‘to allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human 
beings and natural environment [results in the] demolition of society. Robbed of the 
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protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish…No society 
could stand [these effects] unless its human and natural substance… was protected 
against the ravages of this satanic mill’ (Polanyi, 1996:27).   
 
The analysis highlights how the state moved to underpin accumulation and 
appropriation by incorporating devices to strengthen the infrastructural basis of social 
organisation, by transferring political control to the periphery and by expanding 
indigenous participation in administration. The ‘welfarist’ Ethical state rationalised 
colonial rule as a decentralised, independent regime. Intentionally or not, the ethos 
provided a moral challenge to the growing republican-nationalist movement’s 
independence ambitions. The state ethos of ‘mutual responsibility and mutual interest’ 
in the running of the country, and by implication in the sharing of the wealth from the 
country, became the dominant ideology.  
 
The state and class control 
The notion of the state as an administrative apparatus forms part of the general 
critique of a class-power understanding of the role of the state. Thus Anderson and 
Benda have characterised the Ethical state as an apolitical, independent and 
representative institution concerned primarily with administrative efficiency (Gordon, 
1993:445).   This approach is contested in Chapter 4 where I have argued that the 
state retained its focus on production regulation to secure and maximise long-term 
wealth-generation from Indonesia. This again reflects the contradictions in 
understanding between the evidence that each colonial regime’s primary role was to 
regulate production to facilitate appropriation, and the assumption that the state could 
somehow be distanced from this colonial project.   
 
The proof of the falsity of the perception that the state did not play a labour-regulatory 
role on behalf of metropolitan corporate and state-power interests is demonstrated by 
evidence of the strict maintenance of the exclusionary system of surplus appropriation 
under the Ethical regime. Certainly the state allowed for an expansion in the numbers 
of Indonesians in the legislature and employed in (lower) levels of government 
administration. This expanded indigenous administrative opportunity did not, 
however, enable democratic representation in the colonial parliament. More 
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pertinently for this research, the reforms did not incorporate the breaking of 
exclusionary restrictions and western dominance of financial, production and 
distribution systems. Thus the essential underpinnings of colonial organisation were 
retained. 
 
The clearest support for the conceptual understanding of the colonial state as an 
agency and driving force for private capital accumulation can be noted in the 
consideration of the mass political opposition to colonial appropriation. The growing 
storm of civil unrest leading up to the Second World War was driven by mass-
opposition to foreign economic control.  The earliest indication that the unrest 
represented a challenge to the exclusionary system was evidenced in the indigenous 
bourgeoisie’s agenda to ‘break open’ Chinese monopoly constraints on indigenous 
business. The resulting political organisation spread like wildfire and expanded its 
small-business base to incorporate a national struggle against foreign political and 
economic domination.  
 
Whilst these conflicts between nationalists and the ruling regime are considered as 
forming the basis of a continuing post-colonial class conflict, I have also 
acknowledged that there is some opposition to the notion of a class-conception of the 
nationalist movement’s struggle for independence. A reluctance to embrace class is 
best exemplified in the argument advanced by Ingleson that the popular struggle 
against colonialism reflected race antagonism towards Dutch rule rather than class 
antagonism against exploitation and exclusionary power.  My reconsideration of the 
character of the political struggle, undertaken in Chapter 4, clearly shows, however, 
that the primary issue of contention was over the ownership and control of 
Indonesia’s system of wealth production and appropriation. Once political sovereignty 
was achieved, the fact of civil war and political confrontation is most sensibly 
explained in the terms of a continuing challenge to economic control. 
 
The Japanese interregnum 
The Japanese occupation of Indonesia established a ‘staging point’ for post-colonial 
regimes, demolishing exclusionary structures and precipitating the overthrow of 
foreign political control. The force of the Japanese regime, which, in one stroke, 
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broke Dutch state and class ties underpinning colonial appropriation, is examined in 
Chapter 5. Stripped of the mystique of Dutch colonial reformism, the analysis reveals 
Indonesia’s productive apparatus as a ‘workhorse’ for imperial needs.  The Japanese 
draining of resources from Indonesia, coupled with the romusha mobilisation, 
enhanced national motivation and ability to achieve post-war political and economic 
sovereignty.  
 
Summary of colonial appropriation 
Chapter 5’s analysis of the Japanese occupation saw their wartime presence, based as 
it was on the imperative to extract all Indonesian resources deemed necessary to 
support Japan’s industrialisation and the war effort, as epitomising the basis of all 
colonial rule. It can be argued that the rigours of Japanese rule represent a harsh 
caricature of the overall Dutch colonial era, especially that of the final liberal- 
reformist phase of colonial rule. Nevertheless there was a consistent colonial 
imperative of surplus appropriation that applied for all colonial regimes, whatever the 
relative degree and severity of extraction imposed. Further, the literature provides no 
substantial challenge to the argument that the prime objective of colonial rule, of 
whatever nationality or creed, was to extract Indonesia’s wealth for metropolitan 
interests.   
 
Having established the objectives and imperatives of colonial rule, I have investigated 
how colonial regimes accomplished wealth appropriation. This raises the question of 
what drives the system of Indonesian economic organisation, specifically the issue of 
what defines what Indonesians produce and how they produce it.  In the process of 
investigating the chronology of Indonesia’s production system consistently strong 
linkages are drawn between the colonial project and systems of production regulation.  
The thesis charts the way the Dutch consolidated trade-control by turning indigenous 
production towards producing a consistent supply of trade commodities. Clearly the 
major issue was not only to appropriate the current surplus of trade commodities, but 
also to convert indigenous production systems to an expanding supply of such 
commodities and away from traditional, subsistence production.  
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The links between the colonial objective and the regulation of production have been 
illuminated by my thesis’ major theme that labour is not simply another factor of 
production but rather a prime element of wealth production. The analysis of 
successive regimes of colonial appropriation has affirmed that the primary objective 
of colonial rule was to enforce the supply, regulation, and disciplining of an 
indigenous workforce.  The perception of labour’s pivotal role thus provides not only 
a deeper understanding of the way Indonesians were organised under colonialism, it 
explains the colonial state’s motive in enforcing a strict exclusionary distinction 
between political and economic opportunities available to Indonesians vis-à-vis 
Europeans.  
 
As the colonial state expanded and entrenched its administrative and coercive systems 
to enforce the production of world-market commodities throughout the archipelago, 
the colonial-extractive agenda moved to make Indonesian land and labour more 
accessible for private corporate investors by enforcing a greater supply of land and 
labour on commodity markets. At all stages in the development of the colonial project 
the state was crucial to the ordering of this colonial agenda, primarily through the 
regulation and disciplining of labour, but also through the reproduction of labour and 
the political control of society. 
 
Republican rule 
Following the Allied defeat of the Japanese, Indonesian nationalists fought a 
revolutionary war for political sovereignty. The nationalist forces were united in a 
confrontation with the forces of recolonisation, and the spectre of a new international 
system of economic imperialism led by the US. The world system conceptual 
approach employed in this research illuminated the post-war context of an 
international political and economic jostling between the old colonial powers and the 
US for corporate control over Indonesia’s resources and the re-establishment of a 
political and economic strategic presence in the region.   
 
Indonesians’ unity of national struggle against re-colonisation hid, however, serious 
divisions within the Republican movement concerning the ownership and control of 
Indonesia’s resources and its productive base. The ruling Republican regime 
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represented corporate interests determined to re-establish Indonesia as a production 
system for private capital accumulation. Most of the apparatus of western corporate 
extraction and production control remained intact, and, whilst allowing a greater 
degree of industrial and political association, the new Republican state baulked at 
challenging foreign corporate domination and appropriation.  As a milder regulatory 
system than the Ethical regime, parliamentary democracy offered only modest 
reforms to mollify the widespread industrial agitation for major structural changes to 
the industrial regulatory system.  
 
The Republican regime’s greatest challenge was to reconcile regional and central 
corporate ambitions. This struggle is portrayed as a ‘fracture of capitals’ fighting for 
control over resources – especially for the control over labour, and for surplus 
distribution. Provincial elites supported by western extractive interests determined to 
assert political and economic control over provincial production and the distribution 
of wealth from their regions. This provincial challenge to the central authority of the 
Republican regime was to prove significant insofar as it precipitated the rise of 
military power, not only as the major player in the national political system, but as the 
key institution able to enforce social and industrial discipline for capital accumulation.  
 
The importance of the emergence of the military from this political maelstrom to 
become the single major national challenge to parliamentary democracy is examined 
in Chapter 6.  The military’s enforcement of national political unity, coupled with its 
growing corporate ownership and substantial western military support, determined 
that it was in a position to rule the country. However, it was constrained from seizing 
political power by the mass political support from the worker-peasant movement 
demonstrated for the populist leader Sukarno.  This worker-peasant alliance 
represented a real threat to the military, foreign, and local corporate interests’ 
corporate autonomy and production control.   
Sukarno’s incorporation of the military and the PKI into a coalition government 
postponed civil war, but could not suppress each group’s ambitions for absolute rule. 
The struggle between the military, strongly supported by international and national 
corporate and strategic interests, and labour and the peasantry, was vastly complicated 
by the international struggles between the western allies and ‘international 
communism’.  Competing US, PRC and USSR regional strategic and resource-need 
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ambitions for the region conflicted with Indonesia’s aspirations for political and 
economic autonomy.  The Cold War struggles determined that Sukarno’s alliances 
with the PKI and associations with the PRC and the USSR would lead to increasing 
western allied pressure to overthrow the regime. The underlying aim of these internal 
and international oppositional forces, however, remained the destruction of any 
political and economic threat to corporate autonomy especially as this might be 
supported through the combined political power of labour and the peasantry.   
 
The 1965 military coup demolished this threat of a worker-peasant challenge allowing 
the unfettered establishment of a regime of production regulation and labour control.  
The New Order’s destruction of the organised labour-peasantry movement created the 
fundamental conditions for the expansion of foreign private investment. The state’s 
repression of labour and the peasantry facilitated Indonesia’s re-engagement with the 
world economy and the consequent transformation of state-corporate accumulation 
from rentier income to a more well-defined system of capitalist accumulation. 
 
The military’s destruction of all semblance of a labour or left-wing ‘voice’ re-
established Indonesia’s status within the international capitalist hierarchy. This status 
is primarily a function of the regime’s ability to repress and discipline labour and the 
peasantry as a class, and demolish all forms of collective association enabling its 
revival.  With the institution of this new regulatory regime, Indonesia provided a 
reservoir of ‘pacified’ labour for international investors. As an aggressively anti-
communist regime the New Order identified Indonesia as a Cold War Warrior firmly 
in support of US regional strategic and economic objectives.  
 
The coup, although brutal, is sometimes considered as justified in terms of the 
imperative of removing an economically incompetent megalomaniac who had 
dragged Indonesia into international disrepute and economic ruin.  My research and 
analysis demonstrates, however, that this representation of the military clique as 
bringing order to the country is fundamentally flawed.  Further, it totally misconstrues 
the character of Indonesia’s post-colonial development and the basis of New Order 
rule. 
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Succeeding parliamentary democratic regimes were unable to create order out of the 
chaos of competing economic challenge.   Their attempts to engender indigenisation 
by imposing western market-developmentalism were examined in Chapter 7.  It is 
argued that these attempts failed because they were incompatible with Indonesia’s 
politico-economic systems and foreign extractive and strategic agendas. More 
particularly the regime was not prepared to address the legacy of colonial agrarian 
wealth-extraction by imposing systems and structures that would ensure industrial 
development by redirecting the national surplus towards economic self-sufficiency.   
 
On the political front, the masses were still chaffing under the yoke of an industrial 
system that had advanced little from the late-colonial era. The reformist, indigenous-
capital based, parliamentary agenda bypassed their aspirations for industrial reform. 
Overall, parliamentary democracy was an interim exercise of parliamentary 
reformism that did little to address the legacy of colonialist wealth extraction and non-
recapitalisation. 
 
Sukarno finally achieved supreme political authority buoyed by national support for 
his revitalisation of the 1945 Republican agenda. My analysis highlights that the 
historical impact of his regime on economic development and the formation of 
regulatory regimes resided in his populist, unifying strategies promoting national 
political and economic goals. It was argued in Chapter 7 that the historical importance 
of his regime was in the creation of a national unifying ethos. In this understanding 
the enduring influence of the Sukarno regime lay in its power to mobilise national 
support around these campaigns of unification. However, the Sukarno regime’s failure 
to control inflation and achieve adequate income distribution for the masses left 
Sukarno prone to overthrow by a militarist regime offering strong leadership and 
political and economic stability.  
 
The New Order built on Sukarno’s nationalist slogans and campaigns, but translated 
his political ethos into developmentalist goals. The essential difference between the 
regimes was that Sukarno promoted the ideal of national advantage through national 
identity and cooperation in the production and a sharing of the fruits of national 
development, whereas Soeharto relied on the ethos that developmentalism would 
generate wealth and improved standards of living. The success of Soeharto’s agenda, 
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of course, relied on the state’s ability to repress political opposition and regulate 
labour. A key element of this ideological hegemony was the marginalisation of any 
groups or individuals perceived as threats to the regime’s control over the production 
and regulatory system. 
 
The contradiction between the New Order’s claim that it was uniting the country 
behind developmentalist goals, whilst particular – largely foreign and comprador – 
interests flourished and others languished, illuminates the regime’s role as social and 
industrial regulatory agent for international and patrimonial investors. Firstly, the 
broad indigenous business community had little voice in the new regime, with the 
‘indigenisation’ agenda lost in an imperative to appeal to major international 
investment players.  Secondly, the appeal to the international investment community 
led to an early dependency on income derived from the resource-sectors that built 
patrimonial associations but accomplished little towards developing a strong national 
industrial base.  It was only in the latter, mid-1980s, stages of New Order rule that the 
post oil-boom economic exigencies forced the development of an indigenous 
capitalist class, still tightly under the control of Soeharto’s patrimonial regime.  This 
development, rather than undermining inequality of corporate ownership and income 
distribution served to deepen the contradiction between the economic ethos of 
national advantage through developmentalism and the vested economic interest of the 
Soeharto regime.  It was at this mature stage of the New Order regime that a popular 
appreciation developed where the ruling regime’s aspiration of national economic 
welfare belied a systemic, and systematic, appropriation of wealth for the Indonesian 
ruling class.  
 
If the parliamentary democratic era was an interim period of unresolved conflicts 
between class-protagonists, then the Sukarno era represented a supreme battle for 
political supremacy between the chief representatives of the class protagonists of 
labour and capital, with Sukarno as mediator. This conflict was finally resolved with 
Soeharto’s military defeat of the Communists and his imposition of a strict regime of 
social and industrial regulation. This regime represented continuity between the 
colonial forms of social and industrial control.  However, whilst the colonial system 
usurped the traditional hierarchical and tributory surplus appropriation system, the 
New Order’s patrimonial elite assumed the surplus production and appropriation role.  
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‘Tribute’ in the contemporary context is best understood as the rent that accrued to the 
ruling group for instituting and enforcing the social and industrial regulatory 
infrastructure necessary to produce and appropriate a surplus from Indonesia’s 
workforce. The evidence of the developing power and authority of the New Order 
regime highlights the giving way of the military leadership’s comprador status to an 
indigenous capitalist class mutually dependent on the military apparatus to enforce 
control and generate wealth.   
 
The pivotal force for the incorporation of the Soeharto patrimonial regime within the 
international system of production and distribution relations has been shown to be its 
system of collective control over labour and the broader society.  The stability of the 
economic and political links between the Indonesian ruling elite and international 
capital were thus a function of class control over the mechanism of surplus-generation 
and thus of labour.  
 
The regulatory mechanisms instituted by the New Order regime brought investment 
opportunities but this investment was conditional on increased regulatory systems that 
became ever more coercive in character and increased demands for greater work-
intensification. This engendered a challenge to the New Order’s system of regulation 
and as such constituted a political and industrial threat to the security of the 
appropriation regime. 
 
Summary  
I have demonstrated that the forces defining the development of Indonesian colonial 
and post-colonial political and economic history were many and varied, with the trails 
showing frequent strong divergences between scholarly explanations of why and how 
Indonesia’s productive base developed the way it did.  However, I have argued that a 
consistent pattern has emerged from the study of Indonesian history when informed 
by considerations of the nature of production organised imposed on the people, and 
the relation between these forms and the economic ambition and priorities of 
succeeding ruling regimes. In this light ruling regimes’ material preoccupation with 
extracting wealth from Indonesia has entailed a turning of the Indonesian people’s 
productive energies and preoccupations towards that end. Clearly this is deeply 
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intertwined with the basic imperative to provide subsistence needs and advances in 
standards of living, with successive regimes more or less committed to this 
imperative. Nevertheless the paramount issue for all ruling regimes was to transform 
the economy to maximise the economic opportunities for world-market engagement.  
This priority is seen in this research as inextricably tied with the need to maintain the 
reproductive base, specifically of the reproduction of labour as the linchpin of 
surplus-generation.  
 
The political component of the process of wealth production and appropriation has 
been described as a fundamental determinant, both of the way in which the ruling 
regime organises the social environment to facilitate ‘public and industrial order’, and 
as part of the overall project of defining the form and direction of capital 
accumulation. This in turn defines the political response, where the workforce as a 
social entity challenges the general forms of political control, the degree of severity of 
extraction, and the shares of surplus accruing to the corporate and state owners of the 
system of production and distribution.  
 
This chapter is followed by a postscript applying my conceptual themes to the post-
New Order politico-economic environment. I introduce this discussion with a brief 
reflection on the perceived utility of the thesis’ analysis for an understanding of the 
continuity between colonial and post-colonial regimes.  Clearly the thesis that the 
prime reason for a colonial occupying presence was to extract a surplus for the 
metropolis, with the state as agency of extraction, and the country as ‘productive 
enterprise’ requires further theoretical translation to apply as an explanation of the 
forces operating in a post-colonial environment. 
 
There are, however, some clear elements of continuity.  A core element of the 
analytical framework is that wealth is generated by labour under conditions of state-
imposed regulation to enforce surplus production and extraction for capital 
accumulation. The assumption underpinning the analysis of post-colonial regimes has 
been that the reins of class control, whilst occasionally obscured by the struggles 
between capitals and between labour and capital, have been consistently retained by 
private capital. This was explicit in the New Order period with the state seen as 
largely an agent for foreign capital interests.  
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A further translation of the processes of economic organisation as applying in the 
post-colonial environment showed that the essential structural elements of colonial 
rule remained intact with the military arm of the Republican state assuming the 
colonial labour-regulatory role. In the contemporary context the increasing 
international investor-driven tendency for manufacturing development was 
accommodated by the enforced shift of the peasantry to urban industrial employment 
in industrial estates.  The regime is clearly carrying out the function of enforcing the 
supply, regulation, and disciplining of an indigenous workforce.  
 
This historical perspective on Indonesia’s political economic development is 
incomplete without at least some an acknowledgement of the current dilemmas facing 
the nation. Whilst the systemic basis for the collapse of New Order rule since the 
1997 Asian financial collapse warrant continuing research and analysis, the following 
postscript draws upon the conceptual concerns of this study to illuminate these 
changes.   
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Chapter 10 
Postscript to the New Order 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
“Indonesian labourers have virtually been delivered to their employers’ arbitrariness 
and greed” (Indonesian Observer, 27th August 1991). 
 
The systemic unravelling and collapse of the New Order requires critical reflection. 
Interrogating the momentous ending of the New Order also provides the opportunity 
to draw upon the understanding of the processes that underscored efforts to enhance 
the momentum of accumulation and the associated forces making for change.  This 
chapter draws together the thesis’ major themes to explore the view that the New 
Order’s demise was not accompanied by, and did not translate into, a fundamental 
transformation in the system of production organisation and labour discipline.  
 
These arguments are framed in an international context of the post Cold War 
redefinition of regional strategic and economic relations. Within this context, the 
Asian financial crisis is seen as triggering expanded opportunities for international 
corporate investment in Indonesia. These external factors form the analytical 
framework for an understanding of the destabilisation of New Order rule.  The 
character of this destabilisation and its implications for the processes of capital 
accumulation and labour regulation are considered in relation to the prevalent view 
that the political and economic viability of the New Order regime was fundamentally 
anchored in its protectionist systems. The demolition of these structures and systems 
thus determined the demise of New Order rule. However, whilst IMF and World Bank 
liberalisation agendas have forced a change in political leadership, the New Order’s 
economic edifice remains intact. An alternative argument is available for the demise 
of New Order rule.  This relates the international corporate agenda to the maintenance 
of New Order systems of production and labour regulation as the cornerstone of 
surplus generation. The transfer of political power is thus perceived within a political, 
rather than an economic, context 
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The contention that protectionism underpinned the New Order’s economic viability 
prompts critical reflection on the view that Indonesia’s continuing economic problems 
are sourced in systemic corruption, collusion, and nepotism. This perception has 
driven an international clamour for “reform”, especially by the IMF, World Bank, and 
foreign investors. These interests promote the view that the state must impose 
stronger corporate governance and transparency in corporate dealings.  Whilst there is 
no doubting the imperative, there is no reason to suppose that the decline in economic 
viability is any more a function of corruption than of protection. I want to contest the 
veracity of the argument that attributes Indonesia’s economic problems to the ruling 
elite’s systemic corruption and collusion fall into the same conceptual ‘trap’ as those 
who perceive protectionism to be at the core of Indonesia’s woes.  This research thus 
looks elsewhere for the sources of continuing instability in the Indonesian politico-
economic system.  
 
Corruption can be equated with protectionism as a mechanism for underpinning the 
patrimonial regime. It is the ‘machinery’ whereby the distribution of favours and 
economic opportunity acts to protect family, accomplice and friends’ political and 
economic power and privilege, and thus sustain the edifice of patrimonial rule.  It will 
be argued, however, that the ‘patronage’ system of corruption, nepotism and collusion 
cannot be seen as the driving force of the economic system. This thesis’ 
conceptualisation of the production process as the source of wealth, as with 
protectionism, relegates corruption to the sphere of the distribution of the national 
surplus. As such, the viability of the system is a function of its capacity to generate 
surplus and to ensure the regulation of labour for this end.  In addressing this question 
this postscript shifts the focus to the question of the degree to which the edifice of 
patrimonial rule has retained control over the production process, thus protecting its 
systems of the distribution of surplus through corrupt dealings by the patrimonialist 
elite.  
 
The international and political context of New Order destabilisation provides a basis 
for the analysis of the objectives and class-base of Soeharto’s political successors. A 
core consideration is the extent to which political upheavals and economic hardship 
prompted class-challenges to the New Order’s system of production and labour 
regulation. These considerations provide the basis for concluding reflections on the 
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continuing political economic implications of these recent upheavals within 
Indonesia.  
 
International corporate re-engagement  
Indonesia’s post-oil boom slump in foreign exchange earnings caused the Indonesian 
state to once again appeal to the international investment community and aid agencies 
for financial assistance.  As in the late 1960s, the aid and investment was conditional 
on Indonesia’s ‘opening up’ its resources to expanded foreign corporate access.  
However, the political and economic environment defining Indonesia’s bargaining 
strength and donors’ ambitions had undergone a significant transformation since the 
1960s. The history of this transformation illuminates the basis of the resulting changes 
to the system of production organisation underpinning expanded foreign corporate 
intervention.  
 
The transformation to the Indonesian political and economic environment is seen as a 
core function of its system of production control. As we saw in Chapter 8, the New 
Order state achieved its power through the institution of a repressive system of 
production regulation. The New Order’s political and economic strength was its 
ability to impose almost absolute social, political, and industrial control over the 
social and production system. The apparatus of labour control and denial of industrial 
democratic representation was the fundamental mechanism underpinning an expanded 
international corporate intervention and aid provision and thus creating the 
foundations for the New Order’s developmentalist program. The New Order used this 
foundation on which to build an edifice of patrimonial corporate power. This power 
was consolidated through a combination of state-protectionism and rent on foreign 
corporate extraction. The collapse in rentier-income threatened patrimonial profits but 
not the regime’s political and economic base.  
 
The changes to the international investment environment chiefly concern the growth 
in international demand for low wage-cost manufactured goods and the rapid 
technological and commercial/financial advances facilitating the placement of 
manufacturing capital in low wage-cost locations.  The World Bank, as chief 
representative of the international donor and investment community, pressured 
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Indonesia to transform its productive base to facilitate its insertion within the world 
franchise manufacturing economy based on a wage-minimisation competition.  The 
Bank’s fundamental conditions for investment/aid were the redirection of the 
productive base to the ‘modern’ manufacturing sector, expanded access to the 
patrimonial state’s commercial, productive and export monopoly apparatus, and the 
continuing enforcement of the low wage-cost regime.  The transformation of the 
Indonesian economy by the New Order’s authoritarian regime of political and 
economic control had determined the possibility that the state could accommodate 
these conditions. 
 
The World Bank’s rationale for the first requirement is encapsulated in its aid-
condition for Indonesia to ‘make way for the replacement of inefficient and costly 
industries such as automobile manufacture and steel production, by internationally 
competitive industries able to compete effectively on world markets’.  This was in 
order for the Indonesian economy to ‘respond to the free operation of the new 
international division of labour’ (Robison, 1990:108). The second condition 
represented the chief component of corporate investors’ overall objective for 
Indonesia to ‘open up’ its economic system of corporate control and conglomerate 
monopoly to an expanded corporate access, equity, and surplus extraction. World 
Bank officials argued that ‘according to the economic principle of comparative 
advantage’, Indonesia’s economy must be opened ‘to unfettered investment by 
international capital’ (Robison, 1990: 108). 
 
The foreign corporate imperative to retain the system of labour-regulation as a core 
condition for expanded intervention was implicit in the Bank’s rationale justifying the 
replacement of Indonesia’s alleged ‘inefficient’ industries through ‘comparative 
advantage’. Indonesia’s productive base was to be restructured to locate the economy 
within the new international system of production-specialisation.  The imperative for 
Indonesia to embark on a massive economic restructuring to satisfy the claimed 
advantages accruing from the application of a 19th Century economic principle begs 
an investigation of how the principle applied to Indonesia and its relationship to the 
corporate ambitions that formed part of the aid/investment conditions. The 
contradictions between the application of this principle and World Bank imperatives 
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for the ‘opening up’ of Indonesia’s economy to greater international corporate access 
illuminates the way in which the state retained power. 
 
In international trade terms Indonesia’s comparative advantage lay in its abundant 
supply of low-cost, strongly regulated, labour. The way in which this supply was 
enforced has been extensively canvassed elsewhere. Whilst the World Bank obliged 
the state to dismantle its protectionist and monopoly constraints on foreign corporate 
access as a condition of aid-provision, a condition of this aid was also the 
maintenance of a protectionist system of wage-cost minimisation that assure 
Indonesia’s ‘comparative advantage’ in cheap labour. The international corporate 
demand for the New Order state to demolish its protectionist apparatus thus related 
solely to foreign access to Indonesia’s supply of resources, especially that of cheap 
labour. 
 
For some economic theorists, the New Order rule turned on its ability to inhibit 
market pressures by instituting ‘market frictions’ such as corruption, nepotism, and 
protection to prop up Soeharto’s rule. In this understanding their removal would 
threaten the stability of the New Order state. Thus, in Robison’s characterisation, by 
demanding an ‘opening up’ of Indonesia’s economy to global competition, the World 
Bank put the government in a quandary over the extent to which this could occur 
‘without causing fundamental damage to the regime and its social and economic base’ 
(Robison, 1990: 108). 
 
I argue that that what is missing from this analysis is an appreciation of the role of the 
labour and social-regulatory system as the key to state-corporate power. Its inclusion 
informs the process whereby accommodation of the World Bank’s imperatives 
determined an expanded corporate intervention, whilst the political and economic 
power of the Soeharto regime was strengthened rather than jeopardised. This 
foreshadows the argument that the final death-knell for the New Order regime did not 
reside in IMF structural adjustment program imperatives to dismantle protectionist 
mechanisms, but with the mass political revulsion against the undemocratic, 
repressive, and corrupt state regime. The IMF programs are seen as influential triggers 
for mass political action, but primarily in terms of their impact on living costs.  
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Expanded production regulation 
Foreign investors’ appropriation ambitions are evidenced by an investigation of the 
chief characteristics defining foreign manufacturing expansion into industrial estates 
and of the processes at work within these state-constructed industrial manufacturing 
production enclaves. International capital’s increasing technical ability to move 
production facilities where costs could be minimised (Winters, 1996: 30) determined 
the huge late 1980s flow of investment monies largely into Indonesia’s industrial 
estates. Many of the companies investing in these Indonesian estates did so to escape 
the ‘rising labour costs and unrest that threatened investment in the newly 
industrialising countries of South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong’ (Beeson and 
Hadiz, 1998: 301). The estates were located near major population centres such as 
Bandung, Jakarta, and Surabaya. The most substantial industrial concentration was 
the Greater Jakarta manufacturing zone that incorporated the manufacturing centres of 
Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi (Jabotabek).  The foreign investment formed 
the core of a dramatic expansion of the ‘low-wage, export oriented industries that 
have underpinned Indonesia’s industrial development since the mid-80s (Hadiz, 
1992a: 2).  
 
Industrial estates’ industrial priorities 
The state played a powerful role in the delivery of labour, a point encapsulated in the 
quote introducing this postscript. The quote suggests that this state-role operates 
through the full cycle of labour organisation: creation, supply, and workplace 
enforcement. This ‘delivery’ of workers into industrial manufacturing employment is 
considered in the context of state-systems supporting greater work intensity.   
 
It is evident that there were several major industrial ambitions driving corporate 
investment in these enclaves. We have already seen that a fundamental objective was 
to avoid the threat of industrial conflict and increasing wage-costs that existed in the 
NICs. Clearly a major motivation was the ability to impose industrial discipline 
without the sorts of constraints pertaining in these countries.  
 
The estates were designed to maximise work-intensity and minimise production costs 
through intensive workforce supervision in a strictly regimented environment. 
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Manufacturing production was supported by the extensive, state-controlled system of 
labour supply, regulation and enforcement. State and corporate control operated in 
three distinct contexts. Firstly, the state and the state-run union were the agencies 
responsible for the overall supply and control of labour. The state facilitated the 
transfer of rural labour to industrial work, and the SPSI acted as an employment 
agency through its village and industrial networks. The state regulatory system was 
external to the systems of discipline imposed by individual companies, but served to 
enforce individual company’s control decisions. 
 
Secondly, the state and private contractors supplied the physical infrastructure for 
production.  This included the essential services for the estates, including labour-
transportation, the construction of factory complexes, the estates, and the state-
enforcement apparatus providing company protection.  Finally, the companies moving 
into these factories installed the appropriate regulatory technology to maximise 
output, such as plant technology, production lines and supervisory systems.   
 
Labour regulation within the estates 
Labour supply 
A poignant example of the military strategy of enforcing the transformation of rural to 
industrial labour was given by the Indonesian government in their response to 
criticism of industrial repression by the international NGO, Asia Watch (January 23, 
1993).  Asia Watch asserted that groups of Indonesian workers were forced to 
participate in military training under the surveillance of KOPASSUS, the army Special 
Forces.  According to the Indonesian government, the workers were given physical 
and vocational training, including marching, saluting, obeying commands, standing at 
attention, and running obstacle courses. ‘The Indonesian military assists with this 
training, which is received … by workers from all over the country. It is thought that 
this combination of training eases the transition from an agricultural environment to 
an industrial one and prepares the trainees for work in an industrial environment’ 
(Asia Watch, Indonesian Statement: 118). Lieutenant Colonel Sutrisno, a military 
officer in charge of the West Java training program noted that the military assistance 
used in the training centres comes from the various branches of the Indonesian Armed 
Forces including the Marine Corps and KOPASSUS, a special combat-trained force 
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which is exceptionally suited to train young job-seekers from a variety of 
backgrounds (Indonesian Statement Exhibit 98). 
 
The physical infrastructure  
A typical estate complex consists of large numbers of factory buildings within a 
barbed wire fenced perimeter patrolled by the military. The Tangerang estate, for 
example, contains 1,500 companies and employs about 200,000, mostly women, 
workers (Razif, 1992: 6).  The ‘prison camp’ security apparatus was intended to 
protect company property. However, the more fundamental reason was to protect 
companies’ surplus appropriation by imposing absolute controls over labour. The 
apparatus was intended to inhibit any form of industrial association. It also limited 
association between employees and the wider community, prevented outside scrutiny 
of the systems of work-discipline applied by individual companies, and prevented 
employees escaping the disciplinary conditions imposed by employers. Overall, the 
physical and institutional structure of the industrial estate was designed to create a 
separate, exclusionary, enclave within which the corporate ambitions of labour-
control for work intensification could be realised. Whilst the security apparatus had 
achieved new heights of technological innovation, the overall system incorporated 
similar characteristics to that of the corporate plantation system of labour 
regimentation a hundred years before.  
 
Industrial discipline 
Within the estates employers have carte blanche to employ whatever form of 
disciplinary action that is deemed ‘appropriate’ to enforce work requirements and 
workplace discipline. Thus in June 2000 Sony company employees took industrial 
action against management’s decision to force staff to stand at their workplaces for 
entire shifts ‘so that workers would be flexible and mobile enough to carry out several 
tasks as a conveyor belt carried television sets and other products down the line for 
assembly’ (Business Times, June 14, 2000). 
 
A further example of disciplinary measures taken by estate companies was a Jakarta 
factory executive’s decision to force several female employees to stand for several 
hours in the full sun as punishment for missing a day’s work. Part of the punishment 
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included holding up a placard bearing the words ‘I skipped work yesterday’.  One 
employee miscarried after two hours. The Jakarta Post reported that ‘this means of 
punishment had been enforced by the company for some time. The four workers who 
reported her case were later sacked by the company without any severance pay 
(Jakarta Post, 12/1/1995). This example, one of many reported in the Indonesian 
newspapers over recent years, shows the extent to which some employers were 
prepared to go to enforce workplace discipline.  
 
In-house forms of labour regulation  
There is strong evidence to show that women bore the brunt of estate-companies’ 
industrial demands.  Wolf’s research shows that the semi-skilled labour-intensive 
employment in these factories was mostly carried out by female labour. Women were 
employed at less than subsistence wage levels (Rutten and Dirkse, 1993:138). 
Employers believed that it was ‘more economically efficient to employ (female 
workers) because they cost less than males and were less likely to disrupt the 
production process with complaints or labour protests (Rutten and Dirkse, 1993: 142).  
 
What is also significant is the evidence that NIC employers appear to have imposed 
even more oppressive regimes of control and work-intensity than their Western and 
Japanese counterparts.  The presence of these companies and the severity of their 
industrial regulation affirms that NIC companies’ move to the country was designed 
to advantage from the state’s authoritarian social and labour regulatory system, and 
the state’s non-interference in internal industrial organisation.  The effectiveness of 
this labour-intensification strategy was shown by major brand name Japanese, 
Western European, and US companies increasingly licensing their products to NIC 
enterprises.  
 
The differing employment conditions resulted from contractual obligations imposed 
by the major companies, the competitive pressure between subcontracting companies, 
and NIC management experience of industrial confrontation in the home countries.   
The evidence of a strike against a large South Korean owned, Tangerang-based, 
electronics factory shows a typical example of NIC companies’ industrial policy. The 
predominantly women workers in this factory went on strike after being forced to 
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work 11 hour shifts with no overtime payment. They complained of physical side 
effects from the work and also of sexual harassment on the part of the Korean 
managers. There was no SPSI unit allowed in the factory because the Korean owner 
said he knew from the Korean experience that if unionisation were allowed, workers 
demands would escalate (Asia Watch, September 1992).  
 
Colonial parallels 
An investigation of the parallels between colonial systems of corporate organisation 
and those operating in the industrial estates illuminates the character of the relative 
surplus-extraction processes. The particular focus is on the role of these estates in 
increasing work-intensity and output. The Dutch state’s imposition of the rigorous 
Cultivation System of coerced labour generated massive profits for the metropolis, 
and formed the foundation for the subsequent late 19th Century vastly expanded 
corporate plantation investment.   
 
The corporate plantation system of production organisation was characterised by 
minimal state restrictions on how planters went about maximising work-intensity, and 
by the strict separation of the estate from the local community and village production. 
These estates were set up on prison-camp lines, with the military enforcing security 
and labour discipline. The intensive supervision and labour control enabled the 
generation of much higher levels of output than those obtaining in the unsupervised 
and unregulated village production system.  
 
A rupture in the regulation regime: industrial confrontation  
A crucial outcome of these mechanisms and systems of control was that employers 
had, by the late 1980s, benefited from paying workers the lowest industrial wages in 
Asia (Financial World, 10.7.1990). Whilst these low wage-costs were underpinned by 
the high degree of state-regulation and enforcement it was clear that there was a 
threshold beyond which further labour intensity and oppression would generate a 
political and industrial backlash. At this margin of exploitation, with subsistence-
levels below the rate of remuneration the regulatory apparatus came under political 
and industrial challenge. When this occurred the repressive apparatus, with its 
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constraints on association, was unable to constrain conflict and rebellion, and we see a 
major rise in industrial disputation and political action. 
 
It is argued that the pressure in the manufacturing sector to increase the rate of 
exploitation generated a worker consciousness leading to a mobilised opposition 
against the oppressive conditions of employment.  The greatest industrial opposition 
occurred within those companies imposing the greatest degree of workplace 
oppression.   
 
The role of the liberalisation policy in destabilising the regulatory regime is 
underscored by the fact of industrial confrontation centring on the modern sector. As 
the degree of work-intensity increased and real wage-levels declined, companies 
faced a ‘sustained wave of industrial action on an unprecedented scale that (was) 
widespread across Indonesia’.  The action ‘took the form of wildcat strikes and mass 
demonstrations (with) most industrial action being in the export oriented economy’ 
(Jakarta Post, 18/8/97). There were 46 strikes across Indonesia between 1986 and 
1990; by 1991 there were 114, with 96 per cent of these in manufacturing (Kompas, 
18 November 1992). Strikes were largely against those companies, such as textiles, 
clothing, and footwear, which formed the core of World Bank/IMF-supported export-
orientated developmental policy. Most of the industrial conflict occurred in the 
Jabotek area, but working class action occurred across diverse regions from Surabaya 
to Medan in Northern Sumatra (Hadiz, 1993: 186).   In one instance 14,000 workers 
from a single factory took strike action against their employer. In the majority of 
cases, strikes were triggered by companies’ violating minimum wage stipulation’s 
Other major claims included the denial of benefits, working conditions, dismissals, 
lack of union representation and military/company intimidation (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 2 April 1992).  
 
The extraordinary escalations in mass demonstrations and industrial confrontation and 
the emergence of a new industrial purpose and unity amongst Indonesia’s 
manufacturing workers signalled an unravelling of the state’s ability to enforce its 
control over labour. The Jakarta Post affirmed that the rise in industrial action and the 
growth of non-government industrial support organisations posed an ‘increasingly 
serious challenge to the forms of workers control exercised by the state for over 20 
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years (Jakarta Post, 18/8/97). Whilst the regulatory apparatus had guaranteed 
industrial stability, it now appeared unable to assure a ‘pacified’ industrial 
environment for local and international corporate investors.   
 
The above discussion and analysis of industrial estates suggests the need for further 
research relating to labour’s political and industrial struggles in these estates. There is 
a clear need to ascertain whether the contemporary political fracturing of the 
Indonesian working class can be overcome in the longer term. This vital imperative 
must then be considered in the context of possible options for a strengthened and 
unified workforce in the face of the general liberalisation ‘reform’ agenda.   Clearly 
these questions suggest an invaluable focus for the continuing analysis of the 
processes and political implications of the industrial and economic struggles that are 
an inevitable part of the industrial estate system of wealth production and 
appropriation.  
 
A broadening political/industrial battle for reform 
Women workers in the primarily export manufacturing sector led much of the 
industrial action against estate companies. In 1992 and 1995 discussions with officials 
from the Women’s’ Section of the SPSI and individual women employees of export-
sector manufacturing industry companies I determined that most women workers 
were more strongly prepared to take industrial action than male employees (Mack, 
1992/1995).  
 
Whilst economic issues were a fundamental factor driving industrial action, workers 
considered that the right to political/industrial association, assembly, and organisation 
was of equal importance in industrial campaigns. The state’s denial of that right 
consolidated opposition to official industrial institutions, and led to the creation of 
alternative organisations. Workers developed small, informal discussion and 
educational groups, (koperasi simpan-pinjam) outside of the SPSI framework. Such 
groups were generally run in conjunction with small labour-oriented NGOs whose 
members characteristically consisted of veteran labour activists or former student 
activists. 
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The existence of these defensive associations and NGO support groups, whilst 
necessarily informal and clandestine, proved the strength, unity, and commitment of 
mobilisation. In order to adequately represent the needs and aspirations of the 
participants, these groups operate outside the institutions and structures designed to 
enforce state control over the political system, labour and the production process.  
‘Thus worker struggles have necessarily been led by small, almost amorphous grass-
roots based organizations that by definition operate outside of them’ (Razif, 1992:1).  
 
International pressures for industrial reform 
The industrial repression and consequent worker action attracted worldwide attention.  
An ever-growing international political pressure was brought to bear to liberalise the 
New Order regulatory regime. Of particular interest was the way in which this 
resulted in the internationalisation of the struggle for Indonesian workers’ rights. The 
first consideration concerns the Indonesian state’s response to the international 
pressure to moderate its regulatory regime, the internal schisms that this engendered 
between corporate interests and the state, and the implications of these schisms for the 
subsequent political destabilisation of New Order rule.   
 
Whilst there were European political campaigns pressuring the New Order state to 
moderate its labour-regulatory regime, the state was more responsive to the US 
campaigns.  The Indonesian government was clearly cognisant of the fact that the US 
criticism could threaten Indonesia’s exports to that country.    US labour groups 
campaigned for the US government to revoke Indonesia’s access to the tariff 
concessions for developing countries if Indonesia did not address key industrial rights 
issues (Schwarz, 1994: 257).  In June 1992, Asia Watch and the International Labour 
Rights Education and Research Fund (ILRERF), a non-governmental organization 
based in Washington, petitioned the United States Trade Representative to review 
Indonesian labour rights practice. Under US law, the President, at the 
recommendation of the Trade Representative, must end tariff benefits to a US trading 
partner under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), if the country is not 
‘taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights’ such as the freedom 
of association, the right to organise and bargain collectively, to ban forced labour, and 
set the minimum age for the employment of children. A cutting of the GSP tariff 
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benefits at that time would have resulted in an annual cost to Indonesia of about $ 
(US) 400 million (Asia Watch, January 23, 1993).  
 
The Indonesian government went to great lengths to explain, justify and moderate its 
industrial policies in response to the US petitions. The Indonesian government 
prepared a 170-page defence against the Asia Watch charges and on October 16 1992 
sent a delegation headed by the director of the Ministry of Manpower, Dr. Payaman 
Simanjuntak, to explain its position to the GSP Subcommittee. Nevertheless, in June 
1993 the US Trade Representative advised Indonesia that unless it improved its labour 
record it would lose its trading benefits with the US The US was supported by 
Western European political pressure on the Indonesian government to ensure that 
Indonesian workers were paid statutory minimum wages and allowed freedom of 
industrial association.  
 
The state moves to moderate the regulatory regime 
The Indonesian government made some concessions including legislating for a rise in 
the minimum wage and the revocation of government legislation allowing employers 
to summon troops to put down strikes (Schwarz, 1994: 261). The Manpower Minister, 
Batubara, moved to implement some of the ILO industrial reforms, and demanded 
employers pay the state-nominated wage-rises.8 His appointment as President of the 
ILO annual conference in 1991 suggested that for some international rights 
organisations the New Order was gaining international support for its attempts to 
implement reforms (Hadiz, 1997: 161). The government’s pressure on employers 
meant that between 1990 and 1997 the minimum wage in the Jakarta area nearly 
tripled (Beeson and Hadiz, 1998: 300). 
 
The Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs considered that the Government 
should take ‘steps toward meeting ILO standards while considering Indonesia’s 
situation’ (Hadiz, 1997: 166). In 1994 Soeharto called for employers to provide higher 
wages and better conditions (The Australian, 5.5.1994). He argued that ‘many 
entrepreneurs and industrialists still viewed their workers simply as one of the factors 
of production, ignoring their real interests…that the wage system should not widen 
                                                 
8 Interview, July 14, 1991 
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the existing gap between rich and poor … but not rise so steeply as to threaten the 
competitiveness of the Indonesian economy’ (The Australian, 5.5.1994). 
 
Rationale for moderation 
The fact that the Soeharto state acceded to some aspects of the international and 
internal pressure to liberalise the industrial regime clearly resulted from the US threat 
to Indonesian trade. The Indonesian establishment’s continuing concern to represent 
the regime as showing a preparedness to address labour rights issues is evident in a 
memorandum of industrial changes presented to President Habibie by his industrial 
adviser, Sudono (Appendix 3). In a section referring to proposed changes to the SPSI, 
the memorandum noted that ‘the new Confederation has to be rooted nationally - 
domestically or internally and externally, and has to try to be acceptable to the 
ICFTU.  The ICFTU is the backbone for labour unions in industrialised countries. 
Therefore the ICFTU provides access to industrialised countries international 
institutions under the United Nations including the IMF and World Bank.  The ICFTU 
has consultative status in the UN and with bodies under the UN.9 In these terms, the 
state was clearly intent on tying its liberalising proposals to aid access.   
 
Emerging contradictions within the state 
The state faced a fundamental and irreconcilable contradiction: it was being pressured 
by the US to ameliorate the harsh conditions of extraction, and thereby dismantle the 
system of exploitation that was the linchpin of the New Order regime of 
accumulation, in return for securing the maintenance of preferential trade advantages. 
In its efforts to reconcile this contradiction, the Indonesian state moved to moderate 
the degree of exploitation but not the regulatory system that underscored the system 
of labour control. The effect was to alienate political and economic interests who 
feared a loss of authority and a decline in the distribution of surplus. Moreover, it was 
becoming evident that the Soeharto state’s preparedness to acquiesce to the foreign 
political and economic pressures to moderate the oppressive labour regime indicated 
incapacity to maintain absolute authority over labour. It will be argued that this 
                                                 
9 Minutes provided to the author of a meeting of the Cabinet and Agus Sudono regarding labour reform, Jakarta 
29.6.1998 
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compounded the inability of the state to meet the competing needs that had hitherto 
defined the production and distribution of surplus.  
 
These contradictions were exposed when the Asian financial crisis swept through East 
Asia in July 1997. The crisis crystallised a mass aspiration for major political reforms, 
creating the conditions for the political overthrow of the New Order regime. This 
overthrow followed Soeharto’s agreement with the IMF to implement a market 
liberalisation, program in return for the provision of aid.  The consequent application 
of an IMF structural adjustment program to abolish the ‘market frictions’ of state-
subsidies for essential consumer goods, such as kerosene and rice, led to the 
mobilisation of mass forces opposed to New Order rule (Mallett, 1999:260). The 
institution of processes of political reform enabled the election of governments 
pledged to reject authoritarian rule in favour a broad process of political 
representation.  
 
The resulting political reforms challenged the military’s dual-function, corporate 
authority, and repressive role. This triggered an Indonesia-wide series of military-led 
disturbances and political confrontations that were intended to undermine the 
challenge to the military’s political dominance.  
 
Tensions within state rule 
The New Order government was acutely aware that its system of industrial regulation 
had generated sufficient political opposition within developed countries to threaten 
Indonesia’s export trade to those countries.  It also perceived a political imperative to 
ameliorate the harsher effects of the regime to justify the severity of extraction. The 
New Order state had consistently employed the political rationale that its sole 
imperative was to strengthen the economy and generate higher standards of living for 
the Indonesian people.  On the other hand, any perceived unravelling of the strict 
regulatory regime threatened foreign investors’ secure supply of a cheap, strongly 
controlled labour force. The state had to balance these competing interests to retain 
political authority and maintain investment. 
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The role of succeeding Manpower Ministers in promoting this ‘balancing act’ was 
evidenced by the intention of new Manpower Minister Abdul Latief’s to maintain 
Batubara’s commitment to improve wage levels to ‘curb industrial unrest without 
conceding the politically-charged issue of the freedom to organise (Beeson and Hadiz, 
1998:301). The state’s maintenance of its ‘industrial agency’ role in the supply of 
cheap labour for foreign capital was shown by the succeeding Minister’s refusal to 
brook any industrial association outside the institutions controlled by the state. In the 
perennial argument used by New Order officials to denigrate alternative 
representative organisations, Latief blamed all industrial organisations outside the 
SPSI as the responsibility of groups designed to threaten the status of the official 
organisations (Schwarz, 1994:260). NGO activity on behalf of the workers, and 
unofficial unions was represented by the military as ‘communist inspired’ threats to 
social stability. 
 
The state’s moderation of industrial excesses and the enforced wage rises led to the 
US maintaining its GSP with Indonesia, but inspired condemnation within the New 
Order regime that was led by the military, and supported by business groups. These 
interests considered it imperative for the military to continue to impose its domination 
over labour to repress ‘intransigent, dissident elements’ and maintain the low wage-
cost environment. They brooked no undermining of the military’s role in 
underpinning the New Order.  Any accommodation of workers’ demands represented 
a break in the system of industrial ‘law and order’ and a challenge to the regimented, 
hierarchical authority structure. Foreign political action was seen as an intervention in 
matters of internal security.  
 
Corporate executives strongly supported the military’s continuing industrial role. 
Further, they believed that the power and authority of the military to maintain its role 
as the agent of industrial enforcement could not be jeopardised by workers’ industrial 
action or international political pressure because Indonesia’s ‘security forces would 
not allow social disorder’, and that the ‘phase of reformism would pass by (Beeson 
and Hadiz, 1998: 301). 
 
The reality and dominance and power of the military and the state’s inability or 
refusal to challenge this power is shown by the failure of successive reformist 
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Manpower Ministers’ attempts to restrict the military’s intervention in industrial 
relations. Even in 1998 after the political demise of the Soeharto government, the 
Habibie government Manpower Minister, Fahmi Idris, was still requesting the 
military and police to cease ‘interfering in labour affairs … in drafting collective 
agreements between workers and employers, negotiating solutions to disputes – 
particularly dismissals – and other bipartite affairs.  The Minister expressed his 
concern that ‘businessmen have often invited military officers to join the negotiations 
with workers to resolve labour problems, but their involvement has always been in 
favour of management’  (Straits Times, August 23, 1998). 
 
Underpinning the regulatory regime 
In 1997, just prior to the full impact of the Asian financial crisis on the Indonesian 
economy, the Soeharto government moved to enforce its labour-regulatory regime. 
Whilst still putting pressure on companies to pay the state-stipulated minimum wages, 
Soeharto introduced a new manpower bill into the Indonesian parliament to, as the 
Jakarta Post argued,  ‘revoke laws which so far have relatively protected the basic 
rights of workers and legalise unfair labor practices into law’ (Jakarta Post, 18/8/97). 
The main objective appeared to be to convince corporations that the government 
retained its firm labour-regulatory intentions. The main thrust of the bill was to ensure 
‘labour flexibility’ by short-term work contracting and subcontracting.   
 
A further contradiction emerges with the pressure to accommodate corporate 
ambitions by imposing a regulatory framework to increase labour productivity by 
short-term work. This led to a decline in the authority of the SPSI. The confederation 
gained its labour regulatory authority from its centralised industrial bargaining power.  
The widespread introduction of individual contracts undermined this authority and 
power.  Business sought other means of controlling labour. The Jakarta Post stated 
that the ‘delegitimisation’ of the military-dominated union meant that companies 
employed private security firms. The extent of this is indicated by the growth in 
company security costs where ‘…some business circles estimate that invisible costs 
now reach 16 per cent to 30 per cent of production costs while labour wages account 
for only 4-11 per cent (in the manufacturing industry sector)’ (Jakarta Post, 18/8/97).  
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At the end of 1997 the market capitalisation of the Indonesian economy declined from 
$US225 billion to $US33 billion, with $US140 billion owed in hard currency debt 
(Australian Financial review, Jan 24, 1998). Approvals for FDI dropped by 40 per 
cent in the first quarter of 1998 in comparison with the same period in 1997. Exports 
declined by 8 per cent, and there was a loss of 20 million jobs (Far East Economic 
Review, November 12th, 1998).  
 
The massive political and economic disruption caused by this financial crisis triggered 
the political destabilisation that undermined New Order state authority. The IMF 
demanded the Indonesian state impose drastic social, political, and economic 
measures as a condition of the provision of loans. These included balanced national 
budgets, rises in interest rates, the abolition of subsidies on food and electricity, an 
acceleration of deregulation and privatisation, the opening up of greater foreign 
access, and the sale of banks and industries regarded as inefficient or under 
performing. The most politically destabilising imposition on the Indonesian economy, 
however, was the IMF’s imperative for the government to remove subsidies on basic 
consumer commodities, especially on food and fuel. The Soeharto government had 
effectively subsidised the cost of labour for business with these subsidies, and their 
removal was a major financial blow falling on top of the massive inflationary 
increases and job losses.  The consequent 70 percent increase in fuel prices sparked 
mass demonstrations that only ended when President Soeharto stepped down from 
office on 21st May 1998 (Straits Times, 23.8.1998). 
 
The financial crash undermined the military’s political and economic base.  Military 
corporations collapsed as foreign investment and rentier income was withdrawn, and 
the cost of investment massively increased. The government-funded wages and 
salaries were barely sufficient to adequately provide for the basic needs of personnel.  
An Indonesian economist contended that ‘military airlines are grounded for lack of 
cash, their office buildings stand half empty and their factories cannot pay their debt. 
Many of their forestry concessions have long been cleared, leaving much of 
Kalimantan, Sumatra and Irian Jaya deforested.  He considered that military-owned 
enterprises were the military’s ‘cash cow, [and] when the cow does not provide any 
milk anymore, ABRI (the armed forces) must find another source of income – like 
racketeering’ (Canberra Times - May 26, 2000). This opinion was backed by the 
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Financial Times in an editorial contending that the continuing military-corporate 
ownership and paid security role in industry and society, by allowing the military to 
finance themselves, means that the government ‘allows for lawlessness, for distortions 
in the economy…[where] …the infrastructure, the people who run all this are 
underpaid and live in a system that is corrupted’ (Financial Times 3.12.1998). 
 
The industrial security role of this ‘racketeering’ came to the fore with the evidence of 
military instigation of riots and attacks on Chinese/Indonesian companies (Jakarta 
Post, 15.7.1998). The evidence of the military’s involvement suggests a two-fold 
intention: to threaten the democratic reformism of the state, and to intimidate business 
into paying the military protection money against future threats to their property.  
Forewarned of the ‘riots’, corporate executives paid the military substantial amounts 
of money to secure their property or to enable them safe transit to Jakarta airport and 
to Singapore for ‘guest worker’ employees (interview, CEO Asia Pulp and Paper 
Company, Jakarta, 23.7.1998.) 
 
The continuing power and authority of the military is shown by the fact that, whilst 
dismissed from his position as armed forces commander, Soeharto-appointment 
General Wiranto remained on active military duty and is currently Coordinating 
Minister for Political Affairs and Security. He chairs cabinet meetings and decides the 
agenda, suggesting that the armed forces continue to play a dominant role in civil rule 
(Washington Post: 4.12.1999). 
 
Summary 
A major theme of this thesis is that succeeding ruling regimes regulated production 
and labour to maximise surplus value extraction, and at particular stages of capital 
accumulation, the system of political and economic controls underpinning the regime 
was destabilised. This chapter interprets the continuing political and industrial turmoil 
surrounding the collapse of the New Order in this context 
 
In part, the tensions in the New Order period arose from Indonesia’s engagement with 
international capital, associated with particular forms of production and labour 
regulation underpinning capital accumulation.  The loss of export earnings following 
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the end of the oil boom and strong international political and corporate pressure 
determined that Indonesia would open its resources and productive and wealth-
generating apparatus economy to greater foreign corporate access. The IMF/WB 
measures promoted the relaxation of constraints on trade and the dismantling of the 
apparatus of patrimonial corporate-protection, but clearly supported the maintenance 
of the New Order state interventionist and regulatory regime as an agency of labour 
control.  
 
This renewed engagement with the international political economy and the subsequent 
massive inflow of foreign investment funds was predicated on the Soeharto state-
provided infrastructural and resources support for foreign corporate interests, 
especially that of a strongly regulated, low-wage, labour supply.  The manufacturing 
investment expansion transformed the New Order state-corporate basis of 
accumulation from a primarily rentier-based to an industrial-based capitalist system. 
State-led, labour-controlling opportunities for foreign corporate access in Indonesia 
conformed to the general pattern of expanded foreign capital intervention under 
colonial regimes. 
 
The infrastructural support for the inflow of foreign investment capital was primarily 
directed at transforming the productive system to accommodate corporate 
requirements defined by the New International Division of Labour. This meant the 
construction of industrial enclaves dedicated to the maximisation of work-intensity 
and labour control. There was a major shift of the workforce from rural to industrial 
employment. This pool of labour, the international pressures to enforce low-cost, high 
output productivity, and the existing state repressive and legal apparatus, were the 
fundamental mechanisms to ‘discipline’ labour to accept the conditions of 
employment in the industrial zones. The labour market enforced this process, and 
acted to inhibit workers’ struggles in the process. Thus the ‘the high level of surplus 
labour in the market’ served to ‘undercut labour’s bargaining position’ (Beeson and 
Hadiz, 1998: 301). 
 
Whilst this access generated wealth for foreign capital interests, it also created the 
conditions for the destabilisation of the social, economic and industrial system 
underpinning capital accumulation. Thus whilst foreign capital gained access to 
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Indonesia’s ‘comparative advantage’ of cheap, docile, labour – with a resulting 
dramatic expansion of manufacturing industry – this access presented threats to the 
security of regulatory regime, in particular through the proletarianisation of labour.  
 
Labour assumed a pivotal role in capital accumulation under the New Order. The 
regulatory mechanisms instituted by the New Order regime to minimise the 
opportunities for labour participation in any aspect of ownership or distribution of the 
surplus supported foreign extraction from the country, and the rentier system that 
sustained patrimonial corporate accumulation. However, this investment was 
conditional on increased regulatory systems and manufacturing companies’ increased 
demands for greater work-intensification. This created a working class’ challenge to 
the New Order’s system of regulation and as such constituted a political and industrial 
threat to the security of the appropriation regime.  The New Order state was forced to 
modify its surplus-creation imperatives.  
 
The centrality of labour to accumulation is shown in the analysis that the sources of 
New Order corporate strength did not reside in the sphere of surplus distribution – 
such as corruption, nepotism, and state protection – but in the production system. 
These factors may have sustained the Soeharto regime’s corporate power where it 
relied on foreign interests to distribute a share of their extracted surplus income, but it 
played a relatively minor role in supporting the construction of a productive base of 
industrial capitalist endeavour on patrimonial relations with foreign capital. This new 
corporate role of the New Order patrimonial system was primarily based on the 
strength of the labour regulatory apparatus. 
 
The rate of Indonesia’s commercial and financial expansion, and the lack of state 
regulatory controls on the direction and coordination of development, led to an 
unstable financial system that was attacked by international currency speculators 
following the mid-1997 Asian financial crisis.  This structural disability, and the 
consequent IMF demands to reduce state spending as a prime condition for the 
allocation of loans, led to the political overthrow of the Soeharto regime. The collapse 
of New Order political rule was not, however, a function of the World Bank/IMF 
imposed reductions in protection and conglomerate monopoly control. The final 
political rejection of the Soeharto regime, whilst triggered by the mass hardship of the 
 267
financial crisis and the IMF structural adjustment program, was driven by a mass 
revulsion of the New Order’s thirty-two year domination of the social and political 
environment.  
 
The evidence of a post-New Order maintenance of the apparatus of labour regulation 
is shown by subsequent leaderships’ lack of preparedness to fundamentally address 
the issues of work intensification. In fact, the crisis precipitated even greater pressures 
on labour, and consequent increases in industrial disputation. Any decision to 
accommodate the demands of the working class continues to be strongly opposed by 
the military. The military has sought to retain their corporate power and dominant role 
as agents of social and industrial control. This schism within the regime of 
accumulation remains unresolved, as the military exerts continuing pressure to affirm 
its dua fungsi and paramount role as repressive apparatus of labour control. This has 
meant that at no stage has the re-institution of a system of parliamentary 
representation been seen to challenge the system of industrial regulation. 
 
It is clear that the ruling regime’s continuing inability to reassert political and 
economic control to assure Indonesians of a greater share of the surplus remains the 
continuing friction between the class interests of capital ownership and labour. The 
non-recognition of the contradiction between the imperative of de-regulation for 
capital interests, and maintained regulation for labour constitutes a continuing 
component of the maintenance of class dominance.   
 
Overall, the transformation of the Indonesian political economy under the New Order 
conformed to the broad conceptual understandings underpinning this thesis.  At all 
stages, the establishment of a dominant ruling apparatus has depended upon the 
strength and ability to control labour for surplus production and appropriation. 
Further, as succeeding regimes engaged with the international political economy there 
was a transformation in the regime of accumulation, specifically concerned with the 
way labour was organised to facilitate extraction. In this final instance of the demise 
of the New Order state, a conjunction of local and international corporate priorities 
determined an expanded level of labour exploitation. This led to a growing popular 
antagonism towards the state regulatory apparatus, and the consequent decline in 
effectiveness of that apparatus.  
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Appendices 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Appendix 1  
Proclamation of Independence 
 
 
Proclamation 
 
We, the people of Indonesia, herewith proclaim the independence of Indonesia. All 
matters concerning the transfer of authority and other matters will be carried out in 
orderly manner and in the shortest possible time. 
 
Jakarta, 8-17-1945  
on behalf of the people of Indonesia  
Sukarno-Hatta 
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Appendix 2  
Jakarta Charter 
 
 
Jakarta Charter 
 
Truly, freedom is the right of all nations, and therefore, colonialism throughout the 
world must be eradicated, because it is not compatible with (the principle of) 
humanitarianism and (the sense of) justice. 
 
And the struggle of the Indonesian Independence movement has come to a happy 
moment to lead the people of Indonesian safely to the threshold of a free, united, 
sovereign, just and prosperous Indonesian State. 
 
With the blessing and mercy of Allah the Almighty, and moved by a noble ideal for 
free national life, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence.  
 
And, therefore, in order to form a government of the State of Indonesia that (might) 
protect the whole nation of Indonesia and the entire territory of Indonesia, and in 
order to promote public welfare, to sharpen the mind of the nation, and to participate 
in the realization of a world order, which is based on freedom, eternal peace, and 
social justice, the independence of the Indonesian Nation is formed in an Indonesian 
Constitution, manifested in the democratic State of the Republic of Indonesia, which 
is based on (the principle of) Lordship, with the obligation to carry out the Islamic 
syari’a for its adherents according to the principle of a just and civilized humanity, the 
unity of Indonesia and (the principles of) peoplehood guarded by the spirit of wisdom 
in (the forms of) deliberation (and) representation, and the realization of social justice 
for the whole people of Indonesia. 
 
Jakarta, 6-22-1945 
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Ir. Sukarno. 
Drs. Mohammad Hatta. 
Mr. A.A. Maramis. 
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso. 
Abdulkahar Muzakir 
H.A. Salim 
Mr. Achmad Subardjo 
Wachid Hasyim 
Mr. Muhammad Jamin 
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Appendix 3  
Memorandum of industrial policy 
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Memorandum of Advice to the President and Cabinet by the Vice-Chief of the 
Supreme Advisory Council, Agus Sudono, 29th June 1998. 
 
Memorandum re Meeting of Vice Chief of DPA and head of economic and finance 
commission with President Habibi, accompanied by the Minister of State, Secretary 
and nine others to discuss matters of labour. In this relation, the Vice Chief of 
advisory group was asked to give suggestions. These were as follows: 
 
1. Ratify ILO Conventions no 67 relating to Freedom of speech and Trade Union Act. 
 
2. It is imperative for the Republic of Indonesia to have a strong democratic, 
independent and responsible Confederation of Labour, that can become a “partner” 
for business and Government in: 
• production; 
• profits; 
• responsibility; 
• keeping and maintaining a conducive business-environment and contributing 
towards  national stability. 
 
Further, that this organisation can be a “balance of power” to the SBSI  ( implicitly 
endorsing the legality of the SBSI, but competing with it). 
 
3.  This Confederation has to be rooted nationally - domestically or internally and 
externally, and has to try to be acceptable to the ICFTU.  The ICFTU is the back-bone 
for labour unions in industrialised countries. Therefore the ICFTU has an access to 
industrialised countries’ international institutions under the United Nations including 
the IMF and World Bank. The ICFTU has consultative status in the UN and with 
bodies under the UN.   Given the ICFTU’s role for labour unions in industrialised 
countries, and the ICFTU’s claimed access to the international institutions, it is vital 
for the new Confederation to make strong links with the ICFTU in order for Indonesia 
to gain internal access to industrialised countries and their institutions. 
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4. HIP should continue as a crucial part of the national Pancasila ideology, but 
without legal penalties and sanctions. 
 
5. It is important for there to be a national code of industrial conduct to regulate 
harmonious relations between government employers and workers. 
 
6. It is time for Indonesia to have a national manpower planning policy. This must be 
implemented across all economic sectors:  
• strategically 
• conceptually, and  
• comprehensively 
 
So this manpower policy must have relevance and ensure balance between economic 
development, planning and human resources development planning and growth of job 
opportunities. 
 
7. It is vital for there to be a  national standardisation of productivity, where wage-
rises are strictly related to a growth in productivity. 
 
8.  The Indonesian Government should ask assistance from ILO experts in order to 
facilitate the planning and implementation of the above suggestions. 
 
Conclusions 
Habibie accepted the eight suggestions and Agus Sudono was asked to help 
implement the suggestions, with the other ministers including the Manpower Minister 
holding responsibility for their implementation. 
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